SECTION 16.1

THE WELFARE OF SERVICE PERSONNEL

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Introduction

1. This Section addresses:

- the military covenant and the Harmony Guidelines, which provided a framework
  for the provision of welfare support to Service Personnel, including Reservists,
  and their families;
- the provision of welfare support during deployments;
- changes to the welfare support available to Service Personnel, including
  Reservists, and their families; and
- the consideration given to the effects on Service Personnel in decisions to
  deploy troops, in particular in terms of the Harmony Guidelines.

2. The provision of medical care, in particular for seriously injured Service Personnel,
   is addressed in Section 16.2.

3. The preparations made for repatriating the bodies of those who lost their lives
   serving on Operation TELIC, how their deaths were investigated, and the support
   provided for bereaved families is addressed in Section 16.3.

4. The problems caused by deployments consistently exceeding the Defence Planning
   Assumptions in respect of the provision of military equipment are addressed in Sections
   6.3 and 14.

5. The decision to deploy to Helmand province in Afghanistan, and the implications
   of that decision, are addressed in Section 9.

The military covenant and the Harmony Guidelines

6. The concept of a “covenant between the Army and its soldiers” was first articulated
   in the March 2000 British Army publication, Values and Standards of the British Army.¹
   The foreword to that publication, written by General Sir Roger Wheeler,² Chief of the
   General Staff, stated:

   “As a soldier in the British Army, much is expected of you. You may be required
   to deploy on operations which will be dangerous, to obey orders which could put
   your life at risk, and to live and work for long periods under extremely challenging
   conditions. Your comrades, your commanders and ultimately the Nation will depend
   on your courage, loyalty and commitment. They will rely on you to maintain the
   highest standards of professionalism and self-discipline at all times. In short, they
   must trust you and you need to trust them.

   “This two-way obligation forms a covenant between the Army and its soldiers …
   By volunteering as a soldier in the British Army you accept that, by putting the needs

² General Sir Roger Wheeler was the military adviser to the Iraq Inquiry.
of the Service before your own, you will forgo some of the rights enjoyed by those outside the Armed Forces. But in return you can at all times expect fair treatment, to be valued and respected as an individual, and to be rewarded by reasonable terms and conditions of service.”

7. The Armed Forces’ capacity to deploy and sustain expeditionary operations was determined by decisions in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR 98).³

8. SDR 98 set out the UK’s defence policy and translated that policy into detailed guidance for defence planning by using a number of “planning assumptions” which defined the required level of forces, or scale of effort, required for specific Military Tasks (see Section 6.1).

9. SDR 98 stated that the UK should be able to:

“– respond to a major international crisis which might require a military effort and combat operations of a similar scale and duration to the Gulf War when we deployed an armoured division, 26 major warships and over 80 combat aircraft.

or

– undertake a more extended overseas deployment on a lesser scale (as over the last few years in Bosnia) while retaining the ability to mount a second substantial deployment – which might involve a combat brigade and appropriate naval and air forces – if this were made necessary by a second crisis. We would not, however, expect both deployments to involve war fighting or to maintain them simultaneously for longer than six months.”

10. The principal scales of effort defined in SDR 98 were:

• Small scale: “a deployment of battalion size or equivalent”.
• Medium scale: “deployments of brigade size or equivalent” for war-fighting or other operations.
• Large scale: deployments of division size or equivalent. The most recent example was the UK contribution to the 1991 Gulf Conflict, “although on that occasion the British division deployed with only two of its three brigades”. This was “the maximum size of force we would plan to be able to contribute to peace enforcement operations, or to regional conflicts outside the NATO area”.
• Very large scale and full scale: all the forces that would be made available to NATO to meet a major threat such as significant aggression against an ally.

11. SDR 98 also defined:

• Endurance: the likely duration of individual Military Tasks. Each Service needed to be able to sustain tasks for the required period, including where necessary by

rotating individual units deployed and, where units were deployed on operations, allowing units a period of respite between each deployment as set out in the Service’s Harmony Guidelines.

- Concurrency: the number of operations of a given scale of effort and duration that could be sustained by the force structure. SDR 98 concluded that “not to be able to conduct two medium scale operations at the same time would be an unacceptable constraint on our ability to discharge Britain’s commitments and responsibilities”.  

12. SDR 98 also considered the “underlying problems of under-manning and overstretch that we have inherited”. It defined overstretch as “trying to do too much with too little manpower”. One result was that units and individuals were separated from their families too often and for too long. Another was that preparation for other tasks and longer-term training suffered. The additional pressures from “persistent overstretch” contributed to higher exit rates from the Armed Forces, which exacerbated under-manning. SDR 98 concluded:

“We must break this vicious circle. To do so we must match the commitments we undertake to our planned resources, recognising that there will always be the risk of additional short-term pressures if we have to respond rapidly to an unforeseen crisis. We need to improve recruitment and retention so that our units are properly manned. And we need to use our manpower in the most effective manner, particularly seeking to avoid unnecessary separation or disruption to individuals and their families.

“The Review [SDR 98] has designed a future force structure matched to the level of commitments we plan to be able to undertake. These structural changes, combined with measures to increase recruiting and retention, will ease overstretch.”

13. The Harmony Guidelines described the maximum time that Service Personnel should spend away from their families (known as Individual Separated Service) and the minimum time that they should have between operational deployments (known as tour intervals).

14. The MOD told the Inquiry that the Harmony Guidelines were developed to help it “get the work/life balance right” for Service Personnel and that, as the name suggested, these were for guidance and were not “rules”.

15. Each Service (the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force) derived its own Harmony Guidelines based on an “analysis of historical norms and judgements, training

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6 The MOD defines Separated Service as “Absence from normal place of duty or lack of freedom to enjoy leisure at the normal place of duty/residence at place of duty”.
requirements, deployment patterns and the unique culture of each Service”, and on the “routine level of concurrency” that the Armed Forces were resourced and structured to sustain.

16. The table below shows the Harmony Guidelines for each Service in 2003.\(^8\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Royal Navy</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Royal Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual Separated Service</td>
<td>In any 36 month period, no one to exceed 660 days.</td>
<td>In any 30 month period, no one to exceed 415 days.</td>
<td>In a 12 month period, not more than 2.5% of personnel to exceed 140 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit tour intervals</td>
<td>Fleet Units to spend maximum of 60% deployed in 36 months.</td>
<td>24 month average interval between Unit tours.</td>
<td>16 month average interval between Unit tours.</td>
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17. On 17 January 2003, Mr Blair agreed the deployment of a large scale UK ground force, comprising the headquarters 1st (UK) Armoured Division and three combat brigades, to Iraq (see Section 6.2).

18. There is no indication that the potential pressure on Service Personnel, including with respect to the Harmony Guidelines, was a consideration in that decision.

19. The Service Personnel Board (SPB), chaired by Lieutenant General Anthony Palmer, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Personnel) (DCDS(Personnel)), discussed the effect of current operations on personnel welfare on 21 January 2003.\(^9\) The SPB commented that the “shift to expeditionary operations was having a significant impact on people”. The lesson from Operation FRESCO\(^10\) was that “wider welfare considerations needed to be taken into account in advance of decisions on commitments”.

20. Mr Adam Ingram, Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Min(AF)), told the Inquiry that the Government knew that the invasion of Iraq would put additional strain on the Harmony Guidelines:

   “… we had been involved in both Iraq and Afghanistan, still engaged in Northern Ireland, still having people in Cyprus, still having people in Sierra Leone and other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, and still having a significant lay-down in the Falklands.

   “All of that made it very difficult to meet harmony guidelines, although it varied between the Services – the Army under most strain … and significant key enablers

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\(^9\) Minutes, 21 January 2003, Service Personnel Board meeting.

\(^10\) Op FRESCO was the provision of emergency cover by the Armed Forces in the event of industrial action by civilian firefighters.
within the Army … They would be under quite considerable stretch. So medics, engineers, a raft of people who were under very significant strain. We knew that.

“However, what was the solution? That [Iraq] was then something we then had to attend to.”

**Early priorities and concerns**

**Operational Welfare Package**

21. The MOD provided an Operational Welfare Package (OWP) to deployed Service Personnel. Although tailored to each deployment, it typically included access to television and films, books, the internet, and a weekly telephone allowance.

22. This support was provided “consistent with the operational and environmental circumstances in which they [Service Personnel] are placed, and the availability of resources”.

23. In late January 2003, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), asked senior officers to scrutinise the lessons identified during Op JACANA (a UK operation in Afghanistan in 2002), and to report on progress in addressing lessons relevant to Op TELIC.\(^\text{12}\)

24. Lt Gen Palmer responded on 31 January, outlining progress towards addressing several of the lessons that had been identified, including the importance of a workable “Welfare Telephone” system early in an operation.\(^\text{13}\) The Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) had made this, along with the delivery of mail, their priority for Op TELIC. The ratio of Welfare Telephones had been increased from one to 50 to one to 30 to meet the needs of manoeuvre forces.

**Review of allowances**

25. From 1 April 2003, all units (Regular and Reserve) from which more than five Service Personnel had deployed received a Family Welfare Support Enhancement (FWSE) of £1 per week per individual deployed.\(^\text{14}\) The FWSE was to be used by the unit to improve communications between families and deployed Service Personnel (for example by providing internet and telephone facilities) and to support welfare activities for families.

26. Lt Gen Palmer advised the Chiefs of Staff on 9 April 2003 that he had reviewed the MOD’s allowance policy “in support of Op TELIC Service Personnel and their families”,

\(^{11}\) Public hearing, 16 July 2010, page 18.


\(^{13}\) MC/DGDS(Pers) to DPSO/CDS, 31 January 2003, ‘Op JACANA Lessons for Op TELIC’.

and had established a close link with the Treasury to ensure a rapid response to individual cases.\textsuperscript{15} A number of changes had been agreed, including:

\begin{itemize}
\item the Longer Separated Service Allowance and Longer Service at Sea Bonus enhancements would be introduced earlier than planned;
\item the introduction of new arrangements to support close relatives of injured Service Personnel hospitalised in the UK; and
\item enhanced support for Service Personnel and their dependants evacuated from permanent posts in the Middle East.
\end{itemize}

27. The new arrangement to support close relatives of injured Service Personnel referred to by Lt Gen Palmer was the extension of the Dangerously Ill Forwarding of Relatives (DILFOR) scheme (which previously provided for two people to visit seriously injured Service Personnel in hospitals overseas for up to 10 days, at public expense) to include hospitals in the UK.\textsuperscript{16} The support provided to injured Service Personnel and their families is described in Section 16.2.

28. The MOD reported in December 2003 that the FWSE had been well received.\textsuperscript{17} A survey undertaken by the Army Families’ Federation (AFF) suggested that communication between families and deployed Service Personnel was good.

29. The FWSE was increased from £1 to £2.20 per week per person deployed on 1 November 2008.\textsuperscript{18} The increase meant that a typical infantry battalion could expect to receive in the region of £30,000 to support families during an operational tour.\textsuperscript{19}

Delivery of the Operational Welfare Package

30. Lt Gen Palmer told the Inquiry that, rather than deliver a fixed OWP for Op TELIC, he worked closely with PJHQ to ensure that the OWP evolved over time to reflect “the views from soldiers on the ground”.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{table}[h]
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\begin{tabular}{|l|}
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\textbf{The free parcel service} \\
\textbf{On 24 March 2003, in an exchange with Mr Frank Roy in the House of Commons, Mr Blair undertook to try to ensure that arrangements to provide a free parcel service to troops in the Gulf were put in place as soon as possible.}\textsuperscript{21} \\
\textbf{The free parcel service began on 17 April.}\textsuperscript{22} \\
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\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{15} Minute Palmer to COSSEC, 9 April 2003, ‘Personnel Issues Update – Op TELIC’.
\textsuperscript{18} Defence Instructions and Notices, October 2008, ‘Amendments to the Family Welfare Grant’.
\textsuperscript{19} Paper MOD, June 2010, ‘Operational Welfare Enhancements as at June 2010’.
\textsuperscript{20} Public hearing, 21 July 2010, page 3.
\textsuperscript{22} Letter Davies to Cannon, 19 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Termination of Free Postal Service’.
Lt Gen Palmer told the Inquiry:

“... free parcels, two kilograms, engraved on my heart ... this was a debate about how far we could stretch the logistic operation. I mean, delivering two kilograms of parcels to everybody in theatre over distances with … not enough helicopters for operations, let alone for administration, was a real issue, but it was critical for the families back in the UK that they could send to their loved ones … things that would remind them of home.”

The free service was terminated in April 2004. In a written statement to Parliament, Mr Ingram stated:

“The provision of a free packet service recognised the difficult conditions Service Personnel were operating in and that it was not possible to provide the full spectrum of welfare support normally available to Service Personnel on operations. Whilst southern Iraq is not yet a benign environment, the level of welfare support and the facilities available on Operation TELIC are now comparable to those provided in other operational theatres.

“It has therefore been decided that from 8 April 2004 … this free service will cease.”

31. Mr Ingram visited Iraq from 13 to 15 May 2003. His Military Assistant reported that the Minister had been impressed by the morale of the troops, but he had been briefed that it could be undermined by (unspecified) small-scale and easily rectified “irritants”. Mr Ingram’s Military Assistant concluded:

“The Minister would be disappointed if we lost opportunities for ‘quick wins’ here (though he appreciates that troops in theatre examine these issues from one end of the telescope).”

32. On 22 May, Major General Robert Fry, Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (Operations) (DCJO(Ops)), listed those irritants and the actions being taken to rectify them in a report for Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Sir Anthony Bagnall, Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS):

- insufficient portaloos (more could be supplied);
- insufficient fresh rations (sufficient fresh rations were available; commanders had chosen to mix these with ration packs);
- a desire for a second Op TELIC medal covering Phase IV operations (being discussed by Chiefs of Staff);

23 Public hearing, 21 July 2010, page 27.
24 House of Commons, Official Report, 27 February 2004, column 69WS. The free parcel service was reintroduced in November 2007.
25 Minute MA/Minister (AF) [MOD] to Sec(O) – Iraq, 16 May 2003, ‘Minister (AF) Visit to Iraq’.
26 Phase IV is the military term for the post-conflict phase of operations.
the recent decision to withdraw the second free welfare families warrant (that decision had been waived for Land forces deployed on Op TELIC);

• the troops’ desire to be able to send parcels back to their families without charge (that facility was not available for any other operation, and would not be provided for Op TELIC);

• inadequate access to TVs (the absence of a final UK “disposition plan” for Phase IV and the low standard of camp infrastructure, and in particular the lack of reliable power supply, was hindering the installation of equipment); and

• inadequate access to the internet (equipment was being rolled out).27

33. Maj Gen Fry concluded that sufficient weight was being given to providing support for deployed Service Personnel, who would see “incremental improvements” in the delivery of the OWP and infrastructure.

34. Mr Ingram told the Inquiry that he saw his role as one of getting “ground truth” of what was happening in Iraq, including by talking to soldiers in theatre.28

35. A small team from the Army’s Personnel Directorate and PJHQ visited MOD civilian staff in Iraq from 18 to 20 May.29 They reported that comments on the OWP:

“… ranged from a claim that there wasn’t a package in existence to the fact that in reality it didn’t run smoothly. At Basra there was only one internet terminal available from 0000 to 0700 for [military and civilian] staff to send messages home … Telephone facilities were similarly limited …”

36. The team reported that other issues such as the availability of exercise equipment were being addressed by local purchases in theatre.

37. The 28 May meeting of the SPB was advised that Service Personnel were currently living in “basic tented accommodation, existing Iraqi buildings, or fighting vehicles”.30 Tier 1 facilities (hard-skinned or tented accommodation with air-conditioning) should be fully deployed by September and Tier 2 facilities (hard-skinned, semi-permanent accommodation) by December. A limited OWP, comprising telephone facilities, British Forces Post Office mail, British Forces Broadcasting Service radio and an electronic letter service, was currently available in all locations; internet and TV were available in some locations. PJHQ intended to provide the full OWP in all locations.

38. The SPB was also advised that a rest and recuperation (R&R) package would be introduced once roulement and force alignment had taken place; “Operational Stand-Downs” would begin on 30 May.

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27 Minute Fry to MA/VCDS, 22 May 2003, ‘Minister(AF) Visit to Iraq’; Email MA/DCDS (Personnel) to MA/VCDS, 29 May 2003, ‘Minister (AF) Visit to Iraq’.
29 Minute PS/Personnel Director to Brooke, 22 May 2003, ‘Visit to Iraq 18th – 20th May 2003’.
30 Minutes, 28 May 2003, Service Personnel Board meeting.
39. Lt Gen Palmer told the Inquiry that, initially, R&R was taken in theatre but, as the situation stabilised and in response to the needs of Service Personnel and their families, this was extended to allow Service Personnel to travel back to the UK. Lt Gen Palmer highlighted the costs of the initiative, particularly in terms of removing Service Personnel from their roles and the demand placed on air transport.

40. The R&R allowance established in Iraq was two weeks, including travel time from and to Iraq.

41. Air Marshal (AM) David Pocock, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel) from 2005 to 2007, told the Inquiry that the practice of flying Service Personnel back to the UK for R&R had evolved over the first years of Op TELIC:

“… as far as I can tell, there was never a careful policy discussion about what we were going to do and why. It started off as a means of getting the troops away from particular areas of danger, hardship. They could have a break, clean up, a rest and go back again, and then it gradually evolved from moving back from the actual areas of fighting to perhaps out of the country …

“… it was never actually, so far as I could tell a formal policy. Like Topsy, it grew.”

42. The demands placed on air transport by that practice are considered later in this Section.

43. Lt Gen Palmer visited Iraq in early June 2003. He reported to General Sir Michael Walker, Chief of the Defence Staff, on 20 June that the OWP had been “well received”. The main effort now was to provide air-conditioned accommodation as temperatures in Iraq rose.

44. An MOD official advised Mr Ingram on 27 June that many of the “welfare irritants” had already been resolved. In general, problems in delivering the OWP had been caused by the rapid pace of operational deployment. The advice concluded:

“Overall, the OWP policy has held up well given the scale of operation and the specific demands imposed in Op TELIC.”

45. The MOD reported in July that, owing to the austere nature of the deployment and the lack of infrastructure in some locations, the OWP had been implemented in stages. The first stage comprised:

- air letters (commonly known as Blueys) delivered electronically;

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31 Public hearing, 21 July 2010, pages 22-23.
34 PS/VCS to PS/Min(AF) [MOD], 27 June 2003, ‘Minister (AF) visit to Iraq – Updated [sic] on Welfare Irritants’.
• mail;
• welfare telephones;
• newspapers;
• radio broadcasting;
• limited internet access; and
• basic shop facilities.

46. By July, the OWP was being extended to provide additional internet access, fitness equipment, TV broadcasting and free books.

47. Lt Gen Palmer told the Inquiry that, over time, the MOD delivered a “very good” OWP.36

48. Lieutenant General Sir Alistair Irwin, the Adjutant General from 2003 to 2005, added that a key factor in delivering the OWP was managing and meeting increasing expectations.37

49. The Inquiry heard mixed reports on the OWP from families and veterans of Op TELIC. Limited access to telephones early in the campaign and the fragility of the air bridge between Iraq and the UK were particular sources of frustration.

50. The Inquiry put those concerns to Mr Ingram.38 On the issue of limited access to telephones, he told the Inquiry:

“… at the beginning of a war phase, and shortly after it, it is very hard to deliver full communication and infrastructure. Indeed, even the military infrastructure, ie in terms of operational demand, was pretty fragile as well.

“So you couldn’t honour the commitment in terms of the amount of time that each soldier … would have to phone back to their family, but as the lay-down became more established, and investment could then be made in communications, and when we had the communications infrastructure, we could then improve the availability and the time …”

THE AIR BRIDGE

51. In January 2004, in response to concerns over the increasing threat to Air Transport (AT), the Chiefs of Staff agreed that only aircraft fitted with a Defensive Aids Suite (DAS)39 should fly into Basra.40

39 A Defensive Aids Suite (DAS) is a military aircraft system which acts to defend the aircraft from attack. A DAS typically comprises chaff, flares, and electronic countermeasures combined with equipment to detect threats.
40 Minutes, 28 January 2004, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
52. General Sir Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, visited Iraq from 10 to 13 October 2005. In his report to Gen Walker, he set out the heavy demands on the UK’s Support Helicopter (SH) fleet, and continued:

“If our SH capability is inadequate, our AT fleet is worse. The air bridge to theatre is now so fragile that sustaining an efficient R&R schedule is nigh on impossible. Quite apart from the morale effect of inordinate delays, the difficulties with R&R are now beginning to impact significantly on the operational effectiveness of the Division. The situation is so bad that I am asking HQ Land to re-examine, at least in principle, whether we might not re-adopt 4 month operational tours without R&R. Since I suspect there will be very many reasons against this – continuity and our current training cycle to name but two – we really need to take stock of our AT capability in the round, especially in light of our impending commitment to Afghanistan.”

53. Later that month, the Chiefs of Staff “noted” that the UK’s AT capability was “unable to meet current and prospective demands”, and that General Sir Timothy Granville-Chapman, Vice Chief of Defence Staff, would undertake a stocktake and scope increased availability.

54. Gen Granville-Chapman reported to Gen Walker in December that the main constraint on AT was the lack of DAS-equipped passenger aircraft to support current operations. The decision that only DAS-equipped aircraft could carry passengers to Iraq and Afghanistan meant that only three RAF TriStar aircraft were currently available to support the air bridge.

55. Gen Granville-Chapman described the work that was under way to address the shortfall in AT availability. A further three TriStar would be fitted with DAS, and a fourth for DAS. Those aircraft would become available between May 2006 and February 2007. The MOD had chartered civil aircraft to shuttle between the UK and a “hub” at Al Udied airbase in Qatar, reducing the burden on TriStar. The first charter flight had been on 6 December.

56. The deployment of additional forces to Afghanistan in 2006 would “demand a surge in AT requirement”. To handle that demand, the MOD was exploring the possibility of establishing a Forward Mounting Base (FMB) for TriStar that shortened the transit time to and from theatre.

57. Gen Granville-Chapman also addressed a number of “more radical approaches” including using civil aircraft fitted with DAS to fly into theatre, and procurement of additional aircraft. On the latter, the only viable option that would make a difference to lift capacity within two years was the early acquisition of a fifth C-17 (currently scheduled

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41 Report CGS to CDS, 18 October 2005, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq: 10-13 Oct 05’.
42 Minutes, 26 October 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
43 Minute VCDS to CDS, 12 December 2005, ‘Air Transport Support to Operations’.
for procurement in 2011). The MOD was considering “innovative finance arrangements”, including leasing arrangements.

58. Gen Granville-Chapman provided Gen Walker with an update on the stocktake on 6 January 2006. After further work, the early acquisition of a fifth C-17 remained a possibility. The “less good news” was that the Treasury now contended that fitting the additional TriStar with DAS was not a legitimate charge to the Reserve, given that the “hub and spoke” arrangement using Al Udied was now operational. Officials advised that the MOD should continue fitting DAS “at risks”.

59. In his post-operational tour report on 18 January, Major General James Dutton, General Officer Commanding Multi-National Division (South-East), wrote:

“The reliance on only 3 suitably equipped TriStar C-2 aircraft to support the UK-BAS [Basra Air Station] air bridge task has again created significant problems, especially as one aircraft has been in long term major maintenance for most of the period and the others have occasionally been required for Op HERRICK tasks … consequently there is an indisputable need for additional Defensive Aids Suite (DAS) equipment for air transport assets.”

60. Gen Walker directed on 24 January that the MOD should “explore innovative funding operations for the early procurement of a fifth C-17 aircraft”.


62. On AT, the DOC reported:

“The availability of air transport assets became critical in October 2005. The strategic and tactical requirement for all aircraft to be equipped with Defensive Aids Suite (DAS) in theatre has compounded the problem. The air bridge to theatre became so fragile that the Rest and Recuperation (R&R) plot became close to untenable in Oct/Nov 2005 … This affected morale and the operational effectiveness of the British personnel in MND(SE). The situation became so pronounced that HQ LAND was tasked to look at initiatives that would allow a shortened tour length without R&R … the Op HERRICK deployment [to Helmand province, Afghanistan] brings with it more pain rather than respite and, as a result, the imperative to improve our AT capacity is stronger than ever.”

44 Minute VCDS to CDS, 6 January 2006, ‘Air Transport Support to Operations’.
46 Minutes, 24 January 2006, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
63. The DOC recommended:

“There is a requirement to assess and improve our AT capacity as an operational priority. The UK should consider civilian air charter to off-load capacity ...”

64. The House of Commons Defence Committee visited Iraq from 4 to 8 June. On the air bridge, the Committee wrote:

“During our visit to Iraq, we heard that air bridge reliability remained a key concern among UK Service Personnel. We witnessed at first hand the disruption caused by delays of flights in and out of, and around, theatre. The difficulties stem from problems both with the commercial service between the UK and Al Udeid and with the C-130 Hercules in theatre and the availability of RAF air bridge TriStar, VC10 and C-17. Troops travelling home on leave are frequently delayed and this reduces their time on leave.”

65. The Defence Committee concluded:

“It is unacceptable that Servicemen and women, many of whom are serving greatly in excess of Harmony Guidelines, should have their leave disrupted by the MOD's inability to provide a reliable air bridge.”

66. The MOD ordered a fifth C-17 aircraft in July 2006, and took delivery of that aircraft in February 2008.

67. In its 2009 report entitled Support to High Intensity Operations, the National Audit Office (NAO) wrote:

“The Department’s [the MOD’s] air transport fleet is small, consists of aircraft types that are old by comparison to modern civilian fleets and is therefore susceptible to mechanical breakdown. In addition, the integration of modern Defensive Aids Suites on to these aircraft has caused reliability problems. The availability of the TriStar fleet, the Department’s main passenger carrying aircraft, has been low. Of the seven TriStar passenger-carrying aircraft, on average 45.5 percent since January 2006, have been unavailable to support operations. Significant effort by those responsible for the air transport fleet has enabled the Department to deliver the overall task but the air bridge remains under considerable strain.”

68. On the fragility of the air bridge, Mr Ingram told the Inquiry:

“The air bridge ... was very fragile. We were dealing with ageing aircraft, you just need an aircraft to break down for a few hours and the whole thing is thrown into dislocation.

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49 www.raf.mod.uk, 22 February 2008, RAF Prepares To Receive Fifth C-17 Aircraft.
“It is why … the procurement of commercial aircraft was then put in place, but they could break down as well, and there was nothing more frustrating than hundreds of personnel hoping to get home and then being contained somewhere else, whether it was Cyprus or Oman or Kuwait or wherever …

“These were real issues, and there were not easy solutions to it.”

69. AM Pocock, DCDS(Personnel) from 2005 to 2007, told the Inquiry:

“The first time I went out to Iraq … the subject [the air bridge] was raised with me more often than anything else and, when I came back, I immediately went to see the Chief of the Air Staff, and he was already aware of it, but I made plain to him that, apart from it being a morale issue generally, it was disastrous for the reputation of the Royal Air Force. He understood completely.”

70. AM Pocock told the Inquiry that the problems with the air bridge were very well known, and were regularly discussed in Chiefs of Staff meetings. He commented that “if there had been a solution, it would have been implemented”.

### Concerns over the effect of Operation TELIC on retention

71. In late April 2003, Lt Gen Palmer wrote to Rear Admiral (RAdm) Timothy McClement, Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, Major General David Richards, Assistant Chief of the General Staff, and Air Vice Marshal (AVM) Philip Sturley, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, requesting a subjective assessment of the likely impact of current operations on retention over the short, medium and long term, and how retention could be improved.

72. RAdm McClement assessed that Op TELIC would have a positive impact on retention in the Royal Navy in the short term (though there might be a slightly negative impact in some areas, including the Royal Marines). A key factor in retention would be ensuring that Service Personnel had a period of “relative programme stability” after operations, to enable them to take leave and spend time with family and friends.

73. Maj Gen Richards assessed that there would be a “net benefit” on retention in the Army. However, much would depend on how the recovery and recuperation phases were managed; the demobilisation of Reservists required particular attention. Measures which would improve retention included:

- recognition, possibly in the form of a memorial service and early agreement on the processes for Honours, Awards and medals;

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52 Public hearing, 19 July 2010, pages 16-17.
54 Minute ACNS to DCDS(Pers), 7 May 2003, ‘Recuperation – People Workstrand’.
55 Minute ACGS to MA/DCDS(Pers), 7 May 2003, ‘Recuperation – People Workstrand’.
• minimising the impact on Harmony Guidelines by reducing other commitments;
• rolling out the OWP developed for Op TELIC – which had been well received – to other operations;
• establishing and resourcing appropriate immediate and long-term arrangements for stress management, including for Reservists; and
• improving accommodation.

74. Maj Gen Richards also highlighted measures which would improve the retention of Reservists, including:

• greater consistency with Regular Service Personnel, in terms of eligibility for operational benefits, allowances and medals; and
• ensuring that no Reservist was financially disadvantaged because of Op TELIC.

75. AVM Sturley assessed that “the combined effect of [Ops] FRESCO, TELIC and our other commitments has hurt”. Maj Gen Richards and AVM Sturley identified a number of measures to improve retention, the first of which (for Regular Service Personnel) was to reduce future commitments.

76. Lt Gen Palmer told the Inquiry that, as DCDS(Personnel), his “major preoccupation” was to reduce the number of troops in Iraq quickly, to reduce the pressure on individual Service Personnel and the Harmony Guidelines. He emphasised that those efforts were always in consultation with PJHQ and never at operational risk.

77. Commodore Noel Preston-Jones, Director Service Personnel Policy, briefed the 28 May 2003 meeting of the SPB that the responses from RAdm McClement, Maj Gen Richards and AVM Sturley “had, inter alia, highlighted the need for a reduction in commitments”. The assessments of the impact of current commitments on retention varied. Overall, the Royal Navy and Army anticipated a net benefit from Op TELIC, while the RAF and Defence Medical Services anticipated a net loss. The emerging conclusions of the “people” work strand of the Recuperation Initiative included the need to relieve pressure on pinch points, for example by reducing commitments, resourcing under manning or adjusting the force structure.

78. At its 28 May meeting, the SPB also discussed priorities for the MOD’s Short Term Plan for 2004 (STP04), and in particular the “significant structural under-funding across the people area”. Lt Gen Palmer concluded that any STP bid needed to be underpinned

56 Minute ACAS to DCDS(Pers), 7 May 2003, ‘Recuperation – People Workstrand’.
57 Public hearing, 21 July 2010, page 75.
58 Public hearing, 21 July 2010, page 79.
59 Minutes, 28 May 2003, Service Personnel Board meeting.
60 The MOD defines pinch point trades as trades or areas of expertise where there is not enough trained strength to perform operational tasks without encroaching on the time provided between deployments for recuperation, training and leave.
61 The Short Term Plan forecast MOD spending on operational costs, looking four years ahead.
by evidence “for example to demonstrate the link between retention and improved accommodation … The process had to be placed on a more scientific basis.”

79. In advance of the 26 November meeting of the SPB, Lt Gen Palmer circulated a personal “think-piece” on STP04. It described STP03 as “relatively good for personnel”, although “recruiting and retaining Service Personnel is becoming increasingly difficult and expensive as demographics change, expectations rise and technology evolves”.

80. Looking ahead to STP04, Lt Gen Palmer assessed that, while the Services had made significant progress towards achieving manning balance targets and premature voluntary retirement (PVR) rates remained relatively low, “the current level of operational commitments … is threatening to undermine or reverse the progress made”.

81. Emerging problems were:

- The Army reported that Op TELIC was having a “marked impact” on tour intervals, rendering it unable to meet Harmony/Separated Service Guidelines.
- The RAF reported a significant worsening in their figures for Separated Service.
- Across all three Services, pressure on pinch point trades was increasing. Medical services continued to be a specific concern.
- The number of Reservists available for mobilisation was falling.

82. Lt Gen Palmer concluded that the MOD’s forthcoming planning round was likely to be particularly challenging; the SPB would need to give direction on which personnel priorities should be “reprieved”.

83. Mr Ingram visited Basra in December 2003. He reported to Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, that, while UK Armed Forces were in “excellent shape”, he had concerns for the future:

“Some units in Iraq have had exceptionally busy operational and training cycles before deployment … I detected signs that the pressures of repeated long separations may be building in some areas. We will need to manage this carefully in the New Year …”

Supporting Reservists

84. There are two key types of Reserve Forces:

- members of the Volunteer Reserve Forces (VRF) who serve within VRF units and usually train in the evenings, at weekends and for at least two weeks each year; and

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63 Letter Ingram to Secretary of State [MOD], 30 December 2003, ‘Visit to UK Forces in Basra 17-19 December 2003’.

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• members of the Regular Reserve, who are ex-members of the Regular Forces who still have a liability for mobilisation.\textsuperscript{64}

85. The VRF comprises the Royal Naval Reserve, the Territorial Army (TA), the Royal Marines Reserve and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force.

86. In 2003, there were approximately 40,000 members of the VRF, of whom 35,000 were in the TA.\textsuperscript{65}

87. The Reserve Forces have three primary roles:

• to augment Regular Forces for enduring operations;
• to provide additional capability for large scale operations; and
• to provide specialist capability.

88. Lieutenant General Mark Mans, the Deputy Adjutant General from 2005 to 2008, told the Inquiry that for Op TELIC, as for other operations, Reservists were:

“… more often than not mobilised as individuals to support regular Army units. Sometimes they were mobilised in teams of 10 to 20, but that was quite unusual.”\textsuperscript{66}

89. Lt Gen Mans described the welfare support provided to members of the TA:

“As far as the support to the Territorial Army, when they were mobilised, they got exactly the same as the Regulars. So there was no distinction whatsoever. As far as support to their families, the same applied, but of course, it is more difficult, because the families of Territorial [Army] soldiers are spread far and wide …

“… when they are mobilised, the [Territorial Army] soldiers do support a Regular unit of one form or another and, therefore, it is incumbent upon that Regular unit, and particularly the rear party back at the home base, to make sure that those individuals within the TA, and their families, are appropriately looked after in terms of maintaining contact, and also making sure they are aware of all the support and sustenance they can achieve.”\textsuperscript{67}

90. Lt Gen Mans added that once a member of the TA was demobilised, responsibility for their welfare reverted to their TA unit.

91. The MOD told the Inquiry that it had considered providing a separate “welfare pathway” for Reservists, but concluded that it would not aid integration.\textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{64} Ministry of Defence, \textit{Future of the UK's Reserve Forces}, 7 February 2005.
\textsuperscript{65} National Audit Office, \textit{Ministry of Defence: Reserve Forces}, 31 March 2006.
\textsuperscript{66} Public hearing, 19 July 2010, pages 26-27.
\textsuperscript{67} Public hearing, 19 July 2010, page 27.
\textsuperscript{68} Paper MOD, 6 July 2010, ‘Iraq Inquiry Reservist Specific Welfare Provision’.
92. The initial call-out notice for Reservists for Op TELIC was issued in early January 2003.\(^{69}\) By 19 March (when military operations against Iraq began), over 5,000 Reservists had been mobilised (comprising some 12 percent of total UK forces).

93. All TA and Regular Reservists deployed for Op TELIC 1 (the major combat phase of operations) were mobilised through the Reserves Training and Mobilisation Centre (RTMC) at Chilwell in Nottingham.\(^{70}\) The briefing and preparation process at RTMC Chilwell provided Reservists with medical and dental examinations, additional operation-specific equipment, and information on pay and allowances.

94. In early June, the DOC produced a short note on lessons identified on personnel issues during Op TELIC 1; the note was sent to Mr Ingram’s office on 11 June.\(^{71}\) The DOC stated that, although the mobilisation of Reservists had gone well, Op TELIC had thrown up “many issues” including:

- Many Reservists had found themselves “financially disadvantaged” because of mobilisation and deployment, or had not been paid properly.
- Some medical Reservists had been compulsorily mobilised from key NHS jobs but were not subsequently deployed where they could use their specialist skills. For many medical Reservists, it was their second or third operational deployment in recent years and this might affect retention.
- In some areas it had proved difficult to provide “active support” to the families of deployed Reservists, because of the dispersed and isolated locations of people’s homes, particularly in relation to other Reservists and military bases.

95. The lessons identified were:

“A review of Reservist pay procedures is required to eliminate inefficiencies and to take into account the financial penalties likely to be incurred by Reservists as a result of mobilisation.

“A review of the mobilisation and employment of Reservist medical personnel on operations is required.

“A review of practical and emotional support to Reservist families is required.”

96. The MOD has not been able to provide the Inquiry with papers on a number of issues relating to Reservists, including whether and how these recommendations were taken forward.

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\(^{70}\) House of Commons, Official Report, 3 June 2003, column 302W. The Reserves Training and Mobilisation Centre (RTMC) was renamed the Reinforcements Training and Mobilisation Centre in 2011 and disbanded in 2015, when its responsibilities were taken on by the Mission Training and Mobilisation Centre (Individual).

97. The Inquiry asked Lt Gen Palmer what lessons had been learned from the mobilisation of Reserves for Op TELIC 1. He told the Inquiry that there were “big changes” between Op TELIC 1 and Op TELIC 2:

“We put in place a mounting centre at Chilwell, in order to try to administer them better, because there were issues definitely about inadequacies in handling Reserve mobilisation to do with their pay, to do with their jobs, and we were very involved in trying to make sure … they could get their jobs back. Actually, I think we did have to resort to law on a couple of occasions.

“We also made sure that they had access to the same packages as the Regulars and obviously the same training, but I did take a number of criticisms from Reservists who did not feel they had been properly looked after administratively or, indeed, in a training sense, but … they performed magnificently during the operation, and we simply could not have done without them.”

98. In October, the Army issued instructions on welfare provision for Op TELIC 3. The instructions detailed the specific support available for mobilised Reservists, including:

- A TA cell had been established in theatre to handle any employment, administrative and pay concerns.
- All TA units were to ensure that they had a “proper focus established” to support the families of mobilised Reservists, and that there was regular contact with those families. The FWSE was designed to help with that work.
- All units were reminded that on mobilisation, “a Reservist becomes a Regular soldier”. There had been a number of cases where a mobilised Reservist had not been given full access to medical and dental care.

99. The instructions directed recipients to take “particular note” of the “aftercare policy” for demobilised Reservists. On demobilisation, TA soldiers should be advised that they should re-establish contact with their TA unit or the Reserve Force and Cadet Association (RFCA) if they experienced any difficulties associated with their operational service. The formal departure interview should impart “the clear understanding” that the Army remained engaged in their welfare.

100. In December, an MOD report on lessons from Op TELIC highlighted the particular difficulties faced by families of Reservists:

“The families of Reservists need particular consideration, as they may have had little or no contact with the Services and may not understand Service structures, administrative procedures, roles or jargon. Such families knew whom to contact, but … still found it much more difficult than Regular Army families to find the

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72 Public hearing, 21 July 2010, pages 84-85.
information and answers they wanted. This will be borne in mind in considering how best to improve the support they need.”74

101. The report also stated that, in order to preserve the volunteer ethos of Reservists and the goodwill of families and employers, the MOD had revised the “desired notice” period for mobilisation from 14 to 21 days. Operational requirements meant that for Op TELIC 1, some Reservists received only four days’ notice.

102. The report did not specify what action would be taken to address these difficulties.

103. In the same month, an NAO report on Op TELIC stated that some Reservists received as little as two or three days’ notice, due to absence from home, postal times and incorrect addresses.75

104. The MOD set out the role of the Reserve Forces in the February 2005 publication Future Use of the UK’s Reserve Forces.76 The paper stated that:

• In recognition of the fact that most members of the VRF joined to undertake activities which were a contrast to their civilian employment, the MOD would not mobilise a Reservist to take advantage of his or her civilian skills except with the express agreement of the Reservist and their employer. This would not preclude a commander on operations ordering an already mobilised Reservist to carry out a task for which he or she was qualified, as a short-term expedient and where no other alternative existed.

• While the Reserve Forces Act 1996 set a limit on the time any Reservist could be mobilised (generally one year over a three-year period), the MOD believed that this level of mobilisation was “unsustainable”. The MOD would therefore, where possible, limit the time that any Reservist would be mobilised to one year over a five-year period.

• The MOD would seek to provide 28 days’ notice of mobilisation (21 days previously).

105. In April 2005, the MOD introduced a new remuneration package for Reservists deployed on operations.77 Under the new scheme, if Reservists were mobilised and their civilian pay was higher than their Service pay, they could claim the difference, including certain benefits in kind. There were additional allowances to compensate for other losses.

106. Reservists had previously applied for allowances to cover the additional costs of deployment. The scheme required a Reservist to collate a great deal of evidence of personal earnings and expenditure in the short time available before deployment.

76 Ministry of Defence, Future of the UK’s Reserve Forces, 7 February 2005.
107. The NAO reported that the new scheme was “generous and less bureaucratic, and has been generally welcomed by the Reservists”.

108. The NAO published a report on the MOD’s use of the Reserve Forces in March 2006. The NAO highlighted the finding from its survey of Reservists, that 41 percent of those intending to leave within one year agreed that inadequate support (relating to welfare and administration) played a part in their decision to leave. The NAO reported that, while the most used form of support was the unit’s welfare representative, some units had no full-time welfare representative to support deployed Reservists and their families.

109. The NAO recommended that the MOD should focus its attention and resources on those welfare services which were most used by Reservists and their families, especially those provided by local Reserve units. In particular, it should:

- ensure that information supplied to Reservists’ families was written in plain English;
- ensure that all TA regiments had adequate, dedicated welfare support, and that similar measures were available for Royal Naval Reservists and Royal Auxiliary Air Force Personnel; and
- improve the welfare support available to the families of deployed Volunteer Reservists who lived far away from the Reserve unit with which they trained and those Regular Reservists who had no unit.

110. The NAO also highlighted the lack of medical support for Reservists after their demobilisation, and recommended that the MOD should:

- undertake to provide medical treatment to all Reservists injured on operations to enable them to rejoin their civilian lives and careers as quickly as possible; and
- institute procedures for the diagnosis and treatment, through Defence Medical Services (DMS), of Reservists who develop mental health problems after the demobilisation process had been completed, as a result of an operational deployment.

111. In November 2006, the MOD established the Reserves Mental Health Programme (RMHP), to provide enhanced mental health care for current and former Reservists who had been demobilised since 1 January 2003 following deployment on an overseas operation. The RMHP is described in Section 16.2.

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Increasing pressure on Service Personnel, 2004 to 2008

The decision not to deploy a headquarters and brigade to Iraq, June 2004

112. In mid-April 2004, the US made an informal request to the UK to send additional troops to Iraq. Section 9.2 describes the Government’s consideration of that proposal, which focused on the question of the contribution that those troops might make to achieving strategic success.

113. On 12 May, Lieutenant General Robert Fry, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments) (DCDC(Commitments)), advised the Chiefs of Staff meeting that the effect of an additional deployment on “Harmony”, previously identified as one of the main concerns, was now assessed to be “less stressing”.

114. Lt Gen Palmer wrote to Lt Gen Fry the following day:

“You know my serious concerns about increasing the current level of commitments … At best, deployment of an additional brigade would reduce average unit separation from our target of 24 months to 12 months. Within this, some trades and individuals (including pinch point trades) will inevitably suffer considerably shorter tour intervals. While recruitment and retention currently remain satisfactory in most areas, the situation is potentially fragile not least because the risk is difficult to quantify.”

115. Lt Gen Palmer suggested that, if a “do nothing” option was judged to be unacceptable, the MOD should develop a “battlegroup only” option which would minimise “the stretch on our people”. He also highlighted the difficulty of following a decision for an additional deployment with the announcement of planned measures to reduce manpower costs.

116. The Chiefs of Staff considered the US request for additional UK military assets to Iraq on 19 May. Although they recognised there were risks and benefits to all the possible options, they agreed that the “best military option” was the deployment of HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC) and a brigade to replace US forces in the provinces of Najaf and Qadisiyah (option six).

117. During the meeting, Lt Gen Fry cautioned against the long-term effects on the Armed Forces of an additional deployment, which militated against that option. Lt Gen Palmer rehearsed the arguments he had set out in his 13 May minute to Lt Gen Fry, adding that he feared a “precipitant retention problem”.

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80 Minutes, 12 May 2004, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
81 Minute DCDS(Pers) to DCDS(C), 13 May 2003, ‘Expanding MND(SE) – People Implications’.
82 Minutes, 19 May 2004, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
118. Gen Walker summarised the conclusion of the Chiefs of Staff, that option six was the “best military option” although “there was current doubt whether it could be delivered and sustained”.

119. Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary wrote to Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs on 25 May, setting out the Chiefs of Staff’s advice. Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary stated that the option which would have the greatest effect and the least military risk was the deployment of HQ ARRC with an associated battlegroup, and a brigade to replace US forces. However, that option carried “significant penalties” including with regard to the wider impact on the Armed Forces.

120. Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary set out those penalties. Deploying HQ ARRC with an associated battlegroup would further reduce tour intervals for many Service Personnel. Some 40 per cent of infantry soldiers already had tour intervals of less than 12 months (against a guideline of 24 months). The deployment would reduce tour intervals for combat service support units to an average of less than 10 months; some units would have even less.

121. Reduced tour intervals would effect training and future capability, and also significantly reduce the time that Service Personnel and their families could spend together. The letter concluded:

“For some, this may be the straw that breaks the camel’s back and leads to experienced personnel leaving the Service.”

122. Holding a brigade at readiness, even if it was not deployed outside the UK, would have even more significant impacts.

123. Given those penalties, and the fact that the situation in Iraq would evolve, Chiefs recommended that the Government should deploy HQ ARRC and an associated battlegroup now, but retain the brigade in the UK to be deployed if necessary.

124. In late May, Lt Gen Palmer asked the Chiefs of Staff to agree that he should develop a costed package of measures, focused on protecting untaken leave and enhanced allowances, to ameliorate the “worst consequences” of the increasing “operational load”. It was conceivable that an increase in the UK’s commitment in Iraq would reduce tour intervals for some units, including medical units, to six months.

125. Lt Gen Palmer advised that the MOD did not have the management information to determine the extent to which increasing pressure on Service Personnel would translate into worsening retention, or when a “tipping point” in retention would be reached (work was under way to generate that information). Recruitment and retention

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84 Minute Palmer to COSSEC, 24 May 2004, ‘Increased Commitments – Ameliorating the Impact on People’.
were holding up well, but there was already evidence that people were starting to feel undervalued, particularly over the issue of pay.

126. Lt Gen Palmer concluded: “Every time we increase the operational load we increase the risk of a sudden, serious downturn in retention.”

127. Section 9.2 describes discussions between Mr Blair, Ministers and senior officials on the deployment of additional troops between late May and mid-June. The extent to which personnel issues featured in those discussions is not clear.

128. On 15 June, Mr Blair, Mr Hoon, Mr Jack Straw (the Foreign Secretary), Mr Hilary Benn (the International Development Secretary), Mr Paul Boateng (Chief Secretary to the Treasury), Gen Walker and others met to discuss Iraq. The meeting concluded that the UK:

“… should not close the door to the possibility of sending further UK troops. We should keep the option open until around the time of the NATO Summit [28-29 June]. But there was no pressing military reason to send them, nor were we coming under much pressure from the US to do so.”

129. On 24 June, Lt Gen Palmer provided an update on his work to develop a package of welfare measures for Mr Ingram, at his request. Lt Gen Palmer advised that, with only a limited understanding of the relationship between operational tempo, separation and behaviour, he was taking a “broad view” of potential measures. These might include new financial incentives for groups under “critical stress”, enhanced separation allowances, improvements to Service Accommodation and measures to protect untaken leave.

The decision to deploy troops to Afghanistan

130. In February 2005, Mr Hoon announced that the UK intended to switch its existing military effort in Afghanistan (around 1,000 Service Personnel based in northern Afghanistan) to Helmand province.

131. Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser from 2003 to 2007, told the Inquiry that “this was a proposal … which came from the Chiefs of Staff”.

132. The 21 July meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) agreed in principle proposals presented by Dr John Reid, the Defence Secretary, for both the transfer to Iraqi control of the four provinces in southern Iraq for which the UK had security responsibility, and for the redeployment of the UK effort in Afghanistan

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86 Minute Palmer to PS/Minister (AF), 24 June 2004, ‘Increased Commitments – Ameliorating the Impact on People’.
from the north to Helmand province in the south, with an infantry battlegroup and full helicopter support. Section 9.4 addresses the decision in detail.

133. The MOD paper which informed the decision advised that this option, which comprised “around 2,500 personnel in total”, would:

“Place greatest pressure on internal MOD resourcing. It would impact on the individual personnel deployed, particularly those in ‘pinch-point’ trades who may have been deployed on operations significantly more than Departmental guidelines advise; stretch the MOD’s logistic capability at a time when force level reductions in Iraq cannot be guaranteed; and place strain on key enablers …”

134. The MOD paper concluded with a brief report on plans for UK military drawdown in Iraq. It cautioned that:

“… any substantial prolongation of the UK military commitment in Iraq at current force levels would have significant impact on individual personnel, the logistic feasibility of any commitment in Afghanistan, and overall resourcing.”

135. The minutes of the DOP meeting do not indicate that there was any discussion of the specific impact on the Iraq campaign of the proposed deployment to Helmand.

136. Gen Jackson was briefed, in advance of a 17 January 2006 meeting with the House of Lords Defence Group, that:

“Depending on campaign progress in Iraq, there is potential for some ‘concurrency challenges’ in 2006/07. We must try to avoid ‘overstretch’, but not end up ‘under stretched’ – particularly when the competition for resources in Whitehall is so fierce.”

137. On the same day, Dr Roger Hutton, MOD Director Joint Commitments Policy, provided Dr Reid with advice on the timing and detail of the deployment of UK forces to Helmand province. Dr Hutton advised that the Chiefs of Staff recommended the immediate deployment of the full Helmand Task Force (HTF). That recommendation was “crucially dependent” on fulfilling three criteria, including:

“Achievability within current UK commitments. The HTF, taken together with the HQ ARRC deployment, calls on a variety of capabilities, and a lengthy and complex logistic tail. With the continued commitment to Iraq through 2006, this presents significant but manageable challenges, particularly for logistic enablers (including air transport). During this period we will still be able to undertake immediate contingency operations, but on a limited basis.”

89 Minutes, 21 July 2005, DOP meeting.
91 Minutes, 21 July 2005, DOP meeting.
92 Briefing, [undated], ‘CGS Address to House of Lords Defence Group – 17 Jan 06’.
93 Minute Hutton to APS/SoS [MOD], 17 January 2006, ‘Afghanistan Deployments’.
138. Annex C to Dr Hutton’s briefing provided more detail on key issues, including the sustainability of the proposed deployment. It stated:

“It remains the case that, with likely timelines for transition in Iraq, the HTF deployment is achievable without serious damage to Harmony, though certain niche trades and capabilities (particularly air transport) will be placed under increased, but manageable, stress.”

139. The decision to deploy to Helmand was approved in Cabinet on 26 January.94 The minutes record that Dr Reid “was looking carefully at where the burden on our troops could be reduced, including in Iraq and Bosnia and hoped to be able to report troop and cost reductions in coming months”.

140. There were different views within the MOD over the effect of the deployment on personnel. Lt Gen Palmer, DCDS(Personnel) from 2002 to August 2005, told the Inquiry that, as he left post, he expressed his concern that deploying two brigades simultaneously (to Iraq and Afghanistan) would breach the Harmony Guidelines and the Defence Planning Assumptions, and was “too big a risk”.95

141. Sir Kevin Tebbit, MOD Permanent Under Secretary from 2001 to 2005, told the Inquiry:

“I was apprehensive [about the deployment of UK forces to Helmand] and I made my concerns known to my planning staff and to the Chiefs of Staff. I think their view was that they could do it and it was manageable … since it was [the Chiefs of Staff] who would actually have to ensure they could do this, I did not press my objections fully.”96

142. The impact of the decision on the availability of key equipment capabilities for Iraq is addressed in Section 14.1.

143. UK troops began to deploy to Helmand in May 2006.

**Concern that the Army is “running hot”, autumn 2006**

144. In August 2006, concerns emerged over the treatment of injured Service Personnel being treated on civilian wards at Selly Oak hospital in the UK, and the adequacy of the welfare package provide to them and their families. The concerns are described in Section 16.2.

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94 Cabinet Conclusions, 26 January 2006.
95 Public hearing, 21 July 2010, page 80.
96 Public hearing, 3 February 2010, pages 15 and 16.
145. General Sir Richard Dannatt, Commander-in-Chief Land Command, wrote to Mr Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, on 31 August setting out his most serious concerns. His letter focused on the pressures on Service Personnel:

“… as an Army, we are running hot, and our operational deployments are well above planned levels set out in current Defence Planning Assumptions … you should be aware that, in my opinion, the demands of the organisation are currently greater than our ability to provide satisfactorily for the needs of the individuals … Quite properly, we often talk about an implied contract – the ‘military covenant’ – that as an Army we have with our soldiers and their families and I fear that it is somewhat out of balance.”

146. Gen Dannatt stated that the concerns might seem misplaced, given that current “outflow levels” of personnel (which he described as the classic gauge of morale) were low. But the cumulative effect of the high tempo of operations, short tour intervals, hectic training and activity between tours, and under-manning gave rise to “a severe risk akin to a cliff-edge experience”.

147. Gen Dannatt identified several pre-emptive actions to prevent any increase in outflow, including:

“Away from the field, I sense that basic pay for our more junior people is becoming an issue, as are some allowances, particularly those that are related to operational deployment. I am not at all sure that a take home pay of £1,150 a month is fair return for a month’s work in Helmand or Basra. But it is the standard of both single and family accommodation when our people are back home that is probably the most emotive issue …”

148. Improvements in those areas would require a “modest shift” of resources from the Equipment Programme into the Short-Term Programme.

149. Gen Dannatt took up post as Chief of the General Staff the following month.

150. Gen Dannatt told the Inquiry:

“When the military covenant is in balance, then the engine [the Army] can do a lot of work. When the covenant is out of balance, we have problems. I think we progressively got out of balance as the amount of work we were being asked to do increased through 2005 and 2006.

“I say this not in any shape or form as a criticism of any of my predecessors, but merely as a reflection of the additional work that we were being asked to do as a consequence of decisions taken to stay in Iraq until we had successfully completed our operations there, but also take on Afghanistan as well.

97 Letter Dannatt to Browne, 31 August 2006, [untitled].
“The way to bring the covenant back into balance was to make sure we were expending sufficient resources on looking after the legitimate needs of individuals, soldiers and their families in terms of their pay allowances, accommodation, and the equipment … you would want to give these people.

“That’s where I think we were deficient. That’s where we had to work quite hard to get it back in balance. I know I said in 2006 the army was running hot. That is correct … I think we were getting quite close to a seizing-up moment in 2006.”

151. The Inquiry asked Gen Dannatt whether work to bring the military covenant back into balance should not have begun earlier. He told the Inquiry that he had no criticism of his predecessor, and that it was:

“… often easier to start something at the start of an appointment when you have had the chance to survey the landscape … and coming from the position of Commander-in-Chief … with time to go round the Army, [I] could sense both at home and abroad the pressures building on soldiers and their families and deciding something had to be done.”

Introduction of the Operational Allowance

152. Mr Browne’s Private Secretary wrote to No.10 on 9 October, setting out proposed new arrangements for supporting Service Personnel on operations. The letter reported that, to reflect the current, high operational tempo and provide an immediate boost to the lowest paid Service Personnel, Mr Browne had agreed with Mr Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the Government would introduce a tax-free Operational Allowance of £2,400 for all Service Personnel who completed a six-month tour in either Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans or certain other operations. Proportional amounts would be paid to those who completed shorter tours. The Allowance would be backdated to 1 April 2006.

153. The MOD had considered offering tax-free pay while on operations, but had concluded that this would not target the lowest paid and would be difficult to administer.

154. The letter also advised that the MOD would discuss the scope for abating Council Tax charges for Service Personnel deployed on operations with the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG). The failure of Local Authorities to exercise discretion on those charges was a “regular complaint”.

155. The letter also advised that the free telephone call allowance would be raised from 20 to 30 minutes a week.

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100 Letter PS/Secretary of State [MOD] to Phillipson, 9 October 2006, ‘A Package for Service Personnel on Operations’.
156. In his autobiography, Gen Dannatt described the Operational Allowance as the product of “some journalistic pressure and keen discussions with the Treasury”.101 He also described it as the beginning of his campaign to “improve the soldiers’ lot”.

157. Mr Browne announced the introduction of the Operational Allowance on 10 October.102

158. Mr Browne raised the issue of Council Tax charges for deployed Service Personnel with Ms Ruth Kelly, the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, on 19 October.103 MOD and DCLG officials subsequently met to explore options for abating Council Tax charges. The MOD’s preferred option was a statutory discount of 25 percent (which would equate to a discount of £132 based on the average Council Tax bill).

159. Mr Browne announced in September 2007 that Service Personnel serving in Iraq and Afghanistan would receive a £140 rebate on their Council Tax bill (based on a six-month tour).104

Reports on recruitment and retention

160. The NAO published a report entitled Recruitment and Retention in the Armed Forces in November 2006.105 The report stated that, at July 2006, the trained strength of the Armed Forces stood at around 180,690 Service Personnel, a shortfall of some 5,170 (2.8 percent) against the MOD’s estimated requirement.

161. This figure masked significant shortages in 88 “pinch point” trades, where there was insufficient trained strength to perform operational tasks while enabling the Harmony Guidelines to be met. While 14.5 percent of the trained strength of the Army had exceeded the Harmony Guidelines at some point in the previous 30 months, this percentage rose to more than 33 percent for some pinch point trades.

162. The NAO concluded:

• Although the Armed Forces had consistently operated at or above the most demanding combination of operations envisaged by the Defence Planning Assumptions (DPAs) since 2001, and the MOD expected that this would continue to be the case for some time, the Armed Forces’ manning requirements had not been adjusted to reflect the current levels of activity. The NAO reported that, while the MOD accepted that operating at that level could result in it placing additional strains on its people, the DPAs were guidelines only and were not intended to constrain decisions taken on the employment of the Armed Forces.

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102 BBC, 10 October 2006, Soldiers to get ‘tax bill’ bonus.
104 The Guardian, 26 September 2007, Council tax rebates for war zone soldiers.
105 National Audit Office, Recruitment and Retention in the Armed Forces, November 2006.
• There were signs that the numbers of Service Personnel choosing to leave the Armed Forces early were beginning to increase for some key groups.
• A variety of factors influenced Service Personnel in their decisions to leave the Services, but workload, separation and the impact on family life were key factors.
• Service Personnel considered that the increased operational tempo had led to heavier workloads and more separation from families.

163. The NAO reported that the MOD was successfully using a range of short-term measures (including financial incentives) to improve retention and alleviate under-manning.

164. The NAO also reported that the MOD was facing current and future challenges to its ability to recruit sufficient numbers of new entrants as a result of demographic changes, changing attitudes to careers, and negative publicity affecting public perceptions of the Armed Forces. The MOD was taking steps to respond to each of those challenges.

165. The NAO made a number of recommendations, including:

“The Department should review the overall manning requirements within individual operational pinch point trade groups to determine whether they are set at sufficient levels to support enduring operational commitments.

“The Department is constrained in its ability to reduce the operational tempo, which is impacting on personnel, but should look to investigate measures to provide greater stability and certainty of work patterns for personnel between operational deployments. Whilst recognising the limitations in how much workload can be reduced, the Department should look to improve its ability to let serving personnel know their work patterns over a longer time horizon.”

166. Mr Bill Jeffrey, MOD Permanent Under Secretary, responded to these conclusions later that month in his evidence to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) during its consideration of the NAO’s report. He argued that frequency of deployment was only one factor in people’s decisions to stay or leave, and that polling and opinion survey evidence suggested that it was not quite as significant a factor as it might appear.

167. Mr Jeffrey told the PAC that he agreed with the view expressed by Ministers, that the Armed Forces were “stretched quite significantly, by the combination of deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan with other things”, but not overstretched. He described overstretch as the inability of the Armed Forces to fulfil the tasks allocated to them.

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168. He also stated that there was not a direct link between the MOD’s Defence Planning Assumptions and the “degree of stretch”. Each operation was different and required different capabilities. Deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan had stretched different capabilities to different degrees; it was a “matter of military judgement” whether the Armed Forces were overstretched. Manning requirements (which flowed from the Defence Planning Assumptions) would be reviewed at the next spending review.

169. In early March 2007, Gen Dannatt wrote to Mr Browne:

“Two overall themes dominated my introductory letter [of 31 August 2006]: the Army is running hot; and the ‘military covenant’ is out of balance. I am pleased to say that I think both these concerns are now well understood across the Department and, importantly, we are taking steps to address both. Nevertheless … the level of operational commitments is still well above Defence Planning Assumptions and looks set to remain so for some years. There is now an acceptance, however, that the Army is effectively fully operationally committed and hence any rebalance between theatres – as we will undertake this year in Iraq and Afghanistan – has to be a ‘zero sum’…”

170. Gen Dannatt:

• welcomed the Operational Allowance and the recent pay award which together sent Service Personnel a “powerful message” on how highly they were valued;
• confirmed that the “general care” provided to casualties was, slowly, improving; the issue would continue to require constant, senior level attention; and
• restated his concerns that there was a risk of a “cliff-edge fall” in Army manning (although retention was holding up, recruitment was falling).

171. The PAC published its report on recruitment and retention in the Armed Forces in June 2007. It echoed the conclusions and recommendations of the NAO’s November 2006 report. The PAC reported that:

“Deployments overseas have been more frequent because the Department has been operating above Defence Planning Assumptions for several years and manning levels have not kept pace with commitments … Decisions about whether the Armed Forces can undertake operations above the Assumptions are matter of military judgement. The Department intends to review [the] Defence Planning Assumptions and the funding of the Armed Forces in the light of the demands placed on them, as part of the next Comprehensive Spending Review.”

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107 Minute CGS to SofS [MOD], [undated], [untitled].
172. The PAC concluded:

“The increasing frequency of deployments on overseas operations and time away from home are factors causing people to leave the Armed Forces. More than 15 percent of Army Personnel are away from home more often than is planned for under the Department’s ‘Harmony’ Guidelines which are being consistently broken. The Department has little scope to reduce the operational tempo which is impacting on personnel but in case of enduring operations, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, it needs to provide people with greater stability of work patterns.

“There are indicators of overstretch in specific areas, such as the severe shortfalls in personnel in some specialist trades, such as nurses, linguists and leading hands, and the routine breaking of harmony guidelines. The longer this situation continues the more it will begin to affect operational capability. The Department maintains that the Armed Forces are stretched, but not overstretched, and would only be overstretched if there was a failure to meet military commitments. But the Department also needs to ascertain the ‘tipping points’ where the degree of stretch itself precipitates the loss of scarce skills, putting operational capability at risk.”

173. The Inquiry asked AM Pocock what he understood by the concept of “overstretch”. He told the Inquiry:

“This is a subject where it is easy to let the heart rule the mind. If we are going to be completely objective about it, I would say there are two things … can we retain our people? And … are we doing them long-term harm? The first one, for virtually the whole period of the 2000’s, certainly up to 2007, retention was virtually static. The Services were short of people, yes, but that was largely down to recruitment issues …

“On the subject of, ‘Were we doing our people harm?’ we didn’t know, but we were looking really hard [at that issue] …”

174. Vice Admiral (VAdm) Peter Wilkinson, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel) from 2007, added that, in his view, the Harmony Guidelines provided a useful, objective measure of the degree of stretch:

“I think they [the Harmony Guidelines] were a very good check on the department to make sure they understood, perhaps better than before, what actually they were asking of their people.”

175. Lt Gen Mans told the Inquiry:

“… recruiting is quite a complex area, so although … on balance, I think Iraq was positive [for recruitment], there were some other issues which made recruiting more difficult. At this stage, the economy in the country was doing very well and, therefore, unemployment was comparatively low. Therefore, we were competing for recruits in quite a difficult market in that respect. There were other issues associated with the phrase that has been used before, ‘gatekeepers’, parents and teachers. Were they actually going to encourage either their children or their pupils to join the military? Well, on balance, they probably weren’t, in terms of that sort of overall perception. So overall, you had to take into consideration all these other rather complex factors, because the army was under-recruited during the period in question.”

The impact of operations on the Harmony Guidelines

176. The MOD told the Inquiry that, since 2002, the Armed Forces had been consistently operating at or above the level of concurrency defined in SDR 98. That had “inevitably constrained” their ability to meet Harmony Guidelines particularly for Service Personnel in “Pinch Point specialist trades”.

177. The MOD provided the Inquiry with figures for the percentage of Service Personnel in each Service for whom the Harmony Guidelines on Individual Separated Service were breached between 2002 and 2009; these figures are presented at the end of this Section. The Navy’s Guidelines were breached in respect of less that 1 percent of Navy Personnel in each of the years covered by the Inquiry. The Army’s Guidelines were breached in respect of over 18 percent of Army Personnel in early 2004 (the first period for which data is available), falling to 10 percent in early 2007. The RAF’s Guidelines were breached in respect of between 2 and 10 percent of RAF Personnel over the period covered by the Inquiry.

178. Professor Christopher Dandeker, Professor of Military Sociology at King’s College London and Co-Director of the King’s Centre for Military Health Research, told the House of Commons Defence Committee in March 2008:

“… so far as our own research is concerned … I think that the Harmony Guidelines have been well constructed because the evidence suggests that if you stay within them they [Service Personnel] do not suffer; if you go beyond them there is a 20 to 50 percent likelihood that they will suffer in terms of PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder].”

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179. In his evidence to the Inquiry, AM Pocock questioned whether Professor Dandeker was right to suggest that the Harmony Guidelines were an appropriate basis for assessing the effect of operational deployment on individuals. The Guidelines had been derived in a straightforward way from the planning assumptions used in SDR 98 (“what operations have we got? How many people have we got? … that means that they can spend this long away”). AM Pocock’s focus had been on the broader relationship between time deployed on operations and the risk of mental health issues.

180. Lt Gen Palmer told the Inquiry that, while his “prime concern” with regard to reducing tour intervals was for individuals, he was also concerned that reduced tour intervals could affect operational capability, as units would not be able to undertake collective training and other development and preparatory activities.

Rebuilding the military covenant

181. In September 2007, in response to growing concerns that the military covenant was being steadily undermined, the Royal British Legion (RBL) launched its “Honour the Covenant” campaign. The RBL argued that the covenant was being breached with respect to three key issues:

- the operation of the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme;
- healthcare and welfare support for serving Service Personnel, their dependants and veterans; and
- support for bereaved families at inquests.

182. In July 2008, partly in response to that campaign and the support it generated, the Government published a command paper entitled The Nation’s Commitment: Cross-Government Support to our Armed Forces, their Families and Veterans (known as the Service Personnel Command Paper). The paper was underpinned by two principles:

- to end any disadvantage that armed service imposes upon Service Personnel, their families and veterans; and
- to better support and recognise those who have been wounded in the service of their country.

183. The paper covered a wide range of topics: compensation, health, housing, education and skills, transport, support for families, benefits, careers and pay.

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115 Public hearing, 19 July 2010, pages 68-70.
117 House of Commons Library, Standard Note SN/IA/5979, 9 June 2011, Armed Forces Covenant.
184. Mr Bob Ainsworth, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, described the production of the Command Paper to the Inquiry as an:

“… opportunity … to get for the first time at every single area of Government and deal with the things that had never been given the importance that they had been given before. There are lots of ways in which Government accidentally, local Government and central Government, discriminates against our Armed Forces because of the juxtaposition of the way that services are delivered and the way that we make them work and the way that we keep moving them around … So in the Services Personnel Command Paper what I wanted to try to do was sweep up as many of those complaints as there were, analyse them, see whether or not there was a reality to them and have them dealt with as a one-off process, but set up an ongoing process.”

185. Mr Ainsworth went on to describe how the Command Paper was used to co-ordinate the Government’s response to veterans’ needs, including on issues which had not been explicitly considered in the paper:

“We had the Prime Minister’s stamp on the Service Personnel Command Paper. We were able to use that as we went round different departments and say ‘This is the Government’s intent’ …

“I had problems from different Departments, but that’s understandable … Government tends to work in silos … So you have to go political in order to get those things sorted out.”

186. VAdm Wilkinson told the Inquiry that the implementation of the Command Paper had been challenging, but that progress had been made:

“The challenges were that there was very little new money attached to the proposals and therefore, to gain the support of other Government departments was very difficult … the second challenge was to make the gains made enduring. I think we have achieved both of those, in that other Government departments were made to change their plans and programmes to take account of the Command Paper …”

187. In May 2010, the new Government committed to “work to rebuild the Military Covenant”.

188. An independent Task Force on the Military Covenant, chaired by Professor Hew Strachan, was established in summer 2010 to inform that work. The Terms of

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119 Public hearing, 6 July 2010, pages 5-6.
120 Public hearing, 6 July 2010, pages 24-25.
121 Public hearing, 19 July 2010, page 100.
Reference of the Task Force were to identify innovative ways in which the Government, and society as a whole, could fulfil its obligation to rebuild the covenant.

189. The Government published a written *Armed Forces Covenant* in May 2011. The *Covenant* incorporated a number of the Task Force’s recommendations. The *Covenant* stated that members of the Armed Forces should expect respect, support and fair treatment in return for the sacrifices they made on behalf of the nation. The *Covenant* set out two core principles:

- No current or former member of the Armed Forces, or their families, should be at a disadvantage compared with other citizens in the provision of public and commercial services.
- Special consideration was appropriate in some cases, particularly for those who had been injured or bereaved.

190. These core principles were enshrined in law in the Armed Forces Act 2011. The Act did not create legally enforceable rights for Service Personnel, but required the Defence Secretary to report annually to Parliament on the Covenant with a particular focus on four areas: healthcare, education, housing and the operation of inquests.

191. The Inquiry’s conclusions and lessons on the pressures on Service Personnel and the support provided to them and their families are set out in Section 16.4.

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125 Armed Forces Act 2011.
Table 2: Percentage of Service Personnel for whom the Harmony Guidelines on Individual Separated Service were breached

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126 Paper MOD, 22 October 2010, ‘Harmony – Statistics’. The MOD informed the Inquiry that no data was available for the Army for the period Q1 2007/08 onwards due to migration to a new personnel administration system. The reporting baseline for the RAF’s Harmony Guidelines changed from Q2 2008/09.
# SECTION 16.2

## SUPPORT FOR INJURED SERVICE PERSONNEL AND VETERANS

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Introduction

1. This Section addresses:
   - the arrangements for providing medical care to Service Personnel;
   - the provision of medical care and welfare support for seriously injured Service Personnel and their families; and
   - the support provided for veterans.

2. The welfare support provided to Service Personnel and their families is addressed in Section 16.1.

3. The preparations made for repatriating the bodies of those who lost their lives serving on Op TELIC, how their deaths were investigated, and the support provided for bereaved families are addressed in Section 16.3.

4. The decision to deploy to Helmand province in Afghanistan, and the implications of that decision, are addressed in Section 9.

System for providing medical care for Service Personnel

5. The healthcare system in the UK comprises three tiers:
   - Primary care is provided at the first point of consultation, including by General Practitioners (GPs).
   - Secondary care is provided by medical specialists who do not usually have first contact with patients, including in a hospital. It includes acute care.
   - Tertiary care is specialised consultative healthcare, for example for cancer management.

6. Primary care for Service Personnel in the UK and Service base areas overseas is provided by the MOD’s Defence Medical Services (DMS).\(^1\)

7. Secondary care for Service Personnel is generally provided within the National Health Service (NHS).

8. Following the closure of military hospitals in the 1990s, the Government established five MOD Hospital Units (MDHUs) within NHS Trusts. MDHUs are not discrete military wards or units, but comprise medical Service Personnel (including substantial numbers of Reservists) integrated into a host NHS Trust. MDHUs:
   - provide accelerated access for elective referrals of Service Personnel, to meet operational requirements; and
   - allow medical Service Personnel to develop and maintain their skills.

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\(^1\) Seventh Report from the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session 2007-2008, Medical Care for the Armed Forces, HC327.
9. In April 2001, the MOD established the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine (RCDM) within the University Hospital Birmingham Foundation Trust (UHBFT), as “a centre of military medical excellence, with academic, teaching and clinical roles”.

10. During the period covered by the Inquiry, the main receiving centre for casualties evacuated from operational theatres was RCDM Selly Oak (one of the hospitals within the UHBFT).²

11. If Selly Oak was unable to cope with the flow of casualties, the Government could activate the Reception Arrangements of Military Personnel (RAMP) plan, engaging the wider NHS in the treatment of military casualties.

12. Military patients requiring further rehabilitation once released from hospital might be referred to the Defence Medical Rehabilitation Centre (DMRC) at Headley Court in Surrey, the principal medical rehabilitation centre run by the Armed Forces.³ DMRC Headley Court also accepted direct admission from hospitals, and most combat casualties were referred directly to DMRC Headley Court from RCDM Selly Oak.

13. DMRC Headley Court provided both physiotherapy and group rehabilitation for complex musculo-skeletal injuries, and neuro-rehabilitation for brain-injured patients.

14. Operation TELIC was the first major military operation after the closure of the military hospitals in the 1990s. Many medical Service Personnel were therefore withdrawn from NHS Trusts, and military casualties were treated in NHS Trusts.

15. Tertiary care for Service Personnel is provided by the NHS.

16. From 2002, the MOD reconfigured its mental health services to focus on community rather than in-patient services, including by establishing 15 military Departments of Community Mental Health (DCMH) throughout the UK to provide out-patient mental healthcare for Service Personnel.⁴

17. From 2004, in-patient mental healthcare was provided by The Priory Group of hospitals, through a contract with the MOD.

18. Those changes were in line with NHS best practice, which held that individuals should be treated in as normal an environment as possible, close to their units, families and friends.

19. The Ex-Services Mental Welfare Society (generally known as Combat Stress) runs three short-stay residential treatment centres for men and women who have served in

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² Seventh Report from the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session 2007-2008, Medical Care for the Armed Forces, HC327, paragraph 21.
³ Paper MOD, 28 June 2010, ‘Medical Input to Ainsworth Brief’.
⁴ Seventh Report from the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session 2007-2008, Medical Care for the Armed Forces, HC327.
the Armed Forces or the Merchant Navy. The MOD meets the cost of fees charged by Combat Stress for “remedial treatment” at the three centres.5

20. Veterans’ healthcare is generally provided by the NHS. Charities and welfare organisations also play an important role.

Medical care during the combat phase of operations

Planning and preparing to provide medical care

21. In July 2002, the MOD defined three options for a UK contribution to US-led military operations in Iraq:

- Package 1 – an “in-place support package” using forces already in the region;
- Package 2 – an “enhanced support package” comprising Package 1 with additional air and maritime forces; and
- Package 3 – a “discrete UK package” based on deployment of an armoured division, in addition to the forces in Package 2.6

22. Those three options provided the broad framework for discussions within the UK Government until the end of 2002.

23. A Strategic Medical Estimate was prepared for the MOD’s Strategic Planning Group on 1 September 2002.7 The Estimate – which assumed an entry into Iraq from Turkey – set out the expected number of Role 3 hospital admissions from an operation in Iraq, as a basis for medical planning:

- 157 (best case) to 241 (worst case) battle casualties;
- 152 (best case) to 212 (worst case) casualties from chemical warfare;
- 15 percent of those exposed to biological warfare; and
- 34 Disease and Non-Battle Injuries (DNBI) a day.

24. The Estimate stated that 55 individuals a week would require medical evacuation back to the UK.

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5 Paper MOD, 29 June 2010, ‘Veterans Mental Health’.
Military medical support was organised in four tiers, on the basis of the medical capabilities and resources available:

- **Role 1** (broadly equivalent to Echelon 1 for maritime forces) medical support was integral or allocated to a small unit, and included the capabilities for providing first aid, immediate lifesaving measures, and triage.
- **Role 2** support was normally provided at larger unit level, and included pre-hospital care.
- **Role 3** support was normally provided at Division level and above. It included specialist diagnostic resources, and specialist surgical and medical capabilities. Support would usually be provided in field hospitals and (as Echelon 3) in hospital ships.
- **Role 4** support was the definitive hospital and rehabilitative care of patients. That would usually be provided in the UK.

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25. General Sir Kevin O'Donoghue, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Health) (DCDS(H)) from September 2002 to 2004, told the Inquiry that medical planning was “quite advanced” by the time he took up post. Staffing plans were in place and gaps in medical equipment and supplies had been identified, although approval had not yet been received to begin procurement to fill those gaps.

26. On 31 October, Mr Blair agreed that the UK should offer Package 3 to the US on the same basis as Package 2, for planning purposes.

27. In early December, an MOD official invited Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, to agree that the MOD should hold detailed talks with the Department of Health (DoH) on the withdrawal of Regular and Reserve medical personnel from the NHS, and on the reception of casualties under the RAMP. Package 3 would require around 2,000 medical personnel, of whom approximately 60 percent would be Reservists. The majority of those Reservists would be working within the NHS; their withdrawal would have a “local impact”. DoH was pressing the MOD for details on the withdrawal of medical Reservists.

28. The official also advised that the procurement of medical equipment through the Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) mechanism to support Packages 0 (Special Forces only) and Package 1 was under way. The Treasury was expected to authorise procurement of medical equipment to support Package 2 shortly. The MOD’s Directorate of Capability, Resources and Scrutiny (DCRS) had not yet approved the business case for the procurement of medical equipment for Package 3.

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9 Public hearing, 14 July 2010, pages 4-5.
11 Minute PS/VCDS to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 6 December 2002, ‘Medical Support to Operations against Iraq’.
for the medical equipment to support Package 3; that approval, and the subsequent
Treasury authority to commence procurement, was needed as soon as possible.

29. The official advised that in “about three months time” the DMS would have
“minimised medical risk by being properly equipped in mission critical areas”.

30. On 11 December, Gen O’Donoghue told the Chiefs of Staff that the DoH had been
engaged on Iraq planning, and had responded “positively and pragmatically”.12

31. The DCRS agreed the business cases for the medical modules (packages of
equipment and supplies) to support Package 3 on 16 December.13 The modules were
expected to achieve “full capability in theatre” on 15 March 2003.

32. At the beginning of 2003, in the light of continued uncertainty on whether Turkey
would agree to the use of its territory by Coalition ground forces, the focus of UK military
planning shifted from the North to the South of Iraq (see Sections 6.1 and 6.2).

33. The Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) assessed that the shift made the
UK medical mission “less demanding in terms of supporting manoeuvre”.14 A revised
Estimate specified that the Role 3 medical support required:

• the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Argus, as the Primary Casualty Receiving Facility
(PCRF), with 100 beds;
• two 200-bed field hospitals deployed;
• a third 200-bed field hospital in reserve;
• casualty staging flights through Cyprus; and
• the augmentation of the Princess Mary Military Hospital in Cyprus.

34. RFA Argus deployed on 15 January and was operational in the North Arabian Gulf
by mid-February.

35. Mr Alan Milburn, the Health Secretary, wrote to Mr Hoon on 10 March to inform him
that the DoH was ready to activate the RAMP, when required.15

36. Mr Hoon was advised by PJHQ on 14 March that an “effective medical capability”,
scaled to the expected number of casualties, was now operational in theatre.16
Arrangements were also in place for the aeromedical evacuation of casualties to the UK.

12 Minutes, 11 December 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
13 Minute MOD/DCRS [junior official] to APS/SoS [MOD], 31 January 2003, ‘Possible Operations against
Iraq UOR List, 31 January 2003’.
15 Letter Milburn to Hoon, 10 March 2003, ‘Military Deployment to the Middle East: the NHS’s
Responsibilities’.
16 Minute PJHQ [junior official] to PS/SoS [MOD], 14 March 2003, ‘Op TELIC – Casualty Treatment and
Management Arrangements’.
37. Gen O’Donoghue told the Inquiry that by 19 March, when military operations against Iraq began, there remained some “shortfalls” in medical modules:

“We had worked out what equipment we needed. We were allowed to discuss that informally with industry in, I think, mid-November. We weren’t allowed to place the orders until early to mid-December, which we did with £34m/£35m worth of UORS, and those came in between then and March.

“Some items may not have arrived by March, but they came fairly shortly afterwards and we topped up the modules.”

38. Sections 6.3 and 13 describe the development and approval of UOR business cases within the MOD and discussions with the Treasury on funding UORs. A mechanism for funding UORs was agreed between Mr Hoon and Mr Brown on 23 September; the mechanism did not require individual UORs to be agreed by the Treasury. Mr Hoon agreed that the MOD could begin discussions with industry on the provision of UORs on 2 December.

39. Brigadier Alan Hawley, Commander Medical of the Joint Force Logistic Command during Op TELIC 1 (which covered the initial combat phase of military operations in Iraq), told the House of Commons Defence Committee in October 2003:

“From where I was, no one informed me of any clinical care that was compromised by a lack of equipment. I have to say that it was very tight.”

40. Brig Hawley assessed that a number of factors had combined to produce that “rather tight, fraught situation”, including the late release of money for UORs, a new process for building medical equipment modules, and a change in responsibility for medical supply from the medical to the logistical Command.

41. Vice Admiral Ian Jenkins, Surgeon-General from 2002 to 2006, agreed with Brig Hawley’s assessment:

“… I can categorically assure you that clinical outcomes [during Op TELIC 1] were uncompromised. Yes there were problems with supply, equipment and everything else, mobilisation of Reserves, support … but the clinical outcomes were first class. I can put my hand on my heart and say that nobody suffered inappropriately because of a lack of medical requirement.”

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18 Defence Committee, Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1176-1179), 22 October 2003, Q 1211.
19 Defence Committee, Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1176-1179), 22 October 2003, Q 1217.
42. Lieutenant General Louis Lillywhite, the Director General of Army Medical Services from 2003 to 2005 and Surgeon General from 2006 to 2009, told the Inquiry that cost had not been an issue in providing medical care:

“As far as care on operations are concerned, it is effectiveness that counts, not cost-effectiveness. As far as providing care for Servicemen was concerned, I was – I personally, and I have to say Ministers supported me – did not allow cost to be an issue. If it was required, it was provided.”

43. A July 2003 MOD report on Op TELIC 1 stated that the medical component of the deployment was fully staffed, with 2,800 medical staff including 760 Reservists. Trained psychiatric staff were also deployed.

Arrangements for supporting mental health

44. Lt Gen Lillywhite described for the Inquiry, the Armed Forces’ general approach to identifying and tackling mental health issues at the beginning of Op TELIC:

- using initial and subsequent training to identify individuals with less ability to withstand stress, and to help prepare people to withstand stress;
- training commanders to identify issues as early as possible; and
- deploying field psychiatric teams to help identify those “who had true psychological disability, that … needed care and evacuation or simply support and return to duty”.

45. Prior to deployment on Op TELIC, Royal Navy and Army units received a pre-deployment presentation by a psychiatrist or community psychiatric nurse (or non-medical personnel if medical personnel were unavailable). As the RAF deployed as individuals rather than formed units, it produced an equivalent booklet for all deploying personnel.

46. The Services also prepared post-deployment stress prevention packages, comprising two handouts and a post-operational psychological briefing.

47. MOD demobilisation policy at the beginning of Op TELIC required that:

- At the end of an operational tour but while still in theatre, all individuals should attend a presentation and be given an information leaflet covering post-traumatic stress reactions and the problems that might be encountered on returning home to families. Families should be offered a presentation and information leaflets on the possible after-effects of an operational deployment.

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20 Public hearing, 20 July 2010, page 73.
22 Public hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 54-55.
• All personnel should undertake a period of “normalisation”, lasting two to three days, before taking post-operational tour leave. It would usually be spent on routine duties. This requirement stemmed from the MOD’s assessment that:
  ○ The immediate release of personnel after an operational tour could be a contributory factor to the likelihood of developing post-conflict syndromes.
  ○ Personnel should be given time to deal with issues raised by combat in the company of those who understood and had shared those experiences.  

48. This policy applied to Reservist as well as Regular Personnel.

49. Lieutenant General Anthony Palmer, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Personnel) (DCDS(Personnel)), wrote to General Sir Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, on 23 April 2003, advising:

“At this morning’s Op COS meeting you mentioned concerns among some of the deployed Personnel that their return to the UK was being delayed because of the requirement for a period of ‘normalisation’ …

…

“Ultimately the implementation of the overall policy guidance lies with PJHQ and the FLCs [Front Line Commands] … However, the lessons learned from the last Gulf Conflict in particular have demonstrated how important it is – not least in terms of demonstrating due diligence – that we are rigorous in adopting formal procedures to reduce the risks and incidence of psychological illness.”

Deliver of medical care

50. The MOD reported in July 2003 that more than 4,000 British patients had been treated in British field hospitals, and over 800 evacuated to the UK by air, during the deployment and combat phases of Op TELIC. The majority of those patients had suffered disease and non-battle injuries.

51. Around 200 Iraqi Prisoners of War and 200 Iraqi civilians had also been treated in British medical facilities.

52. The number of admissions to Role 3 hospitals during Op TELIC 1 are set out in the table below.

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27 Minute MOD [junior official] to Iraq Inquiry [junior official], 22 June 2010, 'Iraq Inquiry – Request for Evidence'.
Table 1: Admissions to Role 3 hospitals during Op TELIC 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Expected number of admissions</th>
<th>Actual number of admissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battle casualties</td>
<td>157-241</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties from chemical warfare</td>
<td>152-212</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties from biological warfare</td>
<td>15 percent of those exposed</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease and Non-battle Injuries</td>
<td>34 a day</td>
<td>31 a day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical evacuations</td>
<td>55 a week</td>
<td>90 a week</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53. In July, PJHQ assessed that medical support during Op TELIC had been “a success by any measure”. The aeromedical evacuation of casualties (by VC 10 to Cyprus then by civilian aircraft to the UK) had been particularly effective.

54. PJHQ reported that some evacuated Service Personnel were nursed in NHS hospitals without other military patients and had therefore lacked “peer support”.

55. The issue of treating injured Service Personnel in NHS hospitals, and on civilian wards, would come to prominence in 2006.

56. Lt Gen Lillywhite told the Inquiry that in the early part of Op TELIC, the MOD did not have the data to make an objective assessment of the effectiveness of emergency care. Analysis of data relating to later phases of Op TELIC indicated that UK medical support was achieving a significantly greater than expected survival rate.

57. Gen O’Donoghue told the Inquiry that the DMS drew two major lessons from its experience during the invasion:

- It needed more Regular medical Personnel, to take account of the limited time that any individual could spend in theatre given their NHS commitments and the need to retain “medical dexterity”.
- UORs allowed DMS to respond to particular threats and secure the latest equipment, but it needed more equipment and supplies “on the shelves” ready to deploy.

58. Lt Gen Lillywhite described a number of changes in the provision of medical care after Op TELIC 1. During Op TELIC 1, the MOD generally used armoured ambulances to move casualties from aid posts to medical regiments and a mixture of ambulances and helicopters to get from (Role 2) medical regiments to hospital. From Op TELIC 2, the military generally used helicopters to move from the point of wounding or the aid post to hospital.

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28 As defined in the 1 September 2002 Strategic Medical Estimate. Figures for battle casualties and casualties from chemical warfare represent best and worse case estimates respectively.
30 Public hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 14-16.
31 Public hearing, 14 July 2010, pages 16-17.
59. Lt Gen Lillywhite told the Inquiry that he had not experienced any problems in securing sufficient helicopters for those medical moves.

Support for injured Service Personnel and their families

60. The number of casualties and aeromedical evacuations relating to Op TELIC are set out in the table below. The figures for 2003, 2004 and 2005 reflect military casualties only; the figures for 2006 onwards reflect military and civilian casualties.

Table 2: Casualties and aeromedical evacuations relating to Op TELIC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Very Seriously Injured or Wounded</th>
<th>Seriously Injured or Wounded</th>
<th>Aeromedical evacuations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>1,971</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Establishing a Military Managed Ward at Selly Oak hospital

61. MOD Ministers and senior military officers made regular visits to injured Service Personnel, both in the UK and Iraq.

62. Mr Blair made a private visit to RCDM Selly Oak in February 2005.

63. Mr Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, visited RCDM Selly Oak on 15 August 2006.

64. Lt Gen Freddie Viggers, the Adjutant General, visited RCDM Selly Oak on 21 August. He reported on 22 August that:

- The quality of clinical care was excellent.
- Morale among military medical staff was “fragile”, due to under-manning, the joint military/civilian structure, and the physical environment.
- Wounded soldiers wanted to be looked after in a military environment “within which they can be with their mates, be looked after by named military nurses

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34 Minute Batchelor to PS/SoS [MOD], 13 August 2006, ‘Preparatory Brief for Visit to RCDM HQ on Tuesday 15 Aug 06 of the Rt Hon Des Browne MP Secretary of State for Defence’.
35 Minute AG to DCDS (Health), 22 August 2006, ‘Visit to Royal Centre for Defence Medicine (RCDM) – 21 August 2006’.
and be treated like soldiers (including security)”. Enhancing the military environment was “essential” for soldiers’ physical and psychological recovery.

- It was iniquitous that soldiers being treated at the RCDM Selly Oak lost their entitlement to the Operational Welfare Package (OWP) and some other allowances. The OWP would provide much of the support (including TVs, DVDs and telephone calls) that were currently being provided from “assorted non-public funds” or paid for by the soldiers themselves.

65. Lt Gen Viggers identified a number of immediate actions, including:

- informing wounded personnel what the MOD was planning to do to create a military environment;
- starting to create that military environment, by putting soldiers together in one area of a ward; and
- extending the OWP to patients.

66. On 23 August, General Sir Timothy Granville-Chapman, Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS), reported that Mr Browne had given him a “very thorough de-brief” on his 15 August visit to RCDM Selly Oak. Key points included:

- Mr Browne was “very seized” with the need for injured personnel to recover in a military environment, and was clear that a “military ward solution” was needed.
- Mr Browne was “very much behind” Lt Gen Viggers’ recommendation that the OWP should be extended to injured personnel.

67. The following week, the MOD’s Service Personnel Board (SPB) considered a package of financial and non-financial measures which aimed to replicate the effects of the OWP for in-patients, whether at the RCDM or elsewhere. The SPB was advised that, although the package was “work in progress”, Gen Granville-Chapman was clear that the proposal “cannot bear the delay inherent in the usual staff circulations”.

68. The package, which included the payment of Incidental Expenses to in-patients and an extension to the Dangerously Ill Forwarding of Relatives (DILFOR) scheme, was agreed and implemented by the end of September.

69. The extension of the DILFOR scheme provided for two close family members to visit the permanent residence of a hospitalised Service person, so that they could support the family members there. The DILFOR scheme was extended again in 2008.

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36 Minute VCDS to DCDS(Pers), 23 August 2006, ‘SoS Visit to Headley Court and RCDM’.
38 Minute Randall to Fleet-NLM DACOS PPA, 27 September 2006, ‘Extension of DILFOR Travel Arrangements to the Families of Service Personnel who are Hospitalized’; Minute Randall to Fleet-NLM DACOS PPA, 27 September 2006, ‘Payment of Incidental Expenses to Service Personnel who are Hospitalized’.
to allow multiple journeys to and from a hospital if the family was unable to remain at the bedside.\(^{39}\)

\section*{70.} In early October, there was considerable press coverage of alleged verbal abuse of military patients at Selly Oak hospital by members of the public.\(^{40}\)

\section*{71.} On 24 October, the SPB assessed that action to establish a Military Managed Ward (MMW) at RCDM Selly Oak was “well in hand”, and that:

“Security had been the biggest issue, and a weekly meeting was now in place between the local police (who have security primacy), MOD Police, RCDM and NHS Staffs.”\(^{41}\)

\section*{72.} General Sir Richard Dannatt made his first visit to RCDM Selly Oak as Chief of the General Staff (CGS) in December.\(^{42}\) He reported to Air Chief Marshal Jock Stirrup, Chief of the Defence Staff, that while progress was being made, the “whole ‘system’ for dealing with those wounded on operations, once back in the UK, has been allowed to sink to such a woefully inadequate level that the task to rebuild it … is huge”. He identified two underlying problems:

\begin{itemize}
  \item RCDM was principally focused on delivering trained medical staff, rather than treating the wounded.
  \item The MOD had implicitly accepted that the NHS level of care was “good enough” for Service Personnel. That was reasonable for clinical care, but not for other issues such as the nurse to patient ratio, access to specialist units, and food.
\end{itemize}

\section*{73.} Gen Dannatt concluded that efforts to establish an MMW needed to be re-invigorated and, more fundamentally, that the MOD should “operationalise” Selly Oak as a Role 4 military medical facility.

\section*{74.} The MMW reached Initial Operating Capability in December 2006 and Full Operating Capability in July 2007, when it comprised 39 medical Service Personnel (compared with 12 in summer 2006):

\begin{itemize}
  \item 11 orthopaedic nurses;
  \item 15 general nurses; and
  \item 13 healthcare assistants.\(^{43}\)
\end{itemize}

\section*{75.} Gen Dannatt visited the MMW at Selly Oak on 22 June 2007 and reported that it was “at last moving in the right direction”.\(^{44}\) Clinical care, welfare support and administration were better led and co-ordinated, and there was a greater sense of

\begin{itemize}
  \item Paper MOD, June 2010, ‘Operational Welfare Enhancements as at June 2010’.
  \item Daily Mail, 5 October 2006, \textit{Calls for ‘military-wards’ to protect troops from abuse.}
  \item Minutes, 24 October 2004 Service Personnel Board meeting.
  \item Minute Dannatt to CDS, December 2006, ‘CGS Visit to RDCM Selly Oak: 6 December 06’.
  \item Paper MOD, 28 June 2010, ‘Medical Input to Ainsworth Brief’.
  \item Minute Dannatt to VCDS, 26 June 2007, ‘Visit to Selly Oak – 2 Jun 07’.
\end{itemize}
urgency, although “we should not take any satisfaction in reaching what is only the basic
level of care that our wounded servicemen deserve”.

76. The challenge now was to ensure that clinical, welfare and administrative support
was delivered to injured personnel in a holistic manner wherever they were in the
healthcare system.

77. In February 2008, the House of Commons Defence Committee described the clinical
care for Service Personnel injured on operations as “second to none”.\(^{45}\) The Committee
commented, however, that “many of the improvements … are relatively recent, and
there has been a great deal of change over the past 18 months. The MOD should not be
complacent: they have had to learn important lessons and it is now clear that the picture
at Selly Oak was not always so positive.”

78. Specific issues cited in the report included the provision of toiletries and basic
clothing for Service Personnel, travel assistance for the families of injured Service
Personnel, and accommodation for the relatives of parents. The report stated that
improvements were taking place, but “some of the slack had been taken up by
welfare organisations”.

79. Mr Adam Ingram, Minister for the Armed Forces from 2001 to 2007, told the Inquiry:

“It became very clear early on that there was a problem at Selly Oak. It wasn’t the
question of the quality of the medical care. It was the fact that they were in mixed
[military/civilian] wards. You had soldiers who had been attended to by civilian
nurses, civilian doctors and in the next bed there may well be a civilian injured
person or old person.

“That became a big issue. My instinct initially was … that if I was injured, I just
wanted the best medical care …

“But, as a result of a number of visits, Ministerial visits, it became abundantly clear
we needed to do other things. So progressively, the number of military personnel,
in terms of the medical care, changed …”\(^{46}\)

80. Lt Gen Lillywhite told the Inquiry:

“It quickly became apparent that returning casualties actually wanted to be looked
after by the military …

“Although at no stage … was the clinical care of casualties coming back from Iraq
compromised, there was an unhappiness amongst the patients themselves and their
relatives about the lack of military involvement in both their care, although actually
much more so in their welfare support.

\(^{45}\) Seventh Report from the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session 2007-2008, Medical Care
for the Armed Forces, HC327, pages 3 and 13.
\(^{46}\) Public hearing, 16 July 2010, page 49.
“So there was a period when the plan, which was working, was not in accord with what people had expected or wanted. So that led to a significant period of adverse press and internal adverse press as well, whilst both the medical services, but even more so the chain of command, organised themselves to actually provide that military bubble around the care in the hospital.”

81. Lt Gen Lillywhite told the Inquiry that, while establishing a “military bubble” – such as the MMW – around a military patient did not improve the quality of clinical care, “one should not underestimate the beneficial impact upon recovery, upon family dynamics, and upon psychological wellbeing of actually being content”. He added that the importance of continuing to provide a military bubble during treatment was one of the main lessons learned by DMS and the MOD from Iraq.

**Improvements at Headley Court**

82. The facilities at DMRC Headley Court had been significantly enhanced by the end of Op TELIC, including through:

- the opening of a Complex Rehabilitation and Amputee Unit in June 2006: a contract was let to a private company that manufactured individually tailored prosthetics on site;
- construction of a 30-bed temporary ward annex, which was brought into use in May 2007;
- construction of a 58-bed staff and patient accommodation block (Wood House) in January 2009; and
- the opening of the Centre for Mental and Cognitive Health, to provide mental health and clinical psychology services, in spring 2009.

83. In May 2008, Ministers announced £24m in capital funding over four years for a Headley Court development programme. Over the first two years, this funding was mainly applied to the MOD contribution to the “Help for Heroes” rehabilitation complex (which was officially opened in June 2010) and a utilities upgrade for the whole site.

84. Lt Gen Lillywhite told the Inquiry that, while Headley Court was a “centre of excellence”, it was also “the greatest area of risk in actually managing casualties”. The first risk area was its capacity:

“We were seeing far more cases that needed in-patient care in beds than we had ever seen probably since Korea … and the capacity of Headley Court was not sufficient to have met it. Luckily, the building programme, the temporary ward, the

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47 Public hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 33-34.
50 [Paper MOD, 28 June 2010, ‘Medical Input to Ainsworth Brief’](#).
relationships with the local planning authority, enabled us just to keep ahead of the surge. A close run thing, I think, but we kept ahead of the surge.”

85. The second risk area was the building itself:

“Headley Court is a fine listed building, which had in essence for many years treated sports injuries, complex sports injuries, but not open wounds. What we have started doing in this conflict is starting rehabilitation ever earlier, with significant success. But it posed risk in the type of surroundings that they were being managed in, in that Headley Court was not set up to look after cases that were open wounds or complex medication that required ongoing non-rehabilitation specialist care.”

86. The Inquiry visited Headley Court in October 2010, and spoke to a number of members of staff and Iraq veterans. Members of staff told the Inquiry that it would be helpful if they were given more forewarning about deliberate operations with potential for high casualties.

87. In early October 2006, Gen Dannatt directed Major General Mark Mans, the Deputy Adjutant General (DAG), to lead an assessment of in-Service welfare provision to see where improvements could be made. Gen Dannatt directed that the assessment should include discussions with the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Families Association (SSAFA) on bringing back SSAFA Social Workers.

88. Maj Gen Mans replied to Gen Dannatt on 30 November, recommending that he should:

- invite the SSAFA to:
  - provide short-stay hostels for families at Selly Oak and Headley Court;
  - provide additional support for vulnerable Service leavers;
  - provide enhanced support for Service parents of children with disabilities and special needs; and
  - provide enhanced adoption services;
- enhance the current Army Welfare Service (AWS) structure with additional Civil Service Social Workers and Welfare Workers; and
- invite DCDS(Personnel) to organise a “wide-ranging, tri-Service, Ministerially-led” conference to increase understanding of welfare and healthcare support to the ex-Service community.

89. Maj Gen Mans advised that the AWS, like the rest of the Army, was “running hot”. The “heavy burden” of operational commitments and increased casualties had led to a 20 percent increase in the AWS’s workload over the past year. Using Civil Service (rather than SSAFA) Social Workers would give the AWS access to an established and

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52 Public hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 40-41.
53 Minute DAG to CGS, 30 November 2006, ‘Welfare and Aftercare’.
trained delivery network with a national footprint. SSAFA could be best deployed to provide support on discrete activities to specific groups.

90. Lt Gen Mans advised colleagues in December 2006 that Gen Dannatt considered it was timely to hold a wide-ranging conference on welfare and aftercare provision for Service leavers and veterans, “[a]gainst a background of changing operational imperatives, high commitment levels and evolving welfare demands, as well as a steadily declining knowledge and consciousness amongst the public and in the media of military needs and expectations during and after service”.54

91. The Tri-Service Welfare Conference was held in April 2007.55

92. Gen Dannatt wrote in his autobiography that although no major decisions were taken at the conference, “all those present were left in no doubt that those of us at the top of the organisation [the MOD] knew what the problems were, understood them, and had a determined commitment to tackle them”.56

The role of charitable organisations

In the UK, charitable organisations have traditionally played an important role in providing care to Service Personnel and veterans, often working closely with the MOD, the NHS and the private sector.

Lt Gen Lillywhite told the Inquiry that the MOD welcomed the involvement of charitable organisations (although it might not always agree with their approach):

“They all have a desire to actually progress the care of Servicemen … and they actually contribute significantly to; one, promoting the cause of particularly the ex-Servicemen; secondly, they are quite good at challenging us on what we are doing or not doing; and thirdly, they often bring a degree of expertise or approach that we might not otherwise have recognised.

“… it is a complex relationship but they are an essential part, in my view, of our society in terms of actually ensuring that veterans in particular, but to a lesser extent, serving soldiers, get the appropriate care that they require.”57

In his autobiography, Gen Dannatt described how, in 2007, charitable organisations became increasingly involved in military medical and welfare issues, as the number of casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan grew and the “fragility of the … arrangements for our seriously injured become painfully apparent”.58 That fragility related not to clinical care, which was excellent, but to the broader support that was available to injured personnel and their families.

57 Public hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 70-72.
Gen Dannatt wrote that the increasing involvement of charitable organisations was, in his view, not a response to “a challenge thrown down by the Government, merely evidence that the nation was beginning to get behind its soldiers and their families”.

**Handling complex cases**

93. Lt Gen Lillywhite told the Inquiry that survival rates improved significantly over the course of Op TELIC. He also highlighted the increasing number of Service Personnel with “complex injuries” that would be seen in civilian life extremely rarely, and for which civilian medical and social services have not been set up to manage.

94. Lt Gen Lillywhite also told the Inquiry that since the start of the Iraq conflict, the MOD had taken a more flexible approach to determining the appropriate date for discharge, which now depended on the individual’s circumstances. He described that to be “a compassionate response to … very, very serious injuries and sometimes family situations”.

95. A particular challenge was managing the transfer of care from the military system to the NHS, when an individual with complex injuries was discharged. The military system was holding onto casualties for longer, and in some cases to a point where it did not have all the capability required to care for the individual. However, at that same point, the NHS was not set up to provide the comprehensive care that was required. Lt Gen Lillywhite commented:

“So arranging that care package requires individual persuasion, discussion, debate, with the local authorities in the place where that individual is at home. Of course, the issue of funding can then come into it …

“So the ongoing care of the complex casualty is throwing up issues that we have not seen before.”

96. Lt Gen Lillywhite suggested that individuals with complex injuries should be treated by the Government as a group with specific clinical needs, in recognition of their service and on clinical grounds to enable specialist care to be arranged and provided more consistently. He subsequently stated:

“I had general agreement when I was in office that that was what was required, but it needs giving effect to, and there are ongoing issues that can be only addressed

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60 Public hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 52-53.
61 Public hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 47-49.
62 Public hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 41-42.
in my view by treating them as a group … for example, giving them the advanced prostheses in the future, giving them access to new techniques that are becoming available as a result of research."  

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**Clinical developments during Op TELIC**

The MOD told the Inquiry that it had identified five major “lessons” from the provision of medical care during Op TELIC, and had incorporated those lessons into its medical procedures. The lessons were:

- **Novel haemostatics.** Experience during Op TELIC showed that control of catastrophic bleeding in the first 10 minutes after wounding led to a significant improvements in mortality and morbidity rates. New blood clotting agents, the Combat Applied Tourniquet, and an improved First Field dressing were introduced to arrest the flow of blood more effectively.

- **Medical Emergency Response Teams (MERTs).** Experience during Op TELIC led to the creation of Immediate Response Teams (IRTs), to deliver medical care at the point of wounding. The concept was developed into MERTs, which deliver consultant-led, pre-hospital emergency care.

- **The introduction of a more capable “ground evacuation platform” (based on the Mastiff) which improved soldiers’ confidence in the casualty evacuation chain and significantly improved the delivery of medical care during evacuation.**

- **The introduction of digital imaging which allowed casualties to be diagnosed more quickly and more accurately.**

- **The development of an enhanced system for capturing medical data from all parts of the operational medical chain which improved casualty care and treatment regimes.**

The Inquiry asked Lt Gen Lillywhite what the MOD had learned from Op TELIC about trauma care. Lt Gen Lillywhite highlighted three areas:

- how to save life at the point of injury, including through the use of haemostatic dressings and massive transfusion protocols;

- how to sustain the quality of life of seriously injured individuals into the long term; and

- pain management.

Lt Gen Lillywhite added that those advances, and others, were being transferred to civilian medicine.

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65 Public hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 24-27.
Support for mental health

Research into the physical and psychological health of Operation TELIC personnel

97. Following a meeting of the Veterans Task Force on 10 April 2003, and as major combat operations in Iraq continued, Dr Lewis Moonie, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence, discussed with MOD officials the value of initiating a long-term study of the health of Op TELIC veterans.66

98. In early May, an MOD official asked Dr Moonie to agree that the UK Government should support a large-scale programme of research on the physical and psychological health of personnel deployed on Op TELIC.67 The cost could not yet be precisely estimated, but could be around £3m.

99. The official commented that the UK Government had moved “far too late” to initiate research programmes after the 1990/1991 Gulf Conflict, leading to a loss of trust from veterans and the public:

“By the time we [the Government] responded concern was widespread and the idea of a ‘Gulf War Syndrome’, for which there is still no scientific evidence, had taken root.

“We therefore need to act early this time and put in place as soon as possible a robust programme of research … and respond as necessary.”

100. Dr Moonie agreed that recommendation.68

101. The MOD subsequently commissioned the King’s Centre for Military Health Research (the King’s Centre) at King’s College London to undertake a large-scale epidemiological study into the physical and psychological health of personnel deployed on Op TELIC.69 The “primary objectives” of the study were:

- to assess the physical and psychological health of personnel deployed on Op TELIC in comparison with personnel not deployed on Op TELIC; and
- to ascertain whether an “Iraqi War Syndrome” had emerged following deployment, similar to the Gulf War Syndrome.

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102. Secondary objectives included:

- to compare the health of Regular and Reservist Personnel; and
- to assess risk-taking behaviours (alcohol consumption and risky driving) in personnel deployed on Op TELIC.

103. In December 2003, the MOD published a report on lessons it had drawn from operations in Iraq. The report provided a brief update on the King’s College work, and concluded that “to date, we are not aware of any unusual pattern of ill-health in returning personnel”.

104. The initial findings of the King’s College research were published in May 2006.

Over-Arching Review of Operational Stress Management


The OROSM defined six steps in operational stress management:

- pre-service entry beliefs and attitudes;
- in-service training and promotion courses for career development;
- pre-deployment;
- operational deployment;
- post-operational recovery; and
- on discharge from the Armed Forces.

Implementation and delivery of operational stress management within that framework remained the responsibility of the individual Services.

The OROSM clearly identified operational stress management as a management, rather than a medical, responsibility.

Decompression

105. Over the course of Op TELIC, in addition to the requirement for a period of “normalisation” at the end of an operational tour, commanders increasingly opted for their units to undertake a formal period of decompression at the end of an operational tour, as part of post-operational stress management.

106. Decompression involved “placing groups into a structured and – critically – monitored environment in which to begin winding down and rehabilitating to a normal, routine, peacetime environment”. Any individual considered to be vulnerable to any form

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71 Minute DCDS(Pers) to VCDS, July 2007, ‘Decompression’.
of post-operative stress should be identified, so that the appropriate support could be provided as the individuals passed through the demobilisation process.\footnote{Minute DCDS(Pers) to MA/USoS [MOD], December 2006, ‘Management of Personnel Returning from High Intensity Operations’.}

107. The MOD assessed that decompression was best suited to formed teams and units.\footnote{Minute DCDS(Pers) to VCDS, July 2007, ‘Decompression’.} Where possible, units should include individual augmentees (including Reservists) in their decompression arrangements. In the cases of individuals who were not available for the decompression period, the “clinically relevant” elements of the decompression process could be covered by pre-departure briefings and the subsequent normalisation period.

108. For Army units on Op TELIC, decompression usually took place in Cyprus over a period of 36 hours.


110. By July 2007, the MOD’s policy was that formed units should have a period of decompression unless a formal application to opt out had been agreed by the chain of command.\footnote{Minute DCDS(Pers) to VCDS, July 2007, ‘Decompression’.} Air Marshal (AM) David Pocock, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel), advised Gen Granville-Chapman that, in the absence of evidence of “clinical efficacy”, the policy was based on the “military judgement” that decompression promoted adjustment and re-integration into a normal environment.

111. In August 2010, the MOD produced an analysis of Op TELIC from a Land perspective.\footnote{Report Land Command, 31 August 2010, ‘Operations in Iraq: An Analysis from a Land Perspective’.} The analysis stated that many units reported that individual augmentees and members of the TA could “fall between the cracks” and not carry out decompression. Some units reported that members of the TA could not remain with the unit during normalisation when it took place in the unit’s barracks, and therefore went home.

112. The MOD concluded:

“… a debate remains to be had about whether the main effort for Reservists should be to return them to civilian life as quickly as possible or extend their period in mobilised service to effect full normalisation … What is vital is to ensure that all TA Personnel are given adequate transition back to civilian life, and this includes important information on where to get assistance if he/she needs it. POSM [Post-Operational Stress Management] must continue through their chain of command.”
Variations in the level of support after an operational deployment

113. The Inquiry heard from a number of veterans and witnesses that the level of support received by personnel returning from Op TELIC varied significantly.

114. The Inquiry asked Lieutenant General Sir Alistair Irwin, Adjutant General from 2003 to 2005, whether he was aware of that variation and, if so, what was done to address it.\(^\text{77}\) He told the Inquiry:

“… we were aware that there were varying standards … That was obviously a worry because, where the standard was good, that was fine. Where the standard was not good, then something clearly needed to be done about it.

“So there was a constant interchange between my people, who were producing the advice, the guidance, the policy, and the people who were actually delivering these things, which were … the welfare staffs … the field Army and the chain of command.

“… there was, amongst us all collectively, a desire to deliver as good a product as we could for those who needed it but, when it boils down to it, when you have a complex machine that consists of over 100,000 individual people, you can be absolutely certain, no matter what it is that you do, that there will be people who one way or another don’t live up to the standard required.

“So much to the regret of all of us involved, there were unquestionably people who weren’t looked after as well as they should have been. There is no doubt about that and each one of them represents, in some degree or another, a failure.

“I hope, though … without in any way wanting to sound complacent about it, that that number was probably relatively small.”

115. Lt Gen Irwin agreed that those individuals were more likely to have returned to environments without significant military support around them, including Reservists returning to civilian life and Regular Personnel living away from barracks.

116. Vice Admiral Peter Wilkinson, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel) from 2007, told the Inquiry:

“Certainly, when we started the campaign, we were much more adept at looking after the large, formed units than we were on those individuals who had either gone out as single staff or on an augmentee basis.

“I think, as we have gained greater experience of the operation and of the likely pressures on the troops, then we have become more adept and more proactive at looking after their likely needs.”\(^\text{78}\)

\(^\text{77}\) Public hearing, 21 July 2010, pages 29-31.
\(^\text{78}\) Public hearing, 19 July 2010, page 24.
First reports from the King’s Centre study

117. Professor Simon Wessely and Professor Christopher Dandeker presented the early findings of the King’s Centre study to the 25 May 2005 meeting of the Service Personnel Board (SPB). The record of the meeting reported:

“The initial observations suggest that for Regulars, there was no Iraqi War syndrome, no increases in general mental health problems and PTSD [Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder], or increases in alcohol intake. These observations were different to Op GRANBY [the 1990/1991 Gulf Conflict]. For Reservists, there have been increases in general mental health problems and a doubling of PTSD, but no increase in alcohol intake.”

118. Two papers from the King’s Centre study into the physical and psychological health of personnel deployed on Op TELIC were published in May 2006.

119. The first paper concluded that for Regular Personnel, deployment to Iraq had not, so far, been associated with significantly worse health outcomes, apart from a modest effect on multiple physical symptoms. There was, however, evidence of a clinically and statistically significant effect on the health of Reservists, in relation to PTSD symptoms, multiple physical symptoms, and general perceptions of health.

120. The second paper concluded that there had been no substantial increase in symptomatic ill-health amongst members of the Regular Armed Forces who had taken part in the invasion of Iraq, and there was no pattern suggestive of a new syndrome. That finding was in contrast to the situation after the 1990/1991 Gulf Conflict, when a substantial increase in symptomatic ill-health had been observed.

121. On 16 May, Mr Tom Watson, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence, set the conclusions of the papers and the Government’s response in a written statement to Parliament:

“… a small but measurable number of Reservists (when compared either with Regulars who did deploy or Reservists who did not deploy) are showing some increased health effects as a result of deployment – particularly for common mental disorders (such as anxiety, depression and stress), post traumatic stress disorder and fatigue. It remains the case, though, that the reported rates of indicators of common mental ill-health for both Reservists and Regulars are broadly of the same order as found in the general UK population.”

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79 Minutes, 25 May 2005, Service Personnel Board meeting.
82 House of Commons, *Official Report*, 16 May 2006, column 43WS.
122. Mr Watson described the issue of Reservists’ mental health as the “key finding” of the study, advised that the Government was already monitoring the issue closely and looking at possible solutions, and announced that the Government would introduce an enhanced post-operational mental health programme for recently demobilised Reservists later in the year.

123. Lt Gen Lillywhite told the Inquiry that there might be several reasons why Reservists might suffer more from mental health issues:

- less preparatory training throughout their careers than Regular Personnel;
- a less supportive environment for the families of Reservists than for Regular Personnel;
- a less robust selection process; and
- an absence of “ongoing support from their peers” when Reservists left the military environment and returned to civilian life.83

124. The King’s Centre study was extended in 2006 into a second phase (2007 to 2010), and broadened to include all subsequent Iraq deployments and deployments to Afghanistan.84

Reserves Mental Health Programme

125. In November 2006, in response to the findings of the King’s Centre study, the MOD launched the Reserves Mental Health Programme (RMHP), to provide enhanced mental healthcare to current and former Reservists who had been demobilised since 1 January 2003 following deployment on an overseas operation.85

126. The RMHP provided a mental health assessment and, if appropriate, out-patient treatment at one of the MOD’s Departments of Community Mental Health (DCMHs). In-patient treatment was provided through the NHS.

127. The MOD assessed that there could be, in the worse case, a “backlog” of 680 individuals (who had been demobilised since 1 January 2003 and who had concerns over their mental health), who would be referred to the RMHP when it launched.86 Thereafter the RMHP was expected to receive 75 referrals a year.

128. A 2011 study concluded that the RMHP was an effective method of treatment for those who accessed it.87

84 Paper MOD, 29 June 2010, ‘Veterans Mental Health’.
Concerns over mental health issues, late 2006

129. Section 16.1 describes the concerns of General Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff (CGS) from August 2006, that the Army was “running hot” and the military covenant was out of balance.88

130. Gen Dannatt visited Iraq in late September 2006.89 His report to Air Chief Marshal Jock Stirrup, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), highlighted the psychological welfare of Service Personnel as one area where action was required:

“I was concerned to hear that there had been 99 referrals to the Field Mental Health Team from 20 Bde alone during their tour. This number seems high, though I suspect as people start returning to Iraq (or Afghanistan) for the third or fourth time it will not be atypical. I am aware … that we do not equip our soldiers as well as we might during their pre-deployment training for the combat stress of operations. I am discussing this with AG [the Adjutant General, Lt Gen Viggers], and we will shortly be taking steps to improve our commanders’ understanding of, and ability to deal with, psychiatric casualties in theatre. I will ensure that this work informs DCDS(Personnel)’s Overarching Review of Operational Stress Management.

“I am less sanguine, however, about what happens to psychological casualties evacuated back to UK – in the case of 20 Bde about 20 individuals. As I understand it, once in the UK these casualties are managed by The Priory, a civilian contractor, for psychiatric treatment. Not only do we tend to lose track of these casualties thereafter, but I feel intuitively that rustication from a military environment is hardly the best way to treat all but the very worst of our stress casualties. Indeed, experience from recent major conflicts tells us that soldiers suffering from combat stress are best treated in as military an environment as possible. Once the psychological props of discipline, esprit de corps, ethos and humour are removed, the road to recovery for stress casualties grows that much longer. Now that we have decided, quite rightly, to run RCDM Birmingham on more military lines,90 we should at least ask ourselves similar questions over our care of psychiatric casualties.”

131. Gen Dannatt subsequently tasked Major General Mark Mans, the Deputy Adjutant General (DAG), to address those concerns.91

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88 Letter Dannatt to Browne, 31 August 2006, [untitled].
89 Minute Dannatt to CDS, 2 October 2006, ‘CGS’ Visit to Iraq: 26-28 Sep 06’.
90 A reference to the decision to establish a Military Managed Ward at Selly Oak hospital.
132. Mr Ingram visited Iraq from 30 September to 1 October. His Private Secretary reported that three concerns had been raised with Mr Ingram with regard to "psychiatric treatment":

- There was an “apparent upward trend (if not surge)” in the number of people requiring support in the second half of six-month tours.
- The US provided “significantly more in-theatre welfare/counselling support” than the UK (although the US deployed personnel for longer than the UK).
- Personnel evacuated back to the UK to receive treatment at The Priory had, from their unit’s perspective, been “lost’ for weeks at a time”.

133. Maj Gen Mans replied to Gen Dannatt on 30 November, advising that:

- The high level of psychiatric casualties being referred to the Field Mental Health Team (FMHT) was a positive feature rather than a cause for concern, as it reflected a willingness by personnel to consult the FMHT. The number of personnel evacuated from theatre was lower than might be expected from the number of referrals to the FMHT.
- The current system for providing care for personnel evacuated from theatre with mental health problems (treatment at The Priory and/or the MOD’s Departments of Community Mental Health) conformed to psychiatric best practice. The recently activated RMHP would also help.
- Regarding commanders’ understanding of and ability to deal with psychiatric issues, the OROSM had recommended that personnel receive stress management training at points throughout their career. This recommendation had been partially implemented; full implementation required resources and training time.

134. In November, Mr Derek Twigg, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence, expressed his concern that the MOD was not providing a “comprehensive rehabilitation package” for personnel returning from operations.

135. AM Pocock responded in December. He advised that a forecast that the current downward trend in Road Traffic Accidents would stall, and a recent King’s Centre paper indicating an increased tendency towards risk-taking behaviour after deployment, both supported Mr Twigg’s “nagging concern” that the MOD might not be providing the support that personnel (including Regulars, Reservists, formed units, individuals, and individuals who had been medically evacuated) required.

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92 Minute PS/Min(AF) [MOD] to MA/CJO, 4 October 2006, ‘Iraq: Minister (AF)’s Visit 30 Sept – 1 Oct ’06’.
93 Minute DAG to CGS, 30 November 2006, ‘Welfare and Aftercare’.
136. AM Pocock set out the six-step process defined by the MOD’s Operational Stress Management Policy and highlighted the role of decompression as one element of step 5 (post-operational recovery). Work to evaluate the effectiveness of decompression was under way.

137. In July 2007, AM Pocock advised Gen Granville-Chapman that, following the 2005 OROSM review, the MOD’s policy on operational stress management was “both comprehensive and robust”. The MOD had now undertaken an analysis within the three Services and the Civil Service of how much training for operational stress was available and how effective it was. This “gap analysis” indicated that the three Services “already do much to address [operational stress management] training needs”. A bid for resources to plug the gaps, including the wider implementation of the Royal Marines’ Trauma Risk Management programme proposed by the Army, would be submitted.

**Trauma Risk Management**

138. In 2008, the Armed Forces rolled out Trauma Risk Management (TRiM) in all three Services.

139. Lt Gen Lillywhite described TRiM as a form of debriefing after a traumatic event, but undertaken in peer groups rather than by an external counsellor. The person who was leading the debriefing was taught to identify whether their colleagues were under stress and might need referral elsewhere.

**Further findings from the King’s Centre study**

140. Further reports from the King’s Centre study in 2009 and 2010 reported that:

- There was no increase in mental health problems in Regular Personnel serving in Iraq or Afghanistan, compared with Regular Personnel not deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan.
- The rate of symptoms of PTSD remained “relatively low” among Regular Personnel deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan; estimates ranged between 1.3 and 4.8 percent following deployment. The rate of symptoms of PTSD in the general UK population was approximately 3 percent.
- Between 16 and 20 percent of Regular Personnel reported common mental disorders, such as depression and anxiety. This was similar to the rate in the general UK population.

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96 Minute DCDS(Pers) to VCDS, July 2007, ‘Decompression’.
98 Traumatic events might include sudden death, serious injury, near misses and overwhelming distress when dealing with disaster relief and body handling.
Alcohol misuse was a common problem among Regular Personnel deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. In the first phase of the King’s Centre study (2003 to 2006), only “combat troops” were found to have a higher prevalence of alcohol misuse following deployment to Iraq. Later analyses showed a higher prevalence of alcohol misuse among all Regular Personnel who were deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, regardless of their role on deployment.

“Combat troops” deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan showed a small but significant increase in the risk of symptoms of PTSD compared with non-combat troops. Approximately 7 percent of combat troops had symptoms of PTSD following deployment.

Reservists deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan were at a higher risk of reporting symptoms of PTSD, when compared with Reservists not deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. The King’s Centre commented that many factors could contribute to the excess of mental ill-health observed in deployed Reservists, including their relative inexperience of combat operations, lower unit cohesion, and problems in the home and work environment during or after deployment. The King’s Centre also commented that despite the introduction of measures focused on helping Reservists (including the RMHP and better support for Reservists’ families), the excess of mental health problems (specifically PTSD) observed among Reservists deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan was “disappointingly persistent”.

Multiple deployments were not consistently associated with an increased risk of mental health problems. However, the cumulative duration of deployments did affect mental health; if troops deployed for more than 13 months over a three-year period they were at increased risk of mental health problems, particularly an increased risk of PTSD symptoms. The King’s Centre commented that the finding supported the MOD’s Harmony Guidelines for Army Personnel. Ensuring that the Guidelines were not exceeded could help to reduce the risk of mental health problems in the UK’s Regular forces.

Regular Personnel were at increased risk of alcohol misuse and PTSD symptoms where the tour length was extended during the deployment itself.100

The King’s Centre concluded:

“Despite extended campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the prevalence of mental disorders in the UK’s Armed Forces remains low. PTSD is in fact an issue for a relatively small proportion of military personnel. Of particular concern, however, are the high levels of alcohol misuse in Regulars, the mental health of combat troops and also the mental health of Reservists. These three issues require attention over the coming years.”

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The Harmony Guidelines and mental health

Professor Christopher Dandeker, Professor of Military Sociology at King’s College London and Co-Director of the King’s Centre for Military Health Research, told the House of Commons Defence Committee in March 2008 that:

“… so far as our own research is concerned … I think that the Harmony Guidelines have been well constructed because the evidence suggests that if you stay within them they [Service Personnel] do not suffer; if you go beyond them there is a 20 to 50 percent likelihood that they will suffer in terms of PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder].” 101

In his evidence to the Inquiry, Air Marshal David Pocock, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel) from 2005 to 2007, questioned whether Professor Dandeker was right to suggest that the Harmony Guidelines were an appropriate basis for assessing the effect of operational deployment on individuals. 102 The Guidelines had been derived in a straightforward way from the planning assumptions used in SDR 98 (‘what operations have we got? How many people have we got? … that means that they can spend this long away’). AM Pocock said that his focus had been on the broader relationship between time deployed on operations and the risk of mental health issues.

142. The Inquiry asked Lt Gen Lillywhite how the MOD’s approach to mental health had changed over the course of Op TELIC. 103

143. Lt Gen Lillywhite told the Inquiry that the “perennial challenge” was to overcome the stigma associated with mental health issues:

“A lot of effort has gone into educating both commanders and individuals that psychological adverse effects is not something that needs to be hidden. We have not fully succeeded, nor has any other nation, and neither has the civilian population. Mental health continues to have a stigma amongst many that actually inhibits its presenting for care early.”

144. Lt Gen Lillywhite highlighted the introduction of a decompression period after an operational deployment and TRiM, as two significant developments in the MOD’s approach to supporting mental health.

Compensation

145. The MOD provided compensation to Service Personnel who suffered from illness or injury, including mental health problems.


102 Public hearing, 19 July 2010, pages 68-70.

103 Public hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 55-57.
146. For illnesses and injuries caused before 6 April 2005, compensation was provided under two separate compensation arrangements, the War Pensions Scheme (WPS) and the Armed Forces Pension Scheme 1975 (AFPS 75).

147. In September 2003, after a consultative process which began in 2001, the Government announced that it would introduce a new Armed Forces Pension Scheme (AFPS 05) (see Section 16.1) and a new compensation scheme. The new compensation scheme would be introduced in April 2005 and would replace provisions under the War Pensions Scheme and attributable benefits under AFPS 75.

148. Mr Ivor Caplin, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence, told Parliament that the new compensation scheme would have “more focus on the more severely disabled” and would provide a lump-sum payment for “pain and suffering” – a benefit that was not available under the current arrangements.

149. The new compensation scheme – the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme (AFCS) – was introduced on 6 April 2005. The AFCS:

- Provided compensation for any injury, illness or death which was caused by service on or after 6 April 2005. That included injury or illness which occurred while participating in a “service related activity”, such as organised sport.
- Covered all current and former members of the Armed Forces, including Reservists. For the first time, serving members of the Armed Forces could make claims.
- In the event of service-related death, paid benefits to eligible partners and children. An eligible partner was described as “someone with whom you are cohabiting in an exclusive and substantial relationship, with financial and wider dependence”.
- Provided lump sum payments and, for the most severe injuries and illnesses, Guaranteed Income Payments (GIPs) to provide a regular income stream. Those payments were made according to a comprehensive tariff reflecting, for lump-sum payments, the severity of the injury or illness and, for GIPs, estimated loss of future earnings. The most severe injuries and illnesses qualified for a lump-sum payment of £285,000.
- Used the balance of probabilities standard of proof, in line with similar schemes for civil claims.

150. Public concern over the level of compensation paid to injured Service Personnel grew in autumn 2007, following press coverage of the compensation awarded to Lance Bombardier Ben Parkinson. Lance Bombardier Parkinson was severely injured in

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104 House of Commons, Official Report, 15 September 2003, column 40WS.
Afghanistan, losing both his legs and suffering a brain injury and multiple other serious injuries.\textsuperscript{108} The \textit{BBC} reported that he had been awarded £152,150 in compensation.

\textbf{151.} In February 2008, the MOD amended the AFCS to take account of individuals who had suffered more than one injury in a single incident and to increase the lump-sum payments to those with the most serious multiple injuries (within the £285,000 maximum).\textsuperscript{109} The MOD stated that, when the AFCS was developed, the MOD had not envisaged the “severe, multiple injury cases of the type that are now unfortunately occurring”. The changes enabled the AFCS to respond to that challenge.

\textbf{152.} In July 2008, within the Service Personnel Command Paper, the Government doubled the lump-sum payment for the most serious injuries, from £285,000 to £570,000.\textsuperscript{110} All payments were increased by at least 10 percent. The Government committed to apply those increases retrospectively to all those who had already made claims under the AFCS. GIPs remained unchanged.

\textbf{153.} Mr Ainsworth told the Inquiry that when he pressed for that increase, he had experienced “some resistance” from some officials in the MOD:

“… I can remember a particular official amusing me no end when he told me, ‘You cannot, Minister, double the upfront compensation payment’ … I think he had worked on the scheme for quite some time and was pretty dedicated to it, and he knew some of the other consequences of doubling the upfront payment, [that] potentially it would cause disparities with other people, but my attitude was ‘So what? I can’t defend the level of upfront payment as it exists today and you do not have to, and you are not injured and we are going to double it’, and we did.”\textsuperscript{111}

\textbf{154.} Further increases in lump-sum payments (though not to the maximum amount) and to GIPs, and changes to the operation of the AFCS, were made in 2010 following a review of the AFCS.\textsuperscript{112}

\section*{Support for veterans}

\textbf{155.} In March 2001, the Government launched the Veterans Initiative to identify and address the needs of veterans, in close partnership with ex-Service organisations.\textsuperscript{113} It also announced the appointment of Dr Moonie as the first Minister for Veterans’ Affairs. The Initiative’s priorities included:

\begin{itemize}
  \item co-ordinating the Government’s response to issues affecting veterans;
\end{itemize}

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\textsuperscript{108} BBC, 28 August 2007, \textit{Maimed soldier ‘let down’ by Army}.
\textsuperscript{110} The Nation’s Commitment: Cross-Government Support to our Armed Forces, their Families and Veterans, July 2008, Cm 7424.
\textsuperscript{111} Public hearing, 6 July 2010, pages 25-26.
\textsuperscript{112} Ministry of Defence, \textit{The Review of the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme}, February 2010.
\textsuperscript{113} Standard Note SN/IA/3070, 28 June 2005, ‘Veterans Policy’.
\end{flushright}
16.2 | Support for injured Service Personnel and veterans

- improving communications between veterans and the Government; and
- promoting partnership between the Government and ex-Service organisations.

156. In June 2001, the War Pensions Agency was transferred to the MOD and in April 2002 it was re-launched as the Veterans Agency, with a remit to provide financial and welfare support to all former members of the Armed Forces, their widows/widowers and dependants.

157. The Veterans Agency published the *Strategy for Veterans* in March 2003, to “help ensure” a coherent Government policy and a structured plan of action.\(^{114}\) The Strategy stated that services for veterans were increasingly delivered on a cross-Government basis, or through a partnership between Government and the private or voluntary sectors. Partnerships between Government and the voluntary sector should not detract from the Government’s responsibilities or impinge on charities’ independence.

158. The Veterans Agency published the *Communications Strategy for Veterans* in September 2003, in response to research commissioned by the MOD that indicated that many veterans, members of the general public, and “statutory and charitable service providers” were unaware of the services, advice and support available to veterans.\(^{115}\)

### Mental healthcare for veterans

159. The Medical Assessment Programme (MAP) was established in 1993 to examine veterans of the 1990/1991 Gulf Conflict who were concerned that their health had been adversely affected by their service.\(^{116}\) The majority of cases seen by the MAP were mental health related and the service evolved into a mental health assessment programme. The MAP was extended in 2003 to include Op TELIC veterans.

160. The MAP provided a thorough assessment by a physician with knowledge of veterans’ physical and mental health issues. The physician would provide a report for the referring doctor including any diagnosis made and recommendations for treatment.

161. In July 2003, King’s College London published its final report on the delivery of cross-departmental support and service to veterans.\(^{117}\) The study (which ran from July 2002 to March 2003) had been commissioned by the MOD to examine key areas of need not already addressed under the Veterans Initiative and the *Strategy for Veterans*.\(^{118}\)


\(^{116}\) Paper MOD, 29 June 2010, ‘Veterans Mental Health’.

\(^{117}\) King’s College London, July 2003, *Improving the delivery of cross-departmental support and services for veterans*.

\(^{118}\) Standard Note SN/IA/3070, 28 June 2005, ‘Veterans Policy’. 

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162. Key findings from the study included:

- There was very little published information on the experience of UK veterans.
- For “many (indeed most)” personnel, military life was a positive experience.
- Most veterans did not develop mental health problems as a result of serving in the Armed Forces. The minority of veterans who did, fared badly.
- There had been a decline in “civilian-military understanding”, which adversely affected veterans’ dealings with Local Authorities and Social Services.
- Only half of veterans with mental health problems were currently seeking help. Of those who had sought help, many were receiving anti-depressant therapies but few were receiving specialist advice or treatment.\textsuperscript{119}

**Community mental health pilots**

163. In 2005, following recommendations on mental health services for veterans presented by the independent Health and Social Care Advisory Service (HASCAS), the MOD, in collaboration with the DoH and the Devolved Administrations, launched six community NHS mental health pilots.\textsuperscript{120} The purpose of the pilots was to provide expert, evidence-based assessment and treatment, led by a mental health therapist with an understanding of the issues faced by veterans, and to improve local health professionals’ awareness and understanding of veterans and military life.

164. The first pilot, in Stafford, started in November 2007; the sixth pilot, in Edinburgh, started in April 2009.

**Priority treatment within the NHS**

165. From 1953, it was Government policy that war pensioners (not all ex-Service Personnel) should receive priority examination and treatment within the NHS for the condition for which they received a pension or gratuity.\textsuperscript{121}

166. In spring 2007, in response to a series of Parliamentary questions on the efficacy of the arrangements underpinning that policy, the MOD tasked the Service Personnel and Veterans Agency (SPVA) to record all complaints relating to priority access.

167. In June 2007, a junior MOD official advised Gen Dannatt that the arrangements for ensuring priority access had several “inherent weaknesses”:

- The MOD owned the policy but was reliant on the DoH for delivery. The DoH did not regularly remind NHS clinicians and GPs of the policy. Even when clinicians

\textsuperscript{119} King’s College London, July 2003, *Improving the delivery of cross-departmental support and services for veterans*.

\textsuperscript{120} Paper MOD, 29 June 2010, ‘Veterans Mental Health’.

\textsuperscript{121} Minute MOD [junior officer] to MA1/CGS, 19 June 2007, ‘War Pensioners – Priority in the NHS’.  

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and GPs were aware of the policy, the allocation of priority treatment was determined by a number of factors.

- The arrangement between the MOD and the DoH had never been formalised, but was rather a “gentleman’s agreement”. “Priority access” had never been defined.
- The MOD did not regularly remind war pensioners of their right to priority access.

168. The official stated that the only alternative to the current arrangement, the provision of treatment in the private sector, was unlikely to be affordable. To mitigate the weaknesses of the current arrangement, the MOD’s current level of engagement with the DoH, including at Ministerial level, should be sustained. The information that was now being collected by the SPVA would, in the future, allow better analysis and “evidence-based” action.

169. On 23 November, Mr Alan Johnson, the Health Secretary, and Mr Derek Twigg, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence and the Minister for Veterans, announced that the NHS would provide priority treatment for all veterans (not just those in receipt of war pensions), whose ill-health or injuries were attributed to their military service.¹²²

170. Lt Gen Lillywhite told the Inquiry that the arrangement on priority access was of limited – but some – utility to veterans.¹²³

171. In July 2008, the Government published a command paper entitled *The Nation’s Commitment: Cross-Government Support to our Armed Forces, their Families and Veterans* (known as the *Service Personnel Command Paper*).¹²⁴ The paper contained a number of measures to address the disadvantages experienced by veterans, including:

- a commitment that the standard of prosthetic limbs provided to veterans by the NHS, would match or exceed the standard of limbs provided to injured personnel by the DMS;
- a commitment to raise awareness amongst healthcare professionals of the healthcare needs of veterans;
- funding for supported housing for Service leavers;
- a commitment to fund tuition fees in further and higher education for Service leavers; and
- measures to improve veterans’ access to transport and employment opportunities.

172. The Inquiry’s conclusions and lessons on the care provided to Service Personnel are set out in Section 16.4.

SECTION 16.3

MILITARY FATALITIES AND THE BEREAVED

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Introduction

1. Between 2003 and 2009, 178 British Service Personnel and one Ministry of Defence (MOD) civilian lost their lives serving on Operation TELIC.¹ A breakdown of those fatalities by year is shown in the table below.

2. This Section addresses:
   - the preparations made for repatriating the bodies of those who lost their lives on Op TELIC, and for investigating their deaths;
   - changes to military investigative processes and to the civilian inquest process;
   - the support offered to the next of kin and bereaved families; and
   - how the Government honoured those who lost their lives.

3. This Section does not consider other UK citizens who also lost their lives in Iraq, in a variety of different roles and as the result of hostage-taking.

4. The provision of welfare support for Service Personnel is addressed in Section 16.1.

5. The provision of medical care, in particular for seriously injured personnel, and the support provided to their families, is addressed in Section 16.2.

6. The problems caused by deployments consistently exceeding the Defence Planning Assumptions in respect of the provision of military equipment are addressed in Sections 6.3 and 14.

7. The decision to deploy to Helmand province in Afghanistan, and the implications of that decision, are addressed in Section 9.

Table 1: Service Personnel and MOD civilian fatalities serving on Op TELIC, 2003 to 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Fatalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Planning and preparing for fatalities

Estimates of UK military fatalities

8. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 describe military planning for operations in Iraq.

9. In early September 2002, the MOD estimated that between 31 and 48 Service Personnel would be killed in action during the initial combat phase of operations of an attack on Iraq (and that between 157 and 241 Service Personnel would be admitted to Role 3 hospitals). Those figures excluded possible casualties from chemical and biological warfare.

10. The MOD regularly updated its casualty estimates as the military plan developed. The estimates did not consider casualties beyond the initial combat phase of operations.

11. Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, wrote to Mr Blair on 16 January 2003, recommending that the UK agree a US request to provide a large scale ground force for operations in southern Iraq.

12. Mr Hoon’s advice did not include the estimates of UK military casualties (including fatalities) that had been developed.

13. Mr Blair agreed Mr Hoon’s recommendation the following day.

14. On 3 February, the MOD produced a Casualty Estimate paper for the Chiefs of Staff meeting later that week. The paper stated that:

- There could be between 30 and 50 fatalities in the Land Component.
- There could be between 5 and 9 fatalities in the Air Component.
- No simple estimate could be made of fatalities in the Maritime Component, given the high impact/low probability nature of incidents.
- Fatalities from a “single small-scale but well executed” chemical attack could be between 0 and 96 fatalities, depending on a range of factors including the target, the chemical agent used, and the weather.
- No useful estimate could be made of fatalities from a biological attack in the absence of more specific information about the circumstances of any attack.

15. The Chiefs of Staff concluded on 5 February that the Casualty Estimate paper would need to be shown to Ministers before any decision to commit UK troops was made.

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2 Role 3 (Echelon 3) medical support is generally provided at field hospitals and on hospital ships.
7 Minutes, 5 February 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
16. On 20 February, in response to the publication of a paper, *Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of the Regime*, by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Mr Blair asked for advice on a number of questions, including: “What is our military’s assessment of the likely consequences of an attack on Iraq; i.e. how many casualties; how quickly the collapse?”

17. On 24 February, Mr Peter Watkins, Mr Hoon’s Principal Private Secretary, wrote to Mr Matthew Rycroft, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, advising that the MOD estimated that there would be between 30 and 60 British and between 500 and 1,200 Iraqi “land battle” fatalities. Mr Watkins also advised that work to estimate Iraqi civilian casualties continued.

18. Lord Boyce, Chief of the Defence Staff from 2001 to April 2003, told the Inquiry that Ministers would have been informed of the MOD’s casualty estimates, as part of the routine briefing process.

19. By 1 May, when President Bush declared that major combat operations in Iraq had ended, 33 British Service Personnel had died serving on Op TELIC.

20. Both Lord Boyce and Sir Kevin Tebbit, MOD Permanent Under Secretary from 2001 to 2005, told the Inquiry that the actual number of casualties had been fewer than the MOD had estimated. Sir Kevin commented:

“… as far as casualties are concerned, the assessment was that they would not be any higher than we faced in the Gulf war 12 years earlier. So the figures were relatively ... modest. In the event, they were even lower than that. The uncertainty was ... the possible use of chemical/biological weapons against us. I think the original assessment was that Saddam was unlikely – but we couldn’t rule it out militarily – unlikely to use them early ... but he might use them, and we expected him to use them, as a matter of last resort, which, of course, informed the nature of military planning.”

Repatriation policy

21. Until the Falklands Conflict in 1982, Service Personnel who died on major operations were normally buried in theatre.

22. After the Falklands Conflict, all bereaved families were offered the opportunity to have the bodies of their relatives returned to the UK, largely because of the difficulty

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9 *Minute Rycroft to McDonald, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Political and Military Questions’.*
11 Public hearing, 3 December 2009, page 94.
of travelling to the Falkland Islands to visit their graves. In subsequent operations, it became MOD policy to repatriate bodies to the UK in all but the most exceptional circumstances.

23. The MOD’s policy on the repatriation of the dead was set out in a paper produced by Lieutenant General Anthony Palmer, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Personnel) (DCDS(Personnel)), on 14 March 2003:

“Repatriation to UK of the dead is to take place wherever possible and as soon as practicable.”

24. If fatalities were suspected to have been caused by Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) agents, then repatriation should only proceed once the presence of a CBRN agent had been confirmed or ruled out, and then on the basis of a risk assessment. In certain circumstances, repatriation might require mitigating actions (such as decontamination or special isolation of the body), or the body might need to be officially cremated in theatre with the ashes repatriated. In exceptional circumstances, the body might need to be cremated and permanently buried in theatre.

Preparing to hold civilian inquests

The legal frameworks for inquests

Coroners are independent judicial officers. They are appointed and paid for by the relevant local authority and their officers and staff are employed by the local authority and/or the police.

Coroners in England and Wales had a statutory duty, under Section 8 of the 1988 Coroners Act, to investigate deaths which are reported to them when the body is lying in their district and there is reason to believe that the death was violent or unnatural, or was a sudden death of unknown cause, or in some other circumstances. That duty applied “whether the cause of death arose in his district or not”.

Section 14 of the 1988 Coroners Act provided that, if it appeared to the coroner for the district where a body was lying that the inquest ought to be held by another coroner, then he may request that coroner to assume jurisdiction.

The position in Scotland and Northern Ireland was different.

In Scotland, the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976 required the appropriate procurator fiscal to investigate (through a Fatal Accident Inquiry) any death which occurred within Scotland in the course of an individual’s employment, or in legal custody. The Act also provided for the Lord Advocate to instruct a procurator fiscal to investigate a death if it appeared to him that an investigation would be in the public interest.

16 Coroners Act 1988. The Act was replaced by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
17 Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths (Scotland) Act 1976.
The Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959 provided that coroners in Northern Ireland within whose district a dead body was found, or an unexpected or unexplained death or a death in suspicious and certain other circumstances occurred, “may” hold an inquest.\(^{18}\) The Act also provided for the Advocate General for Northern Ireland to direct that an inquest should be held in other circumstances.

In the case of military deaths overseas, civilian inquests usually took place after the internal military investigation had concluded, although this was not formally required. The military investigation could provide evidence that would be extremely difficult for a coroner to source elsewhere.

25. An MOD official wrote to Mr Nicholas Gardiner, the Coroner for Oxfordshire, on 17 January 2003 to advise him that the Services were currently considering the administration for “potential mass casualties in the event of war”, and that the majority of fatalities might be repatriated to RAF Brize Norton, which fell within his area of responsibility.\(^{19}\) The official asked whether “normal peacetime rules” would apply and specifically whether, if there were a large number of fatalities, he would expect to hold an inquest into each case.

26. Mr Gardiner replied on 20 January, confirming that:

- If the cause of death appeared unnatural, then there would be an inquest. This would normally be held in public.
- Normal practice where there was a single death was to transfer responsibility for the inquest to the “home town coroner”. Where there were a number of deaths in the same incident it was “clearly sensible” for the same coroner to hold those inquests; that would commonly be the coroner for the point of entry.\(^{20}\)

27. Mr Gardiner and officials in the Home Office (the Department which was then responsible for coronial policy) and the MOD worked together during February and March to refine the arrangements for receiving UK fatalities.

28. Mr Gardiner advised a Home Office official on 20 February that he understood that in “contamination cases”, the bodies of deceased Service Personnel would not be returned to the UK.\(^{21}\)

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\(^{18}\) Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959, as amended.
\(^{19}\) Letter MOD [junior official] to Gardiner, 17 January 2003, ‘Handling of Multiple Deaths as a Result of Operations Overseas’.
\(^{20}\) Letter Gardiner to MOD [junior official], 20 January 2003, ‘Foreign Deaths’.
\(^{21}\) Letter Gardiner to Home Office [junior official], 20 February 2003, ‘Service Deaths Overseas’. Mr Gardiner’s letter provides no further details on the nature of those “contamination cases”. The Inquiry believes that Mr Gardiner was referring to casualties from chemical and biological weapons.
29. Mr Gardiner wrote to a Home Office official on 18 March, the day before military operations against Iraq began:

“There are a few matters outstanding but, generally, I think we are reasonably well prepared, although there are bound to be things we have not thought of.”

30. The Home Office issued guidance to all coroners on handling deaths arising from hostilities in Iraq on 26 March. The guidance stated:

• The MOD had advised that, while hostilities lasted, it would not be possible to provide evidence of the incidents on the battlefield which led to injury. In those circumstances, the Home Office recommended that coroners should adjourn inquests pending the conclusion of hostilities. Coroners “could expect to receive in due course advice on when it might be appropriate to consider the resumption of such inquests”.

• Coroners should notify the Home Office “if the numbers of adjourned cases in their jurisdiction seem likely to cause problems in terms of workload”.

31. A Home Office official wrote to Mr Gardiner on 2 April to advise that, while the Home Office appreciated Mr Gardiner’s “willingness to undertake the handling of all these cases”, the extra costs involved would fall to Oxfordshire County Council and they should be invited to agree the commitment that Mr Gardiner was taking on.

32. The official went on to suggest that, “wherever appropriate, it would be better for the substantive inquests to be held by coroners local to the family concerned, as with any other deaths overseas”. While that approach had not been adopted for the inquests into the deaths caused by the 9/11 attack and the Bali bombing, in those cases the deaths all arose from a single incident:

“In the case of Iraq, the deaths are occurring in different places, at different times and in different circumstances. It seems to me, that unless there is good reason to the contrary, single deaths, and multiple deaths arising from the same incident and involving personnel from broadly the same place in England and Wales, ought to be subject to local inquests where the family or families involved can attend conveniently. Inquests into multiple deaths involving individuals from different parts of the country might properly be undertaken by you, unless there seems to be a more appropriate local coroner (e.g. if the deceased were all from the same military base).”

33. Mr Gardiner replied on 4 April, agreeing that it was certainly appropriate for some inquests to be transferred to other coroners. Those would generally be single deaths,

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22 Letter Gardiner to Home Office [junior official], 18 March 2003, [untitled].
24 Letter Home Office [junior official] to Gardiner, 2 April 2003, ‘Section 14 and War Deaths’.
25 Letter Gardiner to Home Office [junior official], 4 April 2003, ‘Section 14 etc’. 

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and multiple deaths where there was a “significant common factor” indicating that an inquest outside of Oxfordshire would be appropriate.

34. Mr Gardiner also agreed that there were “significant financial implications” for his office, and advised that he was copying the exchange to Oxfordshire County Council.

Support for bereaved families

The Casualty Notification Officer and Visiting Officer

35. Lieutenant General Sir Alistair Irwin, the Adjutant General from 2003 to 2005, described the role of a Casualty Notification Officer (CNO) for the Inquiry:

“It is the hope and expectation that those involved [CNOs] will be from the unit but sometimes, particularly if it was an individual based elsewhere, it had to be done by somebody else ... The general principle was that it should be based on the family entity, the military family entity.

“Once the casualty has been identified beyond peradventure and all the details are correct ... the CNO ... has the unenviable task of knocking on the door and presenting the bad news.”

36. Vice Admiral (VAdm) Peter Wilkinson, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel) (DCDS(Personnel)) from 2007, told the Inquiry:

“... it is the very first official contact that a bereaved family has with the MOD or the Armed Services that determines how the journey will go from there. If that official notification is carried out appropriately from all sides, then there is a chance that we may be able to help the family as they go through the grieving and bereavement process. If, for whatever reasons, that initial official contact doesn’t go well, then it is very hard to recover. Sometimes we never do.”

37. Lt Gen Irwin described the role of a Visiting Officer (VO) for the Inquiry:

“... that person [the CNO] then stays with the family until the notified casualty Visiting Officer appears. The CNO, the one who has broken the bad news, then departs the scene and the VO then remains with the family...

... “These people were trained ... to hold the family’s hand through the awful aftermath of this. First of all, the realisation that it has happened, then the business of going to the repatriation ceremonies, then, in many cases, going through the whole of the coroner’s process, then the funerals, and then the gradual trying to piece together...
life again. Some families, of course, needed their VOs only briefly; others needed them ... for really quite a long time.”

38. VOs were not generally specialists, but Service Personnel who were asked to take on the role in addition to their regular duties because they were thought to be suited to it.

39. In December 2002, following a number of high-profile cases, the Army acknowledged that its procedures for supporting bereaved families “fell short of modern expectations” and introduced a number of changes, including:

- CNOs and VOs were briefed to try to identify any issues that might affect communications with the immediate and wider family (such as divorced or separated parents). If necessary, a second or third CNO could be appointed.
- All Notifying Authorities were instructed to maintain a pool of CNOs and VOs “who must have attended a seminar at Brigade or Divisional level”.
- Notification was to take place at any time of day or night, to avoid families hearing the news from elsewhere.
- The VO would remain in contact with the family as the focus for all communication, as long as the family wished.

40. The Army refined that approach through 2003 and 2004, in the light of their experience of supporting the families of Service Personnel killed in Iraq.

Immediate remedial action on bereavement procedures

41. The prospect of military operations against Iraq prompted the MOD to bring forward plans to extend some benefits to unmarried partners.

42. Mr Hoon was advised on 26 February 2003 that, with conflict in Iraq looming, the Government should end the uncertainty on whether unmarried partners of Service Personnel were eligible for benefits in the event of their death.

43. Unmarried partners were not entitled to benefits under the Armed Forces Pension Scheme (AFPS) and only certain unmarried partners were entitled to benefits for death attributable to service under the War Pension Scheme (WPS). The MOD advised that the new Armed Forces compensation and pension schemes would extend benefits to unmarried partners (both heterosexual and homosexual) for attributable and non-attributable injury and death, but the new schemes would not be implemented before 2005/06.

28 Public hearing, 21 July 2010, pages 48-49.
30 Paper MOD, [undated], ‘The Army Investigations and Aftercare Support Cell (AIASC)’.
31 Iremonger to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 26 February 2003, ‘Unmarried Partners – Implications for the Gulf’.
44. Ministers had already indicated that, in certain circumstances, the Government would extend benefits to unmarried partners on a “case-by-case” basis.

45. That position now needed to be clarified and formalised, by agreeing that AFPS benefits should be extended to unmarried partners for deaths attributable to service.

46. On 20 March, Dr Lewis Moonie, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence, announced that, with immediate effect, where a member of the Armed Forces died as a result of service related to conflict, ex-gratia payments equivalent to the benefits paid to a surviving spouse under the AFPS could be awarded to their unmarried partner, where there was a substantial relationship.\(^{32}\)

47. In late March, the MOD’s Armed Forces Personnel Administration Agency (AFPAA) wrote to the spouse of a Serviceman who had been killed in Iraq advising that an overpayment of her late husband’s salary – relating to the period between his death and formal identification – would be recovered from her benefits.\(^{33}\)

48. The bereaved spouse also felt that the AFPAA was pressuring her to leave her Service Family Accommodation (SFA).

49. The MOD’s policy at that time was to allow spouses of deceased Service Personnel to remain in SFA for up to six months.\(^{34}\) That period could be extended in some circumstances.

50. The case attracted significant press attention.

51. The bereaved spouse wrote to Mr Blair on 26 March, setting out her concerns. Mr Blair replied on 7 April, stating that Mr Hoon would consider the detailed points raised in her letter, but assuring her that she would be given all the time she required to consider her future housing needs.\(^{35}\)

52. Mr Hoon told Lt Gen Palmer on 15 April that he was “very uncomfortable” with the MOD’s handling of the case, including both the tone and content of the AFPAA’s letter.\(^{36}\) Lt Gen Palmer confirmed that the letter was “factually incorrect”, as there were no grounds for seeking repayment.

53. The following day, Mr Hoon tasked Lt Gen Palmer to oversee “a comprehensive review of the way in which all three Services handled bereaved families”.\(^{37}\)

\(^{32}\) House of Commons, Official Report, 20 March 2003, column 54WS.
\(^{34}\) Record, 12 May 2003, ‘Record of Bereavement Policy Meeting Held in St Giles Court at 1330 on 7 May 2003’.
\(^{35}\) Letter Blair to [name redacted], 7 April 2003, [untitled].
54. Lt Gen Palmer wrote to Mr Hoon’s Private Office on 17 April, confirming that work was already in hand to conduct that comprehensive review (an initial report would be available by 16 May), and reporting the “immediate remedial action” that had been taken in response to the individual’s experience:

- Lt Gen Palmer had “declared” that all except one of the Op TELIC fatalities to date were attributable to service. That declaration meant that the usual assessment of attributability would not be required, and that families could be notified now that the higher benefits associated with deaths attributable to service would be paid.
- The letters used by the AFPAA were not appropriate. As of 16 April, all letters dealing with Op TELIC had been “personally vetted” by the AFPAA’s Chief Executive and checked by the appropriate Service Casualty Co-ordination Centre.
- Families of Service Personnel were now able to stay in their service accommodation for “as long as they feel they need to in order to assess their longer-term housing requirements”. If pressed, VOs should “talk in terms of nine months although stressing that each case will be examined on its merits”.
- The MOD had asked the deceased insurer’s to accelerate their procedures.\(^{38}\)

55. Lt Gen Palmer was advised on the same day that the MOD was facing a new challenge: “Policy ... changing ‘on the hoof’”.\(^{39}\)

56. Lt Gen Palmer provided his first report to Mr Hoon on bereavement procedures on 16 May.\(^{40}\) It identified six recent, specific lapses in the MOD’s handling of bereaved families (two of which pre-dated Op TELIC), and three broader areas where improvement was necessary:

- the volume, timing and style of correspondence between multiple MOD organisations and bereaved families;
- a lack of clarity over the sources of specialist advice available to bereaved families; and
- the “training/education” of CNOs and VOs.

57. Lt Gen Palmer reported the actions that had already been taken to prevent a recurrence of those specific lapses, and restated the decisions of the previous month

\(^{38}\) Minute DCDS(Pers) to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 17 April 2003, ’[name redacted] – Follow-up Action’.


to relax the MOD’s policy on the retention of SFA and to improve the quality of AFPAA correspondence. Lt Gen Palmer also advised that:

- He had directed that all MOD correspondence should be routed through the deceased’s unit and the VO, and all MOD visits to bereaved families should be co-ordinated by the VO.
- Further work would be done to develop “simple and readable” guidance, to improve the tone of correspondence, and to develop a comprehensive guide to the sources of advice and support available.
- Further work would be done to assess the selection, training and education of CNOs and VOs.

58. In March 2004, the MOD concluded a study to identify improvements to their investigative and Board of Inquiry (BOI) processes. While the study focused on the investigative and BOI processes themselves, it recommended that:

- Commands should establish a senior focal point with responsibility for pro-actively monitoring all investigations and BOIs;
- all communication with families should be routed through a “single established and known contact”, who could explain the context of any correspondence and “head-off any infelicitous or insensitive drafting”; and
- a “knowledgeable and consistent” officer should regularly brief families on the detail and progress of the entire investigation and BOI process.

59. On 24 June, Lt Gen Palmer reported to Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Sir Anthony Bagnall, Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS), that each Service had now appointed a “Senior Co-ordinator” to act as a focal point for monitoring investigations and Inquiries. Lt Gen Palmer also gave ACM Bagnall the “specific reassurance” that he had requested that each Service had undertaken to provide regular briefings to next of kin on process and progress. All communication with the next of kin would be routed through a single contact (normally the VO) who would “act as a sift” to filter out any insensitive or inconsistent drafting.

60. Lt Gen Palmer advised ACM Bagnall that a study into Services’ bereavement support procedures, including the training provided to CNOs and VOs, had now reported. The study had concluded that:

- While it might seem logical to adopt a tri-Service approach to bereavement support procedures, it was reasonable for each Service to continue to use their

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41 Paper MOD [junior official], 25 March 2004 [incorrectly dated on original as 24 February 2004], ‘Inquiries/Investigations into Death or Serious Injury on Operations: Scope for Improvement and Tri-Service Harmonisation – a Short Study for VCDS/DCDS(Pers)’.

42 Minute DCDS(Pers) to VCDS, 24 June 2004, ‘Inquiries into Unnatural Death and Serious Injury: Improvements in Process and Briefing’.
“slightly different” approaches given their differing geographical spread, unit organisations and ethos.

- With the exception of the Royal Navy, which generally used qualified welfare workers, “bereavement support personnel” were appointed on an ad hoc basis from the junior officer cadre. While bespoke training for the entire cadre was neither cost-effective nor deliverable, it should be possible to provide “awareness briefings” during general staff training, supplemented by “thorough briefings” by specialist personnel when an individual was appointed to be a VO.

61. Lt Gen Palmer advised ACM Bagnall that he supported those findings, but commented that ACM Bagnall might wish to “revisit” the conclusion that it would not be financially or practically viable to develop a bespoke training course for individuals involved in bereavement support.

62. ACM Bagnall accepted the findings, but commented that existing single-Service or tri-Service courses could include some coverage of bereavement support procedures.

63. On 30 June, Lt Gen Palmer provided Mr Hoon with an update on work to improve the BOI process. The update also covered progress on improving communications with families.

64. Lt Gen Palmer advised Mr Hoon that it was “clear that we are failing to meet some families’ expectations in respect of the quality and quantity of information we are providing to them”. A key step in improving communications between families and the MOD would be the appointment of a Senior Co-ordinator in each of the Services to ensure that families were briefed, through their VOs, on the progress of investigations and BOIs; the role of the Senior Co-ordinator, and progress in improving the BOI process, is described later in this Section.

65. Lt Gen Palmer recalled the steps that had been taken to improve the tone and accuracy of the MOD’s correspondence with bereaved families and advised that, as far as practicable, all routine correspondence now followed standard templates. The production of a joint casualty procedures manual and the formation of a Joint Casualty Co-ordination Cell (JCCC) by January 2005 would further improve communication with families. As a “final filter”, all communication with families was now routed through a single point of contact, usually the VO.

43 Paper MOD, [undated], ‘Bereavement Support Training (Scoping Study) – Summary of Findings and Recommendations’.
44 Minute Palmer to VCDS, 24 June 2004, ‘Inquiries into Unnatural Death and Serious Injury: Improvements in Process and Briefing’.
45 Minute VCDS to Palmer, 1 July 2004, ‘Inquiries into Unnatural Death and Serious Injury: Improvements in Process and Briefing’.
47 The first Joint Casualty and Compassionate Policy and Procedures (JSP 751) manual was published in March 2005.
66. Lt Gen Palmer reported that the review of training for personnel involved in bereavement support had concluded that a bespoke training course would be neither “financially nor practically viable”, but had identified a number of ways in which they would be better supported. The “problems of picking VOs from a necessarily ad hoc pool” could be overcome by including VO duties in general staff training, ensuring that specialist advice was available when needed, and ensuring that the “often junior” VO was properly briefed and supervised. Lt Gen Palmer expected that senior commanders would take a close and personal interest in ensuring that this was done properly.

67. In April 2005, Lt Gen Palmer recommended that the MOD’s policy on the occupation of Service Family Accommodation by bereaved spouses should be changed to be “less prescriptive”:

“... while bereaved spouses should be offered retention of SFA for two years we should acknowledge that there might be some ... who seek to retain their SFA for an indefinite period thereafter.”

68. Mr Hoon agreed that recommendation, subject to a number of amendments, including that Ministers should be consulted before any decision was taken to withdraw housing entitlement beyond the two-year period.

69. Mr Adam Ingram, Minister of State for the Armed Forces from 2001 to 2007, recalled the exchange in his evidence to the Inquiry:

“... the view [in the MOD] was, ‘Well, this is going to dislocate all the other arrangements, if you let this widow stay in the house’, and Geoff Hoon just said ‘So what? Fix it’, and it was fixed. I think, to the best of my recollection, we didn’t have a deluge of demand in that area. It may have been beneath the surface, but it never became a reality and, if it had been: yes, they can stay there, yes, we have to be sympathetic.”

Joint procedures and a Joint Casualty Co-ordination Cell

70. The Joint Casualty Co-ordination Cell (JCCC) was established in early 2005 to provide a focal point for casualty administration and notification and requests for compassionate travel.
71. Air Marshal David Pocock, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel) from 2005 to 2007, told the Inquiry that in 2004:

“... there was clear dissatisfaction with the notification procedures because ... it was a single-service responsibility and we were required very quickly to set up a Joint Casualty and Compassionate Cell ... and that took over getting the information from theatre, identifying a [Casualty] Notification Officer and setting the whole notification procedure in place ... on a joint basis.”\(^{52}\)

72. Lt Gen Irwin told the Inquiry that during his time as Adjutant General (from 2003 to 2005):

“... I think [there were] 57 Army casualties ... and I would think, looking back on it, that I may have heard about issues in the notification process, and by ‘issues’ I mean either delays in doing it or calling on the wrong person, or the wrong sort of words being said at the wrong sort of time, I think maybe I had cases of that kind maybe between six and ten, so something of that order.”

“... as an individual, that family, there was nothing in the world was more significant. So we had to keep asking ourselves, ‘Are we doing this right?’

... “So as each issue developed, we tried to close it off, but even after all this time and even with the establishment of the new joint system, with the new central training, even then, I am afraid I can guarantee that, in the future, there will be people who have a bad experience with this for one reason or another, and it is because we are all human beings.”\(^{53}\)

73. The first version of the Joint Casualty and Compassionate Policy and Procedures (JSP 751) was produced in March 2005 (policy and procedures had previously been set and managed by the individual Services).

74. Lt Gen Palmer described the JSP as drawing together into one publication the best practices and procedures currently in place across the three Services.\(^{54}\)

\(^{52}\) Public hearing, 19 July 2010, page 50.
\(^{53}\) Public hearing, 21 July 2010, pages 52-53.
\(^{54}\) Minute DCDS(Pers) to VCDS, 30 July 2004, ‘Inquiries into Unnatural Death and Serious Injury: Improvements in Process and Briefing’.
75. Shortly after the JCCC was established, the Army established the Army Investigations and Aftercare Support Cell (AIASC) to improve and extend the Army’s support for families.\(^55\) The AIASC had two main roles:

- to maintain close contact with bereaved families on a regular basis for as long as they wanted, including estranged family members. This included regular letters on the progress of Service Police investigations and BOIs; and
- on behalf of the Army’s Senior Co-ordinator, to oversee the BOI process and ensure that delays were kept to a minimum.

76. The AIASC had a number of secondary roles, including developing and maintaining a formal, standardised training package for CNOs and VOs. The AIASC aimed to implement that package by the end of 2005.

**TRAINING AND SUPPORT FOR CASUALTY NOTIFICATION OFFICERS AND VISITING OFFICERS**

77. JSP 751 stated that CNOs should “if possible ... have received some training or instruction such as in dealing with bereavement” and that VOs should “if possible ... have received some relevant training or instruction”.\(^56\)

78. Lieutenant General Mark Mans, the Deputy Adjutant General, wrote to senior Army commanders on 25 November 2005, to remind them of the importance of selecting appropriate and experienced individuals to be VOs:

> “Although the majority do an excellent job, from time to time the wrong person is nominated and invariably significant difficulties follow. This happened again recently ...”

> “The training of both Casualty Notification Officers (CNOs) and VOs is also most important and although JSP [751] says ‘if possible ... should have received some training’, it should be exceptional for them not to have attended some sort of instruction.”\(^57\)

79. Lt Gen Mans advised that a centralised training package based on an interactive CD and accompanying material should issue in early 2006 and would form the basis of all future training (divisions and brigades currently ran their own training). Training would become mandatory when this package issued.

80. Lt Gen Mans told the Inquiry that VOs had:

> “… a fairly comprehensive training programme in order to deal with a number of issues ... and, indeed, as individuals, they need to be looked after as well because,

\(^{55}\) Paper MOD, [undated], ‘The Army Investigations and Aftercare Support Cell (AIASC)’.


\(^{57}\) Minute Mans to Comd BFC, 25 November 2005, ‘Selection of Visiting Officers’.
if you are a Visiting Officer, you can have a pretty traumatic time. Throughout a period of a tour of duty, you might be looking after one or two or three families one after the next, and they need to be monitored for stress … and we have a process in place to do just that.”

81. Lt Gen Irwin told the Inquiry that “there is no doubt about it that the training is better now, the preparation is better now”.

82. MOD Ministers returned to the issue of the training and support provided to Visiting Officers in 2008.

83. In February 2008, Sir Bill Jeffrey, the MOD’s Permanent Under Secretary, provided detailed advice to Mr Bob Ainsworth, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, on how the BOI process could be improved and how the existing process could be accelerated. Sir Bill’s advice did not consider the role of the VO.

84. Mr Ainsworth held a meeting on 11 April to discuss that advice. The record of the meeting reported:

“The Minister raised the issue of interface with families. He recognised that the Visiting Officer role was very difficult … He also recognised the clear single Service lead in this area … He, nevertheless, felt that more could be done in terms of the resourcing and training of Visiting Officers. He felt that the cell [the Defence Inquests Unit] should play a role in this area, focusing on ensuring the right training and guidance is provided, sharing best practice between the Services and monitoring performance.”

The experience of bereaved families

85. The experiences that family members have shared with the Inquiry suggest that there was considerable variation in the quality of the notification process. Some family members spoke positively about the sensitive and prompt way in which the news was delivered. A smaller number reported negative experiences, including:

- insensitive delivery;
- an impression that details were being withheld (particularly in ‘friendly fire’ incidents or where there was a possibility of equipment failure);
- release of names to the media before official notification;
- circulation of names amongst the families of others deployed in Iraq before official notification; and

58 Public hearing, 19 July 2010, page 45.
60 Minute Jeffrey to Minister(AF) [MOD], 29 February 2008, ‘Boards of Inquiry and Inquests’.
61 Minute PS/Min(AF) to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 11 April 2008, ‘Boards of Inquiry and Inquests’.
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- use of archive footage by the media which featured the deceased as though they were still alive, causing confusion about what was the truth.

86. The experiences shared with the Inquiry suggest that the creation of the JCCC led to an improvement in the quality of the notification process.

87. There was also considerable variation in families’ experience of the support provided by Visiting Officers (VOs). In some cases, an enduring and positive relationship resulted. In others:
   - The VO was changed without warning, in some instances more than once.
   - The VO was badly briefed and lacked knowledge of procedures.
   - Insensitive language and behaviour caused distress.
   - Contact was sporadic.

88. The Inquiry also heard about a number of distressing incidents which, although they do not form part of a wider pattern, are illustrative of how a lack of care can have a significant impact. They were:
   - Following an air crash in which several Service Personnel died, a number of body parts remained unidentified. Families of those who had died were not told about the existence of those unidentified body parts, and many had already held funerals by the time identification was complete, making a second ceremony necessary.
   - One family discovered that photographs of their son’s body had been used, without permission being sought, in a training seminar.
   - One family member accepted military advice not to view their son’s body based on the impact of the injuries suffered. But facial reconstruction had taken place and there had already been a viewing for another family member.

89. Anyone serving in the Armed Forces is asked to designate one person as their official next of kin. When a fatality occurs, the CNO contacts the next of kin, and they are the ongoing point of contact for a VO.

90. Parents who lost children in Op TELIC told the Inquiry that one consequence of this arrangement was a disparity between the information and support provided to the partner of the deceased, usually the person named as next of kin, and to parents. As one father told the Inquiry, being a bereaved parent can be a very lonely business.

91. The need for greater support to a wider family than just the next of kin was recognised by the Government in July 2008:

   “We recognise that the loss of a Service person affects the whole of the bereaved family, not just the next of kin or nominated emergency contacts, on whom we
traditionally tend to focus our contact and support. We will review our procedures to ensure that in future sufficient account is taken of the needs of the wider family.62

Early concerns about military investigations

92. The MOD had a wide range of internal investigations that could be carried out following a fatality or other serious incident occurring on operations.63 They included:

- **Land Accident Investigation Team (LAIT) investigations.** The LAIT could respond to incidents at very short notice and would normally report within 30 days. It sought to determine the cause of an accident and make timely recommendations to prevent reoccurrence. It did not apportion blame. A LAIT report could inform a Board of Inquiry/Service Inquiry, or substitute for it where the facts of the case were sufficiently clear.

- **Service Police investigations.** Each Service has its own Service Police force; for the Army, that is the Royal Military Police (RMP). The Special Investigation Branch (SIB) of each Service Police force investigates the most serious cases. The MOD told the Inquiry: “While the need for a prompt investigation is important, and may be vital, there are no specific deadlines for the completion of Service Police investigations.”

- **Boards of Inquiry (BOIs).** The purpose of a BOI was to establish the facts about an event, to make recommendations to prevent a reoccurrence, and to inform any decision on whether other action, such as administrative or disciplinary action, should be initiated.64 BOIs would not generally attribute blame.

Impact of a study on military inquiries and investigations, March 2004

93. On 26 June 2003, Mr Hoon received an update on the SIB investigation into the death of a member of the Armed Forces.65

94. Mr Hoon’s Private Office responded on 30 June, expressing Mr Hoon’s concern that the individual’s next of kin had not yet been informed of the result of the post-mortem, in particular as the media might release that information.

95. Mr Hoon’s Office also asked for an update on all the BOIs and other investigations that had been launched into the deaths of Service Personnel killed in Iraq, including details of the “timescales and inter-dependencies on the investigations reaching their conclusions”.

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62 Ministry of Defence, *The Nation’s Commitment; Cross-Government Support to our Armed Forces, their Families and Veterans*, July 2008, Cm 7424, para 2.34.
63 Paper MOD, [undated], ‘Service Inquiries and Investigations’.
65 Minute APS/Secretary of State [MOD] to PJHQ Civ Sec, 30 June 2003, ‘Completion of Main Stage of SIB Investigation into the Death of [name redacted] and Other Action’.
96. On 4 July, Mr Ian Gibson, MOD Deputy Director Service Personnel, sent an update on progress on BOIs and investigations to Mr Hoon’s Office. The update detailed 43 fatalities resulting from 21 incidents. Only one BOI, into the loss of a Sea King helicopter with six UK Service Personnel on board on 22 March, had so far reported. A date for the inquest had not yet been set.

97. Later that month, Mr Gibson sent Mr Hoon’s Office a paper describing military investigative and BOI processes, which highlighted the different approaches taken by the Services. The Royal Navy and RAF would generally launch a BOI as soon as an incident occurred, at the same time as they deployed a criminal investigative team (if they thought that one was required). In contrast, the Army would only launch a BOI after an investigative team had reported. The MOD was considering the scope for harmonising the Services’ approaches to BOIs as part of the Tri-Service Armed Forces Act.

98. Mr Ingram’s Private Secretary wrote to ACM Bagnall on 15 September:

> “Minister (AF) [Mr Ingram] is concerned about the increasing perception amongst next of kin (and as a consequence Parliamentarians) that investigations into the deaths of personnel in Iraq lack focus and are taking too long. Families also have the impression that they are not kept informed of progress, however modest. These are admittedly perceptions, but most investigations seem slow.”

99. While Mr Ingram understood the complications arising from the roulement of formations and the operational situation:

> “Nonetheless, he feels that we need to strengthen our ‘grip’ on these sensitive issues, to ensure that corporate memory is preserved, that investigations are prosecuted as vigorously as possible, and that the flow of information to NOK [next of kin] is actively managed. This may best be done through the DCMO [Defence Crisis Management Organisation].”

100. Mr Ingram’s Private Secretary asked for advice on how that “central management” of the process might be achieved.

101. ACM Bagnall received advice in September and October on how the MOD’s investigative processes might be improved.

102. Major General Richard Shirreff, Chief of Staff LAND, advised ACM Bagnall on 24 September that the key to accelerating RMP/SIB investigations in Iraq was more

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66 Minute Gibson to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 4 July 2003, ‘Investigations into Op TELIC UK Service Personnel and UK Civilian Deaths’.
68 Minute PS/Min(AF) [MOD] to MA/VCDS, 15 September 2003, ‘TELIC Incidents: Investigations’.
resources, and asked that mobilised Reservists and military police from other Services should be deployed to assist with Op TELIC investigations.\(^69\)

103. Lt Gen Palmer advised ACM Bagnall on 17 October that the Army’s policy of investigating all deaths, while “cautious and prudent”, placed a heavy burden on RMP/SIB resources.\(^70\) There was scope for the Services to consider a common policy on when it was necessary for Service Police to investigate an incident, and when a BOI or LAIT investigation would suffice.

104. Lt Gen Palmer also advised that, notwithstanding the Army’s policy, the main reason for delays to investigations on Op TELIC was the difficult working environment in Iraq (including the need for force protection for Service Police and a potentially hostile population). The MOD was now deploying “SIB qualified” Reservists to Iraq, but the RMP “remain swamped with the volume of investigative work”.

105. In early 2004, ACM Bagnall and Lt Gen Palmer commissioned an internal study to identify improvements that could be made to the MOD’s investigative processes, and in particular the scope for harmonising procedures across the three Services.\(^71\)

106. The study reported in late March 2004. It concluded that the core BOI process ran “reasonably well” once triggered. The more significant problems related to how and when BOIs were convened, how they linked to other investigations, and how their findings were processed.

107. The study highlighted the “considerable delay” to Army BOIs that could be caused by a LAIT investigation and by the Army’s practice of undertaking a full RMP/SIB investigation into all sudden deaths:

> “LAIT TOR [Terms of Reference] define four weeks for issue of report after return from investigation, and HQLAND BOI Standing Orders define another 14 weeks after issue of final LAIT and SIB Reports before the BOI first sits. In other words, the target for the BOI to start is some five months after the incident, if everything goes to plan ... five months seems too long for a routine target.”

108. The study also reported that, while existing guidance emphasised that investigations and inquiries should be opened and concluded as quickly as possible, “the words and figures do not match, and it has to be said that the Army’s target timescale of some 10 to 11 months after incident [to the conclusion of the BOI] looks somewhat excessive, particularly when only two months of that is the BOI itself sitting”. The majority of that 10-11 month period was allocated to “waiting for any successive comments” from advisers and senior officers to complete the BOI report.

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\(^{69}\) Minute Shirreff to VCDS, 24 September 2003, ‘Op TELIC Incidents – Investigations’.


\(^{71}\) Paper MOD, 25 March 2004 [incorrectly dated on original as 24 February 2004], ‘Inquiries/Investigations into Death or Serious Injury on Operations: Scope for Improvement and Tri-Service Harmonisation – a Short Study for VCDS/DCDS[Pers]’.
109. The study made 15 recommendations, including:

- Commands should establish a senior focal point with responsibility for pro-actively monitoring all investigations and BOIs.
- There should be a presumption across all three Services that a BOI President should be appointed promptly.
- A BOI President should be required to exercise grip and co-ordination over all Service investigative bodies, and liaise with non-Service bodies. Presidents should be released from other duties.
- There should be a “renewed emphasis ... upon early commencement and conclusion of all phases and maximum concurrent activity”. The standard target timescales for all phases of the investigative and inquiry processes should be reviewed and tightened. The time allowed for advisers and senior officers to comment should be limited to six weeks.
- All communication with families should be routed through a “single established and known contact”, who could explain the context of any correspondence and “head-off any infelicitous or insensitive drafting”.
- A “knowledgeable and consistent” officer should regularly brief families on the detail and progress of the entire investigation and BOI process.

110. The study also reported that there was a significant increase in public expectations that there should be a BOI into every incident, and that its conclusions should be disclosed. That imposed a “heavy workload” on all three Services but especially the Army.

111. Lt Gen Palmer wrote to Mr Ingram on 6 April, advising that all the recommendations in the study had been agreed by the Services; the “main recommendations” would be implemented immediately. The “main advance” from the existing process was that the presumption that a BOI should be convened promptly, with a BOI President appointed within 48 hours of the incident, would now be extended to the Army (it was already standard practice in the Royal Navy and RAF). The President would normally be released from other duties and would “play a wider role in determining and co-ordinating the activities of any other necessary investigations, notwithstanding that he might decide not to convene his own Board immediately”.

112. Lt Gen Palmer set out how communication with the next of kin would be improved. All communications would be routed through a single “personal contact point”. The next of kin would be “briefed clearly, comprehensively and regularly” on the investigation and BOI process. Information that would not compromise the BOI could be released to the next of kin before the final report issued; a clear disclosure policy consistent with

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72 Minute Palmer to Ingram, 6 April 2004, ‘Inquiries into Unnatural Death and Serious Injury on Operations: Improvements in Process and Briefing’.
the Data Protection Act (DPA), Freedom of Information Act (FOI Act) and other relevant legislation would be developed.

113. Lt Gen Palmer also advised that a report on the progress of all Inquiries and investigations would be sent to Ministers every two months.

114. Mr Hoon met some of the families bereaved during Op TELIC on 28 April. They expressed concern about the Services’ investigative processes in general and in particular the quality and frequency of communication from the MOD, and said that they lacked confidence in the BOI and investigative processes. Their concerns triggered a review of Service Police investigations, which is described later in this Section.

115. Mr Hoon received the first progress report on investigations and BOIs on 14 June.

116. Mr Hoon’s Assistant Private Secretary responded to the progress report on 18 June, stating that the MOD now had, for the first time, visibility of the extent and progress of all current investigations. The Assistant Private Secretary reported that Mr Hoon had:

“... noted that the submission has confirmed a number of weaknesses, in particular the length of time it has taken to complete many of the investigations and the apparent lack of communication with some of the families on the more protracted investigations. The Secretary of State [Mr Hoon] will expect to see improvement in these and the other areas as the Board of Inquiry study recommendations are implemented. He will also wish to see early results in the work commissioned by VCDS into the procedural aspects of SIB investigations. It is important that these workstrands are linked: how many BOIs are delayed because of SIB work? He will also wish to see progress in the next report on bringing the more protracted investigations to a speedy close.”

117. Mr Hoon’s Assistant Private Secretary concluded that Mr Hoon would “wish to be assured that making progress on the various investigations and the Boards of Inquiry continues to receive appropriate senior management attention”.

118. Lt Gen Palmer told the Inquiry:

“... the Secretary of State [Mr Hoon] himself was personally briefed every two months by me as to exactly which Board of Inquiry was delayed, or rather the findings were delayed, why they were delayed, what the reasons for the delay was. Could we do anything to speed up the process, and how are the families reacting to this?”

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74 Minute DCDS(Pers) to APS/SofS [MOD], 30 June 2004, ‘Boards of Inquiry – Improvements in Process’.
76 Public hearing, 21 July 2010, page 56.
119. On 24 June, Lt Gen Palmer reported to ACM Bagnall that the “initial tranche” of improvements identified by the BOI study (comprising 13 of the 15 recommendations) was now in place. Each Service had appointed a “Senior Co-ordinator”, to act as a focal point for monitoring investigations and BOIs. Lt Gen Palmer gave ACM Bagnall the “specific reassurance” that he had requested, that:

- Each Service had agreed to appoint a BOI President within 48 hours, unless judged unnecessary by a higher authority.
- Each Service had undertaken to provide regular briefings to next of kin on process and progress. All communication with the next of kin would be routed through a single contact (normally the Visiting Officer) who would “act as a sift” to filter out any insensitive or inconsistent drafting.

120. Lt Gen Palmer also reported that he had carefully considered a suggestion from Mr Hoon that the BOI process should include “an individual who is independent of both MOD and the bereaved family … who would give a view of whether or not the BOI had completed its job successfully, before the report was published”, but had concluded that:

“… the purpose for which BOIs are established and the perceived presentational need to prove to external parties that they carry out their work successfully cannot sensibly be reconciled.”

121. Lt Gen Palmer advised that including an independent element would delay the BOI process, “yet bring no guarantee of adding value, credibility or acceptability of a Board’s findings”. Families’ concerns could largely be met by the “administrative arrangements – including better communications – already put in place”.

122. Ministers returned to the question of whether there should be an independent member on a BOI in 2007.

123. On 30 June, Lt Gen Palmer sent Mr Hoon a progress report on work to improve the BOI process. Lt Gen Palmer wrote that it was “clear that we are failing to meet some families’ expectations in respect of the quality and quantity of information we are providing to them”. The key to improving the flow of information to families would be the new Senior Co-ordinators, who would ensure that BOIs proceeded quickly and that families were briefed on progress.

124. Lt Gen Palmer reflected on the role and impact of the Senior Co-ordinator in his evidence to the Inquiry:

“… he was responsible for the progress of Boards of Inquiry. If there were delays, why there were delays and what should be done about it, and keeping, importantly, the families informed through the visiting officers as to what was going on.

77 Minute DCDS(Pers) to VCDS, 24 June 2004, ‘Inquiries into Unnatural Death and Serious Injury: Improvements in Process and Briefing’.
“We put that in place relatively quickly.

“Now that did not immediately speed up the Boards of Inquiry, because some of them were quite complicated.

“We have already alluded to a shortage of military police investigators ... but the emphasis – because I think this is what the grievance was – was lack of information. The families felt they were excluded from the process.

“I personally believe, once we put ... in place ... a regular briefing for families about where their particular Board of Inquiry had got to, they were less exercised ...”

125. Lt Gen Palmer also advised that all the “quick wins” identified in the BOI study were now in place; work continued to establish a robust disclosure policy and devise a mechanism to allow local commanders to initiate an immediate investigation in urgent and exceptional cases.

126. The target timeline for a BOI was tightened in June 2004, to allow 14 weeks from the incident to the formal release of the completed BOI report to the next of kin.80 That timeline comprised eight weeks for the production of the BOI report and six weeks for advisers and senior officers to comment and complete it.

127. The BOI process was also amended at that time to include the production of additional progress reports for the next of kin.

128. The steps taken by the MOD to improve communication with and support for next of kin and bereaved families, including the review of bereavement procedures and the review of training for personnel involved in bereavement support, are described later in this Section.

Review of Service Police investigations, October 2004

129. During a meeting with Mr Hoon on 28 April 2004, a number of bereaved families expressed a lack of confidence in the Services’ investigative processes.81

130. In response to those concerns, ACM Bagnall commissioned a review of the timeliness and effectiveness of Service Police investigations.82

131. The review, which reported in October, concluded that:

• There were no major issues that were not already being considered.
• There was no evidence that the quality of Service Police investigations was inadequate.

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79 Public hearing, 21 July 2010, pages 55-56.
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- Service Police in Basra were “operating at full stretch and had a considerable backlog”. A key constraint was that relatively few Service Police investigators were qualified to Level 3 (able to carry out the investigations into the most serious offences). More investigative personnel should be trained to the Level 3 standard, and deployed.

- Service Police in Basra needed more equipment and administrative support.83

132. On the timeliness of investigations, the review stated:

“There can be both avoidable and unavoidable delays, but complex investigations and the post-investigative processes do take time and speed must not be at the expense of quality. That said, some trimming may be possible in respect of the timescales for some steps in the process.”

133. The review recommended that the timescales for the individual steps of the post-investigative process should be revalidated.

134. The review also identified the practical difficulties in undertaking investigations in a non-permissive environment such as Iraq, including:

- A number of Service Police personnel had been tasked to train the Iraqi Police Service.
- Service Police needed force protection, which was not always available.
- Access to the crime scene and to witnesses could be difficult, and could cause further tension.

135. Lt Gen Irwin told the Inquiry:

“... as the operation [in Iraq] developed, it began to be something that came to my attention and, therefore, could be regarded as a possible problem, that the Royal Military Police were not there in sufficient numbers to do everything that was required of them in a completely timely fashion.

“Now, of course, when you are trying to investigate incidents when there is shooting going on, there is always going to be a delay that would not occur in the normal circumstance, but nevertheless I began to get a feeling that maybe there were not enough military police in Iraq and maybe also that, extrapolating from that, there were not enough military policemen ... in the British Army.

“So I spent – I would not say every day, but quite regularly I used to speak to the Provost Marshal (Army) and ask him the direct question, looking at him in the eye, ‘Have we got an issue here? Are your people bearing up to the strain? Are they going over too often with too short tour intervals? Do you want me to try to find some other way of reinforcing you, like doing something which the bureaucracy sometimes

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calls ‘novel and contentious’, which was to get civilian police to sort of come along and help?’

“The answer was always, ‘We are a bit stretched, but we are fine’. My people and I just took that at, not exactly face value, but kept our eyes on it and at no stage did we ever have to do anything that was ‘novel and contentious’.”

The deaths of six RMP Personnel at Majarr al Kabir


Mr Hoon informed the House of Commons on 17 November 2004 that a BOI into that incident had now completed its work. Because of the “wider parliamentary and public interest”, the MOD had taken the unusual step of providing a summary of the BOI’s findings to Parliament and to the media. The families of those who died would be briefed by the President of the BOI, and would subsequently meet Mr Hoon to discuss the BOI’s findings and any concerns they might have.

Continued criminal investigation prevented the BOI from considering the events that were the direct cause of the six deaths, but Mr Hoon informed the House:

“The Board found that the incident at Al Majarr Al Kabir was a surprise attack, which could not reasonably have been predicted. The Board also found that a number of factors may potentially have had a bearing on the deaths of the six soldiers, including issues relating to ammunition, communications and command relationships within the battle group to which the Royal Military Police platoon was attached. The Board was not, however, able to state that any of these factors, either in isolation or in combination directly determined the six soldiers’ fate.”

Mr Hoon went on to acknowledge:

“I am aware that some of the families have been critical of the Army’s response to the deaths of the six soldiers. I hope they recognise the Board’s work for the thorough and detailed review that it is. I hope, too, that they now have a much better understanding of the events leading up to the death of their loved ones and the wider context in which the events occurred, and can take some comfort from this.”

The RMP suffered 12 fatalities during the course of Op TELIC, including the six fatalities at Majarr al Kabir.

136. An April 2005 review of the MOD’s future requirements for Service Policing recorded that “The recommendations of the [2004] review have largely been implemented”.87

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85 House of Commons, Official Report, 17 November 2004, columns 90-91WS.
87 Minute Rooks to VCDS, 29 April 2005, ‘Review of the Department’s Requirements for Service Policing’.
137. The 2005 review stated that, in relation to investigations on operations, “delay is still an issue”. Delays were generally due to “overstretch and practical inhibitors”, such as the need for force protection, rather than any specific failings on the part of the Service Police.

138. The review also stated that the “primary RMP output” in Iraq was now providing support for the reform of Iraq’s security forces.

139. The review recorded that work on the future structure of the Army had resulted in an uplift of nearly 10 percent in the baseline figure for RMP manpower.

Changes to MOD processes

140. AM Pocock wrote to Mr Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, on 17 August 2006 proposing that the timeline for conducting BOIs should be increased from 14 to 27 weeks. The MOD was operating at “maximum efficiency, within resources” but, for the Army in particular, experience since the current timeline was introduced in June 2004 had shown that it was “not achievable”. No Army BOI had met the current 14-week timeline. The Royal Navy and RAF did not have a problem with the current timeline but “saw merit” in extending it.

141. AM Pocock summarised the problems in meeting the current timelines:

- It was not possible to produce a Convening Order and Terms of Reference (TORs) for a BOI within 48 hours (as the current timeline required). TORs were often dependent on Service Police or LAIT reports, which could take “several months” to produce.
- It was not possible to “staff” a BOI report (secure comments from advisers and senior officers) within six weeks.

142. AM Pocock advised that underlying those problems was a resource issue. The Army was currently required to convene up to 20 BOIs a month (compared with one or two for the Royal Navy and RAF). It took time to identify and nominate suitable experienced and available Presidents, to confirm the Terms of Reference, and for officers to consider a BOI report.

143. AM Pocock closed his advice:

“Delays in completing BOIs have been linked in the media to delays in Coroners’ inquests. Some families ... have also been critical of the time it takes to complete BOIs. It is, however, unlikely that extending the BOI timeline will attract significant media coverage.”

144. In an annex to his minute, AM Pocock analysed the reasons for delays in completing BOIs. It concluded that progress had been made since 2004 but that,

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88 Minute DCDS(Pers) to PS/SofS [MOD], 17 August 2006, ‘BOI Timelines – A Proposal for Extension’.
against a background of an increasing number of incidents, “the rate of closure has now
remained more or less constant since January 2005”.

Creation of the Army Inquest Cell

145. In February 2007, in response to Ministerial concerns over the MOD’s support
for the inquests into the deaths of Sergeant Steven Roberts and Lance Corporal of
Horse Matthew “Matty” Hull, the Army established a small Army Inquest Cell with a
remit to, “through more effective handling of documents and stakeholders … provide a
better co-ordinated service to the Department [MOD], the coroner, and to the bereaved
families”.89 Mr Ingram was advised that the Army’s existing arrangements had been
unable to manage the volume of work associated with inquests.

146. An MOD official advised Mr Ingram in March that good progress was being made
in clearing the “backlog” of Army BOIs.90 The Army Inquest Cell had “now assumed the
role of managing of the Inquest process”, allowing the Army Inquiries and Aftercare
Support Cell (AIASC) to revert to its primary role of supporting bereaved families.

147. In June, Mr Ingram informed the House of Commons that the Army was planning
to appoint permanent Presidents for BOIs, in order to deliver a more consistent
approach and avoid delays.91

148. In January 2008, Mr Giles Ahern, MOD Deputy Director Personnel with
responsibility for the Army Inquest Cell, advised General Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of
the General Staff, that the team had made “significant progress” in reducing the time
taken to hold an inquest.92

149. Mr Ahern advised that, despite this progress, Ministers remained “very concerned”
about the MOD’s performance. The Army Inquest Cell was focusing on:

- The provision of information to families. In the past, families had received little
  formal information before the inquest about how their relative had died. AIASC
  now provided a “Record of Events” based on SIB findings, but that might only
  reach the family just before the inquest. The Cell was developing an “Initial
  Account” containing “some basic information”, which could be passed to families
  about one month after a death.

- Timely completion of SIB and BOI reports. In a number of cases, completion
  of SIB and BOI reports was “judged to have taken longer than necessary”.
  The Cell was trying to “expedite” completion and sign-off of reports by the
  chain of command.

89 Minute Pitt-Brooke to PS/Minister(AF) [MOD], 26 February 2007, ‘Support to Inquests – Project AJAX’;
90 Minute Pitt-Brooke to PS/Minister(AF) [MOD], 30 March 2007, ‘Support to Inquests – Project AJAX’.
91 House of Commons, Official Report, 7 June 2007, column 28WS.
• Ensuring that witnesses were properly prepared for inquests, by briefing them on their purpose and format.
• Handling of classified material. Recent lapses had resulted in the unauthorised release of classified US material; this had undermined Ministers’ confidence in the MOD’s management of inquests. A review was under way on whether the Services’ support for inquests should be centralised, possibly using the model provided by the Cell.

Reducing the number of redactions in BOI reports released to families

150. The MOD released redacted versions of BOI reports to the next of kin and coroners. The version released to the next of kin was redacted to remove personal information relating to third parties, and security and operationally sensitive information. The version released to the coroner was redacted to remove certain security and operationally sensitive information only, with a request that the report was not introduced into court.  

151. The inclusion of the names of third parties in the version of the BOI released to the coroner allowed the coroner to identity potential witnesses for the inquest.

152. In November 2006, Ms Selena Lynch, Deputy Assistant Coroner for Oxfordshire, directed the MOD to provide a “full set of papers” to a bereaved family’s legal team and indicated that she might consider a legal challenge if the MOD did not comply.

153. Mr Chris Baker, MOD Director General Service Personnel, advised Mr Ingram on 22 January 2007:

“It is evident that the manner in which some of the BOI reports have been redacted, by blocking out the names and text ... renders them unintelligible. Families and their respective Counsel claim that because they are unable to follow the narrative of the BOI it is difficult to consider whether to request the coroner to invite additional witnesses.”

154. Mr Baker stated that the MOD’s position was that the redaction of the names of third parties was necessary “to comply with both our responsibilities in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998, and in common law, as an employer to protect the identity of current and former employees”.

155. Mr Baker concluded that to meet the concerns of families and the coroner, the MOD would replace the names of third parties with unique identifiers (such as Person AA and Officer BB), which would enable families to follow the narrative of the BOI report more easily while still protecting individual identities.

94 Minute Baker to PS/Minister(AF) [MOD], 22 January 2007, ‘Board of Inquiry Reports – Disclosure for the Purposes of an Inquest’.
156. The MOD issued revised instructions for the disclosure of BOI reports in May.\textsuperscript{95} The instructions advised that following the full implementation of the FOI Act on 1 January 2005, the current policy (of limited release of BOI reports outside the MOD) was no longer sustainable; the underlying principle of the FOI Act was that information should be available to members of the public on request unless it had an absolute exemption or there was an overriding public interest in withholding it.

157. The way in which BOIs were conducted would not change, but the reports should now be prepared in two parts:

- Part 1, which would be generally known as the “BOI Report”, should include the convening order, terms of reference, findings, recommendations, and comments from senior officers. It should be carefully structured to ensure that it contained no exempt material or, if that was not possible, suitably redacted.
- Part 2 would include all other supporting documentation including witness statements and police and investigative reports.

158. There would also be a separate master “Schedule of Proceedings”, listing everything that constituted the full BOI Report.

159. Part 1 of the full BOI Report would be proactively published by the MOD under their Publication Scheme. Requests for further information would be considered under the FOI Act in the normal way. Applicants could be provided with the Schedule of Proceedings to help them refine their request.

160. Next of kin should, in the first instance, be given only Part 1 of a BOI Report. Requests for information from Part 2 would be treated in the same way as other FOI requests (although it would normally be inappropriate to redact non-sensitive personal information about the family member). The instructions stated:

“Although this may be seen as restricting what is given to next of kin, it should be borne in mind that Part 1 … will be a synthesis of all the relevant information presented to the Board. Although the next of kin should always be treated in a sympathetic and helpful manner, the provisions of the FOI Act and DPA98 and other relevant legislation and common law must be observed.”

161. Coroners would “continue to be provided with the full unredacted copy of the report (Parts 1 and 2)”, on the understanding that the report contained only information owned by the UK and was not quoted from or admitted into evidence without further reference to the MOD.

162. The instructions directed that where names were redacted, they should be replaced by a unique identifier.

\textsuperscript{95} Defence Instructions and Notices, May 2007, ‘Disclosure of Board of Inquiry Reports, 2007DIN02-15’.
163. In early November, Ms Lynch issued her ruling on the death of Fusilier Gordon Gentle.\textsuperscript{96} She concluded that it was probable that the roadside bomb that killed him would not have detonated if a disabling device had been fitted to the vehicle in which he was travelling.

164. The press reported that Ms Lynch had described the MOD’s policies for the disclosure of evidence to the inquest as “illogical and based on errors of law”,\textsuperscript{97} and that she had stated that the inquest had been delayed by the MOD’s failure to provide documents and their policy of redacting names from the documents that were provided.\textsuperscript{98}

165. Sir Bill Jeffrey advised Mr Ainsworth in February 2008, in the context of a paper on how to improve the BOI system, that while the MOD continued to face criticism over the redaction of BOI reports, “we have gone as far as practicable within the law”.\textsuperscript{99}

166. An MOD/Ministry of Justice (MOJ) information booklet for bereaved families on the BOI and inquest processes, which was issued in 2008, stated that “where names are removed, each will be replaced with a term like Person A, Person B to help you follow the sequence of events in the report”.\textsuperscript{100}

167. A number of the BOI reports seen by the Inquiry have followed this practice.

Creation of the Defence Inquests Unit

168. In early February 2007, the MOD sought and received an adjournment to the inquest into the death of Lance Corporal of Horse Matthew “Matty” Hull, who had been killed in a friendly-fire incident with US forces in 2003, to allow them more time to secure US agreement to the use in court of a US cockpit recording of the incident.\textsuperscript{101}

169. The adjournment came as the UK was negotiating with the US Government on US participation in inquests into the deaths of UK Service Personnel. Those negotiations are described later in this Section.

170. Mr Baker wrote to MOD officials on 19 February advising that, in the light of the inquest into the death of L Cpl Hull, MOD Ministers might wish to have a “further urgent examination” of the BOI process, possibly including “a fundamental review as to whether [BOIs] can be considered fit for purpose given the wider uses to which they are increasingly put”.\textsuperscript{102} Mr Baker asked recipients to provide “positive points ... in support of the BOI system as it currently stands” and information on planned improvements.

\textsuperscript{96} BBC News, 7 November 2007, Army supply ‘chaos’ proved fatal.
\textsuperscript{97} BBC News, 7 November 2007, Army supply ‘chaos’ proved fatal.
\textsuperscript{98} Daily Telegraph, 7 November 2007, Army failings led to death of Gordon Gentle.
\textsuperscript{99} Minute Jeffrey to Minister(AF) [MOD], 29 February 2008, ‘Boards of Inquiry and Inquests’.
\textsuperscript{100} Ministry of Defence & Ministry of Justice, Boards of Inquiry and Coroners’ Inquests: information for bereaved families, 2008.
\textsuperscript{101} Minute Ferguson to APS/Min(AF) [MOD], 2 February 2007, ‘Oxfordshire Inquests: Release of US Classified Information’.
\textsuperscript{102} Minute Baker to DG Sec LF, 19 February 2007, ‘Boards of Inquiry’.
171. Mr Ingram subsequently met Mr Baker and other MOD officials to discuss work already in hand to improve the BOI process. Mr Ingram’s Private Secretary recorded that Mr Ingram:

“... postulated that there might be a need to consider a more radical approach; that rather than working to make the current system work better, we might need to consider adopting a different system.”

172. Mr Baker said that he had already discussed the possibility of a more radical approach with the Services, and concluded that “there was no realistic alternative to the BOI process”. The MOD needed a thorough process of examination in order to learn lessons, and needed to be able to ensure that it could be undertaken quickly and address all the relevant issues. Mr Baker advised that the arguments for continuing with the BOI process would be set out in a submission.

173. An MOD official working in Mr Baker’s Directorate sent Mr Ingram’s Private Office advice on the “rationale for continuing with the BOI process” on 2 March.

174. The official identified three alternative mechanisms for establishing the facts surrounding an incident – Learning Accounts, Service Police investigations, and inquests – and concluded that none of them met the MOD’s requirements.

175. The official concluded that the current BOI system played a “valuable role” in “establishing the full details of the circumstances surrounding an incident and in learning the lessons to prevent a recurrence”. Particular advantages were:

- BOIs enabled the MOD to fulfil its duty of care and health and safety obligations towards its employees.
- Investigations into sensitive matters could be carried out “within the Service environment and by the relevant subject matter experts”.
- As BOIs did not seek to apportion blame, and evidence given to a BOI could not be used in a Service court, witnesses might be more candid than in another type of investigation.
- BOIs were “tried and tested and worked well”.

The official also described the work under way to improve the BOI process.

176. The BOI report into the loss of Nimrod XV230 in September 2006 (in Afghanistan) was published on 4 December 2007. Mr Browne told the House of Commons on the same day:

“By its nature, the Board was not in a position to go into the history of those arrangements [for assessing the airworthiness of Nimrod aircraft] or to assess where responsibility lies for failures ... Flying will never be risk-free. But I do believe

104 MOD [junior official] to PS/Minister(AF) [MOD], 2 March 2007, ‘Boards of Inquiry (BOIs)’.
that the families of those who died are due more of an explanation of the history than the Board of Inquiry could be expected to provide. I have therefore decided to put in place a review of the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod aircraft over its service life; to assess where responsibility lies for any failures; to assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases, taking account of best practice in the civilian and military world; and to make recommendations.\footnote{105}

177. Mr Browne discussed the BOI into the loss of Nimrod XV230 with MOD Ministerial colleagues the following day.\footnote{106} He said that the MOD would shortly announce the name of the Queen’s Counsel who would lead the independent review. It would be important for the families to be able to feed their questions into that process.

178. During the meeting, MOD Ministers concluded that the Nimrod BOI was “a further example of the [BOI] process not necessarily being suited to the requirements of the MOD, the individuals and families involved and, crucially, public expectation”. Mr Browne suggested that there might be merit in a new process comprising:

“... a short, focused Learning Account style review ... conducted in a matter of a few months followed, as required, by a further review to look beyond the immediate circumstances and which was empowered to engage with individuals and the families affected by the incident, had an independent element and could draw from the advice of those who were well-practiced in preparing for evidence-based reviews”.

179. Mr Browne’s Private Secretary asked Mr Bill Jeffrey, the MOD’s Permanent Under Secretary,\footnote{107} to provide “advice on the scope and options for improving the BOI process” by the end of January.

180. Mr Browne’s Private Office wrote to Mr Ainsworth’s Private Office later that week, reporting Mr Browne’s concern that recent good progress in clearing the backlog of inquests would not be sustained as the military investigation/BOI process was moving too slowly.\footnote{108} Particular concerns included:

- The significant number of cases (13) over six months that were still awaiting completion of a BOI or RMP investigation, or even a decision on whether a BOI was required. In one case, a decision on whether to hold a BOI was still awaited nearly one year after the incident.
- The number of cases where the Swindon and Wiltshire Coroner was awaiting SIB reports.

\footnote{105}{House of Commons, \textit{Official Report}, 4 December 2007, column 687.}
\footnote{106}{Minute Forber to PS/Minister(AF) [MOD], 5 December 2007, ‘Defence Ministerial Meetings’.}
\footnote{107}{Mr Jeffrey was knighted in the 2008 New Year’s Honours.}
\footnote{108}{Minute APS/Secretary of State [MOD] to PS/Minister(AF) [MOD], 7 December 2007, ‘BOI and Inquest Backlog’.}
181. Mr Browne asked Mr Ainsworth to look into the backlog of incomplete BOIs and “investigate what further action should be taken to speed up this process, including whether additional staff resource is needed in theatre”.

182. On 28 February, Mr Ainsworth and Ms Bridget Prentice (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Ministry of Justice), met Mr Andrew Walker (Assistant Deputy Coroner for Oxfordshire) and Mr David Masters (Coroner for Wiltshire & Swindon), at Mr Ainsworth’s request, to discuss what could be done to accelerate the inquest process.109

183. Ms Prentice’s Assistant Private Secretary recorded that Mr Walker had welcomed the new Army Inquest Cell, which had had “a profound effect” on the conduct of inquests into the deaths of Army Personnel. Working with the Cell, he had trialed a number of proposals to improve and streamline the inquest process.

184. Mr Walker described how that new partnership had worked in a recent inquest:

“Despite the fact that there was extremely sensitive intelligence involved, the inquest was completed within 12 months from the date of the incident. The key difference was that he [Mr Walker] had been in contact with the Board of Inquiry (BOI) team from the beginning of their investigation and was kept informed throughout, enabling him sufficient time to build up the technical knowledge required to adequately conduct the inquest. Crucially, this early involvement avoided the complicated ‘cold’ handover from the BOI to the inquest.”

185. Both coroners felt that the new arrangement enabled them to update families more effectively on progress and to respond to their needs.

186. Both coroners contrasted that positive experience, with their experiences with the Royal Navy and RAF. In one case, they said that they had had to wait four months “for a signature on a piece of paper”. In four cases, it was alleged to have taken over a year to reach a decision on whether or not to hold a BOI. The coroners felt that the establishment of a tri-Service Inquest Cell based on the Army model would be a “very positive step”.

187. The MOD team confirmed that the idea of a tri-Service Inquest Cell was being considered, and highlighted the greater complexity often associated with Royal Navy and RAF BOIs.

188. Mr Ainsworth told the Inquiry that he had considered the end-to-end process of investigating fatalities and had taken the unusual step of meeting both Mr Walker and Mr Masters to discuss ways in which the MOD could help.110 He recalled some anxiety that a meeting might be seen as interfering with the coroners’ independence, but he

110 Public hearing, 6 July 2010, page 30.
believed that it was possible both to respect that independence and to seek to understand “how the system is working for them from their point of view”.

189. Sir Bill Jeffrey responded to the requests for advice on how the BOI process could be improved and how the existing process could be accelerated in a minute to Mr Ainsworth at the end of February 2008.111

190. Sir Bill advised that, in response to Mr Browne’s question, it would be possible to hold a relatively short fact-finding exercise followed by a “fuller inquiry into the whole course of events”. While the Nimrod XV230 BOI included a careful investigation of the incident itself, its remit did not extend into the history and safety record of the Nimrod; that question was now being examined by Mr Charles Haddon-Cave. Where there was “a need to capture the broader departmental perspective, and where there is high public interest in the case”, the remit of the BOI could be broadened or a “further reaching independent inquiry”, running concurrently with the BOI, could be held.

191. Sir Bill also advised that:

- A new direction should be issued to the chain of command, that families should always be briefed as soon as practicable after an incident and kept regularly informed thereafter.
- A new joint Secretariat should be established, building on the Army’s Inquest Cell, to co-ordinate all three Services’ management of inquests, the relationship with coroners and joint reports to Ministers.

192. The Army had appointed Permanent Presidents to lead high-profile Army BOIs; the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force were taking steps to establish “pools of expertise” from which Presidents could be selected.

193. There were currently 100 open inquests. That was “below last summer’s peak of 132, but still well above the backlog of 80 inquests that was judged to be unacceptable in Spring 2006”. The use of pre-inquest hearings, while a valuable contribution to the inquest process, could introduce delays into the process. Coroners often waited for access to the MOD’s reports, including BOI reports, before undertaking an inquest. Sir Bill commented: “We must show coroners that we treat our investigations as matters of urgency so that we might expect them to do the same.”

194. On 9 April, Mr Ainsworth met senior officials and military officers to discuss Sir Bill’s advice.112 Mr Ainsworth stated that he and Mr Browne remained of the view that there needed to be a “step change in the way in which the BOI and inquest process was handled, end-to-end”. He had already discussed the advice with Sir Bill, and agreed that

111 Minute Jeffrey to Minister(AF) [MOD], 29 February 2008, ‘Boards of Inquiry and Inquests’.
112 Minute PS/Min(AF) [MOD] to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 11 April 2008, ‘Boards of inquiry and Inquests’. 
it formed “a good basis for further discussion”. The key proposal was the establishment of a “single inquest cell”.

195. The meeting agreed that a single inquest cell should be established as a matter of urgency. Key responsibilities would be to:

- professionally manage the MOD’s relationship with coroners;
- chase progress on BOIs in order to “drive down” the time between incident and inquest; it would need sufficient “authority and clout” to do that;
- identify weaknesses in policy and ensure they were addressed, and ensure that existing policy and best practice was adhered to; the lead for developing policy would often sit outside the cell; and
- ensure the right training and guidance was provided to VOs.

196. The cell would not carry out BOIs (which would continue to be the responsibility for the Services).

197. Mr Ainsworth’s Private Secretary recorded that, although the other proposals made by Sir Bill had not been discussed in any detail at the meeting, Mr Ainsworth would like them “taken forward in the context of the establishment of the new cell”.

198. The Defence Inquests Unit (DIU) was created in May 2008 to act as the focal point for all coroners’ inquests into the deaths of Service and MOD civilian personnel.\(^{113}\)

199. The Army Inquest Cell was disbanded on the creation of the DIU, and its posts moved into the DIU.\(^{114}\)

200. Mr Ainsworth told the Inquiry that the role of the DIU was not just to ensure that the MOD was providing the support that coroners required:

> “… my motives were more than just helping the bereaved, they were about the MOD getting better at learning some of the lessons that flowed from inquests … some of our systems were, from time to time, exposed pretty badly by coroners’ inquests and, you know, they were a mine of information … if you were prepared to really embrace the findings …”\(^{115}\)

201. Mr Mike Venables, Head of the DIU from 2009 to 2012, described the DIU’s role as supporting bereaved families by making sure that coroners had everything they needed.\(^{116}\) This included:

- providing all relevant reports and information, and explaining that material where necessary;

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\(^{113}\) Defence Instructions and Notices 2008DIN05-052, December 2008, ‘The Defence Inquests Unit’.

\(^{114}\) Minute D/VCDS to Min(AF) [MOD], 24 April 2008, ‘Inquests Cell: Terms of Reference’.

\(^{115}\) Public hearing, 6 July 2010, pages 30-31.

\(^{116}\) GOV.UK, 23 February 2012, Defence Inquests Unit: helping to find the answers.
• helping to identify and locate military witnesses;
• organising familiarisation events on military equipment for coroners; and
• providing support to witnesses.

202. Mr Venables also indicated that the creation of the DIU served to change the MOD’s policy on legal representation at inquests. The MOD had tended to be legally represented at inquests:

“But we took the view that some families see that as intimidating. It looked as though the big bad Ministry had turned up, so now, even if the families choose to have a barrister, we tend not to, we ... send a case officer.”

**Introduction of Service Inquiries**

203. Section 343 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (AFA 2006), which came into force on 1 October 2008, provided for the establishment of a single form of statutory inquiry – the Service Inquiry (SI) – for all the Services.¹¹⁷

204. The Royal Navy, Army and RAF had previously held inquiries under the Prerogative, Army Act 1955 and Air Force Act 1955 respectively.

205. The MOD told the Inquiry that the AFA 2006 represented the first complete overhaul of the Service justice system in 50 years, harmonising practices and procedures across the Services to provide a single system of Service law.

206. The MOD also told the Inquiry that SIs had the same purpose as BOIs (subject to its terms of reference, to establish the facts of a particular matter and make recommendations to prevent recurrence).

**Efforts to reduce the backlog of inquests, 2005 to 2007**

**Support for the Oxfordshire Coroner**

207. From March 2003 to 1 April 2007, military fatalities on Op TELIC were repatriated to RAF Brize Norton in Oxfordshire.

208. In early 2005, Mr Gardiner applied to the Oxfordshire County Council, then to the Home Office, and finally to the MOD for additional funding to enable him to carry out his duties.¹¹⁸

209. In May 2005, the MOD convened a series of meetings with officials from the Home Office and the Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA)¹¹⁹ to consider how to resolve

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¹¹⁹ The DCA took over responsibility for coronial policy from the Home Office in May 2005.
the immediate problem and “explore alternative arrangements to ensure that the issue
does not reoccur”.

210. On 24 May, the Home Office provided £80,000 to allow Mr Gardiner’s office
to recruit an additional Coroner’s Officer to help manage inquests into the deaths of
Service Personnel in Iraq.\[120\]

211. Mr Don Touhig, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence, told
the House of Commons in early June 2005 that the decision to provide support to
Mr Gardiner’s office predated recent press reports on delays in holding inquests into
the deaths of Service Personnel.\[121\]

212. A June 2007 DCA briefing assessed that that support had “little effect” on the
backlog.\[122\] The main constraint was the time that Mr Gardiner himself was able to
devote to considering case papers in preparation for inquests.

213. On 6 February 2006, Ms Harriet Harman, Minister of State for the DCA, informed
the House of Commons that she intended to bring forward legislation to reform the
coronor service:

“Under the current coroner service, families frequently get overlooked during the
inquest process ... The system is fragmented, with no national leadership, and it
is not accountable ... Standards are not uniformly good; everything rests too much
on the personal qualities and abilities of individuals within the system. The legal
framework is downright archaic. For most coroners, this is not even their principal
occupation; it is a secondary one, added on to their main work as solicitors in
private practice ...

“The coroner service must serve the public interest and meet bereaved families’
concerns in a way that, frankly, it currently does not ...”\[123\]

214. In May 2006, in response to renewed Parliamentary concern over delays in holding
inquests into the deaths of Service Personnel, Ms Harman was charged with “dealing
with the problem”.\[124\]

215. On 22 May, Ms Harman wrote to Mr Browne suggesting that they meet to discuss
how to clear the backlog of inquests in Oxfordshire.\[125\] It was important that all coroners
conducted inquests in good time; she was particularly concerned that the families of
Service Personnel should not face a long wait before an inquest was concluded.

\[121\] House of Commons, Official Report, 6 June 2005, column 982.
\[122\] DCA [junior official] to Harman, 12 June 2007, ‘Request from Wiltshire and Swindon Coroner
for Additional Resources to Deal with Military Fatalities Repatriated via RAF Lyneham’.
\[123\] House of Commons, Official Report, 6 February 2006, column 607.
216. Ms Harman wrote:

- The DCA had been endeavouring to get a full picture of the extent of the delays, working with MOD officials and Mr Gardiner’s Office, and had compiled a grid showing the number of inquests yet to be undertaken. That analysis indicated that there were 39 military deaths and 5 civilian deaths relating to Iraq in the “inquest queue”, excluding cases where Mr Gardiner was waiting for evidential material from the MOD.
- The first military deaths in that queue related to the loss of a Sea King helicopter on 22 March 2003. The first deaths on which Mr Gardiner had not yet received material from the MOD related to the loss of a CH46 helicopter on 21 March 2003.
- Mr Gardiner estimated that to clear the backlog, he would need an additional Assistant Deputy Coroner and continued funding for the additional Coroner’s Officer, at a cost of £125,000 a year for two years. DCA officials had not yet assessed whether that estimate was realistic. The DCA was “poorly placed” to provide that funding. If those resources could not be found, the current position that most inquests were held in Oxfordshire (rather than in the home area of the deceased) would need to be reconsidered.

217. Ms Harman, Mr Browne and Mr Ingram met on 24 May. Ms Harman advised that further work by DCA officials suggested that £250,000 would be required over six months in order to list or complete all cases by the end of the year.

218. A record of the meeting by Mr Browne’s Assistant Private Secretary, which was circulated only within the MOD, reported that Mr Browne had agreed that if there was a “practical plan” to reduce the backlog and there was no possibility of securing funding from the Reserve, then he was “prepared in principle to put in £125,000 for the first year”.

219. An informal record of the meeting by a DCA official reported that Mr Browne had agreed to provide £125,000, and to hold a further £125,000 “in reserve” which could be made available depending on progress.

220. In a Written Ministerial Statement to the House of Commons on 5 June, Ms Harman and Mr Browne set out the support that the Government would provide to the Oxfordshire Coroner’s office to enable it to deal with “outstanding inquests”:

- three Assistant Deputy Coroners (Sir Richard Curtis, Ms Selena Lynch and Mr Andrew Walker);

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126 The (Royal Navy) BOI into the loss of a Sea King helicopter on 22 March 2003 had reported on 1 May 2003 (it was the first BOI relating to Op TELIC to report); the BOI report had been made available to families on 9 June 2003.
• two additional Coroner’s Officers;
• an additional member of support staff; and
• recording equipment which would enable two extra courts to operate simultaneously.\textsuperscript{129}

221. There were currently 59 inquests into the deaths of Service Personnel killed in Iraq and 11 inquests into the deaths of civilians to be concluded. Mr Gardiner expected, with this additional support, to be able to conclude inquests into the deaths of 30 Service Personnel where the MOD had completed their own inquiries and case papers had been prepared, and conclude inquests into the deaths of three civilians where he had been provided with reports and other information, by the end of the year.

222. Ms Harman and Mr Browne undertook to report quarterly to Parliament on progress in clearing the backlog of outstanding inquests.

223. As the Statement was being drafted, Ms Harman expressed her strong view that it should be sent to the families of deceased Service Personnel before it was laid in Parliament.\textsuperscript{130}

224. DCA officials advised that they were “not convinced” by that proposal, and that it was in any case impractical as the MOD was “not prepared” to supply family contact details.\textsuperscript{131}

225. Ms Harman and Mr Browne agreed on 1 June that the Statement should be sent to families before it was laid in Parliament.\textsuperscript{132}

226. Two of the three Assistant Deputy Coroners were appointed in early June, the third in early August.\textsuperscript{133}

227. The effectiveness of the additional support provided to the Oxfordshire Coroner’s office in clearing the outstanding inquests is considered below.

228. In July, as the capacity of the Oxfordshire Coroner’s office was being increased, the MOD extended the target timelines for the completion of BOIs; that decision is described earlier in this Section.

229. By the end of July, it had become clear that the MOD and DCA did not have a shared understanding of how much, and at what point, the MOD would contribute to the cost of the additional support provided to the Oxfordshire Coroner’s office.

\textsuperscript{129} House of Commons, \textit{Official Report}, 5 June 2006, column 4WS.
\textsuperscript{130} Email Tierney to Woolfenden, Patterson & Bainbridge, 1 June 2006, ‘Writing to the Families’.
\textsuperscript{131} Minute Bainbridge to Harman, 31 May 2006, ‘Oxon Coroner’.
\textsuperscript{132} Email Tierney to Anderson, 1 June 2006, ‘Note of Telephone Call between Harriet Harman and Des Browne – Iraq/Coroner’.
\textsuperscript{133} Minute DCA [junior official] to Harman, 6 October 2006, ‘Oxfordshire Coroner: Written Ministerial Statement on Progress with Iraq Related Inquest Backlog’. 
The discussions between the DCA, the MOD, and the Treasury from July 2006 to February 2007 on that issue are described below.

230. The DCA bore the costs that were being incurred by the Oxfordshire Coroner’s office while those discussions continued.134

DISCUSSIONS ON FUNDING

231. On 22 May 2006, Mr Alex Allan, Permanent Secretary at the DCA, and Mr Ian Andrews, 2nd Permanent Under Secretary at the MOD, discussed how the additional funding required by the Oxfordshire Coroner might be found.135 Mr Allan’s Assistant Private Secretary reported that Mr Allan had stated that neither the local authority nor the DCA could provide that additional funding. Mr Andrews said that the Treasury met the MOD’s “operational costs”, and indicated that the funding for the Oxfordshire Coroner should be included within that arrangement.136 That would be for the MOD to explore with the Treasury.

232. On 20 July, Ms Harman sent Mr Browne an update on progress on clearing the backlog of inquests, and concluded that she “hoped that we can clarify the amount of money you will pay”.137

233. On the same day, Ms Harman wrote to Lord Falconer of Thoroton, the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and Lord Chancellor, asking if he would speak to Mr Browne to ensure that Mr Browne’s decision to provide £250,000 would be communicated to MOD finance officials.138

234. Mr Browne replied to Ms Harman on 14 August stating that, as he had previously indicated, given that the inquests were a result of operational commitments, his preference would be for the additional funding to be sought through a call against the Reserve.139 He stood ready to support a request to the Treasury. If funding could not be secured from the Reserve, he was “in principle willing to provide a contribution of £125,000 for the first year towards the financial costs of the additional resources, subject to Accounting Officer and Treasury approval”.

235. Lord Falconer wrote to Mr Browne later that month, stating that £125,000 was insufficient to cover the costs involved and that, while DCA officials would look at the suggestion of making a bid on the Reserve, “given that the backlog is driven by the

135 Email DCA [junior official] to DCA [junior official], 22 May 2006, ‘Coroners – Inquest Delays/MOD’.
136 The established arrangements whereby the MOD claimed the Net Additional Costs of Military Operations (NACMO) from the Treasury are described in Section 13.
138 Minute Harman to Falconer, 20 July 2006, ‘Funding for Extra Resources for the Oxfordshire Coroner’.
MOD’s policy to repatriate Iraq fatalities to RAF Brize Norton in Oxfordshire” it would not be appropriate for the DCA to make that bid.  

236. Mr Browne replied on 10 September, stating that while there was a strong case for funding the additional costs from the Reserve, the Treasury would expect the bid to come from the Department responsible for coronial policy.

237. Lord Falconer replied on 6 October, advising that while the DCA held policy responsibility for coroners, operational responsibility rested with the relevant local authority. In this case, it would normally be for Oxfordshire County Council to meet the costs of the inquests. He continued:

“The Cabinet Office Ministerial Code of Conduct (paragraph 6.10) clearly sets out the principle that Departments responsible for initiating policy are required to take into account the effect their proposals have on other departments. It is MOD policy to repatriate bodies to RAF Brize Norton rather than Lyneham, Fairford or elsewhere and it is a direct result of this decision that the backlog of cases has occurred. If fatalities were shared amongst a number of coroners this problem would have been avoided.

“It is for this reason that I consider that it is your Department’s responsibility to shoulder the costs arising from the Iraq inquest backlog ... If you are unable to fund the additional resources from your existing budget then it is for your Department, not mine, to approach the Treasury for a Reserve claim.”

238. Officials from the MOD, the DCA and the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) met on 8 November to discuss funding options.

239. A DCA official reported to DCA colleagues only that all three departments had difficulties in providing funding from within their existing budgets. The MOD had argued, for the first time, that it would be inappropriate for the MOD to be seen to be funding the inquest process when it had a clear interest in the cases involved. The meeting had agreed that DCA officials should approach the Treasury informally to see whether funding from the Reserve could be made available and, if not, whether they could suggest an alternative solution.

240. A DCA official advised Ms Harman on 13 December that the Treasury had “not replied positively” to that approach. The DCA had subsequently written to the MOD, asking it to confirm that it would provide the necessary funding.

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140 Letter Falconer to Browne, 31 August 2006, ‘Funding for Additional Resources for the Oxfordshire Coroner’.
141 Letter Browne to Falconer, 10 September 2006, [untitled].
142 Letter Falconer to Browne, 6 October 2006, ‘Funding for Additional Resources for the Oxfordshire Coroner’.
241. On 7 January 2007, Mr Lee McCauley, MOD Assistant Director of Defence Resources and Plans, wrote to a Treasury official to advise him that the MOD had “reluctantly concluded” that all additional costs related to the Oxfordshire Coroner should be “funded this year through Defence”. There were several arguments against doing so, but Ministers wanted the issue to be resolved. Treasury approval would be required, as the MOD did not have authority to meet costs that fell to other parts of Government.

242. Mr McCauley proposed that the MOD treat the costs as part of the Net Additional Cost of Military Operations (NACMO), and claim them from the Treasury in the normal way. If that was not possible, the MOD would need to find the funds within its core settlement.

243. On 13 February 2007, Mr Browne wrote to Ms Harman:

“My officials have explored at length with the Treasury the possibility of making a claim against the Reserve. The Treasury have refused on the principle that such costs should lie where they fall and this is not a legitimate charge to Defence for the additional costs of operations. In light of this, I cannot accept an argument that the backlog stems solely from MOD policy: there are sound practical reasons for repatriation of bodies to RAF Brize Norton but there are also, as the current initiative shows, ways in which the burden may be shared with other coroners.”

244. Mr Browne concluded by confirming that he held to his earlier offer to contribute £125,000 towards the additional costs of the Oxfordshire Coroner during 2006/07. That contribution should not be seen as setting a precedent for MOD funding to address “future inquest backlogs, should they arise”.

245. Ms Harman replied on 27 March, expressing her disappointment with that contribution but confirming that she would accept it. She would expect the MOD to contribute if further backlogs emerged.

PROGRESS IN CLEARING THE BACKLOG OF INQUESTS

246. Ministers provided quarterly reports to the House of Commons on progress in clearing the backlog of inquests in Oxfordshire. The table below summarises these reports.

247. The first report, in June 2006, covered only outstanding inquests into deaths relating to Iraq. Subsequent reports included outstanding inquests relating to previous conflicts and military exercises overseas, for which the Oxfordshire Coroner was responsible.

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146 To allocate inquests directly to ‘home-town’ coroners, bypassing the Oxfordshire Coroner.
149 House of Commons, Official Report, 5 June 2006, column 4WS.
248. Ms Harman informed the House of Commons on 12 October that Mr Gardiner would not be able to meet the target set in her June 2006 update for the completion of pre-June 2006 inquests (the end of 2006).  

Table 2: Progress in clearing the backlog of inquests in Oxfordshire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Outstanding inquests</th>
<th>Of which Service Personnel</th>
<th>Of which civilian</th>
<th>Outstanding inquests held since June 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 June 2006</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 October 2006</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 December 2006</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 March 2007</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 June 2007</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 October 2007</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

249. The June 2007 report stated that of the 72 inquests which had been completed by the Oxfordshire Coroner’s Office since June 2006, Mr Gardiner had conducted five, Sir Richard Curtis six, Ms Selena Lynch 28, Mr Andrew Walker 32, and Ms Jennifer Leeming, the Greater Manchester West Coroner, one.  

250. The additional resources provided by the Government in June 2006 enabled the Oxfordshire Coroner’s office to clear the backlog of outstanding inquests (into deaths occurring before June 2006) by October 2007.  

251. The two outstanding inquests reported in the October 2007 report related to the deaths of Fusilier Gordon Gentle on 28 June 2004 and Lieutenant Richard Palmer on 15 April 2006. The inquest into Fusilier Gentle’s death was due to open on 29 October 2007. The coroner had decided to await the completion of the BOI into Lt Palmer’s death before opening an inquest; that inquest would therefore not be held until 2008.

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150 House of Commons, Official Report, 12 October 2006, column 28WS.
151 House of Commons, Official Report, 5 June 2006, column 4WS.
152 House of Commons, Official Report, 12 October 2006, column 26WS. Nine inquests had been completed since the June 2006 WMS, but Mr Gardiner had advised the Government of nine additional outstanding cases relating to deaths from previous conflicts and overseas military exercises.
153 House of Commons, Official Report, 18 December 2006, column 112WS.
154 House of Commons, Official Report, 29 March 2007, column 120WS. The Statement corrected the number given in the 18 December 2006 Statement for Inquests held since October 2006, from 18 to 19.
155 House of Commons, Official Report, 20 June 2007, column 97WS.
156 House of Commons, Official Report, 30 October 2007, column 35WS.
157 House of Commons, Official Report, 20 June 2007, column 97WS.
Efforts to transfer more inquests to local coroners

252. In early September 2006, after discussions with DCA officials, Mr Gardiner alerted coroners that the additional resources he had received from the Government were not intended to be “long term” and were only to reduce the current backlog of cases. He was, therefore, likely to “increasingly be making transfer requests under Section 14(i) of the Coroners Act 1988”.

253. A DCA official advised Ms Harman on 6 October that Mr Gardiner’s office was now receiving a significant number of fatalities from Afghanistan, as well as from Iraq. The additional resources announced on 5 June only covered inquests that were outstanding at that date. The DCA had “serious doubts” that Mr Gardiner’s office could handle the new (post-June 2006) cases, once the pre-June backlog was cleared and staffing levels returned to normal.

254. The official commented that it was not helpful that the MOD continued to repatriate bodies to RAF Brize Norton: DCA and MOD officials were meeting shortly to discuss that issue.

255. MOD and DCA officials met on 18 October to reconsider the policy of repatriating the bodies of deceased Service Personnel via RAF Brize Norton. Points made in the discussion included:

- Mr Gardiner was “considering transferring cases to other jurisdictions, but in limited circumstances”. That was in line with established policy. Mr Gardiner would not be transferring cases where there were multiple deaths in a single incident, and all transfers required the agreement of the receiving coroner.
- Arrangements for inquests relating to incidents in 2003 and 2004 were “well in hand”, but there were still “serious delays” to later inquests and the number of bodies repatriated to RAF Brize Norton was increasing.
- One unavoidable factor behind those delays was the need to wait for a BOI to conclude before beginning an inquest.
- It was crucial to keep families informed of progress.
- MOD officials felt that Mr Gardiner and his officers provided effective support to families through the inquest process.
- DCA officials considered that Mr Gardiner’s office would be unable to cope with the workload once the additional resources provided by the Government were removed.

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160 Record, 18 October 2006, ‘Oxfordshire Coroner: Note of a meeting at 10am on 18 October 2006 in room 8.04 Steel House’.
256. The meeting considered a number of options, and agreed that:

- The MOD should continue to use RAF Brize Norton.
- MOD policy should be amended, so that when a death occurred (and before the body was repatriated), the appropriate local coroner would be alerted that the body of the deceased would be coming into their district.
- The body would be taken to the local coroner immediately after the repatriation ceremony. Such a policy “would avoid the need to involve the Oxfordshire Coroner at all”.

257. Ms Harman wrote to Mr Gardiner on 17 November, following up on discussions between Mr Gardiner and DCA officials, to seek his views on that approach.\textsuperscript{161}

258. Mr Gardiner replied on 21 November, recalling that the Coroner’s Act required him to hold an inquest if he was informed that a body was within his jurisdiction and the death appeared violent or unnatural, and advised:

“In practice it is inevitable that I will be informed, either directly or through my Officers, of any bodies in my jurisdiction. Indeed … I would be failing in my duties if I had not over the years established appropriate lines of communication.”\textsuperscript{162}

259. Mr Gardiner also advised that he had had informal discussions with a number of coroners, and most of them had indicated that they would accept transfers from him under Section 14 of the Coroners Act. Since he had alerted coroners to the likelihood that he would be transferring more cases (in early September), he had transferred three cases.

260. On 4 December, Ms Harman met relatives of Service Personnel killed in Iraq to discuss their experience of the investigation and inquest process and the coroners’ service.\textsuperscript{163} The meeting, which was facilitated by an external organisation called Opinion Leader, was attended by 17 relatives from 12 families.

261. A record of the meeting by a DCA official highlighted relatives’ concern over the distance they had to travel to inquests (there was a “particular difficulty” with Scottish fatalities as there was no discretion to hold a Fatal Accident Inquiry in Scotland where the death occurred overseas), and the perceived failure of the MOD to provide them with all documentation before the inquest.\textsuperscript{164} The official commented that the Oxfordshire Coroner had been encouraged to transfer cases to other coroners. The DCA was also exploring ways to transfer a body directly to a local coroner.

\textsuperscript{162} Letter Gardiner to Harman, 21 November 2006, ‘Foreign Service Fatalities’.
\textsuperscript{164} Email DCA [junior official] to Burden, 8 December 2006, ‘Short Paper on Actions from Iraq Inquest Meeting with Families’ attaching Paper, [undated], ‘Actions from Iraq Inquest Meeting with Families’.
262. Discussions on whether a Fatal Accident Inquiry could be held for all Scottish fatalities are addressed later in this Section.

263. On 13 December, a DCA official advised Ms Harman that the Oxfordshire Coroner’s office continued to receive a significant number of fatalities from Iraq and Afghanistan (15 and 33 respectively, since June).\(^{165}\) The DCA continued to have serious doubts about whether it could cope with that workload. The Coroner’s office had “raised the possibility” of extending the additional staff until all inquests (pre- and post-June 2006) had been cleared, but the DCA had advised them that that would be a matter for Oxfordshire County Council.

264. Ms Harman told the House of Commons on 18 December that, following the 4 December meeting, the DCA was “working on providing families with better information about the inquest system, how we can help families to have access to all material relevant to the inquest, and holding inquests closer to where the relatives live”.\(^ {166}\)

265. Ms Harman wrote to Mr Browne on the same day, highlighting five areas identified at the 4 December meeting where changes might improve a family’s experience:

- Holding the inquest closer to the family’s home, rather than in Oxford. The DCA was encouraging Mr Gardiner to transfer cases to other coroners as a way of reducing his backlog. Another possibility would be to repatriate the bodies of deceased Service Personnel directly to the family’s local coroner without any involvement by the Oxfordshire Coroner.\(^ {167}\)
- Creating an information pack for families of deceased Service Personnel which described what to expect from an inquest and where to go for further support. Ms Harman suggested that DCA and MOD officials should discuss the contents of the pack.\(^ {168}\)
- Establishing a “victims’ advocate service” for families, similar to the Coroner’s Court Support Service but tailored to address the particular problems of families of those killed abroad and in conflict. The service could build on the support already provided by Visiting Officers.
- Ensuring earlier and more complete advance disclosure of documents and key facts to families.
- Ending the practice of charging families for access to documents, including inquest transcripts.

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\(^ {166}\) House of Commons, Official Report, 18 December 2006, column 116WS.

\(^ {167}\) Letter Harman to Browne, 18 December 2006, ‘Proposals Arising from Meeting with Relatives of Service Personnel on their Experience of the Inquest System’.

\(^ {168}\) The resulting booklet, *MOD & MOJ Boards of Inquiry and Coroners’ Inquests: Information for Bereaved Families (2008)*, was published in early 2008.
266. The Opinion Leader record of the 4 December meeting, which issued in January 2007, reported that the Coroner’s service had not sufficiently met the needs of most families. It identified six main issues:

- the time between incident and inquest (more than three years in some cases);
- insufficient notification of an inquest, leaving little opportunity to prepare;
- not having access to key information;
- specific problems with the running of the inquest (including key witnesses not being present, factual errors, and not having the opportunity to ask questions);
- a lack of sensitivity in the treatment of families; and
- cost and logistical issues (including being asked to pay for documents and the difficulty faced by some families in paying for legal representation).

267. The report advised that families had also raised concerns relating to their treatment by the media and the Army’s investigative processes.

268. On 22 January 2007, Mr David Cameron, the MP for Witney, in whose constituency RAF Brize Norton was located, wrote to Lord Falconer stating that it was “patently unfair” that Oxfordshire County Council should have to provide funding to clear post-June 2006 inquests. The Council estimated that the Coroner’s office would require an additional £100,000.

269. On 13 February, Mr Browne replied to Ms Harman’s letter of 18 December:

“... I understand that your officials have confirmed with the Oxfordshire Coroner that provided the body is not formally reported to him he would be content for the repatriated body to be transferred directly from Brize Norton after the ceremonial to the area of the ‘home’ coroner.”

270. Mr Browne commented that this was a welcome development, provided that flexibility was retained; there would be occasions when the Oxfordshire Coroner, with the pathology services available to him, would be able to release a body to the family more quickly than a local coroner.

271. On 27 March, a DCA official advised Ms Harman that the DCA’s line that Oxfordshire County Council should provide funding was “becoming harder to maintain”. It was important that Mr Walker was retained to deal with the post-June 2006 backlog. The DCA would look to the MOD to provide funding, but it was certain to resist.

170 Letter Cameron to Falconer, 22 January 2007, ‘Coroner Service in Oxfordshire’.
Ms Harman informed the House of Commons on 29 March that the Government had made further resources available to the Oxfordshire Coroner office’s to enable Mr Walker to remain as Assistant Deputy Coroner and to enable one Coroner’s Officer to be retained, to handle the new (post-June 2006) backlog of inquests.\footnote{173 House of Commons, Official Report, 29 March 2007, column 124WS.}

Ms Harman advised Mr Browne at the end of March that, since the Oxfordshire Coroner was now routinely transferring inquests to the appropriate local coroner, there had been no need to repatriate bodies directly to a local coroner without any involvement by the Oxfordshire Coroner.\footnote{174 Letter Harman to Browne, 27 March 2007, ‘Proposals Arising from Meeting with Relatives of Service Personnel on their Experience of the Inquest System’.} Ms Harman understood that the practice of transferring single death inquests would be followed by the Swindon and Wiltshire Coroner (when fatalities began to be repatriated through RAF Lyneham from 1 April).

Support for the Swindon and Wiltshire Coroner

From 1 April 2007, due to essential repair work at RAF Brize Norton, ceremonial repatriations took place through RAF Lyneham in Wiltshire.

In May, the DCA took on certain responsibilities from the Home Office and was renamed the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). Ms Harman retained Ministerial responsibility for coronial policy.

Mr David Masters, the Coroner for Wiltshire & Swindon, wrote to the Ministry of Justice on 21 May, requesting additional resources for his office to enable it to deal with the bodies of Service Personnel killed in Iraq and Afghanistan.\footnote{175 Minute MOJ [junior official] to Harman, 12 June 2007, ‘Request from Wiltshire and Swindon Coroner for Additional Resources to Deal with Military Fatalities Repatriated via RAF Lyneham’.}

An MOJ official advised Ms Harman that she should resist providing additional funding, but offer Mr Masters a meeting with MOJ and MOD officials to discuss his workload and possible options. There was a risk that without additional funding a backlog could develop (as it had in Oxfordshire), but there was also a case for challenging the argument that Mr Masters could not cope without it.

Ms Harman replied to Mr Masters on those lines.\footnote{176 House of Commons, Official Report, 12 July 2007, column 1623.}

Subsequently, against a background of Parliamentary concern over the possibility that the backlog of inquests was increasing, she agreed with Mr Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor, that he should meet Mr Masters.

Mr Straw and Ms Prentice met Mr Masters on 23 July.\footnote{177 Minute PS/Prentice [MOJ] to MOJ [junior official], 23 July 2007, ‘Meeting with Wiltshire Coroner – 23 July 2007’.} Mr Masters said that he had transferred 17 cases relating to single deaths to other coroners, but retained...
jurisdiction in 16 cases relating to multiple deaths or where the deceased was from Scotland. He needed additional staffing and resources to deal with the additional workload. Mr Straw and Ms Prentice both said that they were "sympathetic" to that request.

281. Mr Straw and Mr Browne agreed later that month that the MOJ and the MOD should share the cost of supporting Mr Masters’ office, and in October that their Departments should share the cost equally. The cost for 2007/08 was likely to be £230,000, and £350,000 a year thereafter.

282. In October, an MOJ official advised Ms Prentice that there was no backlog of military inquests in Wiltshire and Swindon.

283. The Coroners and Justice Bill, which was introduced into Parliament in January 2009, included a number of measures to ensure that any future backlogs of inquests could be addressed more easily. The Bill is described later in this Section.

Efforts to improve the inquest process, 2006 to 2009

US participation in inquests

284. Ms Harman wrote to Mr David Johnson, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in London, on 20 July 2006 about “the need for US co-operation which was contributing to delays in inquests” into the deaths of British Service Personnel in Iraq.

285. The inquest into the death of Mr Terry Lloyd, an Independent Television News (ITN) journalist who died in a friendly fire incident with US forces on 22 March 2003, was conducted by Mr Andrew Walker, the Assistant Deputy Coroner for Oxfordshire, in October 2006. Mr Walker found that Mr Lloyd had been unlawfully killed.

286. In early August, as part of the preparations for that inquest, MOD and FCO officials met US Embassy staff on behalf of Mr Walker, to try to secure US authority to use a US Marine Corps report into one part of the incident and additional material covering the precise circumstances of Mr Lloyd’s death.

287. The Pentagon advised MOD officials in late September that a redacted version of the Marine Corps report could be used and that no additional material was available.

288. Mr Walker then asked for US Service Personnel to attend the inquest. When that request was refused, he ruled that the information provided by the US was

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181 Letter Harman to Johnson, 6 November 2006, ‘Oxfordshire Iraq related Inquests’.
182 Briefing MOD, [undated], ‘Meeting with David Johnson, Deputy Chief of Mission US Embassy London (16 November 2006)’. 
“inadmissible”, as he would not have the opportunity to question those who had provided witness statements.

289. Ms Harman wrote to Mr Johnson again on 6 November, to advise him that difficulties in securing US co-operation remained.\(^{183}\) It appeared that US Service Personnel did not regard themselves as being required to attend inquests, despite being requested to do so. Mr Walker had told her that the inquest into the death of Mr Lloyd would have benefited considerably from the presence of US witnesses who could be questioned by him and the next of kin. Reading out the witnesses’ statements (with the names of the witnesses redacted) “was no substitute”.

290. Ms Harman reassured Mr Johnson that an inquest was not a criminal trial, and there was no reason for US Service Personnel not to attend. She suggested that they should meet to discuss the issue.

291. Ms Harman met Mr Johnson on 20 November.\(^{184}\)

292. In advance of the meeting, Ms Harman asked for advice on a number of issues including how the UK would respond to a request for UK Service Personnel to attend a US inquest (or equivalent).\(^{185}\)

293. The MOD advised that there was:

> “... no formal process ... to facilitate such attendance. Attendance would have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis and the MOD would have to carefully consider the rights of the individual under different legal/constitutional systems” \(^{186}\)

294. At the meeting, Mr Johnson said that the US had provided redacted copies of US reports into incidents for a number of inquests; he was disappointed that Mr Walker had “rejected” that material.\(^{187}\) Ms Harman suggested that the key issue was the ability of the coroner and families to question the material. Mr Johnson asked whether individuals who had been closely involved with the investigation of an incident could attend the inquest, instead of individuals who had been involved in it. Ms Harman agreed that that option should be explored, but said that it was for the coroner to decide who should give evidence.

295. Mr Johnson asked if UK Service Personnel were obliged to attend US or other inquests and inquiries; Ms Harman said that she had discussed that point with Mr Hoon,

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\(^{183}\) Letter Harman to Johnson, 6 November 2006, ‘Oxfordshire Iraq related Inquests’.
\(^{184}\) Email Tierney to English, 21 November 2006, ‘Note of Meeting between Harriet Harman and David Johnson’.
\(^{185}\) Email Tierney to English, 14 November 2006, ‘Meeting with US Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission’.
\(^{186}\) Briefing MOD, [undated], ‘Meeting with David Johnson, Deputy Chief of Mission US Embassy London (16 November 2006)’.
\(^{187}\) Email Tierney to English, 21 November 2006, ‘Note of Meeting between Harriet Harman and David Johnson’.
who thought that “they should”. Mr Johnson also raised concerns about creating a precedent for similar processes in other countries.

296. An FCO official who attended the meeting reported that the US appeared to have two concerns:

- the material that they might be required to provide; and
- the risk that attendance at inquests by US Service Personnel might expose those individuals to civil action in the UK.  

297. In the following weeks, DCA and FCO officials provided advice to the US Embassy on the inquest process and the extent of extra-territorial jurisdiction under English law.

298. The FCO’s advice on extra-territorial jurisdiction was that:

- English criminal law was essentially territorial. There was no jurisdiction in English law to prosecute a foreign national for homicide committed overseas.
- If there was no extra-territorial jurisdiction, there was no question of any charges being issued against US Service Personnel.
- There were a group of “international” offences for which the UK had taken universal jurisdiction, including most relevantly “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions committed anywhere by persons of any nationality. It was, however, “hard to imagine circumstances in which a ‘friendly fire’ incident would amount to a grave breach” of the Convention.

299. Ms Harman met Mr Johnson again on 6 December. Ms Harman suggested that the meeting should focus on the inquest into the death of L Cpl Hull.

300. Ms Harman said that she had spoken to Mr Walker, the coroner responsible for that inquest. He would like US witnesses to the incident to attend the inquest; however, he could accept “as a minimum”:

- an unredacted copy of the US report on the incident: the US and UK reports differed, and the US report had “large sections, even whole pages” redacted; and
- a US representative to speak to and explain the contents of the report.

301. An MOD official added that “in a reverse situation the UK would consider what we could offer in terms of best evidence”.

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188 Email FCO [junior official] to MOD [junior official], 20 November 2006, ‘Iraq Coroners Inquests’.
189 Email DCA [junior official] to US Embassy [junior official], 30 November 2006, ‘Questions from the US Embassy about Inquests’.
190 Email Adams to US Embassy [junior official], 1 December 2006, ‘Questions from US Embassy about inquests’.
302. Mr Johnson advised that the US Government had concluded that it would not be possible for US witnesses to an incident to participate in the inquest. It was now considering whether it could provide someone who could speak authoritatively to a US report.

303. On 1 February 2007, Mr Walker stated that he wished to play in open court a video-recording taken by one of the A-10 aircraft showing the attack on L Cpl Hull’s convoy.\footnote{Minute Ferguson to APS/Min(AF), 2 February 2007, ‘Oxfordshire Inquests: Release of US Classified Information’} That recording had been provided to the MOD by the US for use in the BOI into the incident, and had subsequently been shown to the coroner by the MOD on the mistaken premise that it was UK-owned material.

304. The following day, the MOD sought and received an adjournment to the inquest to allow time to consult the US on disclosure of the recording.

305. These events attracted a great deal of media attention, focusing on:

- claims that the family of L Cpl Hull had previously been informed by the MOD that no video-recording of the incident existed;
- the MOD’s decision to seek an adjournment, thus delaying the inquest; and
- the US Government’s position that US witnesses to an incident should not participate in any subsequent UK inquest.

306. On 4 February, The Observer newspaper quoted Ms Harman’s view:

“My letters haven’t proved successful, phone calls haven’t proved successful, requests from the coroners haven’t. It’s just not fair on the relatives to sit in on an inquest and to know that they can’t ask questions. They’re entitled to know the truth from our allies.”\footnote{The Observer, 4 February 2007, Why won’t the US tell us how Matty died?}

307. The recording was leaked to the press on 6 February.\footnote{The Guardian, 6 February 2007, US allows ‘friendly fire’ tape in court.}

308. Later that day, the US told the Government that the recording could be viewed by the coroner, an MOD representative and L Cpl Hull’s family only.\footnote{Minute DCA [junior official] to Tierney, 21 February 2007, ‘Note of meeting with David Johnson (Deputy Chief of Mission, US Embassy)’}

309. On 19 February, prompted by concerns arising from the MOD’s support for the inquest into L Cpl Hull’s death, Mr Ingram sought advice on whether the MOD should adopt a fundamentally different BOI process. This is described earlier in this Section.
310. Ms Harman met Mr Johnson for a third time on 21 February.\footnote{Minute DCA [junior official] to Tierney, 21 February 2007, ‘Note of meeting with David Johnson (Deputy Chief of Mission, US Embassy)’.} A DCA official recalled Mr Walker’s requests for an unredacted copy of the US report on the attack on L Cpl Hull’s convoy and for a US representative to speak to the report. Ms Harman said:

“... although it is difficult for the US to do what the coroner is asking, it is worse for the US not to ... providing no document and no representative at the inquest would be unacceptable.”

311. Mr Johnson advised that the US Government was still considering these requests; discussions between the US and UK military would take place later that week.

312. Mr Bill Jeffrey and Mr Gordon England, the US Deputy Defense Secretary, discussed the issue two days later.\footnote{Minute PS/PUS [MOD] to Policy Director, 23 February 2007, ‘Coroners’ Inquests – PUS Phonecall with Gordon England: 23 February 2007’.} Mr England advised that, while the US aimed to be as co-operative as possible:

- They could not provide an unredacted version of the US report to Mr Walker, could not agree that he should contact the A-10 pilots directly, and could not provide an official to answer questions on the training of A-10 pilots.
- They could not agree to the in principle release of classified US information to coroners in future cases.
- They could not agree to provide “third-party US officials” to attend inquests.

313. Mr Jeffrey asked Mr England to reconsider the provision of third-party US officials; Mr England agreed that he would.

314. On 16 March, Mr Walker ruled that L Cpl Hull was unlawfully killed.\footnote{Daily Telegraph, 17 March 2007, Killing of British soldier by US pilot criminal.} The press reported that Mr Walker was critical of the failure of the US authorities to co-operate with the inquest.

Legal representation at inquests

315. The Government’s position at the beginning of Op TELIC was that legal aid was not normally necessary at inquests as the inquest procedure was designed to be inquisitorial and non-adversarial.\footnote{Standard Note, 28 January 2010, Legal aid for representation at Inquests.} Legal aid could be provided in exceptional circumstances by the Lord Chancellor, provided that the Legal Services Commission (LSC) recommended it. Such exceptional circumstances might relate to a wider public interest in the applicant being legally represented, or to a need for the applicant to be legally represented to enable the coroner to carry out an effective investigation.
316. Legal Help might be available (subject to a means test) to provide legal advice and assistance before an inquest.

317. The Deepcut Review into the circumstances surrounding the deaths of four soldiers at the Princess Royal Barracks, Deepcut between 1995 and 2002, led by Mr Nicholas Blake, reported in March 2006. He concluded that the participation of the family of the deceased in an inquest was desirable, and that their participation was assisted by “having experienced legal professionals to advise them whether there are reasons for concern, and how they can be properly addressed”. He also concluded that, in some circumstances, it was “invidious for the Army to be legally represented at such an inquest at public expense whilst the family is not”.

318. Mr Blake recommended:

“As part of the military covenant with the soldier, the MOD should ensure that the family of a deceased soldier have access to legal advice and, where appropriate, legal representation prior to, and during, the inquest or FAI [Fatal Accidents Inquiry].”

319. The Government’s formal response to the Deepcut Review was issued in June, and stated:

“An inquest is an inquisitorial, non-adversarial fact finding process of limited scope which does not make findings of civil or criminal liability. It is the general presumption that legal representation is not necessary, and it is quite appropriate for those deemed interested persons by the Coroner to ask questions of witnesses at an inquest without legal assistance. Government provision of legal aid ... is not therefore normally available ... However, under the Access to Justice Act 1999 allocation may be made to the Legal Services Commission for exceptional funding.”

320. Ms Harman met relatives of Service Personnel killed in Iraq on 4 December, to discuss their experience of the investigation and inquest process. The formal record of the meeting reported that families “would like to be informed of their right to have legal representation [at an inquest], and that the Government should provide funding for legal representation where families could not afford it”.

321. Ms Harman wrote to Mr Browne later that month summarising the conclusions of the meeting; her letter did not address the issue of legal representation.


203 Letter Harman to Browne, 18 December 2006, ‘Proposals arising from meeting with relatives of service personnel on their experience of the inquest system’.
322. On 13 December, during Prime Minister’s Questions, Mr Roger Gale asked Mr Blair:

“When inquests are held into the deaths of Service Personnel whose bodies are returned to the UK, the Government are represented by the Treasury Solicitor, who has access to effectively unlimited taxpayers’ funds for QCs, witnesses and support investigations. In contrast, families of the bereaved attending the same inquest have to pay out of their own pockets. Is it right that the dice should be loaded against the bereaved?”

323. Mr Blair replied that Ms Harman was looking at the arrangements for inquests, adding that “it is of course important to make sure that bereaved families are given every possible facility”.

324. Mr Gale continued to press the Government to provide funding routinely for legal representation for bereaved families at inquests into the deaths of Service Personnel.

325. On 17 January 2007, a DCA official advised Ms Vera Baird, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the DCA, that Ms Harman had received representations on the issue during a consultation meeting on the draft Coroners Bill and at her 4 December meeting with the families of Service Personnel who had died in Iraq. Ms Harman was concerned that there was a “real or perceived inequality” when a public authority was legally represented at an inquest but the family of the deceased was not. She had therefore asked officials to explore options for providing (non-legal aid) funding for families at inquests where public authorities had legal representatives. That work was still at a very early stage.

326. A DCA official detailed Ms Harman’s position and that work on 22 February:

“Harriet [Ms Harman] was clear that it is of fundamental importance that there should be equality of arms between the families and MOD and something needs to be done to achieve this urgently ... Her view is that if it is not possible for families to be given legal support over and above the legal aid provisions then she would propose that equality of arms is met by there being no MOD lawyers present at the inquests in which they have an interest.”

327. Work was under way to:

- develop a consultation paper to seek views on how representation for families could be paid for outside of the legal aid system, in cases when a public

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204 House of Commons, Official Report, 13 December 2006, column 872.
205 House of Commons, Official Report, 13 December 2006, column 872.
207 Minute DCA [junior official] to Falconer, 22 February 2007, ‘Legal Funding of Military Inquests: Correspondence from Roger Gale MP’.
authority was represented; the favoured option was a surcharge on those authorities; and

- conduct a study to establish fair and effective ways of ensuring that families routinely had official material disclosed to them before an inquest; that should improve the opportunity for families to participate in inquests on equal terms.

328. On 27 February, the All Party Parliamentary Group on Army Deaths held a seminar focusing on the issue of legal representation for families, which Ms Harman attended.208

329. On 9 March, a DCA official advised Ms Harman that:

- the MOD had had legal representation at eight of the 45 inquests (into 63 deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan) that had been completed;
- at five of those eight inquests, the family had also had legal representation; and
- at three other inquests the family had had legal representation and the MOD had not.209

330. The official advised that the DCA had been able to confirm only two cases where families had received legal aid for an inquest relating to Iraq (at a total cost of some £38,000).

331. The official recalled the Government’s response to the Deepcut Review and commented:

“If the MOD maintain the line that inquests are not adversarial ... so that families do not need to be represented, this begs the question as to why MOD needs to be represented.”

332. Ms Harman wrote to Mr Browne on 14 March:

“I am becoming increasingly concerned about the lack of legal representation for families at inquests where the military are represented.210

…

“One solution to the problem might be for neither the military nor the family to be legally represented. Alternatively, funding should be provided to families for representation in those cases where the MOD is represented. I would look to your Department to fund this ...

“I would welcome an early meeting to discuss this.”

333. Ms Harman concluded with the handwritten comment: “I know you share my concern on this.”

208 Email Robins to Burton, 27 February 2007, ‘Seminar on Army deaths’.
334. Ms Harman and Mr Ingram met on 18 April to discuss legal representation at military inquests.\(^\text{211}\) Ms Harman said that there were two distinct areas to consider:

- “logistical and moral” support and advice for families; and
- legal advice and representation.

335. Mr Ingram and Ms Harman both stated that their departments did not have the resources to fund legal representation. They agreed that:

“... the increased support for families from the MOD and the increased support for coroners as well as the work on greater disclosure of information would go a long way to providing families with the support they want at inquests.”

336. They also agreed to set out that increased support in a Written Ministerial Statement.

337. Mr Ingram undertook to ensure that families had an MOD representative with them at the inquest “to provide explanations and support”.

338. Mr Ingram made a Written Ministerial Statement on 7 June on improved support to bereaved families.\(^\text{212}\) The Statement did not cover legal representation for bereaved families at inquests.

339. The Royal British Legion’s “Honour the Covenant” campaign, which was launched in September 2007, highlighted the distress caused to families by delays to and the lack of legal representation during inquests, and called for legal advice, representation and advocacy to be provided to all families at public expense.\(^\text{213}\)

340. Ms Joan Humble, chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Army Deaths, wrote to Ms Prentice on 14 December seeking advice on how the Group could best engage with Government discussions on the reform of the inquest system and in particular the issue of legal representation for the families of deceased Service Personnel.\(^\text{214}\) Ms Humble stated:

“To grieving families it seems a travesty of justice that MOD and Service Personnel should appear in court represented at public expense while they may have been advised they don’t require representation or [are] forced to put their life savings on the line.”

341. Ms Prentice replied on 19 February 2008, recalling the position that legal aid was not usually available for representation at an inquest because it was a “fact-finding

\(^{211}\) Minute Tierney to DCA [junior official], 19 April 2007, ‘Note of meeting between Harriet Harman and Adam Ingram on legal representation at military Inquests’.

\(^{212}\) House of Commons, Official Report, 7 June 2007, column 26WS.

\(^{213}\) The Royal British Legion, September 2007, Honour the Covenant.

\(^{214}\) Letter Humble to Prentice, 14 December 2007, [untitled].
process” and not a trial. Legal representation could be provided in exceptional circumstances, and the MOJ had not refused any exceptional funding applications (from the Legal Services Commission) concerning deaths in Iraq or Afghanistan.

342. Ms Prentice continued:

“I would also say that when I met representatives of the War Widows Association recently, they did not feel that legal representation at inquests was necessary, if the families were taken through the inquest process slowly and gently by the coroner.”

343. On 13 March 2008, in response to a further question from Mr Gale, Ms Harman (Leader of the House of Commons) said:

“I agree with the hon. Gentleman that if bereaved relatives with no legal representation turn up on the steps of a coroner’s court and find that the Ministry of Defence and the Army have a great battery of solicitors and QCs, they cannot help but feel that the position is unfair. The MOD is very concerned about the issue, which will be considered during debate on the Coroners Bill. We need to give bereaved relatives at inquests a real sense of fairness and support.”

The Coroners and Justice Act, 2009

344. A January 2009 briefing on the Coroners and Justice Bill advised that it would contain a number of measures to ensure that any future backlogs of inquests could be addressed more easily:

- It would create a new national head of the coronial system, the Chief Coroner, who would be able to reallocate work between coroners and request the Lord Chief Justice to appoint judges to act as coroners in complex cases. The wishes of the bereaved family would be taken into account in determining the location of the inquest.
- Coroners would have new powers to obtain information to help their investigations. “Rigid restrictions” on where inquests and post-mortems could be held would be relaxed and the power to transfer cases to prevent delays would be enhanced.

345. The Bill would also give the Lord Chancellor powers to issue statutory guidance on how the coroners’ system should operate, in particular with respect to bereaved families.

346. The Coroners and Justice Bill was introduced to Parliament on 14 January 2009. It did not contain any reference to public funding for legal representation at inquests.

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218 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 c.25 Explanatory Notes, paragraph 820.
347. On 21 October 2009, during a debate on the Bill in the House of Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford moved an amendment which would have the effect of bringing inquests into deaths in State custody or while on active military service within the scope of legal aid.219

348. Lord Bach, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the MOJ, agreed to consider that amendment, adding:

“Obviously I cannot give any guarantees that I will be able to bring forward a suitable amendment ... but I shall certainly do my best.”220

349. An MOJ official provided advice to Lord Bach on 23 October on the form and cost of such an amendment.221 The official identified a number of risks, including:

- The MOD was trying to reduce how often it chose to be legally represented at inquests “to tackle the perception that they have the advantage over families”. If bringing military inquests into the scope of the legal aid scheme meant that most families had legal representation, then the MOD would also want representation. The MOD had chosen to be represented at “only” 45 percent of inquests in 2008.

- Bringing military inquests into the scope of the legal aid scheme meant that decisions on whether to provide legal aid would be made by the Legal Services Commission (LSC) without reference to Ministers. That might lead to military inquests being refused legal aid, particularly where the LSC did not waive the financial eligibility limits. The official recalled that all 17 of the applications for exceptional funding in relation to military inquests which had so far been made by the LSC had been granted by the MOJ.

350. When the Bill reached its Third Reading in the House of Lords on 5 November, the Government tabled an amendment which made specific provision for legal representation at an inquest into the death of British Service Personnel on active service to be publicly funded.222 A means test applied.

351. The Bill became the Coroners and Justice Act in November 2009, with the amendment included as Section 51. That Section was not brought into force immediately.

352. Section 51 was repealed by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.223 The MOJ’s consultation paper for that Act, which was published

221 Minute MOJ [junior official] to Bach, 23 October 2009, ‘Legal Aid – Coroners and Justice Bill – Extending Legal Aid to Death in Custody and Military Personnel Inquests’.
222 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 c.25 Section 51 and Explanatory Notes, paragraphs 326 and 820.
223 Standard Note, 10 March 2014, ‘Legal aid for representation at Inquests’.
in November 2010, proposed that as inquests were non-adversarial in nature, legal aid could not be justified.

353. Following the 2010 UK general election, the incoming Government first announced that the Office of the Chief Coroner would be abolished, because of the costs involved, and then proposed to leave the Office on the statute book but to transfer some (but not all) of the functions to other posts and institutions.224

354. In November 2011, following criticism in Parliament and from concerned organisations, the Government announced that it would establish the Office of the Chief Coroner.

355. The first post-holder, His Honour Judge Peter Thornton, took up the post in September 2012.225

Fatal Accident Inquiries in Scotland

356. The Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976 provided for the Lord Advocate to instruct a procurator fiscal to investigate a death if it appeared to the Lord Advocate that an investigation would be in the public interest. This contrasted with the position in England and Wales, where coroners had a statutory duty, under the 1988 Coroners Act, to investigate deaths which were reported to them when the body was lying in their district and there was reason to believe that the death was violent or unnatural, or was a sudden death of unknown cause, or in some other circumstances.226 That duty applied “whether the cause of death arose in his district or not”.

357. On 2 April 2003, two weeks after the start of military operations against Iraq, a Home Office official wrote to Mr Nicholas Gardiner, the Oxfordshire Coroner, proposing guidelines for transferring cases to other coroners:

“An aspect of this we had not yet addressed is the handling of fatalities where they are to be transferred to Scotland or Northern Ireland. I have had a brief word with my Northern Ireland and Scottish counterparts. In neither territory would there normally be inquests or other inquiries into deaths abroad. It would therefore seem inevitable for you to accept jurisdiction for inquests in such cases ...”227

358. Mr Gardiner agreed with that assessment.228

359. There are no indications that the issue was considered again until 2006.

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226 Coroners Act 1988. The Act was replaced by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
227 Letter Home Office [junior official] to Gardiner, 2 April 2003, ‘Section 14 and War Deaths’.
228 Letter Gardiner to Home Office [junior official], 4 April 2003, ‘Section 14 etc’. 
360. The Deepcut Review into the circumstances surrounding the deaths of four soldiers at the Princess Royal Barracks, Deepcut reported in March 2006.\textsuperscript{229} The Review recommended: “There should always be an inquest, or, in Scotland, a Fatal Accidents Inquiry, into a sudden death of a solider, wherever the death has occurred.”

361. The Government’s formal response to the Review, which issued in June, stated that discussions were continuing between the MOD and the DCA, with a view to responding to the recommendation in the context of the Coroners Bill.\textsuperscript{230} Responsibility for legislation on inquiries into deaths in Scotland was delegated to the Scottish administration; any proposals would therefore need to be discussed with the Scottish Executive.

362. On 4 December, Ms Harman met relatives of Service Personnel killed in Iraq, to discuss their experience of the investigation and inquest process.\textsuperscript{231} The record of the meeting reported that there was consensus that inquests should be held “more locally, including in Scotland”.

363. Ms Harman wrote to Mr Browne later that month summarising the conclusions of the meeting, including:

“There is a particular issue about Scottish fatalities which are repatriated to England and Wales ... unless there is an inquest in England there will be no inquiry at all in Scotland. It was suggested [at the meeting] that until such time as the Scottish Executive’s position changes, a coroner in the north of England might be able to take on inquests for Scottish families, and my officials are looking into this possibility. I am also going to discuss with the Scottish Executive the issue of extending the scope of the Fatal Accident Inquiry to cover Service deaths abroad.”\textsuperscript{232}

364. In April 2007, Ms Harman met Mr Ingram to discuss legal representation for families at inquests.\textsuperscript{233} Mr Ingram asked whether there was scope to transfer the inquest into the loss of Nimrod XV230 to Scotland. Ms Harman said that she had discussed the issue with the Scottish Lord Advocate and relevant Scottish Executive Minister, who had both confirmed that there was no scope in Scotland for an inquest or Fatal Accident Inquiry (FAI) into the incident.

365. Nimrod XV230 had crashed in Afghanistan on 2 September 2006, with the loss of 14 crew.\textsuperscript{234} The aircraft was based at RAF Kinloss in Scotland.

\textsuperscript{229} Nicholas Blake QC, \textit{A Review of the circumstances surrounding the deaths of four soldiers at Princess Royal Barracks, Deepcut, between 1995 and 2002}, HC795, 29 March 2006.


\textsuperscript{231} Report Opinion Leader, January 2007, ‘DCA meeting with families of military personnel who lost their lives in Iraq’.

\textsuperscript{232} Letter Harman to Browne, 18 December 2006, ‘Proposals arising from meeting with relatives of service personnel on their experience of the inquest system’.

\textsuperscript{233} Minute Tierney to DCA [junior official], 19 April 2007, ‘Note of meeting between Harriet Harman and Adam Ingram on legal representation at military inquests’.

\textsuperscript{234} GOV.UK, 3 September 2006, \textit{Fourteen personnel in Afghanistan Nimrod crash named}. 

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During Defence Questions in the House of Commons on 14 May 2007, Mr Angus Robertson asked:

“Will the Ministry of Defence work with the incoming Scottish Executive to ensure that inquiries [into the deaths of Service Personnel] can take place under Scots law? After all, that would help to reduce the backlog and to ease the inconvenience to the families.”

Mr Ingram replied:

“The answer to that is yes ... My understanding is that there would need to be a change to primary legislation. We need to look into that, but if there is a will to change in Scotland, let us hear the propositions.”

Mr Ingram subsequently discussed with MOD officials how he could respond to Mr Robertson’s call.

On 2 June, Mr Ingram wrote to Mr Kenny MacAskill, Cabinet Secretary for Justice at the Scottish Executive, to open a discussion on the issue:

“Ensuring that they [inquests] are conducted in a family-friendly manner remains a priority for us and, where practical, we are allocating them to ‘home’ coroners in England and Wales. We share your concern that it has not been possible to hold them in Scotland.

“The fact that we have, so far, repatriated the bodies of Scottish Service Personnel to England ensures that there can be an inquest, albeit under the Coroner’s Court arrangements for England and Wales.

“We would favour moving towards a position where, if appropriate, Inquiries into the deaths of Service Personnel can take place in Scotland. We would be happy to work with you to achieve this. However, we believe it will require a change of law in Scotland ...”

Ms Prentice wrote to Mr MacAskill on 25 October, asking if there had been any developments since Mr Ingram’s letter. In the absence of an appropriate process in Scotland, the bodies of Scottish Service Personnel were repatriated to England “to ensure that there can be an inquest”. This meant that families had to travel considerable distances from their homes in Scotland to attend inquests.

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237 Minute Baker to PS/Minister(AF) [MOD], 22 May 2007, ‘Fatal Accident Inquiries for Service Deaths Overseas’.
238 Letter Ingram to MacAskill, 2 June 2007, [untitled].
Officials from the MOD, MOJ and Scottish Executive met on 14 December to consider the possibility of transferring responsibility for inquiries into the deaths of “Scottish-based” Service Personnel who were killed overseas from the coroners’ service to the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS), \(^{240}\) “with a view to FAIs being held rather than coroners’ inquests”. \(^{241}\) The meeting concluded that:

- The way forward might be an order under Section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998. \(^{242}\) That possibility would be explored by the Scottish Government Legal Directorate and the Office of the Solicitor to the Advocate General (OSAG).
- There did not appear to be any “fundamental obstacles” to the proposed transfer.
- The discretionary nature of the FAI system would need to be addressed.

On 27 March 2008, in response to a letter from Mr MacAskill, Mr Browne wrote:

“Addressing these issues is ... a matter for Scottish Ministers. The answer is for you to make a commitment to amend Scots law in a way that can guarantee that Scottish-based Service families can be assured of mandatory inquiries into overseas operational deaths. If that were to happen then it would be entirely appropriate to repatriate deceased Service Personnel to Scottish bases once the law has been changed. You will understand, however, that I cannot contemplate changes without your commitment to mandatory investigations.” \(^{243}\)

Mr Browne’s letter was copied to all Members of the Scottish Parliament, in order to inform the debate on the planned review of FAIs which would be held in the Scottish Parliament later that day.

The issue of enabling inquiries to be held in Scotland into the deaths of Service Personnel normally domiciled in Scotland featured heavily in the debate. \(^{244}\)

Closing the debate, Mr MacAskill stated that an amendment to the Scotland Act 1998 would be necessary before Scotland could act:

“If Des Browne agrees to the making of a section 30 order, we can begin to make progress; without a section 30 order, it would be ultra vires for us to proceed – the Parliament simply could not take such action.”

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\(^{240}\) The Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service is Scotland’s prosecution service.

\(^{241}\) Report, [undated], ‘Note of meeting to discuss possibility of Fatal Accident Inquiries into deaths of Scottish-based Service personnel in St Andrews House, 14 December 2007’.

\(^{242}\) Orders made under Section 30(2) of the Scotland Act 1998 allow for modifications to be made to Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act, which lists those matters that are reserved to the UK Parliament, and as such defines the competence of the Scottish Parliament. The order-making power allows the Scottish Parliament’s legislative competence to be altered by removing or updating existing reservations, or by adding new ones.

\(^{243}\) Letter Browne to MacAskill, 27 March 2008, [untitled].

The following day, an MOJ official advised Ms Prentice that the 14 December 2007 meeting of officials, and subsequent exchanges, had identified “no simple solution”. There were plans for officials to meet again.

On 4 November, Mr Bob Ainsworth, successor to Mr Ingram as Minister of State for the Armed Forces, informed the House of Commons that: “No reply [to Mr Browne’s letter of 27 March] has yet been received from the Scottish Executive.”

That exchange prompted Mr Ainsworth to ask MOD officials how momentum could be regained on the FAI issue.

An official advised Mr Ainsworth on 11 November that the Scottish Executive had given “considerable thought” to how inquiries could be held in Scotland without changing the devolution settlement, but Scottish Ministers did not appear to have come to a conclusion. The official was not sure that work was now being actively pursued. It was not satisfactory to let the issue drift.

Mr Ainsworth wrote to Ms Prentice the following day, proposing that Ministers and officials should meet to consider the way forward. A copy of the letter was sent to Ms Ann McKechn, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Scotland Office.

Mr MacAskill replied to Mr Browne’s letter of 27 March on 19 November.

After a further exchange in January 2009, Mr Ainsworth wrote to Mr MacAskill on 29 January stating that “we do indeed have the basis for a way ahead”. That was to use the Coroners and Justice Bill to amend the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976, so that the Chief Coroner (a new post that would be created by the Coroners and Justice Bill) could request the Lord Advocate to hold an FAI into a particular death.

Section 12 of the Coroners and Justice Act provided for the Secretary of State or the Chief Coroner to notify the Lord Advocate that a death should be investigated under the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976.

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246 House of Commons, Official Report, 4 November 2008, column 294W.
247 Minute MOD [junior official] to PS/Minister(AF) [MOD], 11 November 2008, ‘Fatal Accident Inquiries in Scotland’.
249 House of Commons, Official Report, 3 February 2009, column 1111W.
250 Letter Ainsworth to MacAskill, 29 January 2009, [untitled].
251 Minute Scotland Office [junior official] to Parliamentary Under Secretary of State [Scotland Office], 28 January 2009, ‘Fatal Accident Inquiries and overseas Service deaths’.
252 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, Section 12(4) and (5).
384. The Act also amended the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976, to provide for the Lord Advocate to investigate when such a notification had been received.\textsuperscript{253}

Honouring the dead

Repatriation ceremonies

385. The MOD’s policy on the repatriation of the dead was set out in a paper produced by Lt Gen Palmer on 14 March 2003:

“Repatriation to UK of the dead is to take place wherever possible and as soon as practicable.”\textsuperscript{254}

386. Before Op TELIC, repatriations were conducted with very little or no formal ceremony.\textsuperscript{255}

387. The MOD put in place a unique arrangement for the repatriation of Service Personnel who died during Op TELIC, known as Operation KEIR. The repatriation ceremony under Op KEIR was designed to “demonstrate the highest level of respect”, and included attendance by members of the Royal Family (or their representatives) and Ministers, military pall-bearers and a military band.

388. In his autobiography, General Sir Mike Jackson described attending a repatriation ceremony in his capacity as Chief of the General Staff:

“We gathered before the aircraft landed, and were seated on the edge of the apron outside the terminal building to watch the C-17 aircraft land and taxi into position, coming to a rest with the nose of the aircraft facing diagonally away from the mourners. Then the ramp was lowered. A bearer party of six soldiers in parade dress advanced and marched up the ramp to take the first coffin. As they came into view down the ramp carrying the coffin, a band began playing and everyone stood. We all saluted as the bearers marched past in slow time, carrying the coffin to the waiting hearse. This simple, but profoundly moving, ceremony was repeated for each coffin on board the aircraft.”\textsuperscript{256}

389. Lt Gen Mans told the Inquiry that a repatriation ceremony could “help the bereaved family to start closure on the whole process of losing a loved one”.\textsuperscript{257}

\textsuperscript{253}Coroners and Justice Act 2009, Section 50.
\textsuperscript{254}Paper Palmer, 14 March 2003, ‘UK Forces: Repatriation of the Dead’.
\textsuperscript{255}Minute DDSP Pol O&M to PSO/CDS, 17 March 2004, ‘Policy for Repatriation of Deceased Personnel from Overseas’.
\textsuperscript{257}Public hearing, 19 July 2010, page 63.
390. In February 2004, Mr Ingram agreed that, following the end of major combat operations in Iraq, the MOD should “rationalise” the repatriation process. The MOD would adopt three levels of repatriation:

- for non-battle deaths, where repatriation would mirror the pre-Op TELIC model;
- for Service Personnel killed in action or who had died of their wounds, where repatriation would include a “degree of ceremony” including military pall-bearers; and
- for exceptional circumstances where it was appropriate to demonstrate the highest level of respect, where Op KEIR would be used. It would be for Mr Hoon to determine whether to invoke Op KEIR, taking into account factors including the circumstances surrounding the incident.

391. Lt Gen Palmer told the Inquiry that the issue of who should attend a repatriation ceremony quickly became “a big issue”:

“Everybody wanted to be there, to show support.

“I think what we realised early on was that this was going to be ongoing. Unfortunately, casualties were going to keep coming. We could not have everybody rushing to [RAF] Brize Norton, as it was then, [RAF] Lyneham, as it is now, every time there was a casualty. So we developed, I think, an extremely good policy, which I think has worked very well, about how repatriations are done.”

392. Lt Gen Palmer added that, in planning and conducting repatriation ceremonies:

“... with Ministers and everybody in the MOD the absolute key thing was to try to be as responsive and sensitive to the families as we possibly could at this enormously difficult moment for them.”

393. In September 2007, a fourth level of repatriation was added, covering repatriations in the event of a mass fatality incident (defined as between 15 and 35 fatalities).

394. In April 2009, the MOD amended its policy so that all deaths on operations (including non-battle deaths) received a formal repatriation ceremony, in the light of the difficulty in drawing a distinction between an individual killed by direct enemy fire and one killed in an accident in direct support of operations, and given public and familial expectations that individuals who died on operations should be honoured.

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ROYAL WOOTTON BASSETT

395. From April 2007, due to essential repair work at RAF Brize Norton, ceremonial repatriations took place through RAF Lyneham in Wiltshire.

396. Corteges departing RAF Lyneham passed through Wootton Bassett. The Royal British Legion reported in June 2011 how the town had responded:

“The first [repatriation] was acknowledged by a few members of the public which included members of the Royal British Legion …

“Over the past four years the number of people has increased and where we were once paying tribute on a more personal basis we have now come to represent the country.

“The repatriation tributes were never and are still not organised – things just happen, such as the Church Bell which started when a bell-ringing practise was taking place just before the repatriation was due, and as a mark of respect the one bell was tolled on that occasion.

...”

“When the cortege is about to leave Lyneham, the police alert us here in Wootton Bassett. The Standard Bearers form an orderly line, spacing themselves at equal distances down the opposite side of the road to the War memorial ... When the cortege reaches the edge of town the bell-ringer is notified and the Church Bell starts to toll and the town falls silent. Shopkeepers close their premises and join the crowds and there is not a sound to be heard.”

397. A military parade was held in Wootton Bassett in October 2008 to thank the town.

398. In March 2011, Prime Minister David Cameron announced that The Queen had agreed “to confer the title ‘Royal’ upon the town, as an enduring symbol of the nation’s admiration and gratitude”.

Letters of condolence

399. In July 2002, following a meeting with the parents of a deceased Serviceman, Mr Hoon asked the MOD to consider whether he or the Prime Minister should routinely write to the next of kin of Service Personnel killed on operations.

262 The Royal British Legion website, June 2011.
263 Daily Express, 13 October 2008, Military pays tribute to respectful residents of Wootton Bassett.
264 GOV.UK, 16 March 2011, Prime Minister announces ‘Royal’ Wootton Bassett.
265 Minute McLoughlin to APS/SofS [MOD], 17 September 2002, ‘Letters to next of kin (NOK)’.
400. Ms Elizabeth McLoughlin, the Director General of Service Personnel Policy, responded in September, having consulted the Chiefs of Staff. Existing practice was that, apart from letters written by those serving with the individual who had been killed, a senior officer would write one letter of condolence “on behalf of both the Sovereign and the Service”. While the Services appreciated the wish to provide additional comfort to the families of personnel killed on operations, they were concerned that:

- It would be very difficult for any letter, unless written locally by the unit commander, to be other than “bland and impersonal”. Experience had shown that it was not helpful for families to receive a large number of official condolence letters based on generic information.
- The Services (and the Chief of Defence Staff in particular) did not want to distinguish, for this purpose, between individuals killed on operations and those who died “as a result of the normal rigours of Service life”. They did not believe that the circumstances of a death made the next of kin any more or less deserving of sympathy.
- There was also a question of whether the next of kin of Reservists and MOD civilians should be included.
- In the event of mass casualties, writing to the next of kin might be difficult.

401. Ms McLoughlin concluded that the existing practice should continue, although the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State might in addition send a personal note in “exceptional cases where it is felt that families would benefit”. That would need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

402. In late March 2003, No.10 asked the MOD for advice on how Mr Blair should honour UK Service Personnel killed on Op TELIC, and especially whether he should write letters of condolence to the families of Service Personnel killed on operations and whether there should be a ceremony or function to commemorate deceased Service Personnel.

403. Mr Hoon’s Private Office responded to Mr Blair’s Assistant Private Secretary on 27 March, advising that:

- the current policy (whereby a senior officer wrote a single letter of condolence) remained sound; and
- it would be appropriate for a ceremony to be held after the conflict had concluded.

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266 Minute McLoughlin to APS/SofS [MOD], 17 September 2002, ‘Letters to next of kin (NOK)’.
267 Minute Gibson to APS/Secretary of State, 27 March 2003, ‘Request from No.10: Letters for the Families of the Bereaved and Memorial Ceremony’.
404. On 7 April, Mr Blair wrote to a bereaved spouse who had lost her husband on Op TELIC, to respond to her concerns about the way she was being treated by the MOD.269

405. On 9 May, in response to a further request for advice from No.10 on whether Mr Blair should write letters of condolence to the families of Service Personnel killed on operations, Mr Hoon’s Private Office repeated the advice that the current policy (whereby a senior officer wrote a single letter of condolence) remained sound.270 Mr Hoon’s Private Office added that the MOD was reviewing its policy on writing letters of condolence “in the light of the specific circumstances of the operation in Iraq”, but was unlikely to change it.

406. Mr Hoon’s Private Office advised No.10 on 16 May that the review had concluded that the MOD’s policy should not change:

“... you [No.10] asked if our experience during operations in Iraq had caused us to alter our position ... It has not ... The Prime Minister wrote in exceptional circumstances and in response to correspondence.”271

407. The MOD looked again at the policy at the end of June, following a meeting between Mr Blair and General Sir Michael Walker, Chief of the Defence Staff, during which Mr Blair expressed a personal desire to write.272

408. Lt Gen Palmer advised Mr Hoon on 30 June that, while the Chiefs of Staff considered that the policy remained sound, given Mr Blair’s desire to write and the fact that he was already corresponding with some families, their preferred option was that Mr Blair should write only to the next of kin of “those who die on Op TELIC”.

409. Mr Hoon’s Private Office wrote to No.10 later that day, to confirm that it “could be appropriate” for Mr Blair to write to the next of kin of those killed on Op TELIC (including civilians and those killed in circumstances other than in direct action with the enemy).273

410. On 1 August, Mr Matthew Rycroft, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, advised Mr Blair that the MOD had, again, reviewed its policy and that Mr Hoon would now write to the next of kin of individuals who had died “while in an operational area”.274 Mr Rycroft recommended that Mr Blair should now write only to the next of kin of individuals who had been killed in action.

269 Letter Blair to [name redacted], 7 April 2003, [untitled].  
272 Minute DCDS(Pers) to PS/SoS [MOD], 30 June 2003, ‘Letters of condolence from Prime Minister to Bereaved Families of Service Personnel’.  
273 Letter Williams to Cannon, 30 June 2003, ‘Letters of Condolence from the Prime Minister to Bereaved Families of Service Personnel’.  
274 Minute Rycroft to Blair, 1 August 2003, ‘Letters of Condolence to Bereaved Families of Service Personnel’.  

146
411. The policy was reflected in the first Joint Casualty and Compassionate Policy and Procedures (JSP 751), which was published in March 2005.275

Commemoration in Parliament

412. It has become established practice for the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition to pay tribute to fallen Service Personnel at the start of Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs). The Inquiry has considered the origins and evolution of this public commemoration.

413. The first time a Prime Minister offered condolences for the deaths of Service Personnel in Iraq at PMQs was 2 April 2003. On that day, Mr Blair said he was “sure that the whole House will want to pass on its sympathies to the families of British Servicemen who have tragically been killed in the service of their country in the past week. Again, we pay tribute to their courage and dignity and we pass on our condolences and sympathy to their families and their friends.”276

414. The practice was repeated a week later, when Mr Blair offered condolences to the families of all those who had lost their lives in the intervening seven days.277

415. On 25 June, he paid tribute to (but did not name) the Royal Military Police (RMP) officers who had lost their lives and been injured at Majarr al Kabir the previous day.278

416. On 10 September, as Parliament returned from the summer recess, Mr Blair paid tribute to the British Servicemen who had lost their lives during the recess.279

417. On 5 November, Mr Blair paid tribute to Corporal Ian Plank of the Royal Marines who had lost his life the previous week.280 That was the first time a Service person had been mentioned by name. It is not clear why the decision was taken to name Corporal Plank.

418. Over the next two years, Mr Blair regularly paid tribute at the beginning of PMQs to British Servicemen who had lost their lives, but only from April 2006 did the practice of naming individuals and their regiments become usual.

419. In June 2007, during his last PMQs, Mr Blair described those tributes as “the saddest of duties”.281

420. The practice was continued by Mr Gordon Brown from July 2007.

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276 House of Commons, Official Report, 2 April 2003, column 908.
Memorial services

421. In late March 2003, No.10 asked the MOD for advice on how Mr Blair should honour UK Service Personnel killed on Op TELIC, including whether there should be a ceremony or function to commemorate deceased Service Personnel.  

422. The MOD responded to No.10 on 27 March, advising that it would be appropriate for a ceremony to be held after the conflict concluded. The MOD intended that the ceremony “would give the Prime Minister and the Government the opportunity to honour the efforts of the Services, and their dead”.

423. Mr Hoon informed Parliament on 17 July that there would be a “national service of remembrance and thanksgiving for the campaign in Iraq”.

424. The service took place on 10 October 2003 at St Paul’s Cathedral. The service was attended by the families of the 51 British Service Personnel who had, at that time, lost their lives in the campaign. They were joined by members of the Royal Family including Her Majesty The Queen and His Royal Highness The Duke of Edinburgh, Government Ministers including Mr Blair, and senior military officers.

425. Baroness Symons, joint FCO/Department of Trade and Industry Minister of State for International Trade and Investment, wrote to Mr Hoon shortly after the service. She had spent her time speaking to bereaved families, and reported from those conversations that:

- There was a generally positive reaction to how they had been informed of their loss (although two families had heard through the media), and to the subsequent support from the VO.
- A number of families felt that they had been “ignored” in the design and conduct of the service.
- All families appreciated the presence of The Queen and the Royal Family at the service.

426. Mr Hoon’s Private Office wrote to Mr Rycroft on 14 November advising that feedback from families had been “overwhelmingly positive”. There had been a great

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282 Minute Gibson to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 27 March 2003, ‘Request from No.10: letters for the families of the bereaved and memorial ceremony’.
283 Letter Williams to Cannon, 27 March 2003, ‘Recognition of Armed Forces personnel who died on operations’.
284 Minute MOD [junior official] to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 27 March 2003, ‘Request from No.10: Letters for the families of the bereaved and memorial’.
285 House of Commons, Official Report, 17 July 2003, column 72WS.
286 BBC News, 10 October 2003, Service honours Iraq war dead.
deal of praise for the “obvious effort made by the Royal Family and senior members of the Government and Armed Forces to speak with as many families as possible”.

**Armed Forces Memorial**

427. Mr Hoon advised the House of Commons in November 2000:

“I have given careful consideration to a number of ways in which the recognition of members of the Armed Forces who give their lives in the service of their country might be enhanced. In the light of discussion, I have concluded that the most appropriate would be the erection in central London of a memorial bearing the names of all those killed on duty and by terrorist attack since the end of the Second World War. In accordance with the long established custom for the erection of memorials, I would expect funds to be raised by public subscription. Further consultation will now take place with ex-Service organisations and other interested bodies.”

428. Mr Hoon advised the House of Commons in March 2002 that, following that consultation and research into suitable sites, the Armed Forces Memorial (AFM) would be sited at the National Memorial Arboretum in Staffordshire.

429. On 30 June 2006, following an assessment by officials that there was a significant risk that fundraising for the Memorial would not reach the total required, Mr Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, directed Mr Jeffrey that the MOD should underwrite the Memorial project “in the sum of £3.3m which represents the balance the AFM Trustees require to fully fund the project”.

430. In October 2007, the Armed Forces Memorial was formally dedicated in the presence of Her Majesty The Queen at the National Memorial Arboretum in Staffordshire.

431. Ministers were advised in early 2008 that the total cost of the Memorial was expected to be £7.3m. The AFM Trustees had raised £6.7m, including £1.5m from the sale of Trafalgar Coins (announced by Mr Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in February 2006), £2.417m from the Millennium Commission (agreed in November 2006), with the balance from public subscriptions. There was no realistic prospect of significant further public contributions. Trustees had therefore asked the MOD to provide £500,000 to complete the project.

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289 House of Commons, Official Report, 10 November 2000, column 413W.
290 House of Commons, Official Report, 20 March 2002, column 311W.
291 Minute Jeffrey to Secretary of State [MOD], 29 June 2006, ‘Armed Forces Memorial’; Minute Secretary of State [MOD] to PUS [MOD], 30 June 2006, ‘Armed Forces Memorial’.
292 Armed Forces Memorial website.
432. AM Pocock told the Inquiry that the process of securing funding for the Memorial illustrated the difficulty of translating intent into action:

“Although the political intent was perfectly clear, we were also told there was going to be no public money for it. We were hoping to get some money from the Lottery. We did eventually, after some strong support from newspapers caused the Lottery to change the rules.

... 

“We had the designs, it was in The Queen’s diary to come and open it. We actually had to let the contract but we didn’t have the money, and it wasn’t from lack of effort ... I remember going round embassies with a begging bowl and all sorts of things, but the money just wasn’t forthcoming.

“The difficulty we had in getting the guarantee from the department [the MOD] was immense. We eventually did. We were able to build it.”

433. Both AM Pocock and VAdm Wilkinson felt that the Memorial provided a strong focus for remembrance. VAdm Wilkinson told the Inquiry:

“The focus for recognition and remembrance that it [the Memorial] has provided and the source of comfort to a number of bereaved families, it really is quite remarkable, perhaps, that, as a nation, we didn’t have one before 2007.”

434. The Memorial also provides a home for the Basra Memorial Wall. The wall was originally built in 2006 outside the headquarters of Multi-National Division (South East) in Basra by members of 37 Armoured Engineer Squadron to commemorate those who died in or as a result of action in Iraq.

435. PJHQ advised Mr Browne’s Office in June 2007 that its “current intent” was to move the Basra Memorial Wall (which comprised a collection of memorial plaques from the various bases that UK forces had occupied) to the National Memorial Arboretum when UK forces left Basra.

436. The Memorial Wall was brought to the UK in April 2009, and was re-dedicated in March 2010.

296 British Army website, 11 March 2010, Basra Memorial Wall rededicated in moving service at its new home.
297 Minute Green to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 29 June 2007, ‘Request from Families of Dead Service Personnel to Visit Basra’.
298 BBC News, 11 March 2010, Service to rededicate Basra Memorial Wall.
The Elizabeth Cross

437. On 10 June 2008, Mr Browne announced the inauguration of a new award.²⁹⁹

438. The award itself had been proposed by the Chiefs of Staff, who concluded that the time was right to recognise the “families of those personnel who die on operations, or as a result of terrorist action whilst on duty”. Mr Browne confirmed that the recommendation had been welcomed by Ministers and approved by Her Majesty The Queen. Paying tribute to the bravery and courage shown by the families of all serving personnel, he hoped that the new award would “provide a more visible form of recognition from the nation for those who pay the ultimate sacrifice in the name of their country”.

439. VAdm Wilkinson told the Inquiry that there was “unanimity” among the Chiefs of Staff “that it was appropriate to recognise the sacrifice that bereaved families had made”.³⁰⁰ The proposal reflected consultation with serving personnel and with bereaved families, as well as consideration of what other nations do to recognise the sacrifice that Service families make.

440. Mr Ainsworth, Mr Browne’s successor as Defence Secretary, set out further detail about the award and the circumstances in which it would be given in July 2009.³⁰¹ He confirmed that The Queen had agreed that the award should be known as the Elizabeth Cross, the first new honour to take the name of a serving monarch since the creation of the George Cross in 1940.

441. It would commemorate the lives of those who had died on operations or as a result of terrorism from 1948 onwards (or from 1945 in the case of service in Palestine), in order to fit with the end of the period in which deaths are officially attributed to service in World War II. He reminded Parliament that “this is not a posthumous medal for the fallen but national recognition for the family for their loss”. The award would consist of the Elizabeth Cross itself – awarded to the named next of kin – and a Memorial Scroll, copies of which could be presented to certain additional members of the deceased’s close family. Both the Cross and the Scroll would be awarded on application, as contact details for the several thousand eligible families were unlikely to be up to date.

442. The first presentation of the Elizabeth Cross, made by The Queen, took place in Catterick Garrison, North Yorkshire, on 12 September 2009.³⁰² Those receiving the awards included five families of soldiers killed in Iraq.

443. The Inquiry’s conclusions and lessons on the preparations made for repatriating the bodies of those who lost their lives serving on Operation TELIC, how their deaths were investigated, and the support provided for bereaved families are set out in Section 16.4.

²⁹⁹ House of Commons, Official Report, 10 June 2008, column 10WS.
³⁰¹ House of Commons, Official Report, 1 July 2009, columns 18-21WS.
³⁰² BBC News, 12 September 2009, Queen honours regiment’s fallen.
SECTION 16.4

CONCLUSIONS: SERVICE PERSONNEL

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Introduction and key findings

1. This Section addresses analysis and findings in relation to the evidence set out in Sections 16.1 to 16.3, including:

   • the pressures on Service Personnel, and the welfare support provided to them and their families;
   • the arrangements for providing medical care to Service Personnel; and
   • the arrangements for investigating the deaths of Service Personnel who lost their lives on Operation TELIC and the support provided for bereaved families.

2. The provision of military equipment is addressed in Sections 6.3 and 14.

Key findings

• In 2002, the UK military was already operating at, and in some cases beyond, the limits of the guidelines agreed in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. As a result, the Harmony Guidelines were being breached for some units and specialist trades.

• The Government’s decision to contribute a military force to a US-led invasion of Iraq inevitably increased the risk that more Service Personnel would be put in breach of the Harmony Guidelines. The issue of the potential pressure on Service Personnel was not a consideration in the decision.

• The MOD planned and prepared effectively to provide medical care in support of Operation TELIC.

• There were major improvements in the provision of medical care, mental healthcare and rehabilitative care available to Service Personnel over the course of Op TELIC.

• Most of the contacts between the MOD and bereaved families were conducted with sensitivity. In a few cases, they were not. The MOD progressively improved how it engaged with and supported bereaved families, in part driven by consistent public and Ministerial pressure.

• The Government’s decision in 2006 to deploy a second medium scale force to Helmand province in Afghanistan further increased the pressure on Service Personnel, on elements of the MOD’s welfare, medical and investigative systems, and on the coronial system.

• Much of the MOD’s and the Government’s effort from 2006 was focused on addressing those pressures.

• The MOD should have planned and prepared to address those pressures, rather than react to them.

• The Government should have acted sooner to address the backlog of inquests into the deaths of Service Personnel. The support it did provide, in June 2006, cleared the backlog.

• The MOD made a number of improvements to the Board of Inquiry process, but some proposals for more substantive reform (including the introduction of an independent member) were not fully explored. The MOD significantly improved the way it communicated with and supported bereaved families in relation to military investigations and inquests.
The MOD was less effective at providing support to Service Personnel who were mobilised individually (a category which included almost all Reservists) and their families, than to formed units.

The pressure on Service Personnel

3. In 2002, the UK military was already operating at, and in some cases beyond, the limits of the guidelines agreed in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. As a result, the Services’ Harmony Guidelines (which defined how much time a member of a particular Service should spend away from home and the period between tours) were being breached for some units and specialist trades.

4. The Government’s decision to contribute a military force to a US-led invasion of Iraq inevitably increased the risk that the Harmony Guidelines would be breached.

5. There are no indications that the potential pressure on Service Personnel was a consideration in the Government’s decision to contribute a military force, and in particular a large scale land force (a division), to a US-led invasion of Iraq.

6. The Inquiry concludes in Section 9.8 that, throughout 2004 and 2005, it appears that senior members of the Armed Forces reached the view that there was little more that would be achieved in southern Iraq and that it would make more sense to concentrate UK military effort on Afghanistan where it might have greater effect.

7. In July 2005, Ministers agreed in principle proposals presented by Dr John Reid, the Defence Secretary, both for the transfer to Iraqi control of the four provinces in southern Iraq for which the UK had security responsibility, and for the redeployment of the UK effort in Afghanistan from the north to Helmand province in the south (see Section 9.4). The proposals were based on high-risk assumptions about the capability of the Iraqi Security Forces to take the lead for security.

8. In January 2006, Cabinet approved the deployment of a UK military force to Helmand.

9. The MOD’s formal advice to Dr Reid was that this deployment was “achievable without serious damage to Harmony”, although certain units and specialists would be “placed under increased, but manageable, stress”.¹

10. There were different views within the MOD over the effect of the deployment on personnel. Lieutenant General Anthony Palmer, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Personnel) from 2002 to August 2005, told the Inquiry that, as he left post, he expressed his concern that deploying two brigades simultaneously (to Iraq and

¹ Minute Hutton to APS/SofS [MOD], 17 January 2006, ‘Afghanistan Deployments’.
Afghanistan) would breach the Harmony Guidelines and the Defence Planning Assumptions, and was “too big a risk”.¹

11. Sir Kevin Tebbit, MOD Permanent Under Secretary from 2001 to 2005, told the Inquiry:

“I was apprehensive [about the deployment of UK forces to Helmand] and I made my concerns known to my planning staff and to the Chiefs of Staff. I think their view was that they could do it and it was manageable ... since it was [the Chiefs of Staff] who would actually have to ensure they could do this, I did not press my objections fully.”³

12. The impact of the decision on the availability of key equipment capabilities for Iraq is addressed in Section 14.1.


14. At the end of August, General Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff, advised Mr Des Browne, the newly appointed Defence Secretary, that “as an Army, we are running hot”.⁴ With operational deployments well above the levels set out in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review and the MOD’s own Harmony Guidelines, the Army’s demands on soldiers were greater than its ability to look after them.

15. Gen Dannatt told the Inquiry that the military covenant had “fallen out of balance ... as a consequence of decisions taken to stay in Iraq until we had successfully completed our operations there, but also take on Afghanistan as well”.⁵

16. The MOD’s assessment that the Helmand deployment was achievable without causing a substantial number of personnel to breach the Harmony Guidelines reflected overly optimistic assumptions about the intensity and duration of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

17. The twin deployments challenged the planning assumption agreed in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review that the UK should be able to undertake two medium scale deployments simultaneously but would not expect both to involve war-fighting or to be maintained simultaneously for longer than six months.

18. It would only have been possible to manage the established Iraq commitment and the new Helmand commitment, without significantly increasing the pressure on Service Personnel, if the former was wound down on schedule and the latter was contained. In the event, it proved difficult to withdraw from Iraq as quickly as hoped while Helmand developed into a more substantial combat operation than originally envisaged, pushing up force levels.

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¹ Public hearing, 21 July 2010, page 80.
² Public hearing, 3 February 2010, pages 15 and 16.
³ Letter Dannatt to Browne, 31 August 2006, [untitled].
⁴ Public hearing, 28 July 2010, page 98.
19. In addition to increasing the pressure on Service Personnel, the decision to deploy a second medium scale force increased the pressure on the MOD’s medical, welfare and investigative systems, and in particular on:

- the air bridge between Iraq and the UK;
- Selly Oak hospital;
- Headley Court and other rehabilitation facilities; and
- the Army’s capacity to investigate fatalities and support bereaved families.

20. It also increased the pressure on the coronial system.

21. From 2006, the efforts of the MOD and the Government would increasingly be focused on addressing those pressures.

22. The MOD should have been aware of the potential impacts on its medical, welfare and investigative systems, and made the necessary contingency plans to increase their capacity.

**Medical care**

23. Op TELIC was the first major military operation after the closure of the military hospitals in the 1990s and therefore the first test of the new medical arrangements. Under the new arrangements, many medical Service Personnel (including a large number of Reservists) were deployed from NHS Trusts for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and military casualties were treated in NHS Trusts.

**Planning and preparation**

24. In early September 2002, the MOD estimated that between 31 and 48 Service Personnel would be killed in action during the initial combat phase of operations of an attack on Iraq, and that between 157 and 241 Service Personnel would be admitted to Role 3 hospitals (figures exclude possible casualties from chemical and biological warfare). The MOD regularly updated its casualty estimates as the military plan developed. The estimates did not consider casualties beyond the initial combat phase of operations.

25. The Chiefs of Staff concluded on 5 February 2003 that a Casualty Estimate paper including estimated casualty figures, which had been produced by the MOD, would need to be shown to Ministers before any decision to commit UK troops was made.

26. In response to a question from Mr Blair on the possible number of casualties arising from an attack on Iraq, the MOD advised No.10 on 24 February that there would be between 30 and 60 British and between 500 and 1,200 Iraqi “land battle” fatalities.  

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6 Role 3 (Echelon 3) medical support is generally provided at field hospitals and on hospital ships.

27. Lord Boyce, Chief of the Defence Staff from 2001 to April 2003, told the Inquiry that Ministers would have been informed of the MOD’s casualty estimates, as part of the routine briefing process.

28. Although the Inquiry has seen no evidence that the Casualty Estimate paper was shown to Ministers, it accepts that Ministers were informed of the MOD’s casualty estimates.

29. The MOD established an effective medical capability in theatre to support Op TELIC by 14 March 2003.

30. By 1 May, when President Bush declared that major combat operations in Iraq had ended, 33 British Service Personnel had died serving on Op TELIC and 81 had been admitted to Role 3 hospitals.

31. Casualties would have been much higher if chemical and biological weapons had been used.

32. The MOD planned and prepared effectively to provide medical care in support of Op TELIC. Although some of the medical equipment and supplies procured by the MOD arrived in theatre shortly after military operations began, there are no indications that the quality of clinical care was compromised.

**Improvements in the provision of care**

33. There were a number of significant improvements to the care provided to Service Personnel over the course of Op TELIC.

34. From June 2006, the MOD, working closely with a number of charities, progressively enhanced the rehabilitation facilities at Headley Court.

35. In August 2006, following visits by MOD Ministers and senior military officers to injured Service Personnel recovering on civilian wards, the MOD began planning to establish a Military Managed Ward (MMW) at Selly Oak hospital. The MOD assessed that, while the quality of clinical care at Selly Oak was excellent, injured Service Personnel would recover better in what Lieutenant General Louis Lillywhite, the Surgeon General from 2006 to 2009, described as a “military bubble”.

36. The MMW was established in December 2006 and was fully staffed by July 2007.

37. In his evidence to the Inquiry, Lt Gen Lillywhite highlighted the advances during Op TELIC in the military’s understanding of how to save life at the point of injury, how to sustain the quality of life of seriously injured individuals into the long term, and pain management.

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8 Public hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 33-34.
38. The advances in the provision of medical care during Op TELIC meant that more individuals with very serious and complex injuries survived.

39. A number of injured veterans shared with the Inquiry their concern that they might not continue to receive the same quality of care over the long term, and in particular when they left the military.

40. Lt Gen Lillywhite told the Inquiry that, in recognition of their service and on clinical grounds, individuals with very serious injuries should be treated by the Government as a group with specific clinical needs, to enable specialist care to be arranged and provided more consistently.

41. The Government will need to consider how to address the issue of providing whole-life care to individuals with very serious injuries.

42. There were also significant advances in the provision of mental healthcare.

43. In April 2003, the MOD commissioned a large-scale, long-term programme of research on the physical and psychological health of personnel deployed on Op TELIC. The findings of that programme identified a number of important mental health issues and informed the MOD’s response to them.

44. The Inquiry recommends that the MOD commissions similar studies for future major operational deployments. In addition to the direct benefits for Service Personnel and the MOD, mental health is an area of significant public concern. It is important that the MOD is able to demonstrate that the effects of deployments are properly monitored and managed.

45. The major developments in the provision of mental healthcare over the period covered by the Inquiry were:

- There was increased use of a period of decompression at the end of an operational tour, as part of post-operational stress management.
- In November 2006, in response to the findings of the King’s Centre study that a number of Reservists were experiencing increased mental health effects as a result of deployment, the MOD launched the Reserves Mental Health Programme (RMHP). The RMHP provided enhanced mental healthcare to current and former Reservists who had been demobilised since 1 January 2003 following deployment on an overseas operation.
- In November 2007, the MOD launched six community NHS mental health pilot programmes to provide mental health assessment and treatment for veterans. The programmes were led by a mental health therapist with an understanding of the issues faced by veterans.
- In 2008, the MOD rolled out Trauma Risk Management (TRiM) in all three Services. TRiM is a form of debriefing after a traumatic event, undertaken in peer groups rather than with an external counsellor.
Investigations into the deaths of Service Personnel

46. Investigations by the MOD and coroners into the deaths of Service Personnel serving on Op TELIC could be very slow, and in one case lasted for more than four years.

47. The Inquiry considered how the three major elements of the investigative process – Service Police investigations, Boards of Inquiry (BOIs), and inquests – changed after 2003.

Service Police investigations

48. The earliest concerns about the military’s investigative process emerged in September 2003. Mr Adam Ingram, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, expressed his concern that the next of kin of deceased Service Personnel increasingly perceived that the MOD’s investigations lacked focus and were too slow, and that the MOD did not keep them informed of progress.

49. The following month, Lt Gen Palmer advised that the Army’s Royal Military Police (RMP) was “swamped” with the volume of work in Iraq.9 The major challenge was the difficult working environment, including the need for force protection for Service Police and a potentially hostile population. The Army’s policy of holding investigations into all fatalities added to the pressure on the RMP.

50. Reviews of Service Police investigations in October 2004 and April 2005 found that there were still delays in Service Police investigations, but did not recommend any substantial changes to the investigative process. The October 2004 review concluded that investigations could be complex and “speed must not be at the expense of quality”.10

Boards of Inquiry

51. The purpose of a military BOI was to establish the facts about an event and to make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

52. In response to Mr Ingram’s concern over the MOD’s investigative process, the MOD had, by June 2004:

- shortened the time allowed for completing BOIs to 14 weeks;
- strengthened the role of the BOI President;
- introduced measures to improve the management of BOIs by each Service; and
- introduced a series of measures to improve communications with bereaved families on progress with the entire Service Police investigation and BOI process.

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53. MOD Ministers remained closely engaged. From June 2004, Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, received regular briefings on progress on BOIs and the reasons for any delays.

54. The possibility of adding an independent member to a BOI was raised by Mr Hoon in June 2004 and by Mr Browne in December 2007. On neither occasion was the idea considered seriously by the MOD.

55. The Inquiry recommends that the MOD consider whether an independent member should sit on BOIs, in particular in order to assure families that the process is as rigorous and transparent as possible.

56. The MOD, and in particular the Army (through the work of the Army Inquiries and Aftercare Support Cell and Army Inquest Cell), continued to improve the management of the Service Police investigation and BOI processes, the support provided for bereaved families, and the support provided for coroners. The Army Inquest Cell provided the model for the tri-Service Defence Inquests Unit, which was established in May 2008.

57. By early 2008, the Army had appointed permanent Presidents to lead high-profile Army BOIs, and the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force had taken steps to establish pools of expertise from which Presidents could be selected.

58. The Inquiry recommends that the MOD consider providing BOI Presidents with access to expert advisers on process and standards, who would play a role analogous to Court Clerks, in order to help establish consistency and best practice.

THE CONCERNS OF BEREAVED FAMILIES

59. A number of families shared with the Inquiry their concerns over the MOD’s process for investigating fatalities. The concerns were:

- Military investigations were not sufficiently rigorous, in particular in relation to incidents where there were suspicions of friendly fire or equipment failure.
- No action appeared to be taken against individuals as a result of military investigations (this concern also applied to inquests).
- Material had been redacted from the version of the BOI report that families received, which made the content harder to understand. Some family members thought that text had been redacted to protect individuals criticised in reports or to hide failings by the MOD.

60. The Inquiry reviewed 25 percent of BOI investigations into Op TELIC fatalities, including those that attracted the most controversy. The Inquiry also reviewed the 15 BOI reports into Op TELIC fatalities that are in the public domain.
61. The BOI reports reviewed by the Inquiry were not consistent in approach or quality. Areas of particular variance were:

- the extent to which the reports considered what happened to the individual(s) who died (as well as the wider incident in which it happened); and
- the extent to which the reports recorded and addressed the concerns of the deceased’s family and next of kin.

62. The Inquiry does not believe that any of the BOI reports it reviewed were deliberately produced in such a way as to protect the MOD. In at least two cases, the BOI revealed that an incident might have been caused by friendly fire when the earlier Service Police investigation had concluded otherwise.

63. However, some practices apparent in the BOI reports reviewed by the Inquiry could create a mistaken impression of a “cover-up”. They were:

- interview transcripts which switch between on and off the record;
- the difficulty in taking evidence, for example from Iraqi witnesses;
- restrictions on using US material;
- the use of defensive or euphemistic language, which can give the impression that serious failings are being dismissed; and
- heavy redaction.

64. A recurring theme raised by families with the Inquiry was frustration at being denied visibility of action taken against those who were shown to have done something wrong (for example, where an individual had not provided truthful evidence to a BOI) or who a family believed to have been in some way negligent.

65. A BOI is not intended to apportion blame. The MOD defended that position, on the basis that it was the best way to ensure maximum disclosure and, therefore, the best chance to prevent a recurrence of the incident.

66. That position is not unique to BOIs. The right not to incriminate oneself is common to other investigative processes (such as inquests) where the main objective is to establish the facts of a case.

67. Very few of the BOI reports considered by the Inquiry led to disciplinary measures.

68. In order to respond to the concerns regarding the redaction of material from BOI reports, the Inquiry reviewed a sample of BOI reports relating to Op TELIC, comparing the full and redacted versions. The Inquiry considered whether the substance justified redaction, and how the redaction was made.

69. The Inquiry concludes that:

- There were no indications that information was redacted by the MOD in order to cover up wrong-doing, either by individuals or the MOD.
The use of redaction was not consistent between BOIs. Not all redactions were justified. In some cases, whole passages were redacted when only a few details were sensitive. In others, material had been redacted when it was already in the public domain (for example, the name of a Commanding Officer or pathologist). In many cases, no attempt was made to explain the nature of the redacted material to the reader. There were some improvements in practice during the course of Op TELIC. In general, the most recent BOI reports contained fewer redactions and were easier to follow.

70. The Inquiry recognises that some redactions will be required in almost all such reports but recommends that the MOD take steps to ensure consistency of practice, in line with the Information Commissioner’s guidance. Good practice seen by the Inquiry includes:

- including a clear statement of redaction policy at the start of a document;
- providing a short overarching description of events described in text which has been redacted;
- adding a description which tells the reader the nature of the text has been redacted (for example, 'Personal medical information');
- assigning each individual a unique number or other cipher and attaching a description of their role to it; and
- leaving in ranks where names are redacted, so that command relationships are clear.

71. Many of the concerns shared by families in relation to the rigour of the BOI process and its transparency could be addressed by adding an independent member to a BOI.

Inquests

72. From January 2003, the MOD and the Home Office (the department then responsible for coronal policy) worked with Mr Nicholas Gardiner, the Coroner for Oxfordshire, to refine the arrangements for receiving UK military fatalities from Iraq. The majority of fatalities were expected to be repatriated to RAF Brize Norton, which fell within his area of responsibility.

73. During those initial exchanges, Home Office officials highlighted a number of issues that would later become problematic: the need for Mr Gardiner’s office to secure additional resources (from Oxfordshire County Council) to cover the cases it was taking

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on; the desirability of transferring cases to coroners who were local to the families of the deceased; and how to handle cases where the deceased was based in Scotland.

74. The day before the beginning of military operations against Iraq, Mr Gardiner wrote to Home Office officials:

“There are a few matters outstanding but, generally, I think we are reasonably well prepared, although there are bound to be things we have not thought of.”

75. There are no indications that the Government put in place any contingency plans to support Mr Gardiner’s office, or that the Government maintained contact with Mr Gardiner’s office after those initial exchanges.

76. The Inquiry recommends that for any future major operational deployment, the Chief Coroner, the department responsible for coronial policy (currently the Ministry of Justice) and the MOD should develop contingency plans to increase the capacity of the coronial system to handle fatalities. Those plans should include the identification of funding in the event that it becomes necessary to increase the capacity of the coronial system.

77. In May 2006, in response to growing concern over delays in holding inquests into the deaths of Service Personnel, Ms Harriet Harman, Minister of State for the Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA), was charged with resolving the problem.

78. By early June, Ms Harman had brokered an agreement with the MOD to provide a substantial package of support to Mr Gardiner’s office, including the recruitment of three Assistant Deputy Coroners.

79. Although the package was announced in Parliament in June 2006, discussions continued between the DCA, the MOD and the Treasury until February 2007 on how much the MOD would contribute. The discussions concluded with the DCA reluctantly accepting the MOD’s initial offer of £125,000.

80. While the discussions did not delay the provision of support to Mr Gardiner’s office (as the DCA bore the costs as they were incurred), a disproportionate amount of senior officials’ and Ministers’ time was consumed in inter-departmental wrangling over a relatively small amount of money.

81. The additional resources provided in June 2006 allowed Mr Gardiner’s office to clear the existing backlog of inquests by October 2007, much sooner than it would otherwise have done.

82. From July 2006, the Government pursued a number of initiatives to make the inquest process more responsive to the needs of the families of deceased Service Personnel. The Inquiry commends Ms Harman’s efforts in pursuing those initiatives.

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12 Letter Gardiner to Home Office [junior official], 18 March 2003, [untitled].
83. Between July 2006 and February 2007, Ms Harman pressed the US Government, through the US Embassy London, to provide classified US material and US representatives to support inquests into the deaths of UK Service Personnel. The US declined to provide that support.

84. Following a meeting with the families of Service Personnel killed on Op TELIC in December 2006 and representations in Parliament, including from Mr Roger Gale, Ms Harman explored the possibility of providing legal representation at inquests for the families of Service Personnel, in particular at inquests where the MOD chose to have legal representation.

85. The Government did not provide that support. In 2009, the Government agreed an amendment to the Coroners and Justice Bill to provide legal representation at inquests into the death of British Service Personnel on active service. However, that provision was not brought into force and was subsequently repealed.

86. From June 2007, MOD Ministers pressed the Scottish Executive to make provision for Fatal Accident Inquiries to be held into the deaths overseas of Service Personnel normally domiciled in Scotland.

87. The Government made provision for such Inquiries in the 2009 Coroners and Justice Act.

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Delays in military investigations and civilian inquests

It could take several years for the MOD and the coronial system to conclude investigations into the deaths of Service Personnel.

The Inquiry considered why the investigative process should take so long. The four main factors were:

- the difficulty of conducting Service Police investigations in a hostile environment, which was exacerbated by a lack of qualified military investigators; the MOD set no deadlines for the conclusion of Service Police investigations;
- the Army’s policy, at the beginning of Op TELIC, to hold an investigation into all deaths, and only to launch a BOI after the investigation had concluded; this policy changed in 2004;
- the time taken to complete BOIs, and in particular to receive comments from senior officers and advisers on draft BOI reports; and
- the backlog of inquests which built up in the Oxfordshire Coroner’s office.
Support for bereaved families

88. Most of the contacts between the MOD and bereaved families were conducted with sensitivity. In a few cases, they were not.

89. In April 2003, prompted by concern over the insensitive treatment of a bereaved spouse, and at the direction of Mr Hoon, the MOD initiated a comprehensive review of bereavement procedures. By the middle of May, it had introduced new guidelines for communicating with bereaved families, begun work to make the guidance on the support available to bereaved families more accessible, and amended its policy to allow bereaved spouses to remain in Service accommodation for as long as they required it.

90. Mr Ingram attributed the MOD’s failings at the beginning of Op TELIC to a continuing view within the military that bereavement was “just something that happened”. Mr Ingram added that, in the context of “a big sea change” in public attitudes and the experience of Op TELIC, the MOD moved quickly to improve the bereavement and welfare support it provided to families.

91. The creation, in 2005, of the Joint Casualty Co-ordination Cell (JCCC) and the production of a joint policy covering the support for bereaved families reduced the inconsistency between the Services and individual units in the support they offered to bereaved families.

92. The experiences shared with the Inquiry by bereaved families suggest that the creation of the JCCC led to an improvement in the quality of the notification process.

93. Being a Casualty Notifying Officer (CNOs) and a Visiting Officer (VOs) was (and remains) an extremely difficult role: a small number fell below the standard required. The training and support provided to CNOs and VOs remained an issue of concern for the MOD throughout the period covered by the Inquiry.

Support for Service Personnel and their families

94. The MOD progressively improved the allowances and support provided to Service Personnel and their families over the course of Op TELIC.

95. The most substantial development was the introduction of the Operational Allowance in October 2006. The Allowance, initially set at £2,400 for all Service Personnel who completed a six-month tour in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans or on certain other operations, was designed “to reflect the current, high operational tempo”.

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13 Public hearing, 16 July 2010, pages 36-42.
The Operational Welfare Package

96. The Inquiry heard mixed reports about the Operational Welfare Package (OWP) from families and veterans of Op TELIC. Limited access to telephones early in the campaign and the fragility of the air bridge between Iraq and the UK – which reduced the time available for rest and recuperation – were particular sources of frustration.

97. While these were undoubtedly real frustrations, the Inquiry considers that the MOD delivered most elements of the OWP as quickly as could reasonably have been expected. A key challenge, recognised by the MOD, was managing and meeting rising expectations.

Support for Reservists

98. Over 5,000 Reservists were mobilised for Op TELIC 1 (comprising some 12 percent of total UK forces). Lt Gen Palmer told the Inquiry that Reservists “performed magnificently during the operation, and we simply could not have done without them”.

99. The MOD’s policy was that deployed Reservists, and their families, should receive the same welfare support as Regular Service Personnel.

100. The MOD found it difficult to provide support to the families of deployed Reservists. It was the responsibility of the unit to which a Reservist was attached to provide that support, but the families of Reservists were often spread across the country, some distance from that unit. A Reservist’s family might have had little or no previous contact with the unit to which the Reservist was attached, and find it difficult to access the support that was available.

101. The MOD introduced a number of measures to improve the support provided to Reservists in theatre and in the UK. It also sought to ensure that Reservists benefited from new initiatives, such as decompression, alongside their Regular colleagues.

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15 Public hearing, 21 July 2010, pages 84-85.
SECTION 17

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

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Introduction and key findings

1. This section addresses:

- the statements issued by the Government before the conflict on the human rights abuses committed by Saddam Hussein’s regime and the human cost of not intervening in Iraq;
- the assessments made by the Government before and during initial combat operations of the number of Iraqi civilian casualties;
- reports of the number of Iraqi civilian casualties during initial combat operations; and
- how the Government responded to demands that it should count the number of Iraqi casualties attributable to the conflict, and to estimates of the number of casualties.

2. As this Section shows, there have been a number of studies to determine the civilian death toll in Iraq after the Coalition invasion. The numbers vary considerably. What is not in doubt is that, in both the military operation to overthrow the Iraqi regime and the subsequent violence, many tens of thousands of Iraqi citizens, most of them civilians, lost their lives. Many more were displaced or injured, or lost members of their families.

3. It is beyond the scope and abilities of this Inquiry to establish independently the number of fatalities caused by conflict in Iraq, or the broader human cost of the conflict to the Iraqi people. The Inquiry is, however, very conscious of the extent of the suffering in Iraq resulting from the conflict and this has informed its approach to its analysis of the course of the conflict and to drawing lessons for the future.

Key findings

- The Inquiry considers that a Government has a responsibility to make every reasonable effort to understand the likely and actual effects of its military actions on civilians.
- In the months before the invasion, Mr Blair emphasised the need to minimise the number of civilian casualties arising from an invasion of Iraq. The MOD’s responses offered reassurance based on the tight targeting procedures governing the air campaign.
- The MOD made only a broad estimate of direct civilian casualties arising from an attack on Iraq, based on previous operations.
- With hindsight, greater efforts should have been made in the post-conflict period to determine the number of civilian casualties and the broader effects of military operations on civilians. More time was devoted to the question of which department should have responsibility for the issue of civilian casualties than it was to efforts to determine the actual number.
- The Government’s consideration of the issue of Iraqi civilian casualties was driven by its concern to rebut accusations that coalition forces were responsible for the deaths of large numbers of civilians, and to sustain domestic support for operations in Iraq.
4. The Inquiry received a number of substantive submissions relating to the human cost of the conflict in Iraq, including from:

- Mr Hamit Dardagan and Professor John Sloboda for the Iraq Body Count (IBC) project. The IBC project aims to record the violent civilian deaths that have resulted from the 2003 military intervention in Iraq. In its submission to the Inquiry, IBC argued that the Inquiry should take full and proper account of Iraqi casualties resulting from the conflict and the subsequent breakdown in security. It continued: “One of the most important questions in situations of armed conflict and in the laws of war is whether the use of force has been a proportionate response to the threat that prompted it … It is impossible to establish the wisdom of actions taken … if the full consequences in human welfare are not taken into account. Casualty data are perhaps the most glaring indication of the full costs of war.”

- Action on Armed Violence (AOAV). AOAV is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) which aims to reduce the incidence and impact of global armed violence. In its submission to the Inquiry, AOAV argued that the UK Government actively sought to maintain a position of ignorance regarding measurements of death, injury and deprivation resulting from violence in Iraq. It proposed that the UK Government should establish a structured process to undertake transparent measurement and monitoring of the impact of armed violence where its Armed Forces are active.

5. The Inquiry is grateful for these, and other, submissions, and has taken account of them in preparing its Report.

Consideration of Iraqi civilian casualties before the conflict

Statements on the human cost of not intervening in Iraq


7. Eight of the dossier’s 50 pages considered life in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, describing his security apparatus, internal repression, external wars and abuse of human rights.

8. The dossier’s Executive Summary indicated the purpose of that material:

“But the threat from Iraq does not depend solely on the [Weapons of Mass Destruction – WMD] capabilities we have described. It arises also because of the

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1 Dardagan and Sloboda, 26 August 2006, *Iraqi casualties must form part of Britain’s Iraq Inquiry.*
violent and aggressive nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime. His record of internal repression and external aggression gives rise to unique concerns about the threat he poses.”

9. The dossier stated:

- Saddam Hussein used patronage and violence to motivate his supporters and to control or eliminate opposition. He had pursued a long-term programme of persecuting the Iraqi Kurds, including through the use of chemical weapons. Amnesty International had estimated that more than 100,000 Kurds had been killed or had disappeared during the 1987 to 1988 “Anfal” campaign of attacks on Kurdish villages. Thousands of Iraqi Shia had also been killed.
- Saddam Hussein had led Iraq into two wars of aggression, against Iran and Kuwait. The Iran-Iraq War was estimated to have caused one million casualties.
- Human rights abuses continued within Iraq: “People continue to be arrested and detained on suspicion of political or religious activities or often because they are related to members of the opposition. Executions are carried out without due process of law. Relatives are often prevented from burying the victims in accordance with Islamic practice. Thousands of prisoners have been executed.”

10. Mr Blair addressed those issues in his opening statement in the 24 September 2002 Parliamentary debate:

“People say, ‘But why Saddam?’ … two things about Saddam stand out. He has used these weapons in Iraq itself – thousands dying in those chemical weapons attacks – and in the Iran-Iraq war, started by him, in which one million people died; and his is a regime with no moderate elements to appeal to.

“Read the chapter on Saddam and human rights in this dossier. Read not just about the 1 million dead in the war with Iran, not just about the 100,000 Kurds brutally murdered in northern Iraq, not just about the 200,000 Shia Muslims driven from the marshlands in southern Iraq, and not just about the attempt to subjugate and brutalise the Kuwaitis in 1990 that led to the Gulf war. I say, ‘Read also about the routine butchering of political opponents, the prison ‘cleansing’ regimes in which thousands die, the torture chambers and the hideous penalties supervised by him and his family and detailed by Amnesty International.’ Read it all and, again, I defy anyone to say that this cruel and sadistic dictator should be allowed any possibility of getting his hands on chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction.”

4 House of Commons, Official Record, 24 September 2002, column 5.
11. Amnesty International issued a press release two days later, urging the UN Security Council to consider:

“… not only the security and political consequences of its action, but also the inevitable human rights and humanitarian toll of war … concern for the life, safety and security of the Iraqi people is sorely missing from the debate, as is any discussion on what would be their fate in the aftermath of conflict …”\(^5\)

12. On 2 December, the FCO published a report on Saddam Hussein’s crimes and human rights abuses.\(^6\) The report is addressed in more detail in Section 6.4.

13. The FCO report was “based on the testimony of Iraqi exiles, evidence gathered by UN rapporteurs and human rights organisations, and intelligence material”. It examined “Iraq’s record on torture, the treatment of women, prison conditions, arbitrary and summary killings, the persecution of the Kurds and the Shia, the harassment of opposition figures outside Iraq and the occupation of Kuwait”.

14. Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, told the BBC that the report was being published “because it is important that people understand the comprehensive evil that is Saddam Hussein”.\(^7\)

15. The report was criticised by some as an attempt to influence public opinion in favour of war.\(^8\)

16. Amnesty International responded to that report, stating that the human rights situation in Iraq should not be used selectively; the US and other Western Governments had ignored previous Amnesty International reports of widespread human rights violations in Iraq.\(^9\) Amnesty International continued:

“As the debate on whether to use military force against Iraq escalates, the human rights of the Iraqi people, as a direct consequence of any potential military action, is sorely missing from the equation.”

17. In his speech to the Labour Party Spring Conference in Glasgow on 15 February 2003, Mr Blair said:

“Yes, there are consequences of war. If we remove Saddam by force, people will die and some will be innocent. We must live with the consequences of our actions, even the unintended ones.

“But there are also consequences of ‘stop the war’…”\(^10\)

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\(^7\) BBC, 2 December 2002, *UK unveils ‘torture’ dossier.*


18. Mr Blair said that those consequences would include Saddam Hussein remaining in power in Iraq:

“A country that in 1978, the year before he seized power, was richer than Malaysia or Portugal. A country where today, 135 out of every 1,000 Iraqi children die before the age of five – 70 percent of these deaths are from diarrhoea and respiratory infections that are easily preventable. Where almost a third of children born in the centre and south of Iraq have chronic malnutrition.

“Where 60 percent of the people depend on Food Aid.

“Where half the population of rural areas have no safe water.

“Where every year and now, as we speak, tens of thousands of political prisoners languish in appalling conditions in Saddam’s jails and are routinely executed.

“Where in the past 15 years over 150,000 Shia Moslems in Southern Iraq and Moslem Kurds in Northern Iraq have been butchered, with up to four million Iraqis in exile round the world, including 350,000 now in Britain …

“If there are 500,000 on that [Stop the War] march, that is still less than the number of people whose deaths Saddam has been responsible for.

“If there are one million, that is still less than the number of people who died in the wars he started.”

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**Child mortality in Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s regime**

The figure for child mortality in Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s regime used by Mr Blair in his speech to the Labour Party Spring Conference in February 2003, and in subsequent public statements, has been questioned. The Inquiry therefore considered the origin of that figure.

On 14 February, the day before Mr Blair’s speech, Ms Clare Short, the International Development Secretary, wrote to Mr Blair setting out key humanitarian issues in Iraq (see Section 6.5). Ms Short advised that the humanitarian situation in the centre and the south of Iraq, which was under Saddam Hussein’s control, was worse than the situation in the north. To demonstrate that point, she attached statistics, attributed to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), on child and maternal mortality in Iraq. Child mortality in central and southern Iraq was 135 per 1,000 (“worse than the Democratic Republic of Congo or Mozambique”) compared with 72 per 1,000 in northern Iraq.

On the same day, No.10 asked the FCO for material on a number of issues in preparation for Mr Blair’s speech to the Conference, including how many Iraqi children under the age of five died each month.12

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12 Minute Rycroft to Owen, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Speech’.
The FCO’s reply, which had been agreed with DFID, stated that there were no truly reliable figures for child mortality in Iraq. The only figures available were from a 1999 UNICEF report which claimed that child mortality had risen from 56 per 1,000 in 1989 to 131 per 1,000 in 1999 in “Baghdad-controlled Iraq” and fallen from 80 per 1,000 to 72 per 1,000 over the same period in “UN-controlled” northern Iraq. However, those figures had been questioned. The household surveys on which the figures were based had been “conducted with the Iraqi regime’s ‘help’ and relied on some Iraqi figures”.

A No.10 official passed the figures for Baghdad-controlled Iraq (but not northern Iraq) to Mr Blair. The official did not make any reference to the reliability of those figures.

The Inquiry concludes that the figures provided to Mr Blair in February 2003 by Ms Short and FCO officials were drawn from UNICEF’s Iraq Child and Maternal Mortality Survey (ICMMS), published in August 1999. That survey received extensive coverage in the media, in particular on whether there was a connection between the apparent rise in child mortality and the sanctions regime that was then in force.

The level of child mortality in Iraq estimated by the ICMMS was significantly higher than that estimated by later surveys. The Child Mortality Estimates website, which presents the work of the UN Inter-Agency Group on Child Mortality Estimation, charts the estimates of major surveys of under-five mortality in Iraq.

The UN Inter-Agency Group on Child Mortality Estimation estimates that the under-five mortality rate in Iraq was 55 per 1,000 in 1989, 46 per 1,000 in 1999, 42 per 1,000 in 2003, and 37 per 1,000 in 2010 (when Mr Blair gave his evidence to the Inquiry).

In September 2010, Professor Michael Spagat reported that the child mortality estimates reported by the ICMMS were between two and three times higher than those reported by three other major UN-sponsored surveys (the Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2005, the Multiple Indictor Cluster Survey in Iraq 2007 and the Iraq Family Health Survey 2008). He suggested that the high and rising child mortality rates reported by the ICMMS could be explained by:

- the manipulation of the sanctions regime by Saddam Hussein, in order to exacerbate the suffering caused by that regime for political purposes; and
- the manipulation of data by Saddam Hussein’s regime, to exaggerate the suffering caused by sanctions.

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13 Fax Owen to Rycroft, 14 February 2003, ‘PM’s Speech Question’.
14 Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Scotland Speech – Additional Points’.
16 BBC, 12 August 1999, Iraqi child death rates soar.
18 Child Mortality Estimates website, Under-five mortality rate: Iraq.
19. On 19 March, in response to a question from Mr Martin Caton in the House of Commons, Mr Blair said:

“Of course, I understand that, if there is conflict, there will be civilian casualties … However … civilian casualties in Iraq are occurring every day as a result of the rule of Saddam Hussein. He will be responsible for many, many more deaths even in one year than we will be in any conflict.”

20. The Coalition began military action against Iraq later that day.

Assessments of Iraqi civilian casualties during initial combat operations

21. In the second half of 2002, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) produced four Assessments which identified the possibility of significant civilian casualties in the event of a Coalition attack on Iraq.

22. In August 2002, the JIC assessed Saddam Hussein’s diplomatic and military options to deter, avert or limit the scope and effectiveness of a US attack. The JIC’s Key Judgements included:

“Saddam would order the use of CBW [chemical and biological weapons] against Coalition forces at some point, probably after a Coalition attack had begun. Once Saddam was convinced that his fate was sealed, he would order the unrestrained use of CBW against Coalition forces, supporting regional states and Israel.”

23. The Assessment also identified a number of “unorthodox options” that Saddam Hussein might pursue, including:

“… a ‘scorched earth’ policy … with the aim of creating a humanitarian or environmental catastrophe …”

24. In September, the JIC assessed how Iraq might use chemical and biological weapons. Its Key Judgements included:

“If not previously employed, Saddam will order the indiscriminate use of whatever CBW weapons remain available late in a ground campaign or as a final act of vengeance.”

22 JIC Assessment, 9 September 2002, ‘Iraqi Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons – Possible Scenarios’.
25. In October, the JIC assessed the likely reaction of the Kurdish and Shia population of Iraq to any US-led attack. It stated that:

“... spontaneous uprisings, without any clear central leadership, are likely in both southern and northern Iraq ... should the regime’s control collapse quickly ... In both areas there could be violent score settling.”

26. In December, the JIC assessed Iraq’s military options during Coalition air strikes and a ground attack. Its Key Judgements included:

“Saddam [Hussein] would use chemical and biological weapons (CBW) if he faced defeat. He might also use them earlier in a conflict, including against coalition forces, neighbouring states and his own people. Israel could be his first target.

... Other Iraqi responses might include seizing hostages as ‘human shields’; using non-lethal BW agents in a deniable manner; suicide attacks; or a ‘scorched earth’ policy with the aim of creating a humanitarian or environmental catastrophe. At some point, motivated by revenge, Saddam would seek to inflict the maximum damage on his enemies, whether Iraqis or outsiders.”

27. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 consider UK military planning for the invasion of Iraq, including the development of the UK’s Targeting Directive.

28. On 15 January 2003, Mr Blair met Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, the Chiefs of Staff and others to discuss military planning for Iraq. Mr Blair asked how many civilian casualties there might be, and for a list of the targets which UK air forces might be asked to attack, along with a commentary on their military importance and the risk of casualties.

29. On 3 February, the MOD produced a Casualty Estimate paper for the Chiefs of Staff. The estimates of UK military casualties are described in Section 16.3.

30. The MOD advised that, although detailed assessments of civilian casualties resulting from the air campaign could be produced on a “target-by-target” basis, the target set was not yet sufficiently well defined to allow an estimate to be produced for the air campaign as a whole. Analysis based on estimated civilian casualties during operations over Iraq between 1998 and 1999 suggested that the civilian casualties for an air campaign would be around 150 killed and 500 injured.

31. No assessment had been produced of civilian casualties arising from “urban operations in Basra”. Experience from World War II suggested that between 200 and 2,000 civilians could be killed in urban operations in Basra, depending on “circumstances, duration and the degree to which civilian casualties are minimised”.

32. Mr Blair was briefed on the targeting aspects of an air campaign by Mr Hoon, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce (Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS)) and Air Commodore Mike Heath (MOD Head of the Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations) on 6 February.28

33. At the meeting, Mr Blair underlined the importance of “minimising the number of civilian casualties and ensuring that all targets were appropriate and proportionate” and that consideration should be given to “how best to explain publicly the scale and nature of the campaign”.

34. On 19 February, at the request of the Overseas and Defence Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, the JIC provided an Assessment of the situation in southern Iraq and what might happen before, during and after any Coalition military action.29 The JIC assessed that the “relative weakness of Iraq’s conventional forces in the south, and the fact that those forces will face the brunt of a Coalition ground attack” meant that southern Iraq was “the most likely area for the first use of CBW against both Coalition forces and the local population”.

35. The JIC identified a number of factors that could undermine popular support for any post-Saddam Hussein administration, including major civilian casualties.

36. In mid-February Mr Blair read the Adelphi Paper *Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change*, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).30

37. Several contributors to the Adelphi Paper warned of the potential for violent disorder in post-conflict Iraq.31 The Paper is addressed in detail in Section 6.5.

38. The Adelphi Paper prompted Mr Blair to ask a number of detailed questions about the military campaign and post-conflict issues, including:

> “What is our military’s assessment of the likely consequences of an attack on Iraq; i.e. how many casualties; how quickly the collapse?”32

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30 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 20 February 2003, 'Iraq: Political and Military Questions'.

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39. General Tommy Franks, Commander in Chief US Central Command (CENTCOM), met Mr Blair on 25 February. The record of the meeting written by a No.10 official reported that Mr Blair asked if Gen Franks had “any idea” of the scale of likely civilian casualties.

40. Adm Boyce stated that civilian casualties were likely to be in the “low hundreds”. Gen Franks stated that ways to minimise civilian casualties were being explored.

41. Mr Blair concluded that “we must set out our strategy: to destroy the regime but minimise civilian casualties”.

42. Mr Peter Watkins, Mr Hoon’s Principal Private Secretary, sent the MOD’s response to Mr Blair’s questions to No.10 on 24 February. Mr Watkins advised that the MOD estimated that the UK “land battle” casualties would be in the order of 30–60 killed, and that Iraqi land battle casualties would be in the order of 500–1,200 killed. Detailed assessments of likely casualties from the air campaign, including civilian casualties, could only be done on a “target-by-target” basis and this work was “in hand”. Mr Watkins stated:

“Iraqi civilian casualties from anything other than the air campaign are likely to be relatively few, unless Coalition forces become engaged in fighting in urban areas.”

43. Mr Watkins’ letter did not refer to the broad estimates of civilian casualties that had been submitted to the Chiefs of Staff on 3 February.

Civilian casualties during initial combat operations

Provision of medical care to Iraqi citizens

44. Section 16.2 addresses the provision of medical care to UK Service Personnel.

45. The MOD recognised before the invasion that, under the Geneva Convention, it was obliged to provide Iraqi citizens (both military personnel and civilians) with the medical care that they required within the UK’s means and capabilities.

46. That obligation was reflected in military planning for Operation TELIC. The MOD’s policy was that initial treatment would take place in theatre, with transfer to other countries in the region if transfer was required and if those countries agreed to accept Iraqi citizens for treatment. If those countries did not agree to accept them, the UK would evacuate the very seriously injured to the UK for specialist care.

35 Minute PJHQ [junior official] to APS/Mr Hoon, 14 May 2003, ‘Operation TELIC: Aeromedical Evacuation of Iraqi Civilians to the UK for Treatment’.
47. The Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) advised Mr Hoon on 14 May 2003, two weeks after the end of major combat operations, that only seven Iraqi citizens had so far been evacuated to the UK, predominantly for severe burns (PJHQ had planned for the evacuation of 20 Iraqi citizens).

48. The MOD reported in July 2003 that around 200 Iraqi Prisoners of War and 200 Iraqi civilians had been treated in British medical facilities during the deployment and combat phases of Op TELIC.36

Reports on civilian casualties

49. On 31 March, Mr Hoon and Adm Boyce briefed Mr Blair on progress on military operations.37 Mr Blair asked for an estimate of civilian casualties. Mr Hoon replied: “Hundreds.”

50. As major combat operations continued, the Government came under sustained pressure in the House of Commons to provide estimates of Iraqi and civilian casualties and to minimise civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure.

51. On 2 April, in response to a question from Mr John MacDougall, Mr Adam Ingram, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, stated:

“We have no means of ascertaining the numbers of military or civilian lives lost during the conflict in Iraq to date, although we make every effort to keep any impact upon the Iraqi civilian population to an absolute minimum. All our military planning is conducted in full accordance with our obligations under international law to employ the minimum necessary use of force to achieve military effect, and to avoid injury to non-combatants or civilian infrastructure. Practically, this is achieved through a combination of an extremely careful targeting process and highly accurate precision guided weapons.”38

52. The following day, in response to a question from Ms Caroline Spelman regarding the number of Iraqi civilians who had been injured and killed as a result of the conflict, Mr Ingram stated:

“… it is impossible to know for sure how many civilians have been injured, or killed and subsequently buried.”39

53. IBC reported in July 2005 that 7,299 non-combatant civilians had been killed between 20 March 2003 and 30 April 2003.40 Of those deaths, 6,882 had been caused by US-led forces, 206 by “anti-Occupation forces, unknown agents and crime”, and 211 by both US-led and anti-Occupation forces.

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38 House of Commons, *Official Report*, 2 April 2003, column 738W.
### Battle Damage Assessment

Section 6.2 describes the main principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also known as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) or the Law of War, how they were disseminated to those engaged in military action, and how they were reflected in the UK’s Targeting Directive and Rules of Engagement (ROEs).

The key elements of IHL which apply to targeting of military objectives during a conflict are set out in the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Protocol I). The main principles can be summarised as:

- **Distinction.** The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives, and shall direct their operations only against military objectives (Article 48).
- **Proportionality.** Military objectives must not be attacked if the attack is likely to cause civilian casualties or damage which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated (Article 57:2:b).
- **Military Necessity.** Offensive operations must be limited to those which are necessary (Article 57:3).
- **Feasible Precautions.** In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.

Those who plan or decide upon an attack must take a number of specified precautions, focusing on the principles outlined above (Article 57).

The Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) process in place at the beginning of Op TELIC was set out in the UK’s 2001 ‘Joint Targeting and Battle Damage Assessment for UK Forces’. The paper stated that the purpose of BDA was:

“… to evaluate the overall effectiveness of an attack. It is also required to determine collateral and additional damage in order to provide an authoritative statement about the proportionality and legality of the attack, and on the absence or presence of collateral or additional damage when required for rebuttal purposes.”

The paper defined “collateral damage” as unintentional or incidental damage affecting facilities, equipment or personnel that were not justifiable military objectives. It defined “additional damage” as unintentional or incidental damage affecting facilities, equipment or personnel that were justifiable military objectives.

The paper did not describe how, after an attack, the number of civilian casualties should be determined.

The MOD told the Inquiry that, during Op TELIC 1, civilian casualty incidents were classed as “serious incidents” for which investigation was mandated by the Commanding Officer and a “higher authority”. The process was formalised in June 2003, so that any incident judged to have potentially fallen outside the UK’s ROEs was fully investigated by the Service Police.

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Case study of a bombing in a Basra suburb, 5 April 2003

54. The deaths of 10 members of the Hamoudi family in a Coalition air strike on houses in a residential area of Basra in early April 2003 attracted significant media attention.

55. The Inquiry has considered, as a case study, the Government’s role in and response to the air strike.

56. The UK military undertook a Rapid Collateral Damage Assessment on 4 April 2003 for a possible attack on a small group of residential houses in Basra that were expected to be visited by General Ali Hasan Al-Majid (also known as Chemical Ali). Gen Al-Majid was described as responsible for co-ordinating resistance to the Coalition within southern Iraq and therefore as a combatant.

57. The Assessment concluded that seven houses (not including those targeted) might suffer collateral damage, and that there would be additional casualties in the open, resulting in 39 civilian casualties in a day attack and 51 in a night attack (again, not including casualties in the targeted houses). No separate estimate had been made of damage to or casualties in the targeted buildings.

58. Given the number of expected civilian casualties (more than 30), approval for the attack was referred from HQ 1st (UK) Armoured Division to Air Marshal (AM) Brian Burridge, the UK’s National Contingent Commander, and hence to Mr Hoon.

59. AM Burridge advised Mr Hoon that:

“… the expected civilian casualties … would not be excessive in relation to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated should Al-Majid be successfully targeted. The attack is therefore capable of being assessed as proportional by the Commander.”

60. On 4 April, Mr Hoon agreed that the attack should proceed. However, Gen Al-Majid was reported to have left the location before the attack could be carried out.

61. In the expectation of Gen Al-Majid’s return, AM Burridge also sought approval for the attack from CENTCOM.

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44 Minute NCHQ OA to NCHQ J3 Targets, 4 April 2003, ‘Rapid Collateral Damage Estimate Residential Houses (Loc: 303121.8N 474904.0E)’.
45 TST Log Sheet, [undated], [untitled].
46 Minute NCHQ OA to NCHQ J3 Targets, 4 April 2003, ‘Rapid Collateral Damage Estimate Residential Houses (Loc: 303121.8N 474904.0E)’.
48 TST Log Sheet, [undated], [untitled].
62. CENTCOM agreed the attack early on 5 April, subject to a reduction in the ordnance to be used from 500lb and 1,000lb bombs to 500lb bombs only, in order to minimise collateral damage.  

63. At 0530 local time on 5 April, following reports that Gen Al-Majid had returned to the location, US forces dropped seven bombs on the target. The US reported immediately after the attack that:

- four bombs had hit the target and detonated;
- two bombs had missed the target; and
- one bomb had hit the target but failed to detonate.

64. Mr Abed Hassan Hamoudi wrote to the “Head of Coalition Forces” in Basra on 12 April, informing him that 10 members of his family had been killed when a number of rockets from Coalition aircraft had hit his house. He had received no expression of condolence or explanation for the attack. Mr Hamoudi indicated that he would seek compensation for the attack and said that he had authorised his son, Mr Sudad Hamoudi, to pursue the case.

65. The Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (JARIC) produced a Phase 1 Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for the attack on Gen Al-Majid on 14 April. It stated that no collateral damage had been observed.

66. By 15 April, HQ 1st (UK) Armoured Division had associated the attack on Gen Al-Majid with the deaths reported by Mr Hamoudi.

67. HQ 7 Armoured Brigade (then responsible for the Basra battlespace) issued a consolidated BDA for the Basra urban area on 19 April. The BDA covered 15 targets which had been engaged by precision guided munitions, including the 5 April attack on Gen Al-Majid. The BDA for that attack reported that the target residence had been completely destroyed, but Gen Al-Majid was believed to have escaped. The attack had damaged other properties and caused civilian casualties; one neighbour had claimed that 10 members of his family including four children had been killed, and another neighbour had claimed that an additional seven children had been killed.

68. The consolidated BDA made no mention of civilian casualties in its reports on any of the other attacks.

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51 Minute BMRA to NC HQ, 15 April 2003, ‘Civilian casualties – Coalition Engagement in Basrah – 05 April 2003’.
53 Letter Hamooudi to Head of Coalition Forces, 12 April 2003, [untitled].
54 Report JARIC, 14 April 2003, ‘MRNXXHAC1Z/0248’.
55 Minute BMRA to NC HQ, 15 April 2003, ‘Civilian casualties – Coalition Engagement in Basrah – 05 April 2003’.
69. The consolidated BDA considered the contribution that pre-planned strikes had made to the campaign, and concluded that:

“… PGMs [precision guided munitions] shortened the battle … and as a result, reduced loss of life on both sides.”

70. An MOD official advised Mr Ingram on 23 April that an investigation into Coalition activity on 5 April, the BDA of the attack on Gen Al-Majid, and other evidence indicated that Mr Hamoudi’s claim was true.\(^57\) Two of the bombs had missed their target “and we suspect therefore that these bombs caused the collateral damage to Mr Hamoudi’s house”.

71. The official also advised that although the MOD had not yet developed a policy on compensation, it was unlikely that Mr Hamoudi would have a claim. There was no legal obligation on the Coalition to compensate civilians affected by hostilities. In line with previous operations, the MOD would not expect to offer compensation for damages resulting from legitimate targeting during hostilities.

72. Mr Ingram wrote to Mr Sudad Hamoodi on 4 June. Mr Ingram advised that the UK had “looked into” the circumstances surrounding the event and could confirm that the deaths were:

“… likely to have been the result of Coalition bombing aimed at General … Al Majid. There as no deliberate targeting of your father’s home and the losses suffered by your family were quite unintended. I appreciate that this may be of very little comfort to you now.

“… the Coalition does take every care to ensure that our military action avoids injury to civilian populations. That said it is not possible to eliminate the risk to civilians entirely, but I hope you will understand that when civilians are injured or killed in this way, this is a tragic accident rather than a deliberate event.”\(^58\)

73. Mr Sudad Hamoudi replied to Mr Ingram on 8 June, posing a number of questions including:

- Was the intelligence that had placed Gen Al-Majid at the location (in a residential district) reliable?
- Why had the family not been warned about the possibility of an attack, so that they could have taken action to ensure their own safety?
- Whether it was correct to describe the deaths as an accident, when they had resulted from a deliberate action.\(^59\)

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57 Minute MOD [junior official] to PS/Minister(AF) [MOD], 23 April 2003, ‘OP TELIC: Hamoodi Family: Civilian Fatalities’.
58 Letter Ingram to Hamoodi, 4 June 2003, [untitled].
59 Letter Hamoodi to Ingram, 8 June 2003, [untitled].
Mr Sudad Hamoudi concluded that there had to be “some kind of accountability” for the loss of civilian lives.

An MOD official provided Mr Ingram with a draft reply to Mr Sudad Hamoudi’s letter on 20 June.\(^{60}\) The official advised that further analysis of the attack suggested that the damage to Mr Abed Hamoudi’s house had not been caused by one of the two bombs that had missed their target, as had been suggested in the 23 April minute to Mr Ingram, but had instead been “an unavoidable consequence of an accurate strike on the target house”. The official continued:

“The targeting planning process identified that collateral damage was likely in neighbouring properties to the target area. If the Hamoudi house was one of these, it therefore seems possible it was damaged as an expected and unavoidable consequence of the strike on the building believed to contain General ‘Chemical’ Ali Hassan Al-Majid, although at the moment we cannot say this with certainty.

“Although we can say with complete certainty that the Hamoudi house was not deliberately targeted by the Coalition … it becomes difficult in this particular instance to sustain with any confidence the line that this was an accident.”

The MOD official stated that there was nevertheless no doubt as to the legitimacy of the attack.

The official also stated: “In line with previous operations we would not expect to offer compensation for damages resulting from legitimate targeting during hostilities.”

Mr Ingram replied to Mr Sudad Hamoudi on 23 June.\(^{61}\) He reiterated his sorrow at the deaths caused by the attack and set out the UK Government’s position on its legality:

“As the Commander of the Southern Region [of Iraq] … Al-Majid was a key Iraqi military figure whose removal from command was expected to deliver considerable military advantage … thus ultimately minimising casualties on both sides. The attack on the place where he was believed to be located was therefore entirely lawful.”

Mr Ingram was advised on 10 July – over three months after the attack – that the UK’s “research” into the incident remained “incomplete, and the information available ambiguous”.\(^{62}\) PJHQ was trying to confirm the address of Mr Hamoudi’s house, and that the strike on Gen Al-Majid was “actually accurate and directed against the correct co-ordinates”.

Members of the Iraq Inquiry Committee met members of the Hamoudi family in 2010.

\(^{60}\) Minute MOD [junior official] to APS/Mr Ingram, 20 June 2003, ‘Op TELIC: Hamoodi Family: Civilian Fatalities’.

\(^{61}\) Letter Ingram to Hamoodi, 23 June 2003, [untitled].

Responding to demands to count civilian casualties

81. From early June 2003, and throughout the summer, there were signs that security in both Baghdad and the South was deteriorating.

82. The Government continued to face pressure in Parliament to provide estimates of the numbers of Iraqi citizens who had died during the conflict. The Government’s line remained that the UK had no means of ascertaining the number of Iraqi Service Personnel or civilians who had been killed during the conflict.

83. On 14 October 2003, in response to a question from Mr Adam Price regarding the number of Iraqi civilians who had been killed by UK or US forces in Iraq since the end of the conflict, Mr Hoon said:

“We make every effort to minimise the impact of military operations on the Iraqi civilian population.

“We have no reliable means of ascertaining the numbers of civilians killed by United Kingdom Forces since the conflict ended.”

84. FCO and MOD officials discussed that response.

85. On 12 November, an FCO official reported to Mr John Buck, FCO Director Iraq, that according to MOD officials:

 “… notwithstanding this answer, records are kept of all significant incidents involving UK forces. A significant incident would include … a soldier wounding or killing a civilian. At present, this information is not collated, although PJHQ accept that it could be.”

86. That collated information would not necessarily be “fully reliable”, as UK forces could not always be sure if someone had been killed or wounded in an incident, and whether that person was a civilian.

87. On the same day, PJHQ sent Mr Hoon a report on the death of two Iraqi adults and the injury of an Iraqi child in an incident involving UK forces.

88. The report prompted Mr Hoon to ask PJHQ for “further advice on the total numbers of civilians killed by UK forces since the end of major combat operations”.

89. On 13 November, in response to a question from Mr Price in the House of Commons, Mr Ingram confirmed that the Special Investigation Branch (SIB) of the Royal

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63 House of Commons, Official Report, 14 October 2003, column 22W.
64 Minute FCO [junior official] to Buck, 12 November 2003, ‘Iraq – Civilian Casualties’.
65 Minute PJHQ to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 12 November 2003, ‘Iraqi Civilian Shooting in Basrah’.
66 Minute APS/Secretary of State to PJHQ, 13 November 2003, ‘Iraqi Civilian Shooting in Basrah’.
Military Police (RMP) had begun investigations into 17 civilian fatalities allegedly caused by UK forces.\textsuperscript{67}

90. Mr Straw wrote to Mr Hoon on 18 November to ask that the MOD examine whether it would be viable to collate information on post-conflict civilian casualties inflicted lawfully and in accordance with the UK’s Rules of Engagement by UK forces (and other troop contributors) in the UK’s Area of Responsibility.\textsuperscript{68} Mr Straw recalled recent media and NGO reporting on the “allegedly high levels of civilian casualties inflicted by Coalition forces” and the level of Parliamentary and public interest, and continued:

“I recognise fully the difficulties involved in compiling accurate statistics about civilian casualties, particularly during combat operations. But I am concerned that the current UK/US position – that ‘there is no reliable means of ascertaining the number of civilian casualties, even in post-conflict Iraq’ – leaves the field entirely open to our critics and lets them set the agenda …

“We need to find ways of countering the damaging perception that civilians are being killed needlessly, and in large numbers, by Coalition forces.”

91. Mr Straw referred to the work of IBC, which he described as having “some credibility (within the sourcing limitations)”.\textsuperscript{69}

92. Mr Hoon’s Private Office passed Mr Straw’s letter to PJHQ, asking for a draft reply.\textsuperscript{70} Mr Hoon’s Private Office commented that they had already asked PJHQ to identify the total number of civilians killed by UK forces since the end of major combat operations.

93. PJHQ replied to Mr Hoon’s Private Office on 25 November.\textsuperscript{71} It confirmed that assessment reports (ASSESSREPs) recorded the detail of contacts and incidents in the UK’s Area of Operations, including details of civilian “casualties or deaths”. It would take two weeks to review all ASSESSREPs produced since 1 May 2003, to determine the number of Iraqi civilian casualties. The number produced would not be “definitive or entirely comprehensive”; ASSESSREPs would only cover incidents which were witnessed by or involved UK forces.

94. PJHQ also advised:

“The current line, that there is no reliable way of knowing how many casualties there have been … was perfectly reasonable during the decisive combat phase of Op TELIC … as long-range attacks meant that there was no source on the ground to verify … casualty numbers.

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\textsuperscript{67} House of Commons, \textit{Official Report}, 13 November 2003, column 433W.

\textsuperscript{68} Letter Foreign Secretary to Defence Secretary, 18 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Civilian Casualties’.

\textsuperscript{69} Minute APS/Secretary to State [MOD] to PJHQ J9 Hq Pl/Ops, 18 November 2003, ‘Iraq – Civilian Casualties’.

\textsuperscript{70} Minute PJHQ J9 to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 25 November 2003, ‘OP TELIC: Civilian Casualties’.

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“Since … the end of decisive combat operations, this line has become more difficult to defend as confirmed cases of civilian casualties where UK forces are involved are recorded locally.”

95. Mr Hoon replied to Mr Straw the following day, advising that neither Iraqi ministries nor Coalition Forces currently had the capacity to collate definitive statistics on the causes of death or injury to civilians.71 He nevertheless shared Mr Straw’s desire to be able to produce accurate casualty statistics “to be able to refute some of the more wild speculation”. The SIB was investigating 17 civilian fatalities allegedly caused by UK forces. The MOD was “seeking to analyse” incident reports produced since 1 May 2003 in order to determine the likely number of “additional Iraqi civilian deaths”. That process would take some time; Mr Hoon undertook to write to Mr Straw with the results.

96. Mr Price secured an Adjournment Debate on “military operations and civilian deaths in post-war Iraq”, which was held in Westminster Hall on 7 January 2004.72 Mr Price had previously tabled 17 Parliamentary Questions on civilian casualties in post-war Iraq and had sent his paper *Can Kill, Won’t Count* to Mr Hoon and the Attorney General.

97. Mr Ingram’s briefing for the debate advised that the review of ASSESSREP reports which had been initiated the previous month had been completed. In addition to the 17 civilian deaths which were subject to investigation by SIB/RMP, the review had identified a further 17 civilians who had been killed by UK forces; one in an (unspecified) accident and 16 in circumstances where force was deemed to have been used in accordance with the UK’s Rules of Engagement.

98. Opening the debate, Mr Price asked Mr Ingram how many civilian casualties had been reported by UK forces.73 In his response, Mr Ingram referred to the 17 deaths that were being investigated by SIB/RMP, but not to the 17 further deaths that the MOD review had identified.

99. Mr Ingram rejected the charge that the UK was refusing to keep records of civilian casualties:

> “That is not true … Although we record all such incidents, it would be wrong to claim that we have an exhaustive record, because we cannot always be certain of the number of fatalities that result. In some incidents … those who have been attacking UK forces and who have been injured or killed are removed from the scene …

> “There have also been incidents in which UK forces have been forced to withdraw from an engagement with no reliable means of ascertaining the number of fatalities … Finally, gun battles have taken place in which our forces were not involved, but there have been claims that they were responsible for casualties none the less.”

71 Letter Hoon to Straw, 26 November 2003, [untitled].
72 Minute PJHQ to APS/Minister(AF) [MOD], 23 December 2003, ‘Adjournment Debate on 7 January: Military Operations and Civilian Deaths in Post-War Iraq – Adam Price’.
100. Mr Ingram also clarified the MOD’s definition of a civilian:

“For our purposes, the term ‘civilian’ applies to all Iraqis. Besides peaceful law-abiding men, women and children, it includes those former regime loyalists who have since April continued to bomb, kill and maim their fellow Iraqi countrymen and women and Coalition troops.”

101. On 6 February, in response to a written Parliamentary Question from Mr Price, Mr Ingram stated:

“As at 2 February, since the end of major combat operations 37 alleged fatalities had been reported by British units of which 18 have been the subject of investigations. All those not subject to investigation involved assailants attacking British forces and in defending themselves the soldiers involved were acting clearly within their Rules of Engagement.”

102. That was the first public statement, of which the Inquiry is aware, of the number of civilians killed by UK forces in Iraq.

103. IBC reported on 7 February 2004 that the number of “non-combatant civilian” deaths in Iraq during 2003 “as a result of the US/UK-led invasion and Occupation of Iraq” might have passed 10,000.

104. IBC commented:

“Pushing the total past the 10,000 mark were recent reports of Iraqi policemen killed since Saddam’s fall in April. It is unsurprising that, as the CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] and Occupying forces bunker themselves behind concrete fortresses, their most exposed and least well-protected front-line defence, members of the ‘new’ Iraqi civil defence and police forces, have suffered disproportionately.”

105. On 23 April, at his request, Mr Blair received 19 “unvarnished accounts” of progress on security, the political process and reconstruction in Iraq (see Section 9.2).

106. In his response to those accounts, Mr Blair asked for answers to four specific questions, including:

“How many civilians have been killed in Iraq, and how? The figure of 15,000 is out there as a fact – is it accurate?”

107. The Cabinet Office responded to that question on 30 April, as part of a detailed update on the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces. It advised that there were no accurate estimates of the number of Iraqi casualties since the start of combat operations.

74 House of Commons, Official Report, 6 February 2004, column 1104W.
75 Iraq Body Count, 7 February 2004, Civilian deaths in ‘noble’ Iraq mission pass 10,000.
operations; figures ranged from 5,000 to 20,000. The MOD’s public line had been that it was not possible to determine the number of civilian casualties, and that UK forces took every effort to minimise the impact of military operations on the civilian population.

108. An “initial assessment” undertaken by the MOD in February 2004 had indicated that 36 civilians had died as a result of UK actions since 1 May 2003. The MOD was now undertaking a “comprehensive assessment” of unit records to produce a more accurate estimate; the outcome of that assessment would be shared with Ministers in May.

109. On 21 May, No.10 asked the FCO to “look again” at the question of civilian casualty figures, and for a weekly “digest” of casualty figures.

110. The FCO replied on 26 May. It stated that CPA advisers to the Iraqi Ministry of Health (MOH) had told the FCO that the MOH did not have reliable figures for civilian deaths or their causes. The MOH was gradually re-establishing standard practices and procedures, but those were still “very basic”.

111. The FCO concluded that the UK did not have reliable figures for overall civilian casualties. As the MOH improved its systems, it might be possible for the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) to determine numbers and causes of civilian deaths and injuries: “But, for now, we are primarily reliant on NGO websites whose reliability we cannot easily assess.”

112. The Inquiry has seen no indications that the FCO provided a weekly digest on civilian casualties to No.10.

113. In response to a written question from Lord Lester of Herne Hill on whether the CPA had access to hospital records detailing Iraqi civilian deaths and injuries and their causes, Baroness Symons, FCO Minister of State, stated on 7 June:

> “Coalition Provisional Authority advisers to the Iraqi Ministry of Health (MOH) do have access to some figures on civilian deaths. However these statistics are not reliable, as Iraqis often bury their deceased relatives without official notification/registration. This has been particularly true during periods of heightened conflict. The MOH does not therefore have accurate figures for civilian deaths or their causes for the past year. The MOH is gradually re-establishing standard practices and procedures, although these are basic. In the longer term the Iraqi Interim Government may be able to evaluate the causes of civilian deaths and injuries.”

78 President Bush declared on 1 May 2003 that major combat operations in Iraq had ended.
114. Lord Lester followed up that reply by asking the UK Government to publish the MOH statistics on Iraqi civilian deaths and injuries. Baroness Symons replied on 24 June:

“There are no reliable figures for Iraqi civilian deaths since March 2003. The Iraqi Ministry of Health has informed us that the number of civilians killed in security incidents is 1,203 and 3,992 wounded dating from when statistics began on 5 April 2004. However they reflect only hospital admissions and may not be comprehensive. It is not possible to break these down into how they were killed or who may have been responsible. It includes casualties caused by terrorist action.”

115. The Occupation of Iraq formally came to an end on 28 June. Power was transferred from the CPA and Iraqi Governing Council to the IIG.

116. On 6 October, the US media reported that the Iraqi MOH had recorded 3,487 insurgency-related deaths between 5 April, when the MOH began compiling data, and 19 September. According to (unnamed) Iraqi officials, between 10 June (when the MOH began compiling data on cause of death) and 10 September, 1,295 Iraqis had been killed by “multinational forces and police” and 516 by “terrorist operations”. The MOH defined terrorist operations as explosive devices in residential areas, car bombs and assassinations.

117. The US media reported that the MOH was “convinced” that nearly all of those reported dead were civilians or police and Iraqi national guardsmen, rather than insurgents; family members would often not report the death of a relative who had died fighting for an insurgent group.

118. No.10 wrote to the FCO on 11 October:

“The Prime Minister [Mr Blair] has asked for an updated assessment of civilian casualties in Iraq. This should include our best estimate of civilian casualties since military action was launched last year, what the US are saying, and a comparison with figures being produced by other bodies (e.g. NGOs, Brookings) and/or quoted in the media.

“The Prime Minister is concerned that we are not getting the message across effectively enough about the extent of insurgent/foreign terrorist responsibility for civilian deaths.”

119. Mr Robin Cook (Labour) asked Mr Straw in the House of Commons on 12 October whether he had seen the MOH figures highlighted in the US media reports, which

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showed that “two thirds of the civilians killed in the last six months died as a result of coalition bombing”. 85

120. Mr Straw said that he had not seen those figures. 86

121. An MOD official provided a contribution to the FCO’s response to No.10 on 13 October. 87 The MOD official confirmed that the MOD did not estimate civilian casualties because it believed that there was no reliable method for doing so, adding:

“This is not merely our public line but our genuine judgement.”

122. The official dismissed the suggestion, made by the FCO, that the civilian casualty figures that were reported to the weekly Chiefs of Staff meeting could serve as a reliable estimate of total civilian casualties. Those figures were compiled by the US based on incomplete “reporting of incidents” to US Corps HQ. The figures were reported to Chiefs of Staff as trends in them indicated whether the security situation was improving or deteriorating.

123. The official concluded by re-stating:

“... the MOD does not produce an estimate of civilian casualties, either within our own area of operation or across Iraq. We have no methodology which would enable us to do this; nor do we believe it possible to define a methodology that would produce figures meaningful enough to alleviate No.10’s concern about public presentation.”

124. The FCO replied to No.10 on 14 October, having consulted UK advisers in the Iraqi MOH. 88 The FCO recommended that the UK should not take any ownership of figures of civilian casualties; none of the estimates available were reliable, and the UK Government would have difficulty in defending the methodology behind them to the media and Parliament.

125. The UK would also have difficulty in compiling its own statistics:

“We rarely have our own people on the ground following terrorist attacks, often relying on press statistics. But their figures result in widely varying estimates ...”

126. The FCO advised that it regarded hospital and mortuary admissions collated by the Iraqi MOH as the “most reliable” figures available, although there were a number of deficiencies:

- Monthly and six-monthly MOH reports were not consistent.

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87 Minute MOD [junior official] to FCO [junior official], 13 October 2004, [untitled].
• Civilians who were taken to hospital injured and subsequently died were counted as injured.
• Hospital staff had come under (unspecified) pressure to inflate casualty figures.

127. The FCO also advised that the Iraqi MOH had publicly estimated that 3,617 Iraqi civilians had been killed and 14,554 injured in the period from 5 April 2004 to 25 September 2004. An unpublished MOH estimate indicated that of those casualties, 516 had been killed and 2,016 injured in “terrorist attacks”.

128. The FCO reported that the UK’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) gave “a very different estimate” of 1,125 fatalities caused by “foreign fighters” since the beginning of 2004. Of those casualties, nearly 1,000 were civilians.

129. The FCO concluded that the UK should be “wary” about being drawn into a debate on which of those figures was accurate. Another unpublished MOH estimate indicated that 1,295 Iraqi citizens had been killed and 5,479 injured in the period from 16 June 2004 to 10 September 2004 “in military action”:

“This is more than double the number they [the Iraqi MOH] estimate were killed by terrorists. Although the figures include insurgents as well as civilians, the Iraqi figures as they stand now will not help us make the case that more civilians have been killed by terrorists than by military action.”

130. The FCO continued:

“In sum, if we produce a figure that differs from the Iraqi Government figures, we will have to defend it – and the way it was arrived at – before Parliament and the media … We recommend that for the moment we continue to put our public emphasis on specific atrocities against civilians …”

131. Mr David Quarrey, a Private Secretary to Mr Blair, passed the FCO’s advice to Mr Blair the following day.⁸⁹ Mr Quarrey commented:

“You asked for an assessment of civilian casualties in Iraq, noting that we cannot let figures of 10–15,000 go unchallenged as if we are responsible for all of them …

“The FCO recommend that we stick to publicising terrorist responsibility for civilian casualties in individual incidents. Underlying this is concern that any overall assessment of civilian casualties will show that MNF [Multi-National Force – Iraq] are responsible for significantly more than insurgents/terrorists.

“But we should be able to handle this better …”

132. Mr Quarrey advised Mr Blair that he intended to ask the Cabinet Office to convene a meeting of departments to initiate a trial period of monitoring daily statistics

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⁸⁹ Minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 15 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Civilian Casualties’.
on fatalities, drawing on whatever information was available. The Government could then assess how “credible (and helpful) the information would be publicly”. Mr Quarrey concluded:

“If the trial is successful, we could look at outsourcing to a credible external organisation (e.g. a think-tank or academics).”

133. Mr Blair agreed that approach.90

134. Mr Quarrey wrote to the MOD on 18 October, to confirm that he had asked the Cabinet Office to convene a meeting to discuss how to take forward a trial monitoring period “in order to demonstrate more effectively the harm being inflicted by terrorism in Iraq”.91 Copies of Mr Quarrey’s letter were sent to the FCO and other departments.

135. A Cabinet Office official chaired a meeting on 22 October to plan how to take forward the trial monitoring period.92 During the meeting, officials stated that there was a risk that the UK might come under pressure to disclose publicly any conclusions that were reached. Mr Quarrey told the meeting that No.10 believed that the UK needed to make a “serious attempt to quantify what is happening”.

136. Officials agreed that:

- The “headline task” was to quantify, as precisely as possible, the number of civilian deaths caused by a) insurgents and b) coalition military action (both MNF – I and the Iraqi Security Forces).
- The best way to do that was to break the task down. The FCO would report from open sources, the MOD would report from Multi-National Division (South-East) (MND(SE))93 using existing military reporting systems, and JTAC/PJHQ would analyse US statistics on casualties.
- The trial period would run for the month of November.

137. An MOD official wrote to the Cabinet Office on 28 October, setting out the MOD’s concerns about the trial process.94 The MOD’s position remained that it did not believe it was possible to establish an accurate methodology for estimating the total number of civilian casualties. Although incident reports could be analysed, there was a danger that:

“… once we have adopted a methodology, Parliament and the public would in future expect us to apply this no matter what the intensity of the operation.”

90 Email Quarrey to Bowen, 18 October 2004, ‘Iraq Civilian Casualties’.
93 MND(SE) comprised the four provinces in southern Iraq for which the UK had security responsibility.
94 Letter MOD [junior official] to Cabinet Office [junior official], 28 October 2004, [untitled].
138. The official recalled the limitations of the incident-reporting process, and concluded:

“… if HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] really does wish to get into the business of challenging media and NGO statistics, we would need to open up discussions with the US and other coalition partners on how to change the incident reporting process in order that – in future – it attributed blame for civilian killings.”

139. An FCO official wrote to the Cabinet Office on the same day, setting out how the FCO intended to contribute to the trial. It would report figures compiled by NGOs and the media but not amend them in any way. To do so would suggest that those NGO and media figures had some reliability, when the UK’s public line was that they did not. Any amendments would also make the figures releasable under the Freedom of Information Act (which would come into effect the following year). The FCO concluded:

“The focus of our work will instead be on the figures produced by the Iraqi Ministry of Health (MOH) … these too have their limitations. However, we will work with the MOH during the next few weeks to see if these statistics can be improved.”

140. On 29 October, as the Government’s trial monitoring period got under way, *The Lancet* published a study by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health entitled *Mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: cluster sample survey* (the *Lancet* study).

141. The study was based on a survey of 988 households in 33 clusters. It found that there had been 98,000 more deaths from all causes in Iraq than expected in the 18 months since the invasion (95 percent confidence interval 8,000–94,000) outside of Fallujah. There would be “far more” deaths if data from the Fallujah cluster were included.

142. The study stated that violence accounted for most of the excess deaths, that violent deaths were “mainly attributed” to coalition forces, and that most individuals reportedly killed by coalition forces were women and children. On the causes of death, the study stated:

“The major causes of death before the invasion were myocardial infarction, cerebrovascular accidents, and other chronic disorders whereas after the invasion violence was the primary cause of death.”

143. There had been an increase in the infant mortality rate, from 29 deaths per 1,000 live births to 57 deaths per 1,000 live births.

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144. The study stated that there had been 53 deaths in the Fallujah cluster when only 1.4 had been expected. That indicated that there had been about 200,000 excess deaths in Fallujah. However, the uncertainty in that estimate was “substantial”.

145. On the same day, following a discussion with the MOD’s Director of News, Professor Sir Roy Anderson, the MOD’s Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA), “quickly reviewed” the study.97 His Private Secretary sent his conclusions to Mr Hoon’s Private Office and senior MOD officials:

“CSA has concluded that the design of the study is robust … He therefore believes that the paper is a sensible one … and that the results are probably as robust as one could have achieved in the very difficult circumstances. He therefore recommends that we should proceed with caution in publicly criticising the paper.

“He would, however, add three caveats. First, extrapolation from a very small sample size to the whole of Iraq is a weakness … Second, there are weaknesses in the way that deaths have been recorded … in many cases the only evidence of a death having occurred, and of the cause of death, was the verbal information provided from (not necessarily disinterested) family members. And finally … there were excess of deaths amongst males, possibly indicating that some of those who died were combatants rather than civilians.”

146. The Iraq Policy Unit (IPU) sent a copy of the minute to Mr Straw’s Private Office on 4 November.98

147. The Iraqi Minister of Health issued a statement on 29 October, offering his Ministry’s own figures of civilian casualties:

“Every hospital reports daily the number of civilians (which may include insurgents) who have been killed or injured in terrorist incidents or as a result of military action. All casualties are likely to be taken to hospital in these circumstances except for some insurgents (who may fear arrest) and those with minor injuries. The figures show that between 5 April 2004 and 5 October 2004, 3,853 civilians were killed and 15,517 were injured. I am satisfied that this information is the most reliable available.”99

148. The Lancet study, and the interest shown in it by the media and MPs, prompted a discussion between Mr Hoon and Mr Straw over whether the MOD or the FCO should have responsibility for the issue of civilian casualties.100 That discussion would continue, between senior officials, until December.

99 House of Commons, Official Report, 17 November 2004, column 94WS.
100 Letter Hoon to Straw, 2 November 2004, [untitled].
149. On 3 November, Mr Blair told the House of Commons that “we do not accept the figures released by The Lancet … at all”. Mr Blair went on to cite the figures released by the Iraqi Minister of Health.

150. The following day, Mr Straw said on Today that “our people are still looking into it [the Lancet study], the epidemiologists and statisticians”. Mr Straw also said that he would make the Government’s assessment available to Parliament.

151. An IPU official provided advice to Mr Straw’s Private Secretary on 4 November on how Mr Straw might respond to Mr Hoon’s letter of 2 November, which had proposed that the FCO should have responsibility for the issue of civilian casualties.

152. In that context, the official reported on the options for producing the assessment of the Lancet study that Mr Straw had promised to provide to Parliament:

“One option … is that we rely on assessments from the Iraqi Ministry of Health; another is that we draw on the help of MOD experts. We already have the views of the MOD Chief Scientific Adviser … It is not a promising start. We are awaiting a report from the Iraqi Ministry of Health setting out their assessment of civilian casualties; we believe this will be a better line of response.”

153. Mr Quarrey passed a transcript of a Newsnight discussion on the Lancet study to Mr Blair on 5 November.

154. Mr Blair commented: “We must get robust lines on numbers killed since the war and on number of airstrikes.”

155. Mr Quarrey wrote to Mr Straw’s Private Secretary on 8 November to confirm that the FCO should lead on the issue of civilian casualties. Mr Quarrey reported that Mr Blair remained concerned that the UK was not getting across its message about “the extent of insurgent/foreign terrorist responsibility for civilian deaths”, and that Mr Blair wanted the FCO to develop a “quicker and more forceful response to claims about civilian deaths that we regard as unfounded (e.g. the Lancet claims)”. Mr Dominic Asquith, FCO Director Iraq, advised Mr Straw later that day that he should challenge that allocation of responsibility.

156. Mr Asquith said that MNF-I produced a daily update on operations which included details of civilian casualties (killed and wounded). The MOD itself produced the figures

101 House of Commons, Official Report, 3 November 2004, column 301.
102 The Today Programme, 4 November 2004.
103 Minute IPU [junior official] to FCO [junior official], 4 November 2004, ‘Civilian Casualties in Iraq: Letter to Geoff Hoon’.
104 Manuscript Quarrey to Prime Minister, 5 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Update’.
105 Manuscript note Blair on Minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 5 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Update’.
106 Letter Quarrey to PS/Straw, 8 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Civilian Casualties’.
107 Minute Asquith to PS/Straw, 8 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Civilian Casualties’.
for MND(SE). PJHQ collated the daily MNF-I reports for the weekly Chiefs of Staff meeting.

158. The Cabinet Office was currently overseeing a trial to determine civilian casualties in MND(SE). The MOD was, however, arguing that it could not provide either the MNF-I or its own MND(SE) casualty figures to the exercise, as the US military did not allow publication of country-wide information on civilian casualties on security grounds. The MNF-I figures would in any case be unlikely to be comprehensive and did not show who was responsible for civilian casualties.

159. The UK’s current line was to rely on Iraqi MOH figures, though that might not be sustainable in the face of increasing Parliamentary, NGO and media demands that the UK release its own statistics. The current military operation in Fallujah was increasing pressure on MNF-I to prove that it was making every effort to minimise civilian casualties, and:

“There will be seen to be a certain plausibility in the argument that we can only do so if we can provide credible (i.e. our own) figures for casualties.”

160. Mr Asquith concluded that any estimate of casualties, other than from MOH and NGO sources, would have to come from MNF-I, which was deployed throughout Iraq. But the MOD had ruled out the use of the MNF-I figures. If the MOD felt there were good reasons for holding back its own figures for MND(SE), it (rather than the FCO) should explain those reasons to Parliament and to the public.

161. Mr Asquith continued that if the FCO did accept the lead on handling civilian casualty issues, it should be on three conditions:

“(a) MOD to explore with DoD [the US Department of Defense] reverting to the practice at the time of the first Gulf War when civilian casualties were released into the public domain.

(b) If DoD refuses, MOD to explain publicly (to Parliament) why it is not possible to produce estimates from MNF-I sources.

(c) FCO to lead on the handling of civilian casualties … But Ministers should be clear that, in the absence of releasable data from military sources, we will be heavily dependent on figures from the Iraqi MOH which will not be comprehensive …”

162. Mr Asquith advised Mr Straw in a separate minute on the same day:

“Legal Advisers say there are no obligations to report civilian casualties in the Fourth Geneva Convention … or under any other provision of international humanitarian law.

“While it is essential in advance of any particular attack to assess the likely civilian casualties, there is no obligation after the event to make any assessment of either
the civilian casualties resulting from the attacks or of the overall civilian casualties of a conflict.”

163. Also on 8 November, Mr Straw chaired a meeting with FCO officials including Mr Creon Butler, the FCO’s Chief Economist, to discuss the scope of a Written Ministerial Statement that he would make on 17 November, responding to the *Lancet* study.

164. After the meeting, Mr Butler sent Mr Straw’s Private Secretary his “initial thoughts” on the *Lancet* study. Mr Butler stated that “the statistical methodology appears sound” and concluded:

“In commenting on the study we should certainly continue to emphasise the considerable uncertainty around the central estimate [of 98,000 excess deaths] (reflecting the small sample size), as well as the lack of corroborating evidence – particularly evidence of injured in the numbers one might expect. We could also highlight some of the factors which might bias the study towards an over-estimate of deaths. However, there are as many reasons why the study might be biased in the other direction (so probably safer not to go down this road).”

165. Mr Butler stated that the “lack of corroborating evidence” related in particular to the apparent mismatch between the central estimate of 98,000 excess deaths and the much lower estimates based on press reporting and the lack of anecdotal evidence for large numbers of injured Iraqi citizens attending Iraqi hospitals. The latter mismatch was “much harder to explain”.

166. Mr Butler considered how the estimates presented in the *Lancet* study might be validated and refined using data from other sources. He concluded:

“In the absence of a detailed census (impossible in the current security environment), the best way of narrowing down the uncertainty … is likely to be to conduct a similar survey with a significantly larger sample.”

167. On 9 November, the MOD sent the Cabinet Office a summary of incident reports for MND(SE) for the seven days up to 7 November, as part of the trial monitoring period. There had been no incidents involving civilian fatalities; two civilians had been injured in an (unspecified) accident.

168. On 11 November, Mr Blair, Mr Straw and Mr Hoon discussed which department should be responsible for work on casualty figures. After the meeting, Mr Straw’s Private Secretary asked Sir Michael Jay, the FCO Permanent Under Secretary, to liaise

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108 Minute Asquith to PS/Straw, 8 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Civilian Casualties’.
109 Email Owen to Asquith, 8 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Casualties’.
110 Minute Butler to PS/Foreign Secretary, 8 November 2004, ‘Counting Iraq Casualties’.
111 Letter MOD [junior official] to Cabinet Office [junior official], 9 November 2004, ‘Civilian Casualties’.
with Sir Kevin Tebbit, MOD Permanent Under Secretary, to secure the MOD’s agreement to take on that responsibility.

169. At Cabinet on 11 November, Mr Straw told colleagues that he would be making a Written Ministerial Statement on the estimate of civilian casualties published by The Lancet, and that he proposed to make more use of the Iraqi MOH figures, which were “more reliable”.113

170. On 12 November, the Iraq Senior Officials Group agreed that there was “potential advantage” in making more use of the Iraqi MOH’s figures, but the UK needed to recognise the presentational difficulties of using those figures while “using US figures for internal planning purposes without publicly acknowledging their existence”.114 It would be useful to compare the MOH figures with those produced for the Chiefs of Staff by PJHQ.

171. Mr Straw issued a Written Ministerial Statement on 17 November, responding to the Lancet study.115 Mr Straw stated that during the period of major combat operations, the Coalition had made every effort to minimise civilian casualties. He continued:

“Casualties – civilian and military – which have occurred since major combat operations ended on 1 May 2003 have done so directly as a result of those determined to undermine the political process.”

172. Mr Straw rejected the suggestion in the Lancet study that there was a legal obligation (deriving from Article 27 of the fourth Geneva Convention) for the MNF‑I to assess civilian casualties.

173. Mr Straw stated that the UK Government shared the Iraqi Minister of Health’s view, expressed in his 29 October statement, that the MOH’s information was the most reliable available. The “running estimate” provided by IBC “suggested” that between 14,284 and 16,419 Iraqi civilians had died since March 2003. While that was “an estimate relying on media reports, and which we do not regard as reliable”, IBC’s figures did show that the Iraqi MOH’s figures were not the only ones to differ widely from those presented in the Lancet study.

174. Mr Straw stated that the methodology used in the Lancet study had passed The Lancet’s peer review process and was similar to that used in other cases, but questioned the data that the survey had produced and hence the findings of the study.

175. Dr John Reid, the Health Secretary, sent an assessment of the Lancet study to Mr Straw on 29 November.116 The assessment, which Dr Reid said he had personally

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113 Cabinet Conclusions, 11 November 2004.
114 Record, 12 November 2004, Iraq Senior Officials Group.
116 Letter Reid to Straw, 29 November 2004, [untitled], attaching Paper, [undated], ‘Mortality Before and After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: Cluster Sample Survey’. 

200
commissioned, had been produced by Dr Bill Kirkup, one of the Department of Health’s Regional Directors of Public Health and its lead on health in Iraq.

176. Dr Kirkup’s assessment was more detailed and more critical of the Lancet study than the assessments undertaken earlier by Professor Anderson and Mr Butler. He stated:

“Less than a thousand [households] … is a small number on which to base death rates … The confidence intervals are correspondingly very wide … A confidence interval this large makes the meaning of the estimate very difficult to interpret …

“Cluster sampling may not be appropriate when there is a large element of discontinuity in the population experience. Clearly, some parts of Iraq have seen much more violence than others …”

177. Dr Kirkup stated that, according to his calculations, the study’s conclusion that “violence accounted for most of the excess deaths” was only true if the “bizarre” Fallujah cluster was included (the study stated that that cluster was not included in its central estimate of 98,000 excess deaths). Dr Kirkup calculated that if the Fallujah cluster was not included, just over 23,000 of the 98,000 estimated excess deaths were due to violence.

178. Dr Kirkup stated that it was not possible, from the data provided in the study, to confirm the study’s conclusion that “air strikes from coalition forces accounted for most violent deaths”.

179. Dr Kirkup explained his characterisation of the Fallujah projection as “bizarre”. The study estimated that there had been 200,000 excess deaths in Fallujah (using the same techniques as for other areas). That would represent a loss of nearly 28 percent of the population of Fallujah in just 14 months. Dr Kirkup commented: “Something has plainly gone so badly wrong with the estimates in Fallujah that it must cast doubt on the validity of the rest of the findings.”

180. Dr Kirkup concluded:

“… the paper suffers from wide confidence intervals, dubious methodology, the likelihood of significant respondent bias and results that are disastrously skewed by the Fallujah outlier. The authors have been tempted into extrapolations based on shaky data that lack face validity, and in two cases are not even borne out by their own results.”
Indirect effects of conflict on public health

The health charity Medact considered the direct and indirect effects of the conflict in Iraq in its November 2003 report *Continuing collateral damage: the health and environmental costs of war on Iraq 2003*.\(^{117}\) That report outlined the indirect effects on health arising from:

- damage to the environment, including through the use of depleted uranium ammunition;
- damage to Iraq's water and sanitation and power infrastructure;
- the continuing risk of malnutrition and food insecurity;
- damage to housing; and
- damage to health services.

The report stated that 7 percent of hospitals had been damaged during the major combat phase of operations, and 12 percent had been looted. UNICEF had reported that the conflict had led to the breakdown of the cold chain system for storing vaccines, which meant that some 210,000 newborns had had no immunisations and were at risk from preventable diseases such as measles.

The report also outlined the physiological and social impacts of the war, and suggested that Iraq would experience a rise in behavioural and emotional disorders.

Although the report did not attempt to quantify those indirect effects, many of which would only become apparent over the long term, it concluded that they could prove to be more significant than the direct effects.

The report made a number of recommendations, including:

- Establish health information systems to monitor disease incidence and examine disease patterns in order to plan effective public health interventions.
- Carry out an assessment of the country’s chemical risks and levels of contamination in addition to surveillance of health effects of environmental risk factors including depleted uranium.
- Fund and rapidly implement the clear-up of all unexploded ordnance.
- Study long-term effects of the war on mental health and trends in domestic and criminal violence, and develop effective health care and social policy interventions.
- Fund independent academic institutions or UN agencies to continue monitoring the health effects of war.”

181. Discussions continued between senior officials in the FCO and MOD over who should have responsibility for answering questions on civilian casualties.

182. The “Count the Casualties” campaign was launched by Medact and IBC on 8 December, through an open letter to Mr Blair.\(^{118}\) The letter stated that without counting

\(^{117}\) Medact, November 2003, *Continuing collateral damage: the health and environmental costs of war on Iraq 2003*.

\(^{118}\) Letter Medact to Blair, 8 December 2004, [untitled].
the dead and injured, it was not possible to know whether the UK was meeting its obligations under international humanitarian law to protect the civilian population in Iraq. It urged the Government to commission a comprehensive, independent inquiry to determine how many Iraqi citizens had died or been injured since March 2003, and the cause of those casualties.

183. The campaign also argued that information on casualties was needed to plan healthcare in Iraq.119

184. At Prime Minister’s Questions on the same day, Mr Blair said that he did not agree that the UK needed to hold a full, independent inquiry into civilian casualties to comply with its international legal obligations, and stated that the figures from the Iraqi MOH were the most accurate available.120 He continued:

“… those who are killing innocent people in Iraq today … are the terrorists and insurgents … Any action that the multinational force or the Iraqi Army is taking in Iraq is intended to defeat those people …”

185. The IPU provided the Cabinet Office with a contribution to the Cabinet Office trial on 13 December.121 The IPU analysis captured casualty figures for the five weeks from 1 November, sourced from the Iraqi MOH, the BBC, IBC, the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count project and Sky News. The casualty figures were broken down into two categories: killed by insurgents; and killed by coalition forces.

186. The total casualty figures produced by the Iraqi MOH were the highest among the five sources in four of the five weeks.

187. The figures produced by the Iraqi MOH showed that casualties caused by the coalition were higher than casualties caused by insurgents in four of the five weeks. Figures from all other sources showed that casualties caused by insurgents were higher than casualties caused by the coalition in all five weeks.

188. The IPU commented that, apart from the Iraqi MOH, the sources were “of no real value”. The comparison of the figures did suggest, however, that the Iraqi MOH figures were incomplete. This could be due to delayed reporting of deaths at hospitals or bodies not being taken to hospitals. The Iraqi MOH had reported that its figures did not include the Kurdish provinces.

189. The IPU also commented that the analysis would not answer the demands from MPs and others that the UK should produce its own estimate of Iraqi civilian casualties. The only way a proper comparative analysis of the Iraqi MOH figures could be made was to set them alongside figures produced by the US and UK military.

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119 Count the Casualties, 8 December 2004, 46 prominent figures call on Prime Minister to commission independent inquiry into Iraqi casualties.
120 House of Commons, Official Report, 8 December 2004, column 1164.
190. The Inquiry has seen no indications that the Cabinet Office trial was taken further.

191. A detailed brief on civilian casualties produced for Mr Blair on 18 December in advance of his visit to Iraq made no mention of the trial or its conclusions.  

192. An IPU official informed Mr Straw’s Private Office on 15 December that the MOD was now ready to “step forward and explain why it is impossible for us to use our military assets in Iraq to get an estimate [of civilian casualties]”. The official commented that this was welcome. It would force the MOD to take some responsibility for managing one of the “bear-traps” in the UK’s existing policy:

“… although we say there are no reliable estimates of civilian casualties in Iraq, there are estimates of a kind that are made by MND(SE) and others made by the Pentagon. They’re unreliable but are used for military planning purposes as evidence of trends …”

193. Mr Ingram made that statement on 27 January 2005, in response to a question from Mr Peter Kilfoyle.  

194. Mr Ingram also stated that 17 Iraqi citizens believed to have been enemy combatants had died, and 22 had been injured, during the course of other incidents, and 144 Iraqi citizens believed not to have been enemy combatants had died, and 192 had been injured, during the course of other incidents. This included the full range of incidents in which UK forces had been involved but where no deliberate military force had been applied, for example Improvised Explosive Device attacks by insurgent forces on civilian targets, road traffic accidents and in one case the discovery in May 2003 of a mass grave, thought to date back to 1991, containing 32 bodies.

195. Mr Ingram stated that those figures should not be taken as an accurate estimate of Iraqi casualties; they captured only those casualties which were witnessed or discovered by UK forces. The figures did not include the major combat operations phase of Op TELIC, prior to 1 May 2003, for which incident reports were not routinely submitted when casualties were “discovered”.

122 Minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 18 December 2004, ‘Your Visit to Iraq’ attaching Briefing, [undated], ‘Civilian Casualties’.


124 House of Commons, Official Report, 27 January 2005, column 541W.
196. Ms Short (who had resigned as International Development Secretary in May 2003) wrote to Mr Straw on 13 January 2005 to express her support for the Count the Casualties campaign.125

197. Mr Straw replied on 3 March:

“We have never made our own assessment of Iraqi casualties … This is because, after careful consideration of the different means of calculating casualties, we decided that the current circumstances would prevent a valid assessment by the UK …”126

198. Mr Straw advised that the MOD had now published overall casualty figures drawn from military incident reports. The UK military aimed to minimise civilian casualties by using careful targeting procedures. Target clearance procedures considered targets on an individual basis; the MOD did not believe that an estimate of casualties in Iraq as a whole would help them to evaluate those targeting procedures.

199. Mr Asquith discussed civilian casualties with Dr Kirkup on 21 March.127 Dr Kirkup “rebutted” the suggestion that an accurate assessment of casualties would be “an essential element of assessing and improving the current health situation in Iraq”. He confirmed that the Iraqi MOH’s figures provided “the most reliable assessment [of casualties] currently available”.

200. Dr Kirkup identified four sources of information on casualties:

- the Iraqi MOH’s systems for recording deaths, which had been reasonably sound before the conflict but had “taken a serious hit” and were only now recovering;
- civil registration (death certificates): there was no reliable civil registration system;
- surveys: the security situation was not conducive to effective research, in particular by limiting the scope to obtain the necessary range of data and by introducing interviewee bias; and
- figures from the military: “[those] would help to provide a more complete picture of the causes of death and whether deaths had actually occurred. When dealing with incomplete data it is important to have as many sources as possible.”

201. Mr Asquith and Dr Kirkup also considered possible areas of assistance to the Iraqi health service, including data collection and analysis.

202. The record of the meeting concluded: “Our position on assessing Iraqi casualty figures reinforced.”

125 Letter Short to Straw, 13 January 2005, ‘Count the Call’.
126 Letter Straw to Short, 3 March 2005, [untitled].
203. IBC published *A Dossier of Civilian Casualties 2003 – 2005* in July 2005. The dossier stated that 24,865 civilians had been reported killed in the two years from 20 March 2003 to 19 March 2005, almost all of them as a direct result of violence.

204. Of the 13,811 fatalities for which IBC had age and gender information, 11,281 (81.7 percent) had been male (including the elderly) and 1,198 (8.7 percent) had been female (including the elderly). A total of 1,281 (9.3 percent) had been children and 51 (0.4 percent) babies.

205. The dossier also provided a breakdown of who had killed those civilians. That breakdown is reproduced in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Killers by category</th>
<th>Number killed</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 US-led forces alone</td>
<td>9,270</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Anti-occupation forces alone</td>
<td>2,353</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Both US-led and anti-occupation forces involved</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Iraqi MOH-defined “military actions”</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Iraqi MOH-defined “terrorist attacks”</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Predominantly criminal killings</td>
<td>8,935</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Unknown agents</td>
<td>2,731</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total deaths</strong></td>
<td><strong>24,865</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

206. The “unknown agents” category included attacks which apparently targeted only civilians and lacked any identifiable military objective – for instance suicide bombs in markets and mosques, or attacks apparently motivated by personal or inter-group vendettas. The category also included 334 individual killings where media reports provided no clear information about the killer. This category was likely to overlap with others.

207. The dossier reported that 98.5 percent of deaths caused by US-led forces were attributable to the US and 1.5 percent of deaths were attributable to other coalition forces including the UK.

208. The dossier also stated that in incidents for which both death and injury information was available, it had recorded 42,500 injuries (of all kinds) against 13,424 deaths, a ratio of over 3 to 1.

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209. IBC stated in the introduction to the dossier that:

“Assurances that military forces ‘make every effort to avoid civilian casualties’ are no substitute for real data-gathering and analysis, and can have no basis without it. On the eve of the invasion Tony Blair stated that ‘[Saddam Hussein] will be responsible for many, many more deaths even in one year than we will be in any conflict’. Only data such as presented here will allow a realistic evaluation of such predictions.”

210. The US Government was required under the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 2005 to provide quarterly reports to Congress on political, economic and security progress in Iraq. 129

211. The second quarterly report, in October 2005, included a graph showing the average daily number of coalition and Iraqi casualties caused by insurgents since 1 January 2004. 130 The report did not provide the data used to produce that graph.

212. On the basis of that graph, The New York Times estimated that over 25,000 Iraqi civilians and members of the Iraqi Security Forces had been killed and wounded by insurgents since 1 January 2004. 131 The New York Times stated that that was fewer than reported by the Iraqi MOH and IBC.

213. A Pentagon spokesperson stated that the figures were compiled from reports filed by coalition military units after they responded to attacks. Those reports did not provide a comprehensive account of Iraqi casualties, but did provide information on trends in casualties resulting from insurgent attacks.

214. The New York Times reported that the graph had been included in the quarterly report as a result of specific questions posed by Congressional staff, and commented that its disclosure was significant as it showed that the US military was tracking Iraqi casualties, having “previously avoided virtually all public discussion of the issue”.

215. In subsequent quarterly reports to Congress, the Pentagon updated that graph and added a breakdown of casualties by province. 132

216. In June 2006, the UK Government signed the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development. 133 Signatories resolved to take action to reduce armed violence and its negative impact on socio-economic and human development, including by supporting initiatives “to measure the human, social and economic costs of armed violence, to assess risks and vulnerabilities, to evaluate the effectiveness of armed violence reduction programmes, and to disseminate knowledge of best practices”.

129 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005.
217. The UK became one of 15 members of the “Core Group” charged with steering the Geneva Declaration process and guiding its implementation.\textsuperscript{134}

218. The Lancet published the second Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health cluster sample survey of excess mortality in Iraq (direct and indirect, violent and non-violent deaths) on 12 October 2006.\textsuperscript{135} The first Johns Hopkins study had been published by The Lancet in October 2004.

219. The second study used the same (cluster sample survey) methodology as the first study, but was based on a larger sample (1,849 households as against 988 in the first study).

220. The study estimated that between March 2003 and June 2006, there had been 654,965 excess Iraqi deaths and 601,027 excess violent Iraqi deaths as a consequence of the war. The study attributed 31 percent of violent excess deaths to the coalition, 24 percent to “other” and 45 percent to “unknown”. The study also concluded that levels of violence were increasing.

**Criticisms of the Lancet studies**

The 2004 and 2006 Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health studies published by The Lancet have been subject to several criticisms. The most significant are:

- That the baseline pre-invasion mortality rate used by the studies was lower than the actual pre-invasion mortality rate, leading to an over-estimation of excess mortality in the post-invasion period. The second study used a pre-invasion mortality rate of 5.5 deaths per thousand people.\textsuperscript{136} The 2008 Iraq Family Health Survey (IFHS) used a figure of nine deaths per thousand.\textsuperscript{137}

- That the sample sizes were too small. The 2004 Lancet study (central estimate 98,000 excess deaths) surveyed 988 households and the 2006 Lancet study (central estimate 655,000 excess deaths) surveyed 1,849 households. The 2008 IFHS (central estimate 151,000 excess violent deaths) surveyed 9,345 households. The IFHS team highlighted the implications of that difference in scale: “The estimated number of deaths in the IFHS is about three times as high as that reported by the Iraq Body Count. Both sources indicate that the 2006 study by Burnham et al [the second Lancet study] considerably overestimated the number of violent deaths. For instance, to reach the 925 violent deaths per day reported by Burnham et al for June 2005 through June 2006, as many as 87 percent of violent deaths would have been missed in the IFHS and more than 90 percent in the Iraq Body Count. This level of underreporting is highly improbable, given the internal and external consistency of the data and the much larger same size and quality-control measures taken in the implementation of the IFHS.”

\textsuperscript{134} Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development website, How does it work.
221. An Iraqi Government spokesperson commented on 12 October that “these figures [in the study] are unrealistic and give a very exaggerated picture”.

222. A DFID Statistics Adviser provided advice on the study to IPU on 12 October, at their request. He concluded that “in essence, the method is tried and tested”.

223. Professor Anderson provided his views on the study the following day. He stated that he had received comments on the study from an independent expert on statistical epidemiology and demography. Professor Anderson advised:

“… the study design is robust and employs methods that are regarded as close to ‘best practice’ in this area, given the difficulties of data collection and verification in the present circumstances in Iraq … The methods are an improvement on those used in the 2004 Lancet article by the same author …”

224. Professor Anderson advised that deaths were much more prevalent among adolescent to middle-aged men and suggested that bias might remain with respect to the level of non-combatant mortality.

225. Professor Anderson concluded that, given the reasonably robust study design and appropriate analysis methods, the UK Government should be cautious in publicly criticising the Lancet study.

226. An IPU official produced a brief on the study for Mr Blair later on 13 October. The brief summarised the advice from the DFID Statistics Adviser and Professor Anderson, and identified several “key points”:

• … People are dying at the hands of those who choose violence to pursue their aims …
• There are conflicting estimates [of the number of civilian casualties] from a number of sources, and no comprehensive or accurate figures;
• The numbers that the Lancet has extrapolated are a substantial leap from other figures. There is no reason to assume the Lancet figure is any more accurate than any other is.”

227. The same IPU official wrote to colleagues on 16 October:

“… we do not (not) accept that the figures quoted in the Lancet survey are accurate … The figures are extraordinarily high and significantly larger than the figures quoted by the Iraq Body Count or Iraqi Government – however the survey methodology used here cannot be rubbished, it is a tried and tested way of

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139 Email DFID [junior official] to FCO [junior official], 12 October 2006, ‘Foreign Secretary Comment on the Lancet Report’.
measuring mortality in conflict zones. The overriding message is that there are no accurate or reliable figures of deaths in Iraq.”

228. On 18 October, in response to a Parliamentary Question from Sir Menzies Campbell, Mr Blair stated:

“It is correct that innocent civilians are dying in Iraq. But they are not being killed by British soldiers. They are being killed by terrorists and those from outside who are supporting them …”

229. Researchers at Oxford University (Mr Sean Gourley and Professor Neil Johnson) and Royal Holloway, University of London (Professor Spagat) issued a press release on 19 October, claiming that there were “serious flaws” in the methodology used by the Lancet study which acted to inflate its casualty estimate.

230. In response to a question from Mr Jeremy Corbyn on 6 November, Mr Ingram set out the Government’s position on the Lancet study:

“Maintaining records of civilian deaths in Iraq is ultimately a matter for the Government of Iraq and we believe they are best placed to monitor the situation. The Lancet report is one of a number of recent studies … none of which can be regarded as definitive. The figures in the Lancet report are significantly higher than other casualty estimates.”

231. Professor Anderson revisited the Lancet study in March 2007, following Mr Straw’s request for further advice on the study in the light of the public exchanges since its publication. Professor Anderson wrote to Mr Straw on 19 March, stating that while there was “clearly a possibility of [sampling] bias”:

“I reiterate my earlier advice, which acknowledged that bias and moderate confidence bounds remain in the study, and that at this stage I see no value in either criticising the study or engaging in the public debate.”

232. Later that month, following the release of papers relating to the Lancet study under the Freedom of Information Act, the Government was asked how it could accept the Lancet study’s methodology but reject its findings. A Government spokesperson responded:

“The [Lancet study] methodology has been used in other conflict situations, notably the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, the Lancet figures are much higher

142 Email FCO [junior official] to FCO [junior official], 16 October 2006, ‘PMQs Deaths of Iraqis’.
143 House of Commons, Official Report, 18 October 2006, column 869.
144 Oxford University/Royal Holloway, University of London, 19 October 2006, Lancet study fundamentally flawed: death toll too high.
146 House of Commons, Official Report, 6 November 2006, column 810W.
147 BBC, 26 March 2007, Newsnight special investigation – Iraq civilian casualties.
than statistics from other sources, which only goes to show how estimates can vary enormously according to the method of collection. There is considerable debate amongst the scientific community over the accuracy of the figures."

233. General David Petraeus, Commanding General MNF-I, presented Congress with his assessment of the US troop surge on 10 September 2007. He highlighted the “considerable data collection and analysis … using a methodology that has been in place for well over a year and that has benefitted over the past seven months from the increased presence of our forces living among the Iraqi people” which underpinned his assessment, and offered Congress statistics on the number of violent civilian deaths and “ethno-sectarian” deaths.

234. Colonel Steven Boylan, Gen Petraeus’ spokesman, provided details of that methodology to The Washington Post later that month. Col Boylan reported that the statistics quoted by Gen Petraeus drew on data which combined “unverified” Iraqi reports and coalition Significant Activities reports (SIGACTS).

235. A 2008 RAND report, sponsored by the Office of the US Secretary of Defense, considered the argument for documenting civilian casualties. The report stated:

"Because protecting the population is one of the central tenets of US COIN [counter-insurgency] doctrine, it can be surmised that trends related to Iraqi civilian fatalities should be a chief concern for the U.S. military."

236. RAND reviewed a number of studies of civilian casualties, including the two Lancet studies, the 2008 Iraq Family Health Survey (IFHS) Study Group and IBC. RAND went on to present its own dataset, which combined the RAND Terrorism Knowledge Base with the IBC dataset. RAND drew a number of observations and conclusions from the consolidated dataset, including that:

- The US military had devoted considerable effort to defeating Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs), yet IEDs accounted for only 5 percent of civilian fatalities in 2006. Firearms accounted for 58 percent of civilian deaths in 2006. RAND concluded that while measures to defeat IEDs might save coalition lives, they might not be useful for reducing civilian fatalities; the coalition and the Iraqi Government needed to implement measures to counter the types of attacks that were claiming civilian lives.
- The insurgency was specifically targeting the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi economy. Over 30 percent of insurgent attacks were aimed at these two aspects of the Iraqi polity.

• Most violence was directed at “for lack of a better word, the common Iraqi civilian”. For over 50 percent of the individuals killed in 2006 there was “… no identifying data, no apparent or recorded reason, and no discernible affiliation or target. All we know of these people is that they were killed; this fact alone suggests that our capacity to understand, analyze, and effectively respond to the bloodshed is limited by a lack of information.”

237. In April 2009, researchers from King’s College London, Royal Holloway, University of London and IBC used IBC’s record of Iraqi non-combatant civilian deaths to analyse the nature and effects of various weapons.

238. The researchers concluded that in events with at least one Iraqi non-combatant civilian casualty, the methods that killed the most non-combatant civilians per event were aerial bombing (17 per event), combined use of aerial and ground weapons (17 per event) and suicide bombers on foot (16 per event). Aerial bombs killed on average nine more non-combatant civilians per event (17) than aerial missiles (8). The team commented:

“It seems clear from these findings that to protect civilians from indiscriminate harm, as required by international humanitarian law … military and civilian policies should prohibit aerial bombing in civilian areas unless it can be demonstrated – by monitoring of civilian casualties for example – that civilians are being protected.”

The WikiLeaks Iraq War Logs

On 22 October 2010, WikiLeaks released 391,832 US Army Field Reports, covering the period from 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2009 (except for the months of May 2004 and March 2009).151 WikiLeaks stated that the Field Reports detailed 109,032 deaths in Iraq over that period, comprising:

• 66,081 “civilian” deaths;
• 23,984 “enemy” deaths (“those labelled as insurgents”);
• 15,196 “host nation” deaths (Iraqi Government forces); and
• 3,771 “friendly” deaths (coalition forces).

IBC reported that, based on an “early analysis”, the Field Reports contained 15,000 previously unreported civilian deaths.152 Once a full analysis was complete, casualty data would be integrated into IBC’s record.

IBC stated that the majority of the previously unreported deaths came from small incidents comprising one to three deaths. That was not unexpected, as larger incidents attracted more media coverage than smaller incidents.

151 WikiLeaks, 22 October 2010, Iraq War Logs.
152 Iraq Body Count, 22 October 2010, 15,000 previously unknown civilian deaths contained in the Iraq war Logs released by WikiLeaks.
Witness comment

239. The Inquiry asked Mr Ingram, Minister for the Armed Forces from June 2001 to June 2007, why the UK Government had been unable to produce an estimate of civilian casualties when other organisations including NGOs and academic organisations had done so, in particular given the public interest on the issue.\(^{153}\)

240. Mr Ingram told the Inquiry:

“The idea that somehow or other an NGO is the fount of all wisdom and knowledge and accuracy I don’t think stands up.

“So if we were going to take the figures from external sources, then we would have had to put effort and verification into that. Should we have done so? Perhaps, yes, and I’m not so sure it wasn’t being done …”

241. Mr Ingram added that establishing the number of civilian casualties would not have changed the reality on the ground:

“… the concept of ground truth is absolutely vital in this and, by establishing that fact, wouldn’t have altered where we were. Because we couldn’t, in one sense, easily have stopped the civilian casualties because it wasn’t being carried out by us on the civilians, it was being carried out by the tribal wars, the family feuds, by the Sunni/Shia factionalism that was taking place, by the Shia on Shia factionalism that was taking place, but we … were being vilified, attacked and criticised that we had precipitated all of this.

“I have to say I believe that to be a false logic, because that may have happened at any time under Saddam Hussein and, therefore, the establishment of the facts perhaps should have been carried out by – elsewhere in Government. I don’t really think it was an MOD function in that sense.”

242. The Inquiry asked Mr Ingram whether the Government would not have been better placed than external organisations to develop credible estimates of civilian casualties, and asked which department within government should have been responsible for producing such estimates. Mr Ingram told the Inquiry:

“You [the responsible department] have then to go to the hospitals. You then have to put civilians or a military person at that hospital counting the bodies in and the bodies out. So you need force protection to do that. You put people at risk to do that. Is that what people wanted, soldiers or civilians being killed at hospitals? Because they would have been at risk.

“… the UN may have been the mechanism by which we’d establish true facts, but they were withdrawn.”

\(^{153}\) Public hearing, 16 July 2010, pages 30-34.
“So there were points at which, yes, it would have been desirable, but how do you achieve that objective? Do you put other lives at risk to do that? I would say no.”

243. The Inquiry asked if it was the MOD’s function to develop estimates of civilian casualties, or that of another department. Mr Ingram told the Inquiry:

“Unquestionably. Is it something that DFID could have funded? Is it something the FCO should have taken ownership care of? The UN had become engaged – it was still engaged, but not in terms of presence on the ground – is it a role that they should have played? Yes. Of course the answer to that is yes.

“But what – the very establishment of the facts would not have changed what was happening. It would have confirmed what everyone knew, but it wouldn’t have led to a solution …”

Records and estimates of the number of Iraqi fatalities

Approaches to determining fatalities due to conflict

There are two broad approaches to determining the number of fatalities attributable to a conflict:

- Incident, or passive, reporting. This approach, which aims to capture direct conflict deaths, typically involves the collation of reports from the media, other non-government and government sources. Its accuracy depends in part on the accuracy and completeness of those reports. Access to conflict-affected areas (or to particular communities) may be difficult, and there may be pressure to distort information. Incident reporting frequently undercounts the number of direct conflict deaths.

- Estimates derived from a survey of part of a population. This approach typically aims to estimate the number of excess deaths caused by conflict, by extrapolating from the data produced by a survey. Those excess deaths would include both direct deaths (caused by war-related injuries) and indirect deaths (caused by the worsening of social, economic and health conditions in a conflict-affected area). The accuracy of such estimates can be undermined by a lack of detailed, baseline mortality data (and conflicts often occur in areas without such information, or lead to the disintegration of the systems which provide it), the selection of an unrepresentative sample, the methodology used, and the conduct of the survey.

244. The IBC project, founded in 2003 by UK and US volunteers, aims to record the violent civilian deaths resulting from the 2003 military intervention in Iraq. It draws its evidence from cross-checked media reports of violent events or of bodies being found, supplemented by the review and integration of hospital, morgue, NGO and

154 Iraq Body Count website.
official figures. Further details of the methodology and inclusion criteria used by IBC are available on its website.

245. IBC has publicly stated that while its database cannot provide a complete record of violent civilian deaths, it does provide an “irrefutable baseline of certain and undeniable deaths based on the solidity of our sources and the conservativeness of our methodology”.  

246. IBC continually updates its figures as new information becomes available. As at April 2016, IBC had recorded between 156,531 and 175,101 violent civilian deaths since January 2003.

247. As apparent from the material addressed earlier in this Section, estimates of the number of fatalities caused by conflict in Iraq after 2003 vary substantially.


249. In October 2006, *The Lancet* published a second study by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. The study used the same (cluster sample survey) methodology as the first study but was based on a larger sample.

250. The study estimated that between March 2003 and June 2006, there had been 654,965 excess Iraqi deaths and 601,027 excess violent Iraqi deaths as a consequence of the conflict.

251. The IFHS was undertaken in 2006 and 2007 by the Iraqi Government in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO); the results were published in *The New England Journal of Medicine* in January 2008. The IFHS collected data from 9,345 households across Iraq on a number of issues, including mortality.

252. The IFHS Study Group estimated that, between March 2003 and June 2006 (the period covered by the second *Lancet* study), there were 151,000 violent deaths in Iraq.

253. In a September 2008 report, the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development pooled a number of datasets, including IBC, to provide a consolidated

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155 Iraq Body Count, April 2006, *Speculation is no substitute: a defence of Iraq Body Count.*

156 Iraq Body Count, 13 April 2016, *Documented civilian deaths from violence.*


estimate of violent (direct) deaths in Iraq.\textsuperscript{160} It estimated that, between 2003 and 2007, at least 87,000 direct conflict deaths had occurred.

\textbf{254.} The report also considered indirect deaths, and commented on the difference between the figures reported by the two \textit{Lancet} studies and the IFHS:

“At first glance, such a wide range seems to imply that the exact number of deaths due to violence remains unknown. But the quality and reliability of these surveys is not equal. The most recent study (2008) [the IFHS] surveyed 9,345 households, and was conducted under the auspices of the World Health Organization. The previous two studies [the \textit{Lancet} studies], both conducted under difficult circumstances and with limited resources, surveyed 990 (2004) and 1,849 (2006) households. The gain in precision with greater numbers of households surveyed in the 2008 study is obvious …”

\textbf{255.} The report estimated that there had been more than 150,000 indirect deaths in Iraq between March 2003 and March 2008 (with a wide possible range between 80,000 and 234,000).

\textbf{256.} A further analysis was undertaken in 2013 by a team of American, Canadian and Iraqi researchers, based on a sample of 2,000 households.\textsuperscript{161} Unlike earlier studies, this was undertaken when the situation on the ground was relatively calm. The study concluded that there had been 461,000 excess deaths from 2003 to 2011. Most excess deaths were due to direct violence but about a third resulted from indirect causes, such as the failures of health, sanitation, transportation, communication and other systems.

\textbf{257.} About a third of the deaths due to direct violence were attributed to coalition forces (some 90,000), and a third to militias. The study reported that at the peak of the conflict men faced a 2.9 percent higher risk of death than they did before the war and women a 0.7 percent higher risk of death.

\textbf{258.} The majority (63 percent) of violent deaths were the result of gunshot with 12 percent attributed to car bombs.

\textbf{Non-Iraqi civilian fatalities}

\textbf{259.} The Inquiry is not aware of any comprehensive list of non-Iraqi civilian casualties, or of UK civilian casualties in Iraq. The UK Government did not maintain a record of deaths and injuries to UK civilians in Iraq.

\textbf{260.} The Brookings Iraq Index, drawing on a partial list of contractors killed in Iraq maintained by the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count (ICCC), reported that by October 2009


\textsuperscript{161} Hagopian A et al. Mortality in Iraq Associated with the 2003–2011 War and Occupation: Findings from a National Cluster Sample Survey by the University Collaborative Iraq Mortality Study. \textit{PLOS Medicine} 10(10) (2013).}
(the end of the period covered by this Inquiry) 523 non-Iraqi civilians had been killed in Iraq. The Index did not offer any breakdown of that total.

261. The ICCC reported 464 contractors killed in Iraq by October 2009, of whom it identified 45 as British. Of those, the ICCC identified 37 as security contractors or security guards.

262. The US Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) reported in July 2012 that 321 US civilians had died during Operation Iraqi Freedom from 1 May 2003 (the end of major combat operations) to 31 August 2010.

263. The Committee to Protect Journalists recorded that 191 Iraqi and international journalists and other media workers were killed in Iraq between 19 March 2003 and October 2009 (the end of the period covered by this Inquiry).

Conclusions

264. In a series of Assessments in the second half of 2002, the Joint Intelligence Committee identified the possibility of significant civilian casualties in the event of a Coalition attack on Iraq, in particular as a result of Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons, the implementation of a scorched earth policy, and disorder after the end of major combat operations.

265. The MOD made only a broad estimate of direct civilian casualties arising from an attack on Iraq, based on previous operations.

266. In the months before the invasion, Mr Blair emphasised the need to minimise the number of civilian casualties arising from an invasion of Iraq. He repeatedly asked the MOD for details on the accuracy of the weapons that the UK would use, the targeting policy and guidelines, and the estimated number of civilian casualties.

267. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 consider the MOD’s responses, which offered reassurance based on the tight targeting procedures governing the air campaign. Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, Chief of the Defence Staff, advised Mr Blair on 25 February 2003 that civilian casualties were likely to be in the “low hundreds”.

268. In his public statements before the invasion, Mr Blair suggested that the number of civilians who would be killed in any conflict should be set in the context of the number of civilians who had been killed by Saddam Hussein’s regime or were dying as a result of its policies. On the eve of the invasion, Mr Blair stated that Saddam Hussein “will...
be responsible for many, many more deaths even in one year than we will be in any conflict”.  

269. In November 2003, in response to media and NGO reporting on the high levels of civilian casualties, the Government began to consider whether and how it should respond to demands for information on the number of civilians killed in Iraq, including the number killed by UK forces.

270. That consideration was driven by the Government’s concern to sustain domestic support for operations in Iraq. Mr Straw and Mr Hoon agreed in November 2003 that the Government needed to produce accurate casualty figures to rebut claims that Coalition Forces were killing large numbers of civilians; in October 2004, Mr Blair stated that the Government needed an estimate of civilian casualties which showed the extent of insurgent responsibility.

271. With hindsight, greater efforts should have been made in the post-conflict period to determine the number of civilian casualties and the broader effects of military operations on civilians. A trial monitoring exercise initiated by No.10 in November 2004 was not completed. Much more Ministerial and senior official time was devoted to the question of which department should have responsibility for the issue of civilian casualties than to efforts to determine the actual number.

272. The Government was aware of several reports and studies (the Iraqi Ministry of Health in October 2004, the *Lancet* studies in October 2004 and October 2006, and the Iraq Body Count dossier in July 2005) which suggested that coalition forces were responsible for more civilian deaths than were the insurgents.

273. Those reports did not trigger any work within the Government either to determine the number of civilian casualties or to reassess its military or civilian effort. An FCO official commented that the Iraqi Ministry of Health’s figures “will not help make the case that more civilians have been killed by terrorists than by military action”.  

274. The Inquiry has considered the question of whether a Government should, in the future, do more to maintain a fuller understanding of the human cost of any conflict in which it is engaged.

275. All military operations carry a risk of civilian casualties. The parties to a conflict have an obligation under International Humanitarian Law to limit its effects on civilians.

276. In Iraq, the UK Government recognised that obligation in its Rules of Engagement, Targeting Directive and guidance on Battle Damage Assessment. The Government did not consider that it had a legal obligation to count civilian casualties.

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277. The Inquiry considers that a Government has a responsibility to make every reasonable effort to identify and understand the likely and actual effects of its military actions on civilians.

278. That will include not only direct civilian casualties, but also the indirect costs on civilians arising from worsening social, economic and health conditions. (Section 10.4 considers the scale of the reconstruction challenge in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the Government’s contribution to meeting that challenge).

279. It may not be possible, before committing to a course of action, to produce even broad estimates of the number of civilians that would be directly and indirectly affected by it, or to identify all the effects on civilians.

280. The Government should be ready to work with others, in particular NGOs and academic institutions, to develop such assessments and estimates over time.

281. The Government should take account of those assessments and estimates in developing its strategy and plans as well as in its military tactics and use of ordnance, in order to minimise, to the extent possible, the effects on civilians. The Inquiry considers that RAND’s conclusion in relation to US military operations should apply equally to the UK:

   “Because protecting the population is one of the central tenets of US COIN [counter-insurgency] doctrine … Iraqi civilian fatalities should be a chief concern for the US military.”

282. As well as serving to minimise the effect of military action on civilians, such assessments and estimates will also enable the Government to address criticisms of the human cost of military operations.

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ANNEX 1

IRAQ – 1583 TO 1960

This text, on early British involvement in Iraq, was prepared by Professor Sir Martin Gilbert before he was taken seriously ill in 2012. Sir Martin died on 3 February 2015. The text that follows is a tribute to Sir Martin’s valuable contribution to the work of the Inquiry.

The Ottoman years

1. The sources for this survey of British involvement with Iraq from 1583 to 1960 are principally the Admiralty, Cabinet Office, Colonial Office, Foreign Office, India Office, Treasury, War Office, Ministry of Defence and Air Ministry archives at the National Archives. Other sources include the private papers of H.H. Asquith, Winston Churchill and David Lloyd George. Published sources include Special Report: Progress of Iraq, During the period 1920-1931. Colonial Office Paper 58 (His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1931); A.J. Barker, The Neglected War: Mesopotamia, 1914-1918 (Faber and Faber, 1967); Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Haldane, The Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920 (William Blackwood, 1922); Philip Willard Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Development (Jonathan Cape, 1937); and Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950 (Oxford University Press, 1953); Robert Lyman, Iraq 1941: The Battles for Basra, Habbaniya, Fallujah and Baghdad (Osprey Publishing, 2006); Brigadier-General F.J. Moberly, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918 (4 volumes, Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence, 1925); Daniel Silberfarb, The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 1941-1950 (St Martin’s Press, 1994); and Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country (I.B. Tauris, 2007). Certain sources are given in the footnotes.

2. Britain’s interest in what is today Iraq goes back more than four hundred years, to 1583 when an English merchant, John Eldred, left London on a five-year journey that took him to Baghdad.¹ The first British military involvement came in 1775, when the Ottoman Turks faced a sustained Persian attack on the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The Turkish Sultan asked Britain to defend the waterway; the British Prime Minister Lord North agreed, and the Royal Navy drove the Persians out of the Sultan’s domains.

3. Under the Ottomans, what is now northern Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan was within the province of Mosul. What is now central Iraq was the province of Baghdad, and southern Iraq the province of Basra. All three provinces were to become the British Mandate of Mesopotamia (the Land of Two Rivers – the Tigris and Euphrates), later known as Iraq.

¹ John Eldred, Journal of His Voyage (in Hakluyt’s Principal Navigations, first published in 1599).
There was a fourth Ottoman province, running along the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf, with its small port of Kuwait.

4. In 1805 the East India Company appointed its first Resident in Baghdad: Claudius James Rich, who was fluent in Arabic. A visiting Briton later wrote: “Mr Rich was universally considered to be the most powerful man in Baghdad; and some even questioned whether the Pasha himself would not shape his conduct according to Mr Rich’s suggestions and advice rather than as his own council might wish.” Mesopotamian tribesmen frequently appealed to the British Resident for support against the Ottoman authorities.²

**Britain, Basra and al-Faw**

5. In 1861, with the support of the British Government, a British merchant shipping company established the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company. Most of the river steamers on the Tigris were built in British yards. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Basra, and al-Faw at the mouth of the Gulf, became an important staging post for British naval and mercantile traffic with India. The fort at al-Faw had been built by local Ottoman officials, suspicious of British territorial ambitions in the Shatt al-Arab.³ By 1890, nine-tenths of the steamer tonnage using Basra for Indian Ocean trade was British.

**Anglo-German rivalry**

6. In 1899, to counter a planned German railway terminus and naval base in Basra, the ruler of Kuwait promised Britain that he would cede none of Kuwait’s territory without Britain’s agreement. When in 1902, Turkish forces advanced from Basra into Kuwait, they were driven off by a British gunboat. In 1904 a British Resident arrived in Kuwait to uphold Britain’s authority there.

7. In 1913 the British decided to separate Kuwait from the influence of the Ottoman authorities in Basra, of which Kuwait was then an integral administrative part. Under the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of July 1913, Kuwait became a separate administrative district.

8. As German pressure for influence in Baghdad grew, a British irrigation engineer, Sir William Willcocks, was appointed Consultant for Irrigation to the Ottoman Government. As a result of Willcocks’ vision, the Hindiya Barrage was built on the Euphrates, bringing 3,500,000 acres under year-round irrigation. Opened in November 1913, it is still one of the engineering marvels of Iraq.

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³ From 1985 to 1988 (during the Iran-Iraq War) the Iraqi port of al-Faw was occupied by Iran.
Oil

9. In 1912, the Royal Navy changed from coal to oil. To secure this oil for Britain, in the spring of 1914 the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, acquired for the British Government a 51 percent share in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (in 1904 a British prospector had discovered oil in Persia, forty miles from the Mesopotamian border; in 1909 the oilfield was acquired by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, whose principal shareholders were British). The British Government’s 51 percent share in Anglo-Persian Oil made Basra, and al-Faw at the head of the Gulf, a vital British interest.

War and conquest in Mesopotamia

10. On 29 October 1914, in the early months of the First World War, two German warships, flying the Turkish flag, bombarded Russia’s Black Sea ports. Britain, allied to Russia, ordered Turkey to end the bombardments. The British ultimatum expired on 31 October. On 7 November a British and Indian military force landed at al-Faw.\(^4\) Marching a hundred miles inland and crossing the Persian border, it occupied the British Government-owned Persian oilfields. It then marched back into Mesopotamia, to Basra, which it captured on 22 November.

11. That November, the Ottoman Government having declared that the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913 was null and void, Britain, to protect its interests at the head of the Persian Gulf, declared Kuwait an independent sheikhdom under British protection.

12. In London, on 19 March 1915, the War Council – headed by the Prime Minister, H.H. Asquith – discussed various plans to partition the Ottoman Empire once it had been defeated. Only Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, opposed partition and annexation, telling the War Council that he wanted Britain to make a good impression on the British Empire’s Muslim subjects (of whom there were more than fifty million in India) by setting up an independent Muslim State in all the Arab regions of the Turkish Empire: Arabia, Syria and Mesopotamia.\(^5\)

13. Fighting against the Turks continued. In August 1915, after the British occupied Nasiriyah, a civil administration was set up in Basra for the whole southern area.

14. A steady stream of reinforcements reached Basra during the second half of 1916. That October, Lieutenant William Slim (a future Field Marshal) who had been badly wounded at Gallipoli a year earlier, arrived. In the fighting that followed, he was wounded again, and awarded the Military Cross. Slim remembered Basra as “a very unpleasant place to be”.\(^6\)

\(^4\) British troops again landed at al-Faw on 20 March 2003, at 2200 hours (local time), when 40 Commando, Royal Marines and US Marines came ashore, followed within an hour by 42 Commando Royal Marines.

\(^5\) War Council, 19 March 1915: Cabinet Office papers, 22/1.

\(^6\) Quoted by Lt Gen Sir Graeme Lamb, Public hearing, 9 December 2009.
15. On 11 March 1917, as British forces approached Baghdad, and the Turkish Army fled, the city was given over to mass looting by local Arabs and Kurds. After the American Consul appealed to the British to intervene, British and Indian soldiers fired over the heads of the looters and dispersed them.

16. On March 12, a British proclamation announced: “O, people of Baghdad ... Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators”. The people of Baghdad were then invited “through your Nobles and Elders and Representatives, to participate in the management of your own civil affairs in collaboration with the political representatives of Great Britain who accompanied the British Army so that you might be united with your kinsmen in north, east, south and west in realizing the aspirations of your Race”.

17. In August 1917 the Mesopotamia Commission – the first Iraq Inquiry – set up by the British Government a year earlier, published its report of the first two years’ fighting. Among the Report’s criticisms were equipment that was “not up to the standards of modern warfare”, a “lamentable breakdown of the care of the sick and wounded”, the “isolation and ignorance” of those responsible for the care of the wounded, a standard of administration based on “the routine method of normal times rather than to the impressment of new ideas”, army organisation that was “backward in every particular”, and what it called (with regard to some of the witnesses) “misuse of reticence”. Neither in the organisation of industrial resources for the purposes of war, nor in general finances, the Report asserted, “was sufficient alacrity shown during the first year and a half of war.” The overarching failure: “a lack of plans and a lack of preparations”.

18. On 30 October 1918, Turkey accepted an armistice. When it came into force the following day, the three Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra came under British military rule. The human cost of the four-year campaign had been high: more than 31,000 British and Indian dead and at least 25,000 Turkish dead.

19. With the defeat of Turkey, the British confirmed the status of Kuwait as an independent sheikdom under British protectorate. A month later, under the Anglo-French Settlement of 1-4 December 1918, Mesopotamia and Kurdistan – known collectively as Iraq – became a British-ruled entity.

**Insurgency and the British Mandate for Iraq**

20. Iraqis were divided on whether Britain should lead them towards independence or whether they should seek immediate independence by force. In Baghdad, the Sunni-dominated al-Ahd Society was a centre of anti-British (and anti-Kurdish) activity. Al-Ahd also opposed the political aspirations of the Shia in the south. Another Sunni grouping, led by Nuri Said, an officer in the Ottoman Army who had been active in the Arab Revolt of 1916-18 against the Turks (a revolt that originated in the Ottoman Red

7 Command Paper 8610 of 1917.
Sea province of Hedjaz, now part of Saudi Arabia) looked to British rule to secure the unification of Iraq. Nuri Said, a supporter of British influence, was to serve seven times as Prime Minister of Iraq during the following thirty-five years.

21. Seeking immediate independence, first the Baghdad Sunni, then the southern Shia, and finally the Kurds in the north, attacked British garrisons throughout Iraq. In the spring of 1920, a Revolutionary Council was established, dedicated to the removal of British rule. Its President, Mohammad Hassan al-Maliki, was a poet who, after being imprisoned by the British, was to become Minister of Education two years later, in the first Iraqi National Government. (His grandson, Nouri al-Maliki, became Prime Minister of Iraq in 2006).

22. On 26 May 1920, an anti-British rebellion broke out near Mosul, and rapidly spread south, threatening Baghdad. Two days after the start of the rebellion, Britain received, at the San Remo Conference, the League of Nations Mandate for Iraq. The Mandate pledged Britain to create in Iraq “an independent nation subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as she is able to stand alone”.

23. The Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, hoped to end the rebellion in Iraq by immediately setting up an Arab administration. The Cabinet insisted the rebellion be crushed first. British military and air power was used to do this; in the battle for Fallujah, more than ten thousand Iraqi and a thousand British and Indian soldiers were killed.

24. Starting at the end of September 1920, and lasting for three and a half months, punitive expeditions set out to all the centres of revolt, and whole villages were burned to the ground. Throughout the winter of 1920-1, the last of the insurgents were hunted down in punitive expeditions.

25. The defeat of the rebellion had a long legacy. In August 1920, Lieutenant Colonel Gerard Leachman had been killed south of Fallujah in a confrontation with the local tribal leader, Sheikh al-Dari. Eighty-five years later, a British administrator in this same area, Rory Stewart wrote: “They still glorify the killing of Colonel Leachman as a great moment in the anti-colonial struggle … His death was celebrated in Iraqi soap operas, and the grandson of the man who killed him, Harith al-Dari, was a leading figure in the Sunni opposition to occupation. Outside my office in Nasiriyah stood a bronze statue of Leachman being shot in the back.”

26. In January 1921, Lloyd George appointed Winston Churchill as Secretary of State for the Colonies, charged with “setting up a local government congenial to the wishes of the masses of the people” in Iraq. That April, Churchill told the House of Commons it was Britain’s intention “to install an Arab ruler in Iraq … and to create an Arab army

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for the national defence”. Britain’s aim was “to build up around the ancient capital of Baghdad, in a form friendly to Britain and to her Allies, an Arab State which can revive and embody the old culture and glories of the Arab race …”

27. Churchill told the Commons how the decision to give “satisfaction to Arab nationality” had led him to invite Emir Feisal, one of the leaders of the wartime Arab Revolt in the Hedjaz, to “present himself to the people” of Iraq, which would be transformed into an Arab kingdom with its own monarchy, guarded principally by an Arab Army, and linked to Britain by treaty.

28. Feisal was the third son of Sherif Hussein, King of the Hedjaz (and head of the Sunni Hashemite dynasty). In 1919, Feisal had come to an agreement brokered by the British whereby he would become the ruler of an Arab kingdom in Syria, in return for recognising Britain’s 1917 promise of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. At first all went according to plan. In October 1918, Feisal set up an Arab government in Syria, under British protection. Then all went awry: on 7 March 1920, Feisal was proclaimed King of the Arab Kingdom of Syria, by the Syrian National Congress, but within two months the San Remo Conference gave France the Mandate for Syria, and French forces defeated Feisal and drove him out; he went to live in Britain. The British, anxious to preserve their agreement with him, decided to place him on the throne of Iraq (and to give his brother Emir Abdullah the throne of Transjordan – the western part of Britain’s Palestine Mandate, stretching from the river Jordan to the Iraqi border).

29. With British support, Feisal arrived in Iraq in June 1921. The Shia leaders wanted him to push for immediate independence. He refused to do so, fearing to lose British support for his imminent throne. During the first two weeks of August 1921 a referendum was held throughout Iraq on Feisal’s kingship, and on 15 August, the British High Commissioner in Baghdad, Sir Percy Cox, announced that Feisal had been chosen as King, by “an overwhelming vote”.

30. Two weeks later, as the insurgency continued, Cox informed London that Feisal had agreed that “there is no objection to the use of Gas bombs in Iraq provided that they are not lethal or permanently injurious to health”.  

The first Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 1922

31. Feisal agreed to negotiate an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. He was told that Britain must retain responsibility, as the Mandatory power, both for the suppression of internal disorder and for the maintenance of external defence until such time when an “independent Islamic state of Iraq can stand alone”.

32. As negotiations for the treaty continued, Churchill told Lloyd George that there was “scarcely a single newspaper in Britain – Tory, Liberal or Labour”, which was not “consistently hostile” to Britain’s remaining in Iraq. Lloyd George replied that Britain

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9 Cox to Churchill, 2 December 1921, Air Ministry papers, 5/490.
could not abandon Iraq: “Having beaten the Turk ... we could not at the Armistice have repudiated all our undertakings towards the Arabs. We were responsible for liberating them from Turkish sovereignty, and we were absolutely bound to assist them in setting up Arab governments, if we were not prepared to govern them ourselves.” Lloyd George added: “If we leave, we may find a year or two after we have departed that we have handed over to the French and Americans some of the richest oilfields in the world.”

33. Treaty negotiations with Feisal were concluded; under the treaty, Britain would have “executive authority” for twenty years over Iraq’s foreign and security policy, in a “co-equal” Kingdom of Iraq. The Iraqi Cabinet ratified the treaty on 10 October 1922. Two weeks later, Lloyd George’s coalition government disintegrated, and a General Election was called. During the election campaign, several candidates urged Britain to leave Iraq immediately.

34. So strong was antagonism in Britain to remaining in Iraq that, when the Conservative leader, Andrew Bonar Law, became Prime Minister in October 1922, he set up a Cabinet Committee to reconsider whether Britain should continue with the Anglo-Iraq Treaty. The Committee decided that the twenty-year duration of the treaty should be reduced to four years.

35. In Iraq, Sir Percy Cox threatened to dissolve the Constituent Assembly if it did not ratify the treaty, and issued orders for British troops to occupy the Assembly building. The treaty was ratified, whereupon the British encouraged the creation of an Iraqi civilian administration under Feisal’s rule. One obstacle was a fatwa issued in 1922 by the Iraqi Shia religious leaders in Najaf, forbidding observant Shia from supporting Feisal, or any members of the Sunni royal house of the Hedjaz. Feisal was, in the language of the fatwa, “an alien usurper to the throne of Iraq, imposed by the colonial power”. A few leading Shia families defied the fatwa (which remained in force until 1937) and supported the new dynasty and government.

British bombing policy

36. For non-Kurdish Iraqis, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty offered a means of curbing Kurdish separatism. In 1923 and 1924, British fighting against Kurdish separatists involved punitive military operations and RAF bombing raids. The RAF also took part in bombing raids to persuade recalcitrant tribes throughout Iraq to pay their taxes. One method by which Britain sought to maintain law and order in Iraq was by the setting up of “Arab Levies” – troops recruited from minority Iraqi communities: Kurds, Marsh Arabs and the Assyrian Christians.

37. In 1924, Air Commodore Lionel Charlton, the Chief Staff Officer of RAF Iraq Command, visited the hospital in Diwaniya where he saw horribly injured civilians, including women and children, who were among the Shia victims of a British air raid. In protest at Britain’s bombing policy, he resigned.

38. Among Iraqis, the legacy of these punitive bombing raids was long-lasting.
The Mandate years

39. During the ten years from 1922 to the end of the Mandate in 1932, when Iraq obtained full independence, as government ministries were steadily handed over to Iraqi control, British officials led the rebuilding of the Iraqi civilian and administrative infrastructure: in health, education, communications, irrigation, the economy, the judiciary, the army and the police. There were almost three thousand British officials in Iraq in 1922, as administrators in all departments. They were headed and supervised by a five-man, Iraq Secretariat of British officials. Of those, the Judicial Secretary was put in charge of drafting a constitution for Iraq.

40. In accordance with the gradual but immediate Iraqiisation of the administration, while British officials worked as advisers in the Ministry of Finance, the first Minister of Finance was an Iraqi, Sasson Eskell, a Baghdadi Jew and a distinguished financier and parliamentarian since Ottoman times. He is regarded in Iraq to this day as the Father of Parliament. In the long and complex negotiations for the Iraq Treaty, he had worked closely with Gertrude Bell and T.E. Lawrence, and was at the centre of the creation of the new Iraqi Government’s laws and financial structure. He was knighted in 1923.

41. Typical of these British civil servants was the Inspector General of Health Services, Henry Sinderson, who introduced modern medicine to Iraq and became Dean of Iraq’s Royal College of Medicine. Knighted in 1946 after twenty-five years service to medicine in Iraq, the hospitals and clinics he established throughout the country made Iraq a model for the whole region.

42. In 1930, at the request of the Iraqi Government, a distinguished British politician, writer and soldier, Sir Edward Hilton Young, went to Iraq to advise on economic and loan policy, to scrutinise the budget, and to help establish a new currency, replacing the Indian rupee with the Iraqi dinar. His efforts ensured a stable Iraq currency.

43. By 1930 the number of British officials in the Iraqi administration had been reduced to just over two hundred; some were to remain in Iraq for another decade and more. The legacy of their service and of British-built infrastructure lasted into the era of Saddam Hussein and was spoken of with appreciation by several of the Iraq Inquiry’s Iraqi interlocutors.

Defending Iraq

44. During the Mandate years, Britain also defended Iraq from attacks from across the Arabian border. In December 1923, raiders from Nejd, under the control of Ibn Saud, launched an attack on the tribes living in southern Iraq. The RAF drove off the attackers in a series of bombing raids.

45. In November 1927, the northeastern tribes of the Nejd carried out an armed attack seventy-five miles inside the Iraqi border. Despite an RAF bombing raid on the attackers,
they penetrated even deeper into Iraq, killing Shia Marsh Arab shepherds and their children in December.

46. The RAF continued its bombing raids. The Arabian tribes continued their attacks. In February 1928 their target was both Iraqi and Kuwaiti villages south and south-west of Basra. In January 1929 another Nejd tribe crossed the border into Kuwait, killing twenty Iraqis. Then a third Arabian tribe crossed into Kuwait, killing more than seventy Iraqis and Kuwaitis.

47. Only continued bombing raids from RAF Shaibah near Basra drove the attackers out of south-western Iraq. In January 1930, Ibn Saud agreed to financial compensation to the Kuwaitis and Iraqis, and, with British encouragement, in April 1931, a “Treaty of Bon Voisinage, Friendship and Extradition” was signed in Mecca – the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri Said signing for Iraq.\textsuperscript{10}

**The second Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 1930**

48. In 1930, two years before the end of the Mandate, an all-Iraqi Government was formed, with the Sunni politician, Nuri Said – who made determined efforts to assuage Sunni-Shia and Kurdish tensions – as Prime Minister. Nuri Said also negotiated a new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty establishing “perpetual peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Iraq” as well as “full and frank consultation between them in all matters of foreign policy which may affect their common interests”. Article Five of the Treaty authorised British forces to remain in Iraq after it became independent in 1932. By the late 1930s these forces were restricted to two RAF stations, RAF Shaibah near Basra, and RAF Habbaniya west of Baghdad.

49. In November 1930, Nuri Said called a General Election to ratify the Treaty. He was successful, but the Kurds objected that the Treaty did not meet the undertakings they believed the British had given a decade earlier to protect their national status, and once more raised the flag of revolt. For almost two years, RAF Habbaniya was a staging post for bombing attacks on Kurdish rebels until they were defeated in April 1932.

**Iraqi independence, 1932**

50. With the ending of the British Mandate in 1932, Iraq entered the League of Nations as a sovereign State. Britain had fulfilled its pledges and promises – first made when the British Army entered Baghdad in March 1917 – to give the Iraqis control of their country.

51. Oil had been discovered in Iraq in 1927. One of the first official acts of the Iraqi Government after independence was to grant a seventy-five-year concession – valid until 2007 – to the British Oil Development Company, jointly owned by British and Italian investors.

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\textsuperscript{10}In 1932 Ibn Saud renamed his three provinces – Najd, al-Ahsa and the Hijaz – as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
52. King Feisal died in 1933. He was succeeded by his son, twenty-one-year-old King Ghazi. Three years later General Bakr Sidqi – a Kurd, a former officer (like Nuri Said) in the Arab Revolt, and a graduate of a British Staff College, seized power in Baghdad. In the course of the coup, Nuri Said’s brother-in-law, the Minister of Defence, was killed. Nuri fled for safety to the British Embassy in Baghdad, and eventually reached Britain.

53. Nationalists in the army resented General Sidqi because of his Kurdish background, and because he encouraged Kurds to join the army. The Shia could not forgive his brutal suppression of a Shia revolt in 1936. In 1937 General Sidqi was murdered by a group of army officers.

54. In 1937, King Ghazi began publicly advocating that Iraq annex Kuwait, and denouncing British influence in the Middle East, under pressure from German diplomats and Nazi Party representatives in Baghdad. Even the return of Nuri Said at the end of 1938 from London – where he had served for a year as Iraq’s Ambassador to Britain – could not curb anti-British propaganda, although, to counter it, at the recommendation of the British Ambassador to Iraq, Sir Archibald Clerk-Kerr, funds were made available to the British Council in Iraq to help cover the cost of Iraqi students taking examinations for British universities, and bursaries for their books.¹¹

55. In April 1939, King Ghazi was killed in a car accident. His four-year-old son, King Feisal II, came to the throne, with one of his uncles, Abdul Illah, as Regent. In Mosul, after claims that King Ghazi had been murdered by the British, a mob broke into the British Consulate, dragged out the consul and stoned him to death.

**Rashid Ali’s revolt, 1941**

56. On the outbreak of war in September 1939, Nuri Said broke off relations with Germany. For the first eighteen months of the war, while refusing British requests to declare war on Germany and Italy, he ensured that Iraq was an essential overland and air link in Britain’s chain of defence from Egypt to India. On 31 March 1941, however, Nuri Said was forced to resign by a Rashid Ali al-Gaylani. On April 1 the Regent fled from Baghdad, and two days later Rashid Ali became Prime Minister.

57. A Sunni whose family traced their ancestry back to Mohammed, and a lawyer by training, Rashid Ali had been Minister of Justice in 1924 in Iraq’s first government. In 1930 he had rejected Nuri Said’s Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, and called for an end to the British connection. He was Prime Minister of Iraq from March to November 1933 and again from March 1940 to January 1941, when he was dismissed by the Regent for refusing to allow British troops to transit Iraq, and for entering into negotiations with Germany.

58. On becoming Prime Minister for the third time, Rashid Ali seized control of all the main cities except Basra, restored the amicable relations between Iraq and

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Nazi Germany that had been severed by Nuri Said in 1939, and promised the Germans vital fuel oil from the Mosul oilfields.

59. In London, the War Cabinet ordered a brigade of Indian infantry and extra aircraft to Iraq. “We are not at war with Iraq”, Churchill told the House of Commons on May 7. “We are dealing with a military dictator who attempted to subvert the constitutional Government, and we intend to assist the Iraqis to get rid of him and get rid of the military dictatorship at the earliest possible moment.”

60. During the second week of May 1941, the first of thirty German and Italian aircraft reached Mosul. Flying on to Kirkuk, they took part in air operations against the British besieging Fallujah, and carried out frequent bombing raids on RAF Habbaniya. On 20 May, the British captured Fallujah, and nine days later were in battle with Rashid Ali outside Baghdad. Unaware of the small size of the force against him, Rashid Ali fled under cover of darkness to Iran.

61. The Mayor of Baghdad, at the head of a Security Committee of leading Iraqis, approached British forces outside Baghdad. An armistice was signed, and the monarchy restored. On 9 October 1941, Nuri Said formed a government acceptable to the British. Iraqi Ministers who had served under Rashid Ali were removed from all influence, and in some cases deprived of citizenship and deported. At least seven hundred Rashid Ali supporters and those with Axis sympathies were interned for the duration of the war.

The third Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 1948

62. The British military presence in Iraq both before and after Rashid Ali’s revolt was based on the terms of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. When the war ended in 1945, and as British forces prepared to leave Iraq, Britain’s Labour Government (whose Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, had been wounded in Mesopotamia in 1917) asked the Government of Iraq to sign a new military treaty, to give the British even greater powers than under the 1930 Treaty, and to increase joint Iraqi and British military planning and cooperation.

63. The new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was approved by the Iraqi Government and by the Regent. The Prime Minister, Salih Jabr – Iraq’s first Shia Prime Minister – and his Foreign Minister, accompanied by Nuri Said, went to Britain for the signing ceremony, held at Portsmouth on 15 January 1948. The signatories were the Iraq delegates and the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin.

64. As soon as the Treaty was signed there were mass demonstrations in Baghdad against it, and against any continuing links with Britain. On 20 January 1948 the British Consulate at Kirkuk was attacked, and on the following day – six days after the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty had been signed – the Regent announced that the Treaty did not “realise the national aspirations of Iraq or consolidate the friendship between the two countries”. Salih Jabr was replaced as Prime Minister by a leading Shia and former President of the Iraqi Senate, Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadr, one of Britain’s adversaries of a quarter
of a century earlier. Such British influence as remained waned rapidly. In May 1948 the British Military Mission was withdrawn.

The continuing British contribution

65. In April 1954, Lord Salter, a senior British civil servant – and former head of the economic and financial section of the League of Nations Secretariat – was asked by the Iraq Development Board to advise on the economic advancement of Iraq. His report, focusing on forward planning, covered water use, agriculture, communications (road, rail, river and air), industry, housing, health, education and administration.

66. Lord Salter’s report was published in 1955 by the Iraq Development Board, and detailed what Salter described as Iraq’s “exceptional opportunity of achieving a development which within a few years would substantially increase her economic resources and raise her general standard of living”.  

67. This was to be the last British contribution to the economy of Iraq for many years. But 1955 was to see another British-Iraqi joint venture, as fear of the spread of Communism in the Middle East brought Britain and Iraq together again, with the establishment of the Middle East Treaty Organisation (METO), consisting of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Britain, later known as the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).

68. In 1955, with Iraq a member of CENTO and in close relations with Britain’s armed forces, RAF Shaibah and RAF Habbaniya were handed over to the Iraqi Air Force. As part of this air base agreement, the RAF continued to administer the RAF hospital at Habbaniya, and agreed to provide medical and surgical in-patient treatment for up to twenty officers of the Iraqi forces stationed there. In exchange, Iraq also granted free storage to British personnel using the port at Basra.

69. In 1956, with Egypt threatening to nationalise the Suez Canal, Nuri Said was invited to London by the Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, and asked what Iraq wanted for its friendship. He told Eden that Iraq wanted at least one fighter squadron equipped with the latest type of aircraft. Eden agreed. Nuri Said added that Iraq wanted all thirty-six Centurion tanks promised by Britain and a further forty promised by the United States. Eden said “he felt sure that the tanks could be found from one source or another”. Nuri Said then said Iraq was interested in the application of atomic energy to peaceful purposes. Eden offered him a nuclear reactor.

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14 ‘Top Secret’, 25 July 1956: Foreign Office papers, FO 371/121662. The pool-type nuclear reactor, also called a ’swimming pool reactor’, had a core immersed in an open pool of water. It was never delivered.
The fall of the monarchy, 1958

70. On 14 July 1958, an army officer, Brigadier Abdel Karim Kassem, seized power in Baghdad. That day, King Feisal II and many of his family were killed. The British Embassy in Baghdad was ransacked and set on fire. The Ambassador, Sir Michael Wright and his wife were held captive at the Embassy until late in the afternoon, when they were released. On the following day Nuri Said was murdered in the street.

71. The monarchy, established by Britain thirty-seven years earlier, was abolished. Kassem, who was half Sunni, half Kurdish Shia, became Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief. In 1961, in a blow to British commercial activity and investment in Iraq, Kassem nationalised the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Kuwaiti independence

72. In 1961, Kuwait gained independence from Britain; Iraq immediately claimed sovereignty. General Kassem mobilised Iraq troops along the Kuwait border. Britain, which had only recently ended its military presence in Kuwait, sent an expeditionary force to Kuwait, and persuaded the Arab League to recognise Kuwait as an independent country. British troops were then replaced by troops of the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria). Britain had honoured its historic commitment to Kuwait.

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## ANNEX 2

### GLOSSARY

**A**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Air Assault</td>
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<tr>
<td>AA Bde</td>
<td>Air Assault Brigade</td>
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<td>AAA</td>
<td>Anti-Aircraft Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>ab initio</td>
<td>From the beginning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abu al-Khasib</td>
<td>Town in Basra province</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abu Ghraib</td>
<td>Prison in Baghdad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abu Naji</td>
<td>Military base near Basra</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Constable</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACDS(Log Ops)</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Logistic Operations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACDS(Ops)</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations)</td>
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<td>ACGS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of the General Staff</td>
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<td>ACM</td>
<td>Air Chief Marshal</td>
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<td>ACPO</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers</td>
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<td>ACPP</td>
<td>Africa Conflict Prevention Pool</td>
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<td>Admiral</td>
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<td>Army Families Federation</td>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>AFLR</td>
<td>Aviation Force Level Review</td>
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<td>Armed Forces Personnel Administration Agency</td>
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<td>AFPS</td>
<td>Armed Forces Pension Scheme</td>
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<td>AFV</td>
<td>Armoured Fighting Vehicle</td>
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<td>AG</td>
<td>Adjutant General</td>
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<td>Advocate General</td>
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<td>Attorney General</td>
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<td>Attorney General’s Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>AH</td>
<td>Attack Helicopters</td>
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<td>Ad Hoc Group on Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHMGII</td>
<td>Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
AHMGIR  Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
AI      Anas al-Islam
AIASC   Army Investigations and Aftercare Support Cell
AIF     Anti-Iraqi Forces
Aitken Report  Report into killings of civilians in Iraq
Akashat  Town in Anbar province
AKP     AK Party (Turkish Political party)
al-Abbas Shia mosque in Karbala
al-Amara Capital of Maysan province
al-Arabiya Television channel
al-Askari Shia mosque in Samarra
al-Atheer Nuclear weapons facility in Babil province
al-Dawr Town near Tikrit where Saddam Hussein was captured
al-Faw Peninsula Southern tip of Basra province
al-Hakam Biological weapons facility in Babil province
Al Iraqiya Iraqi television network
al-Kadamiyah Shia mosque in Baghdad
al-Kut   Capital of Wasit province
al-Majir al-Kabir Town in Maysan province
al-Maqil Prison in Basra
al-Minah Prison in Basra
al-Muthanna Chemical weapons facility in Salah ad Din province
al-Qa’im Town in Anbar province and site of a uranium processing facility
al-Qa-Qa Radiological weapons facility in Baghdad
al-Qurnah Town in Basra province
al-Rafah Town in Babil province and missile test site
Al Sweady Public inquiry into allegations of mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners by British troops
AM      Aftermath
AM      Air Marshal
Amariyah Biological weapons facility in Baghdad
AMC    Annually Managed Expenditure
AMEC   British multi-national consultancy, engineering and project management company
AMO    Air Movement Operations
Amorim Reports  Reports of the Panel established by the President of the UN Security Council on 30 January 1999 concerning disarmament, monitoring and verification

Anbar  Province in western Iraq
Anfal  Iraqi campaign against the Kurdish people in northern Iraq
Ansar al-Islam  Insurgent group
AO  Area of Operations
AOAV  Action on Armed Violence
AOR  Area of Responsibility
AP  Assessment Phase
APC  Armoured Personnel Carrier
APOD  Air Port of Disembarkation
APT  Armed Protection Team
APV  Armoured Patrol Vehicle
AQ  Al Qaida
AQ-I  Al Qaida in Iraq
ARCENT  United States Army Central Command
ARG  Amphibious Ready Group
Armd  Armoured
ARMILLA  Royal Navy patrol
ARRC  Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
AS  Assessments Staff
Asharq Al-Awsat  Arabic newspaper published in London
Ashura  Shia religious festival
ASSESSREPS  Assessment Reports
AT  Air transport
ATG  Amphibious Task Group
ATV(P)  All Terrain Vehicle (Protected)
AUS  Australia
AV  Armoured Vehicle
AVM  Air Vice Marshal
AWE  Atomic Weapons Establishment
AWS  Army Welfare Service
az-Zubayr  Town in Basra province
B

b/d Barrels per day
Babil Province in central Iraq
Baghdad Capital of Iraq, a province and provincial capital of the same name
Balad Airbase north of Baghdad
Baquba Capital of Diyala province
BAS Basra Air Station
Bayji Oil refinery in Salah ad Din province
Basra Province in southern Iraq and its capital
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BBP Better Basra Plan
BCCB British Consultants and Contractors Bureau
BCG British Consul General
BCU Basic Capability Unit
BCU Basra Crimes Unit
BCW Biological and Chemical Warfare/Weapons
BDA Battle Damage Assessment
BDC Basra Development Commission
Bde Brigade
BDF Basra Development Fund
BE British Embassy
Bechtel US infrastructure contractor
BEO British Embassy Office (sometimes known as British Consulate General)
BFBS British Forces Broadcasting Service
BFPO British Forces Post Office
BG Battlegroup
BH Battlefield Helicopters
BIA Basra International Airport
BIPA Basra Investment Promotion Agency
BTID Battlefield Targets Identification Device
BM Ballistic Missiles
BMATT British Military Advisory and Training Team
BOB British Office Baghdad
BOC Basra Operational Command
BOC Basra Operations Centre
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<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
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<td>BPC</td>
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<td>bpd</td>
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<td>Uninhabited island in the Persian Gulf</td>
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<td><em>Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction</em></td>
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<td>BW</td>
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**C**
- **C**: Chief, Secret Intelligence Service
- **C/B**: Chemical/Biological
- **C2**: Command and Control
- **CAFTT**: Coalition Air Force Transition Team
- **CAN**: Camp Abu Naji (Military base in Maysan province)
- **CAP**: Country Assistance Plan
- **CAS**: Close Air Support
- **casus belli**: An act or event that is a cause of war
- **CB**: Chemical and Biological
- **CBI**: Confederation of British Industry
- **CBR**: Chemical Biological Radiological
- **CBRN**: Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
- **CBRN/M**: Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear/Missiles
- **CBW**: Chemical and Biological Warfare/Weapons
- **CC**: Chief Constable
- **CCCI**: Central Criminal Court of Iraq
- **CCS**: Civil Contingencies Secretariat
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<td>MOD staff authorised to receive the most sensitive material on US planning and UK scoping on Iraq</td>
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<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>Consulate General (see BEO)</td>
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<td>Chargé d’Affaires</td>
<td>Officer in charge of an Embassy in the absence of the Ambassador</td>
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<td>Combined Intelligence and Operations Centre</td>
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<td>Civil Secretary</td>
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<td>Concerned Local Civilian/Citizen</td>
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<td>CM</td>
<td>Command Paper</td>
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<td>Coalition Military Assistance Training Team or Coalition Military Advisory Training Team</td>
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<td>COB-I</td>
<td>Coalition Operating Base – Irbil</td>
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<td>Col</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<td>COLPRO</td>
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<td>Council of Ministers</td>
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<td>coup de main</td>
<td>Surprise attack or sudden development</td>
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<tr>
<td>coup d’état</td>
<td>Sudden overthrow of government from within</td>
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<td>CP</td>
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<td>CPA-I</td>
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<td>CPA-IG</td>
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<td>CPATT</td>
<td>Coalition Police Assistance Training Team or Coalition</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
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<td>CSR</td>
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<td>Civil Transitional Administration</td>
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<td>Curve Ball</td>
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<td>CVR(T)</td>
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<td>CWIED</td>
<td>Command Wire Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>Dahuk</td>
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<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-Integration</td>
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<td>In fact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de jure</td>
<td>According to law</td>
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<td>Defence Equipment and Support Agency</td>
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<td>DIU</td>
<td>Defence Inquests Unit</td>
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<td>Div</td>
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<td>Term</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diwaniyah</td>
<td>Capital of Qadisiyah province</td>
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<td>Diyala</td>
<td>Province in eastern Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>DJC</td>
<td>Directorate of Joint Commitments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJW</td>
<td>Directorate of Joint Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLO</td>
<td>Defence Logistics Organisation</td>
</tr>
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<td>DLOD</td>
<td>Defence Line of Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMB</td>
<td>Defence Management Board</td>
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<td>DMI</td>
<td>Directorate of Military Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMICP</td>
<td>Defence Medical Information Capability Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMRC</td>
<td>Defence Medical Rehabilitation Centre</td>
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<td>DMS</td>
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<td>DNBI</td>
<td>Disease and Non-Battle Injuries</td>
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<td>DOC</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
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<td>Department of Health</td>
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<td>DOP</td>
<td>Ministerial Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy</td>
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<td>Sub-Committee on Iraq</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Defence Procurement</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Data Protection Act</td>
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<td>Defence Procurement Agency</td>
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<td>DPAs</td>
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<td>Deputy Prime Minister</td>
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<td>DSA</td>
<td>Debt Sustainability Analysis</td>
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<td>DSC</td>
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<td>DSF</td>
<td>Director Special Forces</td>
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<td>DSI</td>
<td>FCO Directorate of Strategy and Innovation</td>
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<td>DSP</td>
<td>Defence Strategic Plan</td>
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<td>DSP</td>
<td>Deployable Spares Pack</td>
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<td>DSTL</td>
<td>Defence Science and Technology Laboratory</td>
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<td>DTI</td>
<td>Department of Trade and Industry</td>
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<td>DU</td>
<td>Depleted Uranium</td>
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<td>Dujail</td>
<td>Town in Salah ad Din province</td>
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<td>DUP</td>
<td>Departmental Unallocated Provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVA</td>
<td>Department of Veterans Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DWR</td>
<td>Duke of Wellington’s Regiment</td>
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<td>Definition</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<td>E10</td>
<td>Elected 10: Angola, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, Germany, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan, Spain and Syria</td>
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<td>E-blueys</td>
<td>Electronic letter facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECAB</td>
<td>Executive Committee of the Army Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECBA</td>
<td>Enhanced Combat Body Armour</td>
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<td>ECC</td>
<td>Equipment Capability Customer</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECGD</td>
<td>DTI Export Credit Guarantee Department</td>
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<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Convention on Human Rights</td>
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<td>ECM</td>
<td>Electronic Countermeasures</td>
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<td>EDM</td>
<td>Early Day Motion</td>
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<td>EFP</td>
<td>Explosively Formed Projectile</td>
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<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
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<td>EIU</td>
<td>Economist Intelligence Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMAD</td>
<td>DFID European Middle East and Americas Division</td>
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<td>EMIS</td>
<td>Electromagnetic Isotope Separation</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
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<td>EoL</td>
<td>Exchange of Letters</td>
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<td>EOV</td>
<td>Explanation of Vote</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>Equipment Plan</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>Equipment Programme</td>
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<td>EPAP</td>
<td>Emergency Public Administration Project</td>
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<td>EPCA</td>
<td>Emergency Post Conflict Assistance</td>
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<td>EPD</td>
<td>Economic Policy Directorate</td>
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<td>EPP</td>
<td>Equipment Procurement Programme</td>
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<td>EPW</td>
<td>Enemy Prisoners of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>Province in northern Iraq and its capital</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EU JustLex</td>
<td>European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command</td>
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</table>
Exec Executive
EYF End-Year Flexibility

F
F/R/C France/Russia/China
FAC Foreign Affairs Committee
Fadhila Iraqi political party
FAI Fatal Accident Inquiry
Fallujah Town in Anbar province
FAO UN Food and Agriculture Organization
FAQ Fardh al-Qanoon
FASC Foreign Affairs Select Committee
Fatwa Islamic religious ruling
faute de mieux For want of something better
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FCO RA FCO Research Analysts
FCS Facilities Protection Service
FCU Financial Compliance Unit
Fedayeen Saddam Iraqi paramilitary group
FFCD Full, Final and Complete declaration
Five Mile Market Area in Basra
FLC Front Line Command
FLEET The Royal Navy’s Operational Command
FLR Force Level Review
FMB Forward Mounting Base
FMHT Field Mental Health Team
FMV Full Motion Video
FOC Full Operating Capability
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FP Force Posture
FP Force Protection
FPCC Force Protection Co-ordinating Committee
FPE Force Protection Engineering
FPS Facilities Protection Service
FR Formation/Light Reconnaissance
FRC Future Rotorcraft Capability
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<tr>
<td>FRE</td>
<td>Former Regime Elements</td>
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<td>FRES</td>
<td>Future Rapid Effect System</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRL</td>
<td>Former Regime Loyalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS</td>
<td>Foreign Secretary</td>
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<td>FSU</td>
<td>Forward Strategy Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT</td>
<td><em>Financial Times</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWSE</td>
<td>Family Welfare Support Enhancement</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Financial Year</td>
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**G**

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<thead>
<tr>
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<td>G4</td>
<td>Group of 4: France, Germany, Italy, UK</td>
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<td>G5</td>
<td>Group of 5: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>G7</td>
<td>Group of 7: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, US</td>
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<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of 8: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK, US</td>
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<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>UN General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council of the European Union</td>
</tr>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>US General Accounting Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBAV</td>
<td>Global Burden of Armed Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>Governing Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCBP</td>
<td>Governorate Capacity Building Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Co-operation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCHQ</td>
<td>Government Communications Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCIV</td>
<td>Fourth Geneva Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCPP</td>
<td>Global Conflict Prevention Pool</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>General Electric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIP</td>
<td>Guaranteed Income Payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMT</td>
<td>Greenwich Mean Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOC</td>
<td>General Officer Commanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOC MND(SE)</td>
<td>General Officer Commanding Multi-National Division (South-East)</td>
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**Annex 2 | Glossary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>GOF</td>
<td>Global Opportunities Fund</td>
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<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of Iraq</td>
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<td>Gov</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>General Practitioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning Satellite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRL</td>
<td>Goods Review List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GT</td>
<td>Governorate Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWB</td>
<td>George Walker Bush</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War On Terror</td>
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### H

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>House of Commons</td>
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<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>Habbaniyah</td>
<td>Town in Anbar province</td>
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<tr>
<td>HABITAT</td>
<td>UN Settlements Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>HASCAS</td>
<td>Health and Social Care Advisory Service</td>
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<td>Haditha Dam</td>
<td>Dam in Anbar province</td>
</tr>
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<td>Halabja</td>
<td>City in Sulaymaniya province</td>
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<td>Hayaniyah</td>
<td>Area of Basra, a militia stronghold</td>
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<td>HCDC</td>
<td>House of Commons Defence Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCL</td>
<td>Hydrocarbon Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Headley Court</td>
<td>MOD rehabilitation centre for injured military personnel</td>
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<td>Helmand</td>
<td>Province in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>Highly Enriched Uranium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HGV</td>
<td>Heavy Goods Vehicle</td>
</tr>
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<td>HIC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Information Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hillah</td>
<td>Capital of Babil province</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Countries</td>
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<td>HM</td>
<td>Her Majesty(‘s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMA</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Ambassador</td>
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<td>HMCE</td>
<td>HM Customs and Excise</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMCG</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Consul General</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMIC</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabularies</td>
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<td>HMPS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Prison Service</td>
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<td>HMRC</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs</td>
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<td>HMS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCC</td>
<td>Iraq Coalition Casualty Count</td>
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<td>ICDC</td>
<td>Iraqi Civil Defence Corps</td>
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<td>ICI</td>
<td>International Compact with Iraq</td>
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<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal</td>
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<td>International Criminal Tribunal for Iraq</td>
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<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>ID</td>
<td>Identification</td>
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<td>ID</td>
<td>(US) Infantry Division</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Act</td>
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<td>International Development Committee</td>
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<td>IDF</td>
<td>Indirect Fire</td>
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<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<td>IEA</td>
<td>International Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IEB</td>
<td>Intelligence Exploitation Base</td>
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<td>Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq</td>
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<td>Iraqi Economic Recovery Fund</td>
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<td>IFF</td>
<td>Identification Friend or Foe</td>
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<td>Iraq Family Health Survey</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>IFV</td>
<td>Infantry Fighting Vehicle</td>
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<td>Iraqi Government</td>
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<td>Iraqi Governing Council</td>
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<td>IGFC</td>
<td>Iraqi Ground Forces Command</td>
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<td>Interim Government of Iraq</td>
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<td>Iraqi Higher Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>Iraqi Heritage Trust</td>
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<td>IIA</td>
<td>Iraqi Interim Authority or Iraqi Interim Administration</td>
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<td>IIF</td>
<td>Iraqi Intervention Force</td>
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<td>Iraqi Interim Government</td>
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<td>Iraqi Interim National Council</td>
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<td>IISG</td>
<td>Iraqi Information Strategy Group</td>
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<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>Iraqi Ministry of Justice</td>
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<td>Iraqi National Accord</td>
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<td>Iraqi National Congress</td>
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<td>Incirlik</td>
<td>Airbase in Turkey</td>
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<td>IND</td>
<td>Improvised Nuclear Device</td>
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<td>Iraqi National Guard</td>
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<td>Iraqi National Oil Company</td>
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<td>Iraq Nuclear Verification Office</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>Initial Operating Capability</td>
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<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>International Police Adviser</td>
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<td>International Police Assistance Group</td>
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<td>International Police Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>IPMF</td>
<td>International Police Monitoring/Mentoring Force</td>
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<td>IPRT</td>
<td>DFID Iraq Policy and Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>Iraqi Police Service</td>
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</table>
IPT  Integrated Project Team
IPTF  International Police Training Force
IPU  Iraq Planning Unit (until mid-2003);
     Iraq Policy Unit (from mid-2003)
IRA  Irish Republican Army
IRAM  Improvised Rocket Assisted Mortar
IraqRep  Iraq Representative
IRDC  Iraq Reconstruction and Development Council
IRFFI  International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq
IRGC  Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
IRGC-QF  Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force
IRMO  Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office
IROG  Iraq Rehabilitation Operations Group
IRPS  Iraqi Riverine Patrol Service
IRRF  Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
IRSM  Iraq Reconstruction Service Medal
IRT  Incident Response Team
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force
ISC  Intelligence and Security Committee
ISCI  Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
ISD  In Service Date
ISF  Iraqi Security Forces
ISF HMMV  Iraqi Security Forces Humvee
ISFF  Iraq Security Forces Fund
ISG  Information Strategy Group
ISG  Iraq Security Group
ISG  Iraq Strategy Group
ISG  Iraq Survey Group
ISO  International Standards Organisation
ISOF  Iraqi Special Operations Forces
ISOG  Iraq Senior Officials Group
ISP  Internet Service Provider
ISR  Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ISSU  FCO Iraq Security Sector Unit
IST  Iraqi Special Tribunal
ISTAR  Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
<table>
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>ITA</td>
<td>Iraqi Transitional Administration</td>
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<td>ITCA</td>
<td>International Transitional Civil Authority</td>
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<td>Iraqi Transitional Government</td>
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<td>ITU</td>
<td>UN International Telecommunications Unit</td>
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<td>IZ</td>
<td>International Zone</td>
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<td>J</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>J NBC Reg</td>
<td>Joint Nuclear Biological Chemical Regiment</td>
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<td>JACS</td>
<td>Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability</td>
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<td>Jadiriyah</td>
<td>A detention facility in Baghdad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jaysh Muhammad</td>
<td>Military wing of the Ba’ath Party</td>
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<td>JAM</td>
<td>Jaysh al-Mahdi</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAM1</td>
<td>Detained member of Jaysh al-Mahdi</td>
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<td>Jameat</td>
<td>A police station in Basra</td>
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<td>JAMES</td>
<td>Joint Asset Management and Engineering Solutions</td>
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<td>JARIC</td>
<td>Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre</td>
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<td>Joint Commission</td>
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<td>Joint Capability Board</td>
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<td>Joint Co-ordination Centre</td>
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<td>Joint Casualty Co-ordination Centre</td>
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<td>Joint Captured Material Exploitation Centre</td>
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<td>Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility</td>
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<td>JDAM</td>
<td>Joint Direct Attack Munitions</td>
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<td>JERRV</td>
<td>Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicle</td>
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<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>Joint Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFHQ</td>
<td>Joint Forces Headquarters</td>
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<td>JFLogC</td>
<td>Joint Forces Logistic Component</td>
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<td>JHC</td>
<td>Joint Helicopter Command</td>
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<td>JHF-I</td>
<td>Joint Helicopter Force – Iraq</td>
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<td>JHQ</td>
<td>Joint Headquarters</td>
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<td>JIATF</td>
<td>Joint Inter-Agency Task Force</td>
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<td>JIDC</td>
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<td>Joint Intelligence Organisation</td>
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<td>JIPTC</td>
<td>Joint International Police Training College</td>
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JNA Joint Needs Assessment
JOA Joint Operational Area
JPA Joint Personnel Administration
JPCC Joint Police Command Centre
JRAT Joint Reconstruction Action Team
JRSG Japanese Reconstruction and Support Group
JSP Joint Service Publication
Jt Cmnd Staffs Joint Command Staffs
Jt Comd Joint Command
JTAC Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
JTF-4 Joint Task Force 4
Jumariyah District of Basra

K
KA Kurdistan Alliance
KAA Khawr Abd Allah waterway between Iraq and Kuwait
Kandahar City in southern Afghanistan
Karbala Province in central Iraq and its capital
Karbala Al Husayn Shia shrine in Karbala province
KAZ Kurdish Autonomous Zone
KCMHR King's Centre for Military Health Research
KDP Kurdish Democratic Party
KFOR Kosovo Force
Khor al-Amaya Oil platform in Basra province
Khor al-Zubair City in Basra province
KIG Kurdistan Islamic Group
Kirkuk Province in northern Iraq and its capital
Kirkush Location for training of Iraqi Army recruits north-east of Baghdad
KJ Key Judgement
KNA Kurdish National Assembly
KRG Kurdistan Regional Government
KSF Kuwait Support Facility
KSR Key Service Requirement
Kufa City in Najaf province
KUR Key User Requirement
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<td>Lord Advocate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lake Qadisiyah</td>
<td>A lake in Anbar province</td>
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<td>LAND</td>
<td>Land Command</td>
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<td>LCC</td>
<td>Land Component Command</td>
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<td>LCD</td>
<td>Lord Chancellor’s Department</td>
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<td>LD</td>
<td>Line of Duty</td>
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<td>LE</td>
<td>Locally Engaged</td>
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<td>Locally Employed Civilian</td>
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<td>Lower Income Countries</td>
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<td>Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>LOAC</td>
<td>Law of Armed Conflict</td>
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<td>Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Programme</td>
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<td>LOO</td>
<td>Line of Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loya Jirga</td>
<td>Pashtu grand assembly</td>
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<td>LPG</td>
<td>Liquid Petroleum Gas</td>
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<td>LRG</td>
<td>Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering</td>
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<td>LSC</td>
<td>Legal Services Commission</td>
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<td>LSE</td>
<td>London School of Economics</td>
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<td>LSL</td>
<td>Landing Ships Logistics</td>
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<td>LSSA</td>
<td>Land Systems South Africa</td>
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<td>Lt Bde</td>
<td>Light Brigade</td>
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<td>Lt Gen</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
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<td>LTSA</td>
<td>Long Term Security Arrangement</td>
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<tr>
<td>M*</td>
<td>A pre-detonation capability</td>
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<td>MA</td>
<td>Mahdi Army</td>
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<td>MA/CJO</td>
<td>Military Assistant to the Chief of Joint Operations</td>
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<td>MACA</td>
<td>Military Aid to the Civil Authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Major</td>
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<td>Maj Gen</td>
<td>Major General</td>
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<tr>
<td>MANPAD</td>
<td>Man Portable Air Defence System</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mansour</td>
<td>District in Baghdad</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>Manned Airborne Surveillance</td>
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<td>MAS</td>
<td>Muqtada al-Sadr</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>MAS1</td>
<td>Associate of Muqtada al-Sadr</td>
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<td>MaSTT</td>
<td>Maritime Strategic Transition Team</td>
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<td>MAT</td>
<td>Military Assistance Team</td>
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<td>Maysan</td>
<td>Province in south-east Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBT</td>
<td>Main Battle Tank</td>
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<td>MCM</td>
<td>Mine Counter-Measures</td>
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<td>MCNS</td>
<td>Ministerial Committee for National Security</td>
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<td>MCU</td>
<td>Major Crimes Unit</td>
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<td>Military Defence Hospital Unit</td>
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<td>MDP</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ME</td>
<td>Main Effort</td>
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<tr>
<td>MED</td>
<td>FCO Middle East Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>(US) Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>MEK</td>
<td>Mujahideen e Khalq</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>FCO Middle East and North Africa Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENAD</td>
<td>FCO Middle East and North Africa Department</td>
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<td>MEPP</td>
<td>Middle East Peace Process</td>
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<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Unit</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MGO</td>
<td>Master General of the Ordnance</td>
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<td>MI5</td>
<td>Security Service</td>
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<td>MI6</td>
<td>Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)</td>
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<td>MIC</td>
<td>Military Industrial Commission</td>
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<td>MIG</td>
<td>Mohan Initiative Group</td>
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<td>Mil</td>
<td>Military</td>
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<tr>
<td>Min(AF)</td>
<td>Minister for the Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Min(DP)</td>
<td>Minister for Defence Procurement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MiTT</td>
<td>Military Training Team or Transition Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>MJDRI</td>
<td>Management of the Joint Deployed Inventory</td>
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<td>MMIT</td>
<td>Management of Material in Transit</td>
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<td>MMW</td>
<td>Military Managed Ward</td>
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<td>MNC-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Corps – Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>MND</td>
<td>Multi-National Division</td>
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<td>MND(C)</td>
<td>Multi-National Division (Centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND(CS)</td>
<td>Multi-National Division (Centre-South)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MND(S)</td>
<td>Multi-National Division (South)</td>
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<td>MND(SE)</td>
<td>Multi-National Division (South-East)</td>
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<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Force – Iraq</td>
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<td>MNSTC-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>Modus Operandi (method of operating)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoG</td>
<td>Machinery of Government</td>
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<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOJ</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoO</td>
<td>Ministry of Oil</td>
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<td>Mosul</td>
<td>Capital of Ninawa province</td>
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<td>MOTS</td>
<td>Modified Off The Shelf</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPPV</td>
<td>Medium Weight Protected Patrol Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRAP</td>
<td>Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Medium scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSTF</td>
<td>Manoeuvre Support Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mukhabarat</td>
<td>Iraqi General Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>Muthanna</td>
<td>Province in south Iraq</td>
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<td>MW</td>
<td>Megawatt</td>
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**N**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>NACMO</td>
<td>Net Additional Cost of Military Operations</td>
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<td>NAG</td>
<td>Northern Arabian Gulf</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAIAD</td>
<td>Nerve Agent Immobilised Enzyme Alarm Detectors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td>Province in south-west Iraq and its capital</td>
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<tr>
<td>Najibiyah</td>
<td>Town in Basra province</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAO</td>
<td>National Audit Office</td>
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<td>Nasiriyah</td>
<td>Capital of Dhi Qar province</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NaTT</td>
<td>Navy Training Team</td>
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<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear Biological Chemical</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Contingent Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCD</td>
<td>National Council for Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCHQ</td>
<td>National Contingent Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDA</td>
<td>National Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Development Strategy</td>
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<td>NF</td>
<td>National Force</td>
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<td>NFZ</td>
<td>No-Fly Zone</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>National Health Service</td>
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<td>NI</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>NIA</td>
<td>New Iraqi Army</td>
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<td>NICC</td>
<td>National Intelligence Co-ordination Council</td>
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<td>NICEP</td>
<td>National Independent Cadres and Elites Party</td>
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<td>NIE</td>
<td>National Intelligence Estimate</td>
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<td>NIIA</td>
<td>National Intelligence and Investigation Agency</td>
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<td>Ninawa</td>
<td>Province in northern Iraq</td>
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<td>Northern Ireland Office</td>
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<td>NK</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
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<td>National Monitoring Directorate of Iraq</td>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>Notification Officer</td>
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<td>Number 10 Downing Street</td>
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<td>NOC</td>
<td>National Oil Corporation</td>
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<td>NOFORN</td>
<td>No Foreigners</td>
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<td>NOK</td>
<td>Next of Kin</td>
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<td>National Police</td>
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<td>NPD</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Department</td>
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<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>New Regional Command</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSID</td>
<td>Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development</td>
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<td>NSID(IR)</td>
<td>International Relations Sub-Committee of the Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development</td>
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<td>NSID(OD)</td>
<td>Overseas and Defence Sub-Committee of the Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development</td>
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<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>NTE</td>
<td>Not to Extend</td>
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<td>NATO Training Mission</td>
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<td>NUG</td>
<td>National Unity Government</td>
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O

OA Operational Analysis
OAB Oil Advisory Board
OCHA Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OD Overseas and Defence
OD Sec Cabinet Office, Overseas and Defence Secretariat
ODA Overseas Development Administration
ODPM Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFDA Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance
OFF Oil-for-Food
Oftel Office of Telecommunications
OGC Office of the General Counsel
OGDs Other Government Departments
OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference (known since 2011 as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation)
OM(C) Operator Mechanic (Communications)
OMLT Operational Mentoring Liaison Team
OMS Office of the Martyr Sadr
OMV Ongoing Monitoring and Verification
OOW Operation Overwatch
Op Operation
OP Operative Paragraph
Op AMPERE Power generation project
Op Desert Fox US-led operation against Iraq in 1998
Op Desert Storm Coalition military operation to liberate Kuwait in 1991
Op FRESCO Military cover in the event of a firefighters strike
Op GRANBY UK military operation in Kuwait in 1991
Op HAVEN UK’s contribution to Op Provide Comfort
Op HERRICK UK military operation in Afghanistan
Op JACANA Codename for a series of operations in Afghanistan by Royal Marines
Op JURAL UK contribution to enforce southern No-Fly Zone in Iraq
Op KEIR Repatriation of Service Personnel
Op NORTHERN WATCH UK contribution to enforce northern No-Fly Zone in Iraq
Op Provide Comfort US-led operation to provide humanitarian relief to the Kurds
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>Op ROCKINGHAM</td>
<td>UK intelligence support for UN disarmament activities in Iraq</td>
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<td>Op SALAMANCA</td>
<td>Operation to implement the Iraqi Government’s security plan in Basra</td>
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<td>Op Sec</td>
<td>Operational Security</td>
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<td>Op SOUTHERN WATCH</td>
<td>Operation to enforce southern No-Fly Zone</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Op SOUTHERN WATCH</td>
<td>Operation to enforce southern No-Fly Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>Op Stonehenge</td>
<td>Operation to enhance the protection of personal bunkers</td>
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<td>Op TELIC</td>
<td>UK military operation in Iraq</td>
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<td>Op THYME</td>
<td>Operation to disband Basra’s Serious Crime Unit</td>
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<td>Op Vigilant Response</td>
<td>US operation to block routes in and out of Fallujah</td>
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<tr>
<td>Op WARDEN</td>
<td>No-Fly Zone operation to prevent attacks on Kurds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Op Zenith</td>
<td>Operation to reduce UK forces on the ground in a combat role and return them to bases</td>
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<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<td>MOD Operational Training and Advisory Group</td>
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<td>Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>OROSM</td>
<td>Overarching Review of Operational Stress Management</td>
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<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>OWP</td>
<td>Operational Welfare Package</td>
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<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>Permanent 5: China, France, Russia, UK, US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P9</td>
<td>The nine members of the rotating Presidency of the Iraqi Governing Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>pa</td>
<td>Per annum</td>
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<td>PAC</td>
<td>Public Accounts Committee</td>
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<td>PAT</td>
<td>Police Assistance Team or Police Advisory Team</td>
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<td>Pre-Budget Report</td>
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<td>PC</td>
<td>Plaid Cymru</td>
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261
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<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>Passive Intra Red</td>
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<td>Provincial Joint Co-ordination Centre</td>
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<td>PKB</td>
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<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>Protected Mobility</td>
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<td>Popular Mobilisation Forces</td>
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<td>Program/Project Management Office</td>
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262
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Term</th>
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<td>prima facie</td>
<td>At first sight</td>
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<td>Project AJAX</td>
<td>MOD project to improve handling of inquest/service to families</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project DUCKBOARD</td>
<td>Project relating to light protection mobility vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project L*</td>
<td>An electronic countermeasures project</td>
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<td>Project OSIRIS</td>
<td>Project to provide vehicles and other defence equipment to Iraq</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>Police Service of Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<td>Post Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
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<td>Police Transition Team or Police Training Team</td>
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<td>People’s Union</td>
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<td>Patriotic Union of Kurdistan</td>
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<td>Permanent Under Secretary</td>
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<td>Questions and Answers</td>
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<td>Province in central south-east Iraq</td>
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<td>Airbase in Maysan Province</td>
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<td>QC</td>
<td>Queen’s Counsel</td>
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<td>Qibla</td>
<td>Militia stronghold</td>
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<td>Quick Reaction Force</td>
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<td>Quick Response Fund</td>
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<td>Quai d’Orsay</td>
<td>French Foreign Ministry</td>
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R day  Point at which the rotation of combat units formally commenced
R&D  Research and Development
R&O  Repair and Overhaul
R&R  Rest and Recuperation
RA  Research Analysts
RA  Regular Army
RAB  Resource Accounting and Budgeting
RAD  Research Analysts Department
RAdm  Rear Admiral
RAF  Royal Air Force
Ramadan  Islamic religious holiday
Ramadi  Capital of Anbar province
RAMP  Reception Arrangements for Military Patients
RAND  Rand Organisation
Rasheeda  Air base in Diyala province
RauxAF  Royal Auxiliary Air Force
RC  Radio Control
RCDM  Royal Centre for Defence Medicine
RCIED  Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device
RCT-5  Regimental Combat Team (5th US Marine Corps)
RDD  Radiological Dispersal Devices
RDD  Required Delivery Date
RDEL  Resource Departmental Expenditure Limits
REO  US Regional Embassy Office
RFA  Royal Fleet Auxiliary
RG  Republican Guard
RGFC  Republican Guard Forces Command
RIO  Restore Iraq Oil
RiP  Relief in Place
RM  Royal Marines
RMHP  Reserves Mental Health Programme
RMP  Royal Military Police
RN  Royal Navy
RO  Response Options
ROE  Rules of Engagement
<table>
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<td>Roll-on Roll-off</td>
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<td>Rest of World</td>
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<td>RPG</td>
<td>Rocket Propelled Grenade</td>
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<td>Regional Police Training Academy</td>
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<td>RPV</td>
<td>Remotely Piloted Vehicles</td>
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<td>Regional Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>RRU</td>
<td>Regional Rehabilitation Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSG</td>
<td>Reconciliation Steering Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSOI</td>
<td>Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTI</td>
<td>US organisation funded by USAID to build local government capacity in Iraq</td>
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<td>RUC</td>
<td>Royal Ulster Constabulary</td>
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<td>RUSI</td>
<td>Royal United Services Institute</td>
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<td>RPV</td>
<td>Remotely Piloted Vehicles</td>
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**S**

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<td>Support to Operations</td>
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<td>Support Amphibious Battlefield Helicopters</td>
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<td>Survey Analysis Centre</td>
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<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sadr City</td>
<td>Suburb of Baghdad</td>
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<td>SAF</td>
<td>Small Arms Fire</td>
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<td>Stabilisation Aid Fund</td>
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<td>Safwan</td>
<td>Town in Basra province</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saif Sareena II</td>
<td>Military exercise to assess equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salah ad Din</td>
<td>Province in central Iraq</td>
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<td>Surface to Air Missile</td>
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<td>City in Salah ad Din province</td>
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<td>Capital of Muthanna province</td>
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<td>Stand-By Arrangement</td>
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<td>Senior British Land Adviser</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBMA</td>
<td>Senior British Military Adviser</td>
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<td>SBMR-I</td>
<td>Senior British Military Representative – Iraq</td>
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<td>Security Council</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<td>SCA</td>
<td>Strategic Conflict Assessment</td>
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<td>Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq</td>
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<td>SCOOG</td>
<td>Support to the Centre of Government</td>
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<td>SCP</td>
<td>Sector Control Point</td>
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<td>SCR</td>
<td>Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>Strategic Communications Unit</td>
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<td>Statement on the Defence Estimates</td>
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<td>Strategic Defence Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDSR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence and Security Review</td>
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<td>SCU</td>
<td>Scottish Executive</td>
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<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>South-East</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sec (O)</td>
<td>MOD Secretariat (Overseas)</td>
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<td>Sec Pol</td>
<td>Security Policy</td>
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<td>Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee</td>
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<td>SFA</td>
<td>Strategic Framework Agreement</td>
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<td>Secretary-General</td>
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<td>Special Groups</td>
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<td>SH</td>
<td>Support Helicopter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shatt al-Arab</td>
<td>River running through Basra province</td>
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<td>SI</td>
<td>Service Inquiry</td>
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<td>SIB</td>
<td>Special Investigation Branch</td>
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<td>SIESP</td>
<td>Southern Iraq Employment and Services Programme</td>
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<td>SIGACTS</td>
<td>Significant Activities</td>
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<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
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<td>SIGIR</td>
<td>US Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>sine qua non</td>
<td>Essential action or condition</td>
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<td>Secret Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>Southern Iraq Steering Group</td>
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<td>Security and Justice Sector Reform</td>
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<td>Service Level Agreement</td>
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<td>Shaiba Logistics Base in Basra province</td>
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<td>Spearhead Land Element</td>
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<td>MOD acquisition process</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>SMD</td>
<td>Security Management Department</td>
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<td>Southern No-Fly Zone</td>
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<td>School of Oriental and African Studies</td>
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<td>sui generis</td>
<td>In a class by itself</td>
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<td>Definition</td>
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<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>Province in north-eastern Iraq and its capital</td>
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<td>SUV IPT</td>
<td>Specialist Utility Vehicles Integrated Project Team</td>
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<td>SVN</td>
<td>Stabilisation Volunteer Network</td>
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<td>Special Weapons and Tactics</td>
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**T**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Definition</th>
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<td>TA</td>
<td>Territorial Army</td>
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<td>Airbase in Baghdad province</td>
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<td>Transitional Administrative Law</td>
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<td>Tal Afar</td>
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<td>Tallil</td>
<td>Airbase in Dhi Qar province</td>
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<td>Ta’mín</td>
<td>Former name of Kirkuk province</td>
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<td>TAT</td>
<td>Technical or Transitional Advisory Team</td>
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<td>TAV</td>
<td>Total Asset Visibility</td>
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<td>Transition Bridging Strategy</td>
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<td>Transport Erector Launchers</td>
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<td>Task Force Disablement and Elimination</td>
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<td>United Kingdom medical journal</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSI</td>
<td>Technical Support to Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
<td>Tactical Support Unit</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tactics, Techniques and Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>TU</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUAV</td>
<td>Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
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<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trades Union Congress</td>
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<td><strong>U</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>U2</td>
<td>High altitude reconnaissance aircraft</td>
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<td>U-6</td>
<td>Undecided 6: Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan</td>
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<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
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<td>UHBFT</td>
<td>University Hospital Birmingham Foundation Trust</td>
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<td>United Iraqi Alliance</td>
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<td>United Iraqi Coalition</td>
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<td>UK Div HQ</td>
<td>UK Divisional Headquarters</td>
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<td>UK Permanent Mission to the UN in New York</td>
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<td>Umm Qasr</td>
<td>Port in Basra province</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission for Iraq</td>
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<td>UND</td>
<td>FCO United Nations Department</td>
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<td>UN Environmental Programme</td>
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<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>UN Forces in Cyprus</td>
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<td>UN General Assembly</td>
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<td>UN Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
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</table>
UNIFEM          UN Development Fund for Women
UNIKOM          UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNJLC           UN Joint Logistics Centre
UNMI            UN Mission to Iraq
UNMIK           UN Mission in Kosovo
UNMOVIC         UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNOCS           UN Office of Constitutional Support
UNOIP           UN Office of Iraq Programme
UNOPS           UN Office for Project Services
UNSC            UN Security Council
UNSC            UN Special Co-ordinator
UNSCOM          UN Special Commission
UNSCR           UN Security Council Resolution
UNSG            UN Secretary-General
UNTAET          UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UOR             Urgent Operational Requirement
UQP             Umm Qasr Port
URD             User Requirement Document
US DOD          US Department of Defense
USACE           US Army Corps of Engineers
USAID           US Agency for International Development
USMC            US Marine Corps
USR             Urgent Sustainability Requirement
USUN            US Mission to the UN
USRUR           Urgent Statement of User Requirement
UXO             Unexploded Ordnance

V

VAdm           Vice Admiral
VAT            Value Added Tax
VBIED          Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
VCDS           Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
VFM            Value for Money
VITAL          Visibility in Transit Asset Logging
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>VO</td>
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<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
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<td>VRF</td>
<td>Volunteer Reserve Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>Video Teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VX</td>
<td>A chemical nerve agent</td>
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</table>

### W
- Wasit: Province in eastern Iraq
- WFP: World Food Programme
- WHO: World Health Organization
- WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction
- WMIK: Weapons Mount Installation Kit
- WMR: War Maintenance Reserve
- WMS: Written Ministerial Statement
- WMSL: Weapons of Mass Destruction Master Site List
- WPS: War Pensions Scheme
- WSE: Winter Supplementary Estimate
- WTO: World Trade Organization
- WWII: World War 2

### X
- XTF-75: Exploitation Task Force-75

### Y
- YTF: Yet-To-Find
ANNEX 3

NAMES AND POSTS

A

Abbas (General) Iraqi Army Commander
Abdullah, Tariq Prime Minister Maliki’s Chief of Staff
Abdul-Mahdi, Adil Iraqi Minister of Finance, June 2004-April 2005, Vice President of Iraq, April 2005-July 2011
Abel, Richard Principal Private Secretary to the Business, Innovation and Skills Secretary, October 2007-September 2010
Abu Qadir, Wissam Basra Jaysh al-Mahdi leader
Adams, Cathy Legal Counsellor to Lord Goldsmith, 2002-2005 Inquiry witness
Adams, Geoffrey Principal Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, 2003-2005 (Sir) British Ambassador to Iran 2006-2009 Inquiry witness
Adams, Terry CPA Oil Team Technical Expert
Aflaq, Michael Co-founder of the Ba’ath Party
Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud President of Iran, 2005-2013
Ainsworth, Bob Minister for the Armed Forces, June 2007-May 2009 Defence Secretary, June 2009-May 2010 Inquiry witness
Akram, Munir Pakistani Permanent Representative to the UN, 2002-2008
al-Ahmad, Muhammad Tunis Former senior Ba’athist and founder of the New Regional Command
al-Asadi, Adnan Iraqi Deputy Interior Minister
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role/Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>al-Assad, Bashar</td>
<td>President of Syria, 2000-present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Bakr, Ahmad Hasan</td>
<td>President of Iraq, 1968-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Bitar, Salah al-Din</td>
<td>Co-founder of the Ba’ath Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Bulani, Jawad</td>
<td>Iraqi Interior Minister, June 2006-December 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Darajji, Raheem</td>
<td>(Sheikh) Mayor of Sadr City</td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Douri, Izzat Ibrahim</td>
<td>Senior Ba’athist and founder of the New Regional Command</td>
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<td>Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Council (Iraq), 1979-2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Dulaimi, Saadoun</td>
<td>Iraqi Defence Minister, June 2005-March 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Faiz, Sheikh Amr</td>
<td>Tribal leader</td>
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<td>al-Hadithi</td>
<td>Iraqi Foreign Minister, 2001-2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Hasani, Mohammed</td>
<td>Governor of Muthanna province until March 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Hashemi, Aqila</td>
<td>(Dr) Member of the Governing Council, July 2003-June 2004</td>
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<td>al-Hassani, Hajem</td>
<td>Industry Minister, June 2004-May 2005</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Speaker, Transitional National Assembly, April 2005-April 2006</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vice President of Iraq</td>
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<td>Al-Hussein, Abdullah II bin</td>
<td>King of Jordan, February 1999-present</td>
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<td>al-Huwaish, Abd</td>
<td>Head of the Iraqi Military Industrial Commission</td>
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<td>al-Iraqi, Abd al Hadi</td>
<td>Senior Al Qaida commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Ja’afari, Ibrahim</td>
<td>(Dr) Deputy President of Iraq, 2004-2005</td>
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<td>Prime Minister of Iraq, May 2005-May 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Jedda, Hilal</td>
<td>Former Iraqi detainee</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Director, Iraqi Intelligence Service, 1995-April 2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Maliki, Nouri</td>
<td>Presidential candidate for the United Iraqi Alliance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Prime Minister of Iraq, June 2006-September 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Marashi, Ibrahim</td>
<td>(Dr) Research Associate, Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies</td>
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<td>al-Masri, Ayb Awub</td>
<td>Leader of Al Qaida in Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Musawi, Sayyid Abdul</td>
<td>Shia cleric</td>
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<td>al-Naqib, Falah Hassan</td>
<td>Iraqi Interior Minister</td>
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</table>
al-Qadir, Wissam Jaysh al-Mahdi Commander
al-Rhado, Rhadi Hamza Chairman, Commission on Integrity, 2004-2007
al-Rubaie, Mowaffak (Dr) Iraqi National Security Adviser, 2004-2009
al-Saad, Hassan (Major General) Chief of Police for Basra
al-Sa’adi, Amir (Dr) Scientific Adviser to the Iraqi Presidency to 2003
al-Sadr, Muqtada Iraqi Shia cleric, politician and militia leader
al-Safi, Safa (Dr) Iraqi Acting Justice Minister
al-Saghir, Jalal Al-Din (Sheikh) Member of the de-Ba’athification Commission
al-Sahaf, Mohammed Said Iraqi Foreign Minister, 1992-2001
al-Samarri’e, Ayad Speaker, Iraqi Council of Representatives, April 2009-November 2010
Al-Saud, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, 1982-2005
Al-Saud, Fahd bin Abdulaziz King of Saudi Arabia, June 1982-August 2005
al-Shahmani, Adnan Founder of the Iraqi National Gathering
al-Shahristani, Hussain Iraqi Minister of Oil, May 2006-December 2010
al-Sharaa, Farouk Syrian Permanent Representative to the UN Syrian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, March 1984-February 2006
al-Shaybani, Ahmad Senior Jaysh al-Mahdi Commander
al-Sistani, Ali (Grand Ayatollah) Most senior authority in the Iraq Shia community
al-Sudani, Abdel Falah Iraqi Trade Minister, 2006-2009
al-Tikriti, Abid Hamid (Lieutenant General) Personal Secretary to Saddam Hussein until 2003
al-Ubaidi, Mahdi Head, Iraqi gas centrifuge programme
al-Yaqubi, Mustafa Senior aide to Muqtada al-Sadr
al-Yawar, Ghazi President of Iraq, 2004-2005 Vice President of Iraq, 2005-2006
al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab Leader of Al Qaida in Iraq
Alami, Ali Faisal Director General, de-Ba’athification Commission’s Follow-Up and Implementation Department
Albright, Madeleine (Dr) US Secretary of State, January 1997-January 2001
Aldouri, Mohammed Iraqi Permanent Representative to the UN, 2001-2003
Alexander, Douglas  
Cabinet Office Minister, June 2003-September 2004  
International Development Secretary, 2007-2010  
Inquiry witness

Allan, Alex  
Department for Constitutional Affairs, Permanent  
Secretary, August 2004-June 2007

Allan, Keith  
Trade Partners UK, Deputy Director, International Group 1

Allawi, Ali A  
(Dr) Minister of Defence, Iraqi Interim Government  
Minister of Finance, Iraqi Transitional Government

Allawi, Ayad  
(Dr) Leader of the Iraqi National Accord  
President of the Governing Council,  
October 2003  
Prime Minister of Iraq, 2004-2005

Alvear, Soledad  
Chilean Foreign Minister

Aly Azad Rana, Kipkorir  
Kenyan Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN,  
1997-1998

Amorim, Celso  
President of the Security Council, January 1999  
Brazilian Permanent Representative to the UN in New  
York, 1995-1999

Amos, Valerie  
(Baroness) FCO Parliamentary Under Secretary of State,  
2001-2003  
International Development Secretary, May-October 2003

Ancram, Michael  
Deputy Leader of the Opposition and Shadow Foreign  
Secretary, September 2001-May 2005

Anderson, Donald  
Chairman, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee,  
July 1997-July 2005

Anderson, Michael  
DFID, Head, Middle East and North Africa Department,  
2005-2008

Anderson, Roy  
(Professor, Sir) MOD Chief Scientific Officer,  
October 2004-September 2007

Andrews, Ian  
MOD, 2nd Permanent Under Secretary, 2002-March 2009

Annan, Kofi  
UN Secretary-General, 1997-2006

Applegate, Richard  
(Major General) MOD Capability Manager for Battlespace  
Manoeuvre

Arafat, Yasser  
Chairman, Palestine Liberation Organisation, 1969-2004

Archer, Peter  
(Lord Archer of Sandwell) Solicitor General, 1974-1979

Arias, Inocencio  
Spanish Permanent Representative to the UN, 1997

Armitage, Richard  
US Deputy Secretary of State, March 2001-February 2005

Armstrong, Hilary  
Chief Whip, House of Commons, June 2001-May 2006

Arthur, Michael  
FCO Director Economic, 2001-2003
Asquith, Dominic
Deputy Chief Commissioner in the CPA,
Deputy Special Representative and Deputy Head of
Mission, Iraq during 2004
FCO Director Iraq, 2004-2006
British Ambassador to Iraq, 2006-2007
Inquiry witness

Asselborn, Jean
Minister for Foreign and European Affairs, Luxembourg
(Presidency of EU Troika)

Austin, Chris
DFID, Head, Iraq Policy and Reconstruction Team

Austin, Lloyd
(Lieutenant General) US Commander, Multi-National
Corps – Iraq, 2008-2010

Aylwin-Foster, Nigel
(Brigadier) Commander, CMATT

Aziz
(Major General) Deputy Commander,
11th Iraqi Army Division

Aziz, Tariq
Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, 1979-2003
Iraqi Foreign Minister, 1983-1991

Aznar, José María
Prime Minister of Spain, 1996-2004

Bach, William
(Lord) Parliamentary Under Secretary of State and MOD
Minister for Defence Procurement, June 2001-May 2005
Ministry of Justice Parliamentary Under Secretary of State,
October 2008-May 2010
Inquiry witness

Bagnall, Anthony
(Air Chief Marshal, Sir) Vice Chief of the Defence Staff,
2001-2005
Inquiry witness

Bahr al-Ulum, Ibrahim
Iraqi Minister of Oil, May-December 2005

Baird, Vera
Department of Constitutional Affairs Parliamentary Under
Secretary of State, 2006-2007

Baker, Chris
MOD Director General Service Personnel Policy,
2006-2008

Baker, Frank
FCO, Head, Iraq Group, 2007-2010
Inquiry witness

Baker III, James A
US Secretary of State, January 1989-August 1992
President Bush’s Personal Envoy on Iraqi Debt, and
US Co-Chairman of the Iraq Study Group, 2003-2006

Balkenende, Jan Peter
Prime Minister of the Netherlands,
July 2002-October 2010
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<td>Balls, Ed</td>
<td>Special Adviser to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1997-2003</td>
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<td>Balmer, Colin</td>
<td>MOD Finance Director</td>
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<td>Banerji, Arnab</td>
<td>Economic adviser to the Prime Minister</td>
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<td>Banner, Nick</td>
<td>Private Secretary to the Prime Minister</td>
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<td>Barker, John</td>
<td>Cabinet Office, Director, Corporate Development Group</td>
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<td>Barroso, José Manuel</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Portugal, April 2002-July 2004</td>
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<td>Bartlett, Dan</td>
<td>President Bush’s Communications Director, 2001-2005</td>
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<td>Counsellor to President Bush, 2005-2007</td>
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<td>Barton, Dick</td>
<td>(Assistant Chief Constable) UK Chief Police Adviser – Iraq, March 2006-March 2007</td>
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<td>Barton, Philip</td>
<td>Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1997-2000</td>
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<td>Barzani, Masoud</td>
<td>Leader of Kurdish Democratic Party since 1979</td>
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<td>Prime Minister, Kurdish Regional Government, 2006-2009</td>
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<td>Bassett, Philip</td>
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<td>Beckett, Margaret</td>
<td>Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Secretary, June 2001-May 2006</td>
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<td>Cameroonian Permanent Representative to the UN, March 1998-December 2007</td>
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<td>US State Department Legal Adviser, April 2005-March 2009</td>
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Benn, Hilary  Minister for International Development, May-October 2003
International Development Secretary, October 2003-June 2007
Inquiry witness

Berger, Sandy  President Clinton’s National Security Advisor, March 1997-January 2001

Berlusconi, Silvio  Prime Minister of Italy, 2001-2006 and 2008-2011

Berman, Frank  (Sir) FCO Legal Adviser, 1991-1999
Inquiry witness

Berragan, Gerald  (Major General) Deputy Commander (Operations), Multi-National Corps – Iraq, January-October 2007

Berrocal Soto, Fernando  Costa Rican Permanent Representative to the UN, 1994-1998

Bethlehem, Daniel  FCO Legal Adviser, May 2006-May 2011
Inquiry witness

Bewes, Anna  Principal Private Secretary to the International Development Secretary, August 2001-August 2003

Biddle, Stephen  (Dr) Academic and journalist

Biden, Joe  (Senator) Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2001-2003 and 2007-2009

Bill, Ian  Chairman and CEO, Foster Wheeler Energy Ltd, July 1998-2004

Bin Laden, Usama  2nd General Emir of Al Qaida, 1989-May 2011

Binns, Graham  (Brigadier) Commander, 7 Armoured Brigade, 2001-2003
(Major General) General Officer Commanding Multi-National Division (South-East), August 2007-February 2008
Inquiry witness

Blackshaw, Alison  Alastair Campbell’s Senior Assistant


Blake, Nicholas  Queen’s Counsel, Deepcut Review, 2004-2006

Inquiry witness

Blunkett, David  Home Secretary, June 2001-December 2004
Boateng, Paul  Chief Secretary to the Treasury, May 2002-May 2005 (Lord) Inquiry witness


Boulani, Jawad  Iraqi Minister of the Interior, June 2006-December 2010

Bourne, John  Head, Dhi Qar Governorate Team

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros  UN Secretary-General, January 1992-December 1996

Bowden, Jamie  Deputy Head of Mission, British Embassy Baghdad, September 2004-February 2005 Inquiry witness


Bowler, James  Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 2010-December 2011

Bowman, Mark  Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 2001-2004

Boyce, Michael  (Admiral, Sir) Chief of the Defence Staff, February 2001-May 2003 (Lord) Inquiry witness

Boylan, Steven  (Colonel) General Petraeus’ spokesman, February 2007-September 2008

Bradshaw, Adrian  (Major General) Commander, 7 Armoured Brigade, March 2003-2006 Inquiry witness

Bradshaw, Ben  FCO Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, June 2001-May 2002

Brahimi, Lakhdar  Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, October 2001-December 2004 UN Special Adviser on Iraq, January-June 2004

Brand, Douglas  (Deputy Chief Constable) UK Senior Policing Representative in Baghdad, July 2003-September 2004 Inquiry witness

Bremer III, L Paul (Jerry)  (Ambassador) Administrator, CPA, May 2003-June 2004
<table>
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<td>Brenton, Tony</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Mission, British Embassy Washington, 2001-2004</td>
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<td>Chargé d’Affaires, British Embassy Washington</td>
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<td>Brewer, Nicola</td>
<td>(Dr) DFID Director General Regional Programmes, 2002-2004</td>
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<td>Brims, Robin</td>
<td>(Major General) UK Land Contingent Commander and General Officer Commanding 1st Armoured Division, 2000-2003</td>
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<td>Deputy Chief of Joint Operations, 2003-2005</td>
</tr>
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<td>(Lieutenant General) Senior British Military Representative – Iraq, April-October 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brind, Bridget</td>
<td>FCO, Deputy Head, Iraq Planning Unit</td>
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<td>Bristow, Laurie</td>
<td>(Dr) FCO, Deputy Director, Iraq Planning Unit, 2003</td>
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<td>Brookes, Diana</td>
<td>FCO, Legal Counsellor, 1999-2010</td>
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<td>Brown, Chris</td>
<td>(Lieutenant General) Senior British Military Representative – Iraq, March-July 2009</td>
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<td>Brown, Donal</td>
<td>DFID Deputy Director Iraq, 2008-2009</td>
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<td>Brown, Gordon</td>
<td>Chancellor of the Exchequer, May 1997-June 2007</td>
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<td>Prime Minister, June 2007-May 2010</td>
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<td>Inquiry witness</td>
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<td>Brown, Stephen</td>
<td>(Sir) Chief Executive, UK Trade and Investment, 2002-2005</td>
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<td>Browne, Des</td>
<td>Chief Secretary to the Treasury, May 2005-May 2006</td>
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<td>Defence Secretary, May 2006-October 2008</td>
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<td>(Lord Browne of Ladyton) Inquiry witness</td>
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<td>Browne, John</td>
<td>(Lord Browne of Madingley) Chairman, BP, 1998-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brummell, David</td>
<td>Legal Secretary to the Law Officers, August 2000-November 2004</td>
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<td>Buallay, Jassim</td>
<td>Bahraini Permanent Representative to the UN, 2001-2009</td>
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<td>Mohammed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Buck, John</td>
<td>Head of UK Communications and Information Centre, February-May 2003</td>
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<td>CPA Interim Director Strategic Communication, May-July 2003</td>
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<td>FCO, Director, Iraq, September 2003-July 2004</td>
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<td>Burleigh, Peter</td>
<td>US Deputy Representative to the UN, August 1997-December 1999</td>
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<td>Burnham, Andy</td>
<td>Chief Secretary to the Treasury, June 2007-January 2008</td>
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<td>Burns, William</td>
<td>US State Department Assistant Secretary Near East, June 2001-March 2005</td>
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<td>Burridge, Brian</td>
<td>(Air Marshal) UK National Contingent Commander, October 2002-May 2003</td>
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<td>(Air Chief Marshal, Sir) Inquiry witness</td>
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<td>Bush, George HW</td>
<td>41st President of the US, 1989-1993</td>
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<td>Bush, George W</td>
<td>43rd President of the US, 2001-2009</td>
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<td>Butler, Creon</td>
<td>FCO Chief Economist, 2004-2006</td>
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<td>Butler, Richard</td>
<td>Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission, 1997-1999</td>
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<td>Butler, Robin</td>
<td>(Sir) Cabinet Secretary, 1988-1998</td>
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<td>(Lord Butler of Brockwell) Chair, Butler Review, February-July 2004</td>
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<td>Cameron, Lindy</td>
<td>Deputy Head, DFID office, Baghdad, January-November 2004</td>
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<td>Head, DFID office, Baghdad, 2004-November 2005 Inquiry witness</td>
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<td>Campbell, Alastair</td>
<td>Mr Blair’s Director of Communications and Strategy, 2000-2003 Inquiry witness</td>
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<td>Campbell, Menzies</td>
<td>Liberal Democrat Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, May 1992-January 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cannon, Nicholas</td>
<td>Mr Blair’s Assistant Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, February 2003-April 2004</td>
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<td>Caplin, Ivor</td>
<td>MOD Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, June 2003-May 2005</td>
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<td>Card, Andy</td>
<td>President Bush’s Chief of Staff, January 2001-April 2006</td>
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<td>Casey, George</td>
<td>(Lieutenant General) US Director of the Joint Staff, January-October 2003</td>
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<td>(General) Commander, Multi-National Force – Iraq, June 2004-February 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Casey, Nigel</td>
<td>FCO Acting Director for Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cash, William</td>
<td>Shadow Attorney General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Casteel, Steve  US Senior Advisor to Interior Ministry, October 2003-July 2005
Catsaras, Nick  Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
Cavanagh, Matt  Special Adviser to Mr Brown, 2007-2010
Chakrabarti, Suma  DFID Permanent Secretary, February 2002-December 2007
(Sir) Inquiry witness
Chalabi, Ahmed  (Dr) Member of the Iraqi National Congress, 1992-2005
Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, May 2005-2006
Chaplin, Edward  FCO, Director Middle East and North Africa, 2002-2004
British Ambassador to Iraq, July 2004-May 2005
Inquiry witness
Charlton, Alan  FCO, Director Personnel, 2001-2004
Chatterton Dickson, Robert  FCO, Head, Iraq Security Sector Unit, 2000-October 2003
Cheadle, Richard  (Rear Admiral) Chief of Staff Naval Home Command, September 2002-December 2003
Controller of the Navy, December 2003-April 2006
Cheney, Dick  Vice President of the US, 2001-2009
Chiarelli, Peter  (General) Commander, Multi-National Corps – Iraq, August 2008-January 2012
Chikoti, Georges  Angolan Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, November 2010-present
Chilcott, Dominick  FCO Middle East Department, September 2002-2003
FCO, Head Iraq Planning Unit, January-June 2003
Inquiry witness
Chirac, Jacques  President of France, 1995-2007
Cholerton, Simon  (Dr) MOD, Assistant Director Secretariat (Overseas), 2001-2002
MOD, Acting Head, Iraq Secretariat, April 2004-December 2005
Clarke, Charles  Home Secretary, December 2004-May 2006
Minister without Portfolio and Party Chair, 2001-2002
Clarke, Michael  (Professor) King’s College London, Founding Director, International Policy Institute, 2001-2005
Head, School of Social Science and Public Policy, 2004-2005
Director General, Royal United Services Institute, 2007-2015
Clarke, Wesley  (General) Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 1997-2000
Cleveland, Robin  Associate Director, White House Office of Management and Budget, January 2001-June 2005
Clinton, Bill  42nd President of the US, 1993-2001
Clwyd, Ann  Chair, INDICT, 1997-2003 and Vice Chair, Parliamentary Labour Party, 2001-2005
Prime Minister’s Special Envoy to Iraq on Human Rights, May 2003-May 2010
Inquiry witness
Colbourne, Michael  (Acting Assistant Chief Constable) UK Chief Police Adviser, March 2007-April 2008
Inquiry witness
Collecott, Peter  FCO, Director General, Corporate Affairs, 2001-2003
Collis, Simon  British Consul General in Basra, 2004-2005
Inquiry witness
Colman, Tony  Chair, All-Party Parliamentary Group on the United Nations
Conway, Jim  (Lieutenant General) Commander, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, 2002-2004
Cook, Robin  Foreign Secretary, May 1997-June 2001
Leader of the House of Commons, June 2001-March 2003
Cooper, Geoffrey  Senior Police Adviser in Basra, March 2008-April 2009
Inquiry witness
Cooper, John  (Major General) General Officer Commanding Multi-National Division (South-East), December 2005-July 2006
(Lieutenant General) Senior British Military Representative – Iraq, March 2008-March 2009
Inquiry witness
Cooper, Robert  Head, Overseas and Defence Secretariat, Cabinet Office, 1999-2002
Cornish, Roger  (Dr) MOD, Deputy Director, Iraq
Costello, Barry  (Rear Admiral) Coalition Maritime Component Commander
Cowlam, Shaun  (Brigadier) Commander, Joint Force Logistics Command Commander, 102 Logistics Brigade, December 2000-May 2003
Cowper-Coles, Sherard  Principal Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, 1999-2001
British Ambassador to Israel, 2001-2003
Cragg, Tony  Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence, 1999-2003
Inquiry witness
Crisp, Nigel  (Sir) DoH Permanent Secretary, 2000-2006
Annex 3 | Names and posts

Crocker, Ryan  US Ambassador to Iraq, March 2007-February 2009
Crompton, Neil  FCO, Head, Iraq Planning Unit
                FCO, Head, Iraq Policy Unit
Cross, Tim  (Major General) Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, 2002-2003
                Inquiry witness
Cullen, William  (Lord Cullen of Whitekirk) Chair, Review of Fatal Accident Inquiries, 2008-2009
Cunliffe, Jonathan  Treasury Managing Director Macroeconomic Policy, 2002-2007
                (Sir) Inquiry witness
Cunningham, James  (Ambassador) US Deputy Representative to the UN, December 1999-July 2004
Curtis, Richard  (Sir) Assistant Deputy Coroner for Oxfordshire, 2005-2006

D
Dahlgren, Hans  Swedish Permanent Representative to the UN, 1997-2000
Dalton, Richard  (Sir) British Ambassador to Iran, 2002-2006
                Inquiry witness
Dandeker, Christopher  Professor of Military Sociology, King’s College London, and Co-Director of the King’s Centre for Military Health Research
Dannatt, Richard  (Major General) Assistant Chief of the General Staff, 2001-2002
                (Lieutenant General) Commander, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, 2003-2004
                (General, Sir) Chief of the General Staff, August 2006-August 2009
                Inquiry witness
Dardagan, Hamit  Co-founder of Iraq Body Count
Darling, Alistair  Chancellor of the Exchequer, June 2007-May 2010
Davies, Gareth  Senior Prisons Adviser to CPA(South)
Davies, Patrick  Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, 2000-2003
Davies, Peter  Private Secretary to the Defence Secretary
Davies, Robert  Chief Police Adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior
Davis, Liz  DFID Human Resources Director
Day, Jon
Chief of the Assessments Staff, Cabinet Office, 2000-2001
MOD Director General Operational Policy,
August 2007-October 2008
MOD Director General Security Policy, 2008-2009
Inquiry witness

Dayton, Keith
(Major General) US Military Commander,
Iraq Survey Group

de La Sablière, Jean-Marc
French Permanent Representative to the UN, 2002-2007

de Villepin, Dominque
French Minister for Foreign Affairs, May 2002-March 2004
Inquiry witness

Dearlove, Richard
(Sir) Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service,
August 1999-May 2004
Inquiry witness

Dejammet, Alain
French Permanent Representative to the UN, 1995-1999

Delves, Cedric
(Lieutenant General) Senior UK Liaison Officer at
US Central Command, January-April 2002

Dempsey, Martin
(General) Commanding General, Multi-National Security
Transition Command – Iraq, August 2005-August 2007

Derbez, Luis
Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs,
January 2003-November 2006

Deverell, John
(Brigadier) Deputy Commander, Iraq Survey Group

Dingemans, James
Counsel for the Hutton Inquiry

Dinham, Martin
DFID Director Europe, Middle East and the Americas,
2005-June 2007
DFID Director General International, April 2008-2010
Inquiry witness

Dodd, Tom
Overseas and Defence Secretariat, Cabinet Office,
2001-2004
Deputy British Consul General in Basra, 2004
Inquiry witness

Dodds, John
Treasury, Head, Defence, Diplomacy and Intelligence
Team, October 2002-March 2006
Inquiry witness

Dodge, Toby
(Dr) Reader in International Relations at the London
School of Economics and a Senior Consulting Fellow
for the Middle East at the International Institute of
Strategic Studies

Dowse, Tim
FCO, Head, Non-Proliferation Department,
January 2001-November 2003
Director, Chief of the Assessments Staff, Cabinet Office,
November 2003-2009
Inquiry witness
<table>
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<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Drayson, Paul</td>
<td>(Lord) MOD Parliamentary Under Secretary of State and Minister for Defence Procurement, May 2005-March 2007 Minister of State for Defence Equipment and Support, March-June 2007 Inquiry witness</td>
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<td>Drew, Philippa</td>
<td>FCO, Director, Global Issues, 2002-2006</td>
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<td>Drummond, Jim</td>
<td>Assistant Head, Overseas and Defence Secretariat (Foreign Affairs), Cabinet Office, 2000-2003 DFID Director, Iraq, 2003-2004 Inquiry witness</td>
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<td>Duclos, Michel</td>
<td>French Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, 2002-2006</td>
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<td>Duelfer, Charles</td>
<td>Deputy Executive Chairman of UN Special Commission, 1993-2000 Head, Iraq Survey Group, January 2004-April 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duncan Smith, Iain</td>
<td>Leader of the Conservative Party and official Opposition, September 2001-November 2003</td>
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<td>Dutton, James</td>
<td>(Brigadier) Chief of the Defence Staff’s Liaison Officer to the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon, March 2002-July 2002 Commander, 3 Commando Brigade, July 2002-May 2004 (Major General) General Officer Commanding Multi-National Division (South-East), June-December 2005 Deputy Chief of Joint Operations, February 2007-October 2008 (Lieutenant General, Sir) Inquiry witness</td>
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<td>Eaton, Paul</td>
<td>(Major General) US Head, Coalition Military Assistance Training Team</td>
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<td>Eberly, Don</td>
<td>US political writer and researcher</td>
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<td>Edson, Gary</td>
<td>US Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, January 2001-June 2005</td>
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<td>Eduardo Dos Santos, José</td>
<td>President of Angola, September 1979-present</td>
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<td>Ehrman, William</td>
<td>FCO, Director, International Security, 2000-October 2002 FCO, Director General, Defence and Intelligence, 2002-2004 Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee, August 2004-2005 (Sir) Inquiry witness</td>
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Ekéus, Rolf  Executive Chairman, UN Special Commission, 1991-1997
Inquiry witness

Elaraby, Nabil  Egyptian Permanent Representative to the UN, May 1991-May 1995

ElBaradei, Mohamed  (Dr) Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997-2009

England, Gordon  US Deputy Defense Secretary, January 2006-February 2009

Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip  Chairman, Justice and Development Party, 2001-2014
Prime Minister of Turkey, March 2003-August 2014

Errera, Gérard  French Ambassador to the UK, 2002-2007

Etherington, Mark  Head, Wasit Governorate Team
Head, Basra PRT, April 2006-January 2007
Inquiry witness

Everard, James  (Brigadier) Commander, 20th Armoured Brigade, 2005-2007

Constitutional Affairs Secretary and Lord Chancellor, June 2003-May 2007

Fall, François Lonseny  Guinean Permanent Representative to the UN, 2000-2002
President of the Security Council, March 2003


Farquhar, Andrew  (Lieutenant General) British Deputy Commanding General of Operations, Multi-National Corps – Iraq, September 2004-February 2005

Faulkner, Gregory  British Ambassador to Chile, 2000-2003

Feith, Douglas  US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, July 2001-August 2005

Félix-Paganon, Jean  UN Director in the French Foreign Ministry, 1999-2003

Ferguson, Edward  Private Secretary to the Defence Secretary, September 2007-November 2009
Fergusson, George  Assistant Head, Overseas and Defence Secretariat, Cabinet Office, 2004-2006

Fernie, Alistair  DFID, Head, Middle East and North Africa Department, July 2002-February 2005

Ferrero Waldner, Benita  EU External Affairs Commissioner, 2004-2009


Fischer, Joschka  German Vice Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs, October 1998-November 2005

Flaherty, Paul  PJHQ, Head of Civilian Secretariat

Flanagan, Ronnie  (Sir) Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 2005-2009 Inquiry witness

Fleischer, Ari  President Bush’s Press Secretary, January 2001-July 2003

Fleischhauer, Carl-August  (Dr) UN Legal Counsel, 1983-1994

Fletcher, Ian  CPA Oil Team Policy Expert

Fletcher, Tom  Private Secretary for Foreign and European Affairs, 2007-2010

Foley, Tom  CPA Director for Private Sector Development

Forber, Ian  MOD, Head, Iraq Policy Team

Fox, Liam  (Dr) Shadow Secretary of State for Defence, December 2005-May 2010

Fox, Paul  FCO, Head, Iraq Policy Unit, 2005-2006

Fox, Vicente  President of Mexico, December 2000-November 2006

Foy, Tim  Head, DFID Office, Baghdad, August 2005-August 2006 Head, Basra PRT, from January 2007 Inquiry witness

Fradley, Stephen  British Senior Prison Adviser

Franks, Tommy  (General) Commander in Chief US Central Command (CENTCOM), 2000-2003

Fraser, Simon  FCO, Director, Strategy and Innovation (Sir) FCO Permanent Under Secretary, August 2010-July 2015

Fréchette, Louise  UN Deputy Secretary-General, April 1997-April 2006

Free, Julian  (Brigadier) Commander, 4th Mechanised Brigade, and Deputy Commander Operations, April 2007-2009
French, Joe  (Air Marshal, Sir) Chief of Defence Intelligence, 2000-2003 (Air Chief Marshal) Inquiry witness

Friedman, Thomas L  New York Times columnist


Fulton, Robert  (Lieutenant General, Sir) Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Equipment Capability), June 2003-June 2006 Inquiry witness

G

Gantley, Guy  FCO Middle East/North Africa Economic Adviser

Gardiner, Nicholas  Coroner for Oxfordshire, August 1981-April 2012

Garner, Jay  (Lieutenant General) US Head, Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, April-May 2003

Gasper Martins, Ismael  Angolan Permanent Representative to the UN, May 2001-present

Gass, Simon  FCO, Director, Resources, 2001-2004

Gates, Robert  (Dr) US Defense Secretary, December 2006-July 2007

Gatilov, Gennadi  Russian Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, 1999-2004

Gell, David  (Major) British Army Spokesman

George, Bruce  Chairman, House of Commons Defence Committee, May 1979-July 2005

Ghadban, Thamir  Iraqi Minister of Oil, April-September 2003 and June 2004-May 2005

Gibson, Ian  PJHQ, Deputy Command Secretary

Gibson, Robert  (Dr) Deputy Head of Mission, British Embassy Baghdad

Gieve, John  (Sir) Home Office Permanent Secretary, 2001-2005

Gilchrist, Peter  (Major General) Master General of the Ordnance, 2000-2004

Gillespie, Michael  Head, Public Order and Police Co-operation Unit

Gilligan, Andrew  BBC journalist

Gnehm, Edward  US Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, 1994-1997
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<td>Goldsmith, Peter</td>
<td>(Lord) Attorney General, June 2001-June 2007</td>
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<td>Gomersall, Stephen</td>
<td>UK Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, 1994-1998</td>
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<td>Gonzales, Alberto</td>
<td>Counsel to President Bush, January 2001-February 2005</td>
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<td>Gooderham, Peter</td>
<td>Political Counsellor, British Embassy Washington, 1999-2003</td>
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<td>Gordon, Nick</td>
<td>(Air Commodore) MOD, Director of Equipment Capability, ISTAR, September 2006-July 2009</td>
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<td>Goulty, Alan</td>
<td>FCO, Director Middle East and North Africa, 2000-2002</td>
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<td>Gourdault-Montagne, Maurice</td>
<td>President Chirac’s Diplomatic Adviser, 2002-2007</td>
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<td>Grainger, John</td>
<td>FCO, Legal Counsellor, Middle East Department, 2001-2003</td>
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<td>Granville-Chapman, Timothy</td>
<td>(General, Sir) Commander in Chief Land Command, 2003-2005</td>
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<td>Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, 2005-2009</td>
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<td>Gray, Charles</td>
<td>FCO, Head, Middle East Department, 2002-2004</td>
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<td>Green, Jenny</td>
<td>Chair, War Widows Association</td>
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<td>Greenall, Gilbert</td>
<td>(Dr) DFID-funded consultant in Iraq</td>
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<td>Greenstock, Jeremy</td>
<td>(Sir) UK Permanent Representative to the UN, 1998-July 2003</td>
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<td>Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Iraq, September 2003-March 2004</td>
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<td>Greenwood, Christopher</td>
<td>Professor of International Law, London School of Economics</td>
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<td>Grossman, Marc</td>
<td>US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, March 2001-February 2005</td>
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<td>Prime Minister of Turkey, November 2002-March 2003</td>
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<td>Guthrie, Charles</td>
<td>(General, Sir) Chief of the Defence Staff, 1997-2001</td>
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<td>Haass, Richard</td>
<td>US State Department Director of Policy Planning, February 2001-June 2003</td>
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<td>Habib, Husseini</td>
<td>(Major General) Commander of Iraqi Army 10th Division</td>
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<td>Haddon-Cave, Charles</td>
<td>Author of the Nimrod Review in 2009</td>
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Hadley, Stephen  US Deputy National Security Advisor, 2001-2005
Hafez, Mehdi  Iraqi Minister of Planning and Development Co-ordination
Hague, William  Foreign Secretary, May 2010-July 2014
Hamadi, Ali  (Major General) President of the Basra Security Committee
Hamadi, Mohammed  (Brigadier) Provincial Director of Police
Hamdoon, Nizar  Iraqi Permanent Representative to the UN, 1992-1998
Hamill, Paul  No.10 Communications and Information Centre
Hamilton, Lee  US Co-Chairman, Iraq Study Group
Hamilton-Eddy, Jane  Deputy Head of the Assessments Staff, Cabinet Office, July 2004
Hammoudi, Hummam  (Sheikh) Chair, Constitutional Committee
Hamoud, Mohammed  Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister
Harman, Harriet  Solicitor General, June 2001-May 2005
DCA, Minister of State, May 2005-May 2007
Harradence, Fergus  Head, UK Trade and Industry, Gulf Unit
Harvey, Paul  Head, Kirkuk Governorate Team
Hashemi, Tariq  Iraqi Vice President, April 2006-September 2012
Haslert, Dennis  Speaker of the US House of Representatives, January 1999-January 2007
Hasmy Agan, Tan Sri  Malaysian Permanent Representative to the UN, 1998-2003
Hatfield, Richard  MOD Personnel Director
Hattab, Karim Mahmood  (Prince) Brother of the Governor of Maysan province
Hawley, Alan  (Brigadier) Commander, Medical, Joint Force Logistic Command
Hawramy, Ashtree  (Dr) Minister of Natural Resources, Kurdish Regional Government
Hayes, Peter  Principal Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, 2005-2007
Haynes, William  US Department of Defense General Counsel, 2001-2008
Haysom, Nicholas  Head, UN Office of Constitutional Support, 2005-2007
Haywood, Nigel  British Consul General in Basra, April 2008-2009
Inquiry witness
Heath, Mike  (Air Commodore) Director, Directorate Targeting and Information Operations, 2002-2003
(Air Vice Marshal) Senior British Military Adviser to US Central Command, 2003-2005
Heatly, Charles  No.10 Press Officer  Adviser to Prime Minister Allawi
Hemmings, Martin  MOD Legal Adviser, 1998-2009
Henderson, Bill  Director, Trade Partners UK, International Group 1
Hendrie, Barbara  DFID Deputy Director Iraq
Hetherington, Mark  FCO Research Analyst
Hewitt, Patricia  Trade and Industry Secretary, June 2001-May 2005
Heywood, Jeremy  Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, June 1999-July 2003 and January 2008-May 2010 (Sir) Cabinet Secretary, January 2012 to present
Hill, Christopher  US Ambassador to Iraq, 2009-2010
Hill, David  Mr Blair’s Director of Communications and Strategy, August 2003
Hirst, Neil  DTI Head of Energy Markets Unit
Hogger, Henry  Head, Basra Governorate Team
Holmes, John  (Sir) British Ambassador to France, 2001-2006 Inquiry witness
Hood, Gavin  Legal Adviser, British Embassy Baghdad
Hoon, Geoff  Defence Secretary, October 1999-May 2005 Inquiry witness
Horne, Nick  UK consultant working in the CPA
Howard, John  Prime Minister of Australia, 1996-2007
Howard, Martin  MOD, Director, Corporate Communications, July 2001-2003 Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence, February 2003-May 2004 MOD, Director General, Operational Policy, May 2004-August 2007 Inquiry witness
Howard, Michael  Leader of the Conservative Party and official Opposition, 2003-2005
Howell, David  (Lord Howell of Guildford) Shadow Minister Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, July 2000-May 2009
Howells, Kim  (Dr) FCO Minister for the Middle East, May 2005-October 2008
Hum, Christopher (Sir) British Ambassador to China, 2002-2006
Humble, Joan Chair, Party Group on Army Deaths
Hurd, Douglas Foreign Secretary, 1989-1995
Hurley, Kevin (Assistant Chief Constable) Chief Police Adviser in Basra, June-December 2004
Inquiry witness
Hussein, Qusay Son of Saddam Hussein
Hussein, Saddam President of Iraq, July 1979-April 2003
Hussein, Uday Son of Saddam Hussein
Hutton, John Defence Secretary, October 2008-June 2009
Inquiry witness
Hutton, Roger (Dr) MOD, Director, Joint Commitments Policy 2003-2006

I
Ingram, Adam Minister for the Armed Forces, June 2001-June 2007
Inquiry witness
Innes, Stuart British Consul General in Basra, 2005
Irvine, Derry (Lord Irvine of Lairg) Lord Chancellor, May 1997-June 2003
Irwin, Alistair (Lieutenant General) Adjutant General, 2003-2005
Inquiry witness
Ivanov, Igor Russian Foreign Minister, 1998-2004
Ivanov, Sergei Russian Defence Minister, March 2001-February 2007

J
Jabar, Faleh (Dr) Research Fellow, Birkbeck College, London
Jabr, Bayan Iraqi Minister of Interior, 2005-2006
Iraqi Finance Minister, 2006-2010
Jack, Stuart FCO, Head, Iraq Operations Unit, 2003-2004
FCO Director Iraq
Jackson, Mike (General, Sir) Commander in Chief Land Command, 2000-2003
Chief of the General Staff, February 2003-August 2006
Inquiry witness
Jagne, Marmour A Gambian Permanent Representative to the UN, July 2008-January 2014
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<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jalil Khalaff, Abdul</td>
<td>(Major General) Basra Chief of Police</td>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>Jay, Michael</td>
<td>(Sir) FCO Permanent Under Secretary</td>
<td>2002-2006</td>
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<td>(Lord Jay of Ewelme) Inquiry witness</td>
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<td>Jeffrey, Bill</td>
<td>(Sir) MOD Permanent Under Secretary</td>
<td>September 2005-2010</td>
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<td>Jenkin, Bernard</td>
<td>Shadow Secretary of State for Defence</td>
<td>September 2001-November 2003</td>
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<td>Jenkins, Ian</td>
<td>(Vice Admiral) Surgeon General</td>
<td>2002-2006</td>
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<td>Jenkins, John</td>
<td>(Dr) FCO, Director Middle East and North Africa, Inquiry witness</td>
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<td>2007-2009</td>
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<td>Jenness, Craig</td>
<td>International Commissioner, Independent Electoral Commission, Iraq</td>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>Joffe, George</td>
<td>(Professor) Department of Politics and International Studies, Cambridge University</td>
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<td>Johnson, Alan</td>
<td>Health Secretary</td>
<td>June 2007-June 2009</td>
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<td>Johnson, David</td>
<td>MOD, Head, Iraq Secretariat</td>
<td>September 2002-July 2004</td>
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<td>Johnson, Neil</td>
<td>(Professor) Department of Physics, Oxford University</td>
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<td>Johnston, Paul</td>
<td>FCO, Head, Security Policy Department</td>
<td>2002-2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jones, Brian</td>
<td>(Dr) DIS, Branch Head, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical</td>
<td>1987-January 2003</td>
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<td>Section in the Scientific and Technical Directorate</td>
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<td>Jones, Elizabeth</td>
<td>US Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs</td>
<td>2001-2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jones, Richard</td>
<td>British Consul General in Basra</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
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<td>Jones Parry, Emyr</td>
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<td>Culture, Media and Sport Secretary</td>
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<td>(Lieutenant General) Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, former Minister of Industry and Head of Iraq’s Military Industrial Commission</td>
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<td>Assistant UN Secretary-General for Political Affairs</td>
<td>1999-2003</td>
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<td>Head, Iraq Survey Group, 2003-January 2004</td>
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<td>(Chief Constable) Lead on International Affairs for the Association of Chief Police Officers and Chief Constable of Hampshire, 2001-2008</td>
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<td>Treasury, Head, Country Economics and Policy Team, 2004</td>
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<td>(Dr) US Secretary of State, September 1973-January 1977</td>
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Kiszely, John  (Lieutenant General) Senior British Military Representative – Iraq, October 2004-April 2005
(Lieutenant General, Sir) Inquiry witness
Korski, Daniel  Senior Policy Fellow, European Council of Foreign Relations, 2008
Kunder, James  Acting Deputy Administrator, USAID, 2002-2004

L
Lamb, Graeme  (Major General) General Officer Commanding Multi-National Division (South-East), July-December 2003
(Lieutenant General) Senior British Military Representative – Iraq, September 2006-July 2007
(Lieutenant General, Sir) Inquiry witness
Lamb, Patrick  FCO official, Non-Proliferation Department
Lamb, Robin  British Consul General in Basra, 2006
Lander, Stephen  (Sir) Director General MI5, 1996-2002
Landsman, David  FCO, Head, Counter-Proliferation Department, 2003-2009
Latif, Mohammed  (General) Commander, Fallujah Brigade, April 2004
Laurence, Tim  (Rear Admiral) Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Resources and Plans), July 2004-March 2007
Laurie, Michael  (Major General) MOD, Director General Intelligence Collection, 2002-2003
Inquiry witness
Lavrov, Sergei  Russian Permanent Representative to the UN, September 1994-July 2004
Lee, Ian  MOD Director General Operational Policy, September 2002-May 2004
MOD Director General Media and Communications, 2004-2005
Inquiry witness
Leeming, Jennifer  Coroner for Greater Manchester (West), 2001-present
Lester, Guy  MOD, Director Defence Resources and Plans
Lever, Paul  (Sir) British Ambassador to Germany, 1997-2003
Levitte, Jean-David  French Permanent Representative to the UN, 2000-2002
French Ambassador to the US, 2002-2007
President Sarkozy’s Diplomatic Adviser, 2007-2012
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<td>Libby, Scooter</td>
<td>Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff, 2001-2005</td>
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<td>Lieberman, Joe</td>
<td>(Senator) Chair, Senate Homeland Security Committee, June 2001-January 2003</td>
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<td>(Lieutenant General) Surgeon General, 2006-2009 Inquiry witness</td>
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<td>FCO, Head, Conflict Issues Group</td>
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<td>Llewellyn, Huw</td>
<td>FCO Legal Counsellor, 2003-August 2006</td>
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<td>Lloyd, Liz</td>
<td>Mr Blair’s adviser on Foreign Policy from 1997</td>
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<td>Plaid Cymru shadow spokesperson for Defence and Foreign Affairs, June 2010-March 2015</td>
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<td>(Air Chief Marshal) Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations), 2002-2004</td>
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<td>DFID Director Finance and Corporate Performance, 2001-2003 DFID Director General Corporate Performance and Knowledge Sharing, 2003-2006 DFID Director General Policy and Programmes, 2006-2008 DFID Permanent Secretary, from June 2011 Inquiry witness</td>
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<td>(General) sent to Iraq in 2005 to consider operational issues and report back to the Pentagon</td>
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<td>Assistant Deputy Coroner for Oxfordshire, 2005-2014</td>
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<td>Cabinet Secretary for Justice, Scottish Executive, 2007-2014</td>
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<td>MOD Assistant Director, Defence Resources and Plans</td>
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<td>(General) Commander International Security Assistance Force, and Commander US Forces Afghanistan, June 2009-June 2010</td>
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<td>(Rear Admiral) Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, 2001-2003</td>
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<td>Principal Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, 2001-2003</td>
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<td>Moseley, Buzz</td>
<td>(Lieutenant General) US Air Component Commander</td>
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<td>Moussa, Amre</td>
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<td>Head, Iraqi National Movement</td>
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<td>Head of Policy in the Prime Minister’s Office</td>
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<td>Chairman, Home Affairs Select Committee, 2001-2003</td>
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<td>Director/CEO, BSkyB</td>
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<td>(Cardinal) Archbishop of Westminster</td>
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<td>President of Pakistan, 2001-2008</td>
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<td>(General) Vice-Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 2000-October 2001 Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 2001-September 2005</td>
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<td>Nash, David</td>
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<td>Administrator USAID</td>
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<td>(Wing Commander) Private Secretary to the Defence Secretary, 2002-2004</td>
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<td>US National Director of Intelligence, April 2005-February 2007</td>
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<td>US Deputy Secretary of State, February 2007-January 2009</td>
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<td>Head, CPA(South)</td>
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<td>Noble, Andrew</td>
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<td>FCO Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, May 2002-June 2003</td>
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<td>Ochmanek, David</td>
<td>Senior Defence Analyst, RAND Institute</td>
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<td>Odierno, Raymond</td>
<td>(General) Commanding General III Corps and Commander Multi-National Corps – Iraq, December 2006-February 2008</td>
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O'Donnell, Gus  (Sir) Cabinet Secretary, 2005-2011
  Inquiry witness
O'Donoghue, Kevin (Lieutenant General) Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
  (Health), 2002-2004
  (General Sir) Chief of Defence Logistics, 2005-2007
  Chief of Defence Materiel, 2007-2010
  Inquiry witness
Olsen, Ole  Head, Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs 
  (South)/CPA(South), May 2003-July 2003
Omand, David  (Sir) Cabinet Office Permanent Secretary and Security 
  and Intelligence Co-ordinator, September 2002-April 2005
  Inquiry witness
Orde, Hugh  (Sir) Chief Constable, Police Service of Northern Ireland, 
  2002-2009
O'Sullivan, Meghan  (Dr) US Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and 
  Afghanistan, July 2004-September 2007
Owada, Hisashi  Japanese Permanent Representative to the UN
Owen, Kara  Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary
Owen, Sue  DFID Director General, Corporate Performance, 2006-2009
Özkök, Hilmi  (General) Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish 
  Armed Forces

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Pahad, Aziz  South African Deputy Foreign Minister, 1994-2008
Palacio, Ana  Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 2002-April 2004
Palmer, Anthony  (Lieutenant General) Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff 
  (Personnel), 2002-2005
  Inquiry witness
Parham, Philip  Head, FCO Iraq Operations Unit
Patey, William  FCO, Head, Middle East Department, 
  1999-March 2002
  British Ambassador to Iraq, June 2005-July 2006
  (Sir) Inquiry witness
Pattison, Stephen  FCO, Head, United Nations Department, 2000-2003
  FCO, Director, International Security
  Inquiry witness
Pawson, Tony  Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence, 
  September 2004-2007
  MOD Director General Corporate Communications, 
  2003-September 2004
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<td>(Air Marshal) Chief of Defence Intelligence, 2006-2009</td>
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<td>FCO Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, October 2008-June 2009</td>
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<td>Kenyan Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, 1997</td>
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<td>(Dr) Minister without Portfolio and Labour Party Chair, October 2002-April 2003 Leader of the House of Commons, April-June 2003 Defence Secretary, May 2005-May 2006 Inquiry witness</td>
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Reid, Kathleen  Head, DFID Office, Basra, August 2007-September 2008  
Inquiry witness

Reith, John  (Lieutenant General) Chief of Joint Operations,  
August 2001-July 2004  
(General, Sir) Inquiry witness

Rice, Condoleezza  (Dr) US National Security Advisor, 2001-2005  
US Secretary of State, January 2005-January 2009

Richards, David  (Major General) Assistant Chief of the General Staff, 
2002-2005

Richards, Francis  (Sir) Director, Government Communications Headquarters, 
1998-2003

Richardson, Bill  US Permanent Representative to the UN, 2001-2004

Richmond, David  Prime Minister’s Interim Special Representative on 
Iraq, 2003  
Prime Minister’s Deputy Special Representative on 
Iraq, 2003-2004  
Prime Minister’s Special Representative on 
Iraq, March 2004-June 2004  
(Sir) FCO, Director General, Defence and Intelligence, 
2004-2007  
Inquiry witness

Ricketts, Peter  Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee, 
September 2000-September 2001  
FCO Political Director, 2001-2003  
(Sir) UK Permanent Representative to NATO, 2003-2006  
FCO Permanent Under Secretary, 2006-2010  
Inquiry witness

Ridgway, Andrew  (Lieutenant General) Chief of Defence Intelligence, 
2003-2006

Riley, Jonathon  (Major General) General Officer Commanding Multi-
National Division (South-East), December 2004-June 2005  
(Lieutenant General) Deputy Head, CMATT, 
May-December 2003  
Inquiry witness

Robertson, George  Defence Secretary, 1997-1999  
(Lord) Secretary General, NATO, 1999-2004

Robison, Garry  (Brigadier) Deputy Commander, Iraq Survey Group

Roper, Paul (Dr) Director of Strategic Technology Director of Science and Technology, Defence Intelligence Staff, from July 2002 Inquiry witness

Rose, John (Brigadier) Chief of the Defence Staff’s Liaison Officer (Major General) MOD Director General Intelligence Collection

Rose, Vivien MOD, Head, General and International Law Team

Ross, Carne First Secretary, UK Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, December 1997-June 2002 Inquiry witness

Rove, Karl President Bush’s chief political strategist, January 2001-August 2007 White House Deputy Chief of Staff, February 2005-August 2007

Rumsfeld, Donald US Secretary of Defense, 2001-2006

Rycroft, Matthew Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 2002-2005 Inquiry witness

S

Sabri, Naji Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, 2001-2003

Salih, Barham (Dr) Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, 2004-2009

Salmon, Andrew (Major General) General Officer Commanding Multi-National Division (South-East), August 2008-March 2009 Inquiry witness

Sanchez, Ricardo (Lieutenant General) US Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-7

Sawers, John  Mr Blair’s Foreign Secretary for Foreign Affairs, January 1999-September 2001
British Ambassador to Egypt, 2001-2003
Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Iraq, 2003
FCO, Director General, Political, 2003-2007
(Sir) UK Permanent Representative to the UN, August 2007-November 2009
(Sir) Inquiry witness

Scarlett, John  Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee, September 2001-July 2004
(Sir) Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, 2004-2009
Inquiry witness

Schröder, Gerhard  German Chancellor, 1998-2005

Schulte, Paul  Head, Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit, September 2004-December 2005
MOD Director, Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat

Scotland, Patricia  (Baroness Scotland of Sathal) Attorney General, 2007-2010

Scott, Richard  (Lord Scott of Foscote) Chair, Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions

Scowcroft, Brent  (General) National Security Advisor to President George HW Bush, January 1989-January 1993

Sedwill, Mark  Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, 2000-2002

Segar, Chris  Head, British Office Baghdad

Shafik, Nemat  (Dr) DFID Director General Programmes, October 2004-March 2008
DFID Permanent Secretary, March 2008-June 2011
Inquiry witness

Shaw, Jonathan  (Major General) General Officer Commanding Multi-National Division (South-East), January 2007-August 2007
Inquiry witness

Sheways, Rowsch  (Dr) Vice President of Iraq, 2004-2005
Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, 2006 and 2009-2014

Sheinwald, Nigel  (Sir) UK Permanent Representative to the EU, 2000-2003
Prime Minister’s Foreign Policy Adviser and Head of the Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence Secretariat, 2003-2007
British Ambassador to the US, 2007-2012
Inquiry witness
Shirreff, Richard  
(Major General) Chief of Staff, Land Command  
General Officer Commanding Multi-National Division  
(South-East), July 2006-January 2007  
(Lieutenant General, Sir) Inquiry witness

Shlash, Muhsin  
Minister for Electricity, Iraqi Transitional Government

Short, Clare  
International Development Secretary, May 1997-May 2003  
Inquiry witness

Siddiq, Irfan  
Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary

Sittar, Sheikh  
Leader of the Anbar Awakening

SIS1  
SIS officer below the rank of Chief  
Inquiry witness

SIS2  
SIS officer below the rank of Chief  
Inquiry witness

SIS3  
SIS officer below the rank of Chief  
Inquiry witness

SIS4  
SIS officer below the rank of Chief  
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SIS5  
SIS officer below the rank of Chief  
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SIS6  
SIS officer below the rank of Chief  
Inquiry witness

SIS9  
SIS officer below the rank of Chief  
Inquiry witness

SIS10  
SIS officer below the rank of Chief  
Inquiry witness

Sky, Emma  
CPA, Governorate Co-ordinator, Kirkuk, 2003-2004  
Inquiry witness

Slocombe, Walt  
CPA, Senior Advisor on National Security and Defense, 2003

Smith, Andrew  
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, 1999-2002

Smith, Colin  
UK Chief Police Adviser in Iraq  
Inquiry witness

Smith, Godric  
Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman, 2000-2004

Smith, Jacqui  
Home Secretary, 2007-2009

Smith, Kate  
FCO, Head, Security Sector Unit, October 2003

Snelson, David  
(Rear Admiral) Commander, UK Naval Contingent

Snow, John  
US Treasury Secretary, February 2003-June 2006
Solana, Javier  Secretary General, Council of the European Union
EU High Representative for Common Foreign and
Security Policy
Soleymanpur, Hadi  Iranian Ambassador to Argentina
Soto, Fernando Berrocal  Costa Rican Permanent Representative to the UN
Speckhard, Dan  (Ambassador) Director, Iraq Reconstruction and
Management Office
Spelman, Caroline  Opposition spokesperson for International Development,
July 2001-November 2003
Spencer, Peter  (Vice Admiral, Sir) Chief of Defence Procurement,
May 2003-March 2007
Inquiry witness
Squire, Peter  (Air Chief Marshal, Sir) Chief of the Air Staff
April 2000-December 2003
Stagg, Dickie  FCO, Director, Public Diplomacy
FCO, Director General, Corporate Services
Stephens, Jonathan  Treasury, Director, Public Services
Stewart, Andrew  (Brigadier) MOD, Director, Overseas Military Activity
(Major General) General Officer Commanding Multi-
National Division (South-East), December 2003-July 2004
Inquiry witness
Stewart, Rory  CPA Deputy Governorate Co-ordinator, Maysan province
Stirrup, Jock  (Air Marshal) Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
(Equipment Capability), April 2002-May 2003
(Air Chief Marshal, Sir) Chief of the Air Staff
Chief of the Defence Staff, April 2006-October 2010
Inquiry witness
Storr, Peter  Home Office, Director, International
Strathclyde, Thomas  (Lord) Leader of the Opposition in the House of Lords,
1998-2010
Straw, Jack  Foreign Secretary, 2001-2006
Inquiry witness
Sturley, Philip  (Air Vice Marshal) Assistant Chief of the Air Staff,
2000-2003
Style, Charles  (Rear Admiral) Capability Manager (Strategic Development)
(Vice Admiral) Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
(Commitments), January 2006-August 2007
Inquiry witness
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<tr>
<td><strong>Symons, Elizabeth</strong></td>
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<td>Minister of State for International Trade and Investment, 2001-2003</td>
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<td>State Department Legal Adviser, April 2001-March 2005</td>
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<td>Talabani, Jalal</td>
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<td>(Dr) FCO, Head of Iraq Section, Middle East Department</td>
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<td>Vieira de Mello, Sérgio</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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Viggers, Freddie  (Major General) Adjutant General to the Forces, 2005-2008
   (Lieutenant General) Senior British Military Representative – Iraq and Deputy Commander CJTF-7, May 2003-September 2003
   Inquiry witness
Volker, Kurt  US National Security Council

W
Wahid, Karim  Iraqi Minister of Electricity
Wail, Shirman  Iraqi National Security Minister
Wa’ili, Mohammed  Governor of Basra
Walker, Andrew  Assistant Deputy Coroner for Oxfordshire, June 2006
Walker, Michael  (General Sir) Chief of the General Staff, April 2000-February 2003
   Chief of the Defence Staff, May 2003-April 2006
   (Lord Walker of Aldringham) Inquiry witness
Wall, Peter  Chief of Staff to the UK National Contingent Commander, January 2003
   General Officer Commanding 1 (UK) Div, May 2003-January 2005
   (Major General) Deputy Chief of Joint Operations, 2005-2007
   (Lieutenant General) Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments), August 2007-July 2009
   (General Sir) Commander in Chief Land Forces
   Inquiry witness
Wall, Stephen  (Sir) Adviser on European Issues to the Prime Minister and Head of the Cabinet Office European Secretariat, 2000-2004
   Inquiry witness
Wallace, William  (Lieutenant General) Commander US V Corps
Walmsley, Robert  (Vice Admiral, Sir) Chief of Defence Procurement, 1996-2003
Wang, Guangya  Chinese Vice Foreign Minister
Wang, Yingfan  Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN
Wardell, Susan  DFID Director General Operations
Wareing, Michael  CEO, KPMG
   Inquiry witness
Warner, John  (Senator) Chair, Senate Armed Services Committee
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<td>Director, UK Trade and Industry, International Group</td>
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<td>Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 2000-2003</td>
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<td>Wehbe, Mikhail</td>
<td>Syrian Permanent Representative to the UN, 1996-2003</td>
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<td>Weller, Marc</td>
<td>(Professor) International Law and International Constitutional Studies, Cambridge University</td>
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<td>FCO Deputy Under Secretary (Wider World), 2000-2001 British Ambassador to Turkey, 2002-2006</td>
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<td>Weston, John</td>
<td>(Sir) UK Permanent Representative to the UN, 1995-1998</td>
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<td>Wheeler, Fraser</td>
<td>Deputy British Consul General in Basra province</td>
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<td>Wheldon, Juliet</td>
<td>Treasury Solicitor, 2000-2006</td>
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<td>White, Stephen</td>
<td>(Deputy Chief Constable) Director of Law and Order and Senior Police Adviser to CPA(South), July 2003-January 2004</td>
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<td>(Assistant Chief Constable) Inquiry witness</td>
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<td>White-Spunner, Barney</td>
<td>(Major General) General Officer Commanding Multi-National Division (South-East), February 2008-August 2008</td>
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<td>Whitley, Albert</td>
<td>(Brigadier) Senior British Land Adviser and Deputy Commanding General (Post Hostilities)</td>
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<td>Wicks, Malcolm</td>
<td>DTI Minister for Energy, May 2005-November 2006</td>
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<td>Wilkinson, Peter</td>
<td>(Vice Admiral) Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Personnel), 2007-2009</td>
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<td>Wilks, Jon</td>
<td>Chargé d’Affaires, British Embassy Baghdad, 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Williams, David</td>
<td>MOD, Head, Capability, Resources and Scrutiny Directorate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Williams, Gareth  (Lord Williams of Mostyn) Attorney General, 1999-2001
Lord Privy Seal, June 2001-June 2003
Leader of the House of Lords, 2001-September 2003

Williams, John  Head, FCO News Department, 2000-2006
Inquiry witness

Williams, Martin  Assistant Private Secretary to the Defence Secretary

Williams, Michael  (Dr) Special Adviser to the Foreign Secretary, 2001-2005
(Lord Williams of Baglan) Inquiry witness

Williams, Rowan  (Dr) Archbishop of Canterbury,
December 2002-December 2012

Williams, Shirley  (Baroness Williams of Crosby) Leader of the Liberal
Democrats in the House of Lords,
June 2001-November 2004

Wilmshurst, Elizabeth  FCO Deputy Legal Adviser, 2001-2003
Inquiry witness

Wilson, Brian  FCO Minister of State for the Middle East
Mr Blair’s Special Representative on Trade, August 2003

Wilson, David  (Major General) Senior British Military Adviser to CIC US
Central Command, 2002-2007
Inquiry witness

Wilson, Richard  (Sir) Cabinet Secretary, January 1998-September 2002
(Lord Wilson of Dinton) Inquiry witness

Wilson, Robert  (Dr) FCO, Research Analyst

Wolfensohn, James  President of the World Bank, June 1995-June 2005

Wolfowitz, Paul  US Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2001-2005
President of the World Bank, 2005-2007

Wood, Michael  (Sir) FCO Legal Adviser, 1999-2006
Inquiry witness

Wood, Michael  (Rear Admiral) Director General Operations, MOD
Defence Logistics Organisation

Wood, Sebastian  Counsellor for External Affairs, British Embassy
Washington

Woodward, Bob  US author of *State of Denial*

Woolley, Trevor  MOD Director General Resources and Plans, 1999-2002
MOD Finance Director, 2003-2009
Inquiry witness

Wright, Stephen  FCO, Deputy Under Secretary, Defence and Intelligence, 2000-2002
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position / Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young, Robin</td>
<td>(Sir) DTI Permanent Secretary, June 2001-March 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacklin, Ralph</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary General for Legal Affairs at the UN, 1998-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zawbaie, Salam</td>
<td>Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zayed</td>
<td>(Sheikh) Emir of Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zebari, Hoshyar</td>
<td>(Dr) Iraqi Foreign Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zelikow, Philip</td>
<td>Counsellor, US State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang, Yishan</td>
<td>Chinese Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, 2002-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinni, Anthony</td>
<td>(General) US Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, November 2001-March 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinser, Aguilar</td>
<td>Mexican Permanent Representative to the UN, January 2002-November 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zlauvinen, Gustavo</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency representative to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoellick, Robert</td>
<td>Member of the Administration of President Bush</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 4

Maps

Map 1. Iraq: Provinces, 2003
Map 2. Iraq: Ethnic distribution
Map 3. Iraq: Multi-National Division boundaries, June 2003 to May 2004
Map 4. Baghdad
Map 5. Iraq: Multi-National Division (South-East), June 2003 to May 2004
Map 6. Basra
Map 1. Iraq: Provinces, 2003
Map 2. Ethnic distribution

NOTES:
• There is little reliable demographic data for Iraq. In addition, the most recent census in 1997 was based on ethnicity only and did not record confessional differences.
• Arab Shia estimated to be 60% of population.
• Many, especially in cosmopolitan areas such as Baghdad and Basra, are intermarried with Sunni Arab.
• Unknown number of Kurdish Shia.
• Sunnis present in all Southern Provinces, mainly in urban areas.

This map was produced from information used in the compilation of Iraq: Map Book, Defence Intelligence Staff, 17 March 2006.
After the declared end of major combat operations, Iraq was divided into six divisional areas:
Multi-National Division (North) (MND(N)), Multi-National Division (North-Central) (MND(NC)), Multi-National Division (Baghdad) (MND(B)),
Multi-National Force (West) (MNF(W)), Multi-National Division (Center-South) (MND(CS)) and Multi-National Division (South-East) (MND(SE)).

In late 2004 MND(N) was divided into MND(NE) and MNF(NW).
In late 2005 MNF(NW) and MND(NC) were merged to create a new MND(N).
In early 2007 a new Multi-National Division (Center) was established relieving MND(B) of responsibility for security south of Baghdad.
In late 2008 MND(NE) was dissolved and became part of MND(N).
In early 2009 MND(CS) was dissolved and became part of MND(C).
The boundary of MND(SE) remained unchanged from 2003 to 2009 until the withdrawal of UK troops.
Map 4. Baghdad
Map 5. Iraq: Multi-National Division (South-East), June 2003 to May 2004
Map 6. Basra
Structure of the Report

1. The Executive Summary contains the Inquiry’s key findings and conclusions.

2. The 17 Sections of the Report contain accounts of the relevant decisions and events, the Inquiry’s full analysis and conclusions, and, where appropriate, lessons for the future.

3. The Sections address separate themes arising from the sequence of events between 2001 and 2009. In each Section the Inquiry draws on the available evidence to provide an account of events, policy discussions and decision-making processes.

4. The Inquiry does not present all its conclusions in the same way. Different topics benefited from different approaches. In the Sections covering the period before the invasion, conclusions are placed alongside the main evidence in a single Section. In the majority of post-invasion material, the conclusions appear in separate analytical Sections.

Use of bold text

5. Bold text is used in the pre-invasion Sections of the Report to highlight Inquiry comment and analysis, and to signpost or summarise key events. Bold text is not used in post-invasion Sections. Throughout the Report, bold text is retained in quotes as it appeared in the original.

Cross-referencing

6. Cross-references to other Sections are used where an issue or event referred to in one Section is addressed in more detail elsewhere.

Duplication of text

7. Identical, or very similar, material can appear in two or more Sections where that aids comprehension or is necessary for an accurate description of events.

Use of evidence

8. The Report draws on material from a wide range of sources, including:

   - UK Government documents;
   - transcripts of the Inquiry’s public and private hearings;
   - written submissions to the Inquiry;
• Parliamentary records;
• documents published by the US Government and international organisations;
• published memoirs and diaries;
• academic papers, including papers produced to inform the two seminars organised by the Inquiry;
• meetings in the UK with Service Personnel and their families, and with UK civilians who worked in Iraq; and
• views heard during visits to Iraq, the US and France by members of the Inquiry.

9. The Inquiry presents that material in the form of gists, which summarise the key points of a document or part of a document, and quotes. The source of each gist and quote is given in a footnote.

10. The Report quotes extensively from the full range of sources. To aid comprehension the Inquiry has sought to standardise spellings, abbreviations and acronyms and the representation of numbers, dates and times within quotes. All bold and italic text and underlining appearing within a quote has been retained from the original.

11. Where the meaning of a quote is uncertain or ambiguous, explanatory material has been added in square brackets.

12. US spellings are used for all US job titles and for US and international organisations using US spellings in their names, and are retained in all quotes from US sources.

Documents published by the Inquiry

13. Whole documents and extracts declassified by the Government, transcripts of the Inquiry’s hearings and written submissions to the Inquiry are published on the Inquiry website, with redactions where necessary.

14. Where the Government has declassified a gist or quote from a document, but not the whole document or an extract from it, there is no further material available to the reader beyond the gist or quote in the Report.

15. In the online version of the Report, hyperlinks in the footnotes take the reader to documents published on the Inquiry website.

16. The footnotes in the printed version of the Report do not distinguish between those documents which have been published on the Inquiry website and those which have not.

17. The Report does not include links to other published sources.

18. The legibility of a small number of government documents published on the Inquiry website is poor. In each case, the Inquiry has published the clearest copy available.
Redacted evidence

19. The Government has required redactions to certain documents under the terms of the *Protocol between the Iraq Inquiry and Her Majesty’s Government regarding Documents and Other Written and Electronic Information*. Those redactions appear in three forms:

- as thick black lines in the transcripts of oral evidence given in private;
- as blank white space in whole documents published by the Inquiry; and
- as an ellipsis (three dots) within quotations in the text.¹

20. Certain categories of information have been withheld from publication under the terms of the Protocols agreed between the Inquiry and the Government:

- views expressed by President Bush in conversations with Mr Blair;
- the reference numbers of JIC Assessments;
- the names of SIS officers (other than C), who are identified in the Report as SIS1 to SIS10;
- certain material on the activities of UK Special Forces and the names of successive Directors of Special Forces, who are identified in the Report as DSF1 to DSF3; and
- a small number of other identities and capabilities that require protection and are identified in the text by ciphers.

21. The Inquiry has received some evidence which it has agreed to publish anonymously in accordance with the criteria in paragraphs 4a and 4b of the *Protocol for hearing evidence by the Iraq Inquiry in public, and for identifying witnesses*.

Unusual document types

22. The Inquiry has published and makes reference to a wide range of written material. Less familiar categories of official document include:

FCO telegrams

23. Telegrams were electronically transmitted reports sent between the FCO in London and British Embassies, Missions and Consulates overseas. Very occasionally they were transmitted to or from other government departments and between overseas posts.

24. All telegrams from the FCO in London were attributed to the Foreign Secretary. The most important were seen by the Foreign Secretary in draft. All telegrams from posts were signed, and almost always seen in draft by, the Head or acting Head of Post.

25. All telegrams formed part of the FCO official record.

¹ Not all ellipses represent a redaction. Some represent text omitted by the Inquiry for reasons of relevance. All ellipses in square brackets represent redacted text.
26. Telegrams to and from individual posts were numbered sequentially through the calendar year, starting with “TELNO 1” on 1 January.

27. All telegrams included a date time group using Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). A telegram from the British Embassy Washington sent on “170356Z JULY 03” refers to a telegram sent at 3.56am GMT on 17 July 2003 (11.56pm on 16 July in Washington; 4.56am on 17 July in London).

28. A precedence marking signified the urgency of the telegram. “FLASH” indicated a telegram to be seen immediately by the recipient. A telegram marked “DESKBY 170600Z” was to be available to the recipient at 6.00am GMT. The other designations were “IMMEDIATE”, “PRIORITY” and “ROUTINE”.

29. The FCO phased out telegrams during 2005. They were replaced by eGrams.

**FCO eGrams**

30. The eGram, which replaced FCO telegrams during 2005, was used for significant communications and formed part of the FCO official record. It offered much of the flexibility of an email, including the ability to add attachments.

31. Unlike telegrams, each eGram was assigned a unique number in a single FCO-wide sequence starting at midnight GMT on 31 December. Paris eGram 127/06 to the FCO was not the 127th eGram from Paris, but the 127th eGram sent on the system in 2006.

**FCO teleletters**

32. Letters between named individuals sent electronically using the FCO telegram system. Phased out in 2005.

**Valedictories**

33. Reports from officials at the end of a tour of duty as the head of an overseas post.

**Hauldown reports**

34. Valedictories sent by UK military commanders at the end of a tour of duty in Iraq.

**Private Secretary letters**

35. Routine formal communication between government departments is often conducted by means of a letter from one Ministerial Private Secretary to another. Such letters should be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Minister, not of the signatory. The importance of an issue can often be inferred from the seniority of the Private Secretary. For instance, a letter from one Principal Private Secretary to another would usually hold more weight than a letter from one junior Minister’s Private Secretary to another.
Names and ranks

36. All names, honours, military ranks and job titles in the Report reflect the individual’s position at the time of the event in question.

37. Where the Report quotes written or oral evidence from a witness to the Inquiry, the witness is identified according to their status at the time they gave evidence.